the main heavy-witted barbarians suddenly plunged in material well-being without having undergone any due psychological and intellectual preparation. Something of the same kind goes on even to-day in the United States, among the much more quick-witted and civilised Irish. For civilisation is no sudden angel of change, no tropic rain falling on a germ-filled soil to cover it in a day with a wealth of beauty and joy, but a slow and precarious transmutation of mind and life by a play of direct and indirect forces, which at times visibly frustrate each other, and seem to turn all energy to an evil end.

So it was in the building-up of the civilisation of England. The mere political unification of the country by brute force at the Conquest meant no conscious harmonisation of life. Brute force always incurs brute penalties. The mailed Norman no more than the mailed Dane brought with him a talisman of "genius of race" wherewith to charm the warring egoisms of men into synergy and peace. The sympathetic historian whom we have followed above, with his passion for telescoping periods, tells us[1] in one place that it was in her "years of slavery" under "foreign masters" that England "really became the England that we know," as if self-governing industrial England dated from the thirteenth or fourteenth century. He tells us that between the Conquest and Edward the First, through contact with the Continent, "the old mental stagnation was at once broken up, and art and literature covered England with great buildings and busy schools." But, to say nothing of the twenty years of bloody anarchy under Stephen, there was civil war under John, civil war under Henry the Third, gain and loss of Scotland under the first two Edwards, civil war under Edward II., and, after the palmy days of Edward III., a long decadence and retrogression :—

"The hundred years which follow the brief sunshine of Cressy and the 'Canterbury Tales' are years of the deepest gloom : no age of our history is so sad and sombre as the age which we traverse from the third Edward to Joan of Arc. The throb of hope and glory which pulsed at its outset through every class of English society died into inaction and despair. Material life lingered-on indeed, commerce still widened, but its progress was dissociated from all the nobler elements of national well-being. The towns sank again into close oligarchies, the bondsmen struggling forward to freedom fell back into a serfage which still leaves its trace on the soil. Literature reached its lowest ebb. The religious revival of the Lollard was

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[1] *Short History*, p. 60.

trodden out in blood, while the Church shrivelled into a self-seeking secular priesthood. In the clash of civil strife political freedom was all but extinguished, and the age which began with the Good Parliament ended with the despotism of the Tudors."[1]

In the previous period of expansion, be it observed, every determining element of advance was foreign. The "Teutonic" genius is nowhere to be seen. The Anglo-Norman civilisation began with the influx of French craftsmen, clerks, and artists. The first stirring of the new society by the spirit of imaginative literature, under Henry the First, came from the inspiration of the Welsh Arthurian legend; the first secular-minded and critical men of letters are the "Celtic" Walter de Map and Gerald de Barri, both of Welsh blood, both educated at Paris, both writing in Latin.[2] The very winning of the Charter depended on the situation abroad, the defeat of John's forces (Flemish, German, and English) at Bouvines by the French under Philip[3] being the means of enabling the English barons to hold out; and they had finally to seek aid from the French king against the French mercenaries with whom John would have overwhelmed them. And the historic creation of the English Parliament, still later, is credited to the Frenchman, Simon de Montfort, against whose marriage with the sister of Henry the Third the English baronage at first revolted. As for literature, the fructification of Chaucer's gift by foreign contact is as certain as the felicity of the developed gift itself. The whole course of English history as of every other, in fact, in so far as it is a history of progress at all, is but a record of gain from changed conditions and from the cross-fertilisation of cultures, of civilisations. The rise of modern English literature under Elizabeth is emphatically such a process. Even that side of the literature which might be supposed most strictly derived from the Saxon stock, the Folk Lore, as set forth for instance in the plays of Shakspere, is found to have been very largely if not predominantly Celtic in character.[4] Thus many of the "household

[1] *Short History*, pp. 216-217.

[2] *Id.*, pp. 115-117. "Gerald is the father of our popular literature," says Green, who makes him a mixture of "the restless Celtic fire" and "Norman daring;" while Walter de Map, the poet, is credited with "Celtic vivacity" only.

[3] "It is to the victory of Bouvines that England owes her Great Charter" (Green, as cited, p. 122).

[4] See Thom's *Three Notelets on Shakspere*, pp. 27-39, 73-74, 105-108. Mr Thom notes the peculiar wealth of fairy-lore in Shakspere and Drayton,

words" of English fancy are due to non-English survivals. And still, with literature and Christian theology in full play, the "race" exhibits no innate genius for political harmony: civil war breaks out anew on new pretexts; a new polity is forcibly founded only to fall again; and ever since, English political progress has been made by way of the strife of parties. There is indeed no other way.

Nor does the later history of Germany exhibit any better fortune, any greater gift of union and peaceful organisation among the nominal descendants of the older Teutonic stock. Whatever progress took place among the German-speaking populations was, as has been said, a progress imposed from the outside. The Teutons of Central Europe emerge in modern history without a literature,[1] at a time when the cooped-up Welsh seem to have had a whole library of poetry and legend, and when even remote Iceland (where also perchance, despite assumptions to the contrary, there had been a blending of races) has a poetico-historic lore; and their literary beginnings are for the most part simple imitations from the more civilised neighbouring peoples. In their political development, from the tenth century onwards, after the separation of the German and Frankish sections of the Carlovingian empire, we see only the struggle of forces characteristic of all feudalism, emperors fighting with dukes, sparring with the Pope, balancing fief against fief, pitting bishops against nobles. The organisation of imperial Rome was set up, *plus* feudalism and Christian ecclesiasticism, without even the measure of peace normally enforced by Rome; the new chicane of churchman and lawyer being but a new fountain of strife. Towns, castles, palaces, abbeys, churches, were one and all fortified places, ready for war at any moment; and every new reign seems to have been a pretext for anarchy, till it should appear whether or not the new emperor could maintain his power. The better the emperors established themselves in Italy, the greater the scope for anarchy at home; and the chief significance of the Teutonic rule for mediæval Italy was to make the German cries of Guelf and Ghibeline the symbols of never-ending ferocious strife and an infinity of crime. Pope and anti-pope, Kaiser and anti-Kaiser,

both of Warwickshire, near Wales. I may here note my dissent from the judgment of Mr Grant Allen, that English remains "essentially identical in grammar and idiom with the language of the first Teutonic settlers" (as cited, p. 230). The alteration of English syntax is as marked as the alteration of vocabulary, and for every language-learner it is nearer French than German.

[1] The supposititious ancient mythic poetry having been lost.

recall the worst days of declining Rome. And when after three hundred years of chronic battle we reach the outstanding reign of Frederick the Second, it is to find him employing an army of Saracens against Italian free cities and the Pope, battling all his life long with the church and with his nominal subjects; and dying beaten, to leave Germany once more to anarchy.

All this while the spirit of self-government, in the fuller sense of the term, had been manifesting itself, not in the German-speaking peoples, but in the cities of France, northern and southern alike, in respect of the new phenomenon of communes, claiming and holding defined rights as against the nobles who formerly ruled the towns as their domains. Whether or not this development in the north had any derivation from older Teutonic *guilds*, and in the south from the Roman *curia*,[1] the institution radiated from France in the twelfth century to England, Germany and Italy alike. In France it was, too, that the spirit of culture became organised in the same period in the University of Paris. From the same centre, it may be, spread influences of a less civilising kind, as the institution of chivalry so-called; and indeed France may be said to have organised tyranny earlier than her northern rivals. We are not concerned here, however, to make out any thesis for any one people as a civilising force; but simply to maintain that every people in turn counts for civilisation in the measure in which its conditions make for progress of any kind; and that neither in the moral nor in the æsthetic arts is there any racial bias or disability, though there is precedence and sequence.

We have already glanced at the Teutonic theory, as developed by Dr Taylor, that there is something in the "inner genius" of the Teutonic race which has drawn it to Protestantism and anti-sacerdotalism, while the Celts, or the "brachycephalic race" in general, take as naturally to Catholicism and priestly rule. In one breath accused of incapacity for organisation, the "Celt" is described in the next as unduly prone to religious organisation

[1] This theory, set forth by Augustin Thierry, is now rejected. See in the *Histoire Générale* edited by MM. Rambaud and Lavisse (Vol. II.) the chapter (viii.) by MM. Giry and A. Reville, § 2, *La Révolution communale*, p. 418. *Cp.* Seignobos, *Hist. de la Civ. au Moyen Age*, p. 81, and Chevallier, as cited, p. 484. But compare the view of Dr Brentano as to the origin of the early English guilds in family groups holding trade secrets, and the suggestion of Mr Grant Allen that the first families of craftsmen in England may have been Romanised Welsh inhabitants of the cities—whose municipal life seems to have been carried on without interruption from Roman times. (*Anglo-Saxon Britain*, p. 161. *Cp.* Scarth, *Roman Britain*, pp. 227-230.)

and subordination—to being in religion exactly what modern Germans are in politics. It may be well to deal at some little length with that phase of the discussion; and again Dr Taylor's summary will conveniently serve as a statement of the theory to be dealt with.

"Now that Christianity has spread over Europe, it is divided into two opposed camps—the Catholic and the Protestant, the Church of Authority and the Church of Reason (!), the line of division coinciding very closely with the line which separates the two great races of Aryan speech. The dolichocephalic Teutonic race is Protestant; the brachycephalic Celto-Slavic race is either Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox. In the first, individualism, wilfulness, self-reliance, independence, are strongly developed: the second is submissive to authority and conservative in instincts. To the Teutonic races Latin Christianity was never congenial, and they have now converted it into something very different from what it was at first, or from what it became in the hands of Latin and Greek doctors. The Teutonic peoples are averse to sacerdotalism, and have shaken off priestly guidance and developed individualism. Protestantism was a revolt against a religion imposed by the South upon the North, but which had never been congenial to the Northern mind. The German princes, who were of purer Teutonic blood than their subjects, were the leaders of the ecclesiastical revolt. Scandinavia is more purely Teutonic than Germany; and Scandinavia is Protestant to the backbone. The Lowland Scotch, who are more purely Teutonic than the English, have given the freest development to the genius of Protestantism. Those Scotch clans which have clung to the old faith have the smallest admixture of Teutonic blood. Ulster, the most Teutonic province of Ireland, is the most firmly Protestant. The case of the Belgians and the Dutch is very striking. The line of religious division became the line of political separation, and is co-terminous with the two racial provinces. The mean cephalic index of the Dutch is 75·3, which is nearly that of the Swedes and the North Germans; the mean index of the Belgians is 79, which is that of the Parisians. The Burgundian Cantons of Switzerland, which possess the largest proportion of Teutonic blood, are Protestant, while the brachycephalic Cantons in the East and South are the stronghold of Catholicism. South Germany, which is brachycephalic, is Catholic; North Germany, which is dolichocephalic, is Protestant. Hanover, which is Protestant, has a considerably lower index than Cologne, which is Catholic. The Thirty Years' War was a war of race as well as of religion; and the peace of Westphalia drew the line of religious demarcation with tolerable precision along the ethnic frontier.

"Wherever the Teutonic blood is purest—in North Germany,

Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Ulster, the Orkneys, the Lothians, Yorkshire,[1] East Anglia — Protestantism found easy entrance, and has retained its hold, often in some exaggerated form. In Bohemia, France, Belgium, Alsace, it has been trodden out. In Galway and Kerry it has no footing. The Welsh and the Cornishmen, *who became Protestants by political accident, have transformed Protestantism into an emotional religion, which has inner affinities with the emotional faith of Ireland and Italy.* Even now Protestantism gains no converts in the South of Europe, or Catholicism in the North. Roman Catholicism, or the cognate creed of the Greek and Russian orthodox churches, is dominant in all those lands where the brachycephalic race prevails; Protestantism is confined to the dolichocephalic Teutonic region. The neighbourhood of Toulouse, which was the headquarters of the Albigenses, is more dolichocephalic than any other part of Southern France, and Toulouse was the Visigothic capital. In no city of France were the Huguenots so numerous as at Nîmes, another stronghold of the Visigoths; and Nîmes is still largely Protestant in creed. England, which is orthocephalic, is neither Catholic nor Protestant, but Anglican. It is not to be supposed, however, the religious belief is a function of the shape of the skull, but that the shape of the skull is one of the surest indications of race."[2]

Why the last sentence should be added to such an exposition it is not easy to understand, for if the preceding extract means anything it means that form of skull in general determines form of ecclesiastical preference and of religious belief. We can only deal with the exposition on its merits. It will be noted that where the "broad-headed" peoples are found to be Protestant, as in Wales and Cornwall, the Teutonic theorists assert "political accident" and impute mysticity or "emotion," without asking for a moment whether "political accident" so-called may not have determined equally the Catholicism of Ireland and the Protestantism of North Germany, Scotland, England, and Scandinavia. Such a question, and a further question as to the alleged religious affinity between Welsh Methodism and Irish Catholicism, will be found to be fatal to the whole thesis.

1. It was emphatically "political accident" that set up Protestantism in England and Scotland while Ireland was forced further into Catholicism. The Reformation was made in England by a king *of French and Welsh descent*, acting in concurrence

[1] [One of the parts of England where there certainly survived a large part of the pre-Saxon population. J. M. R.]

[2] *Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 247-249.

with a large body of the lower aristocracy, who went with him because they were offered a large share of the spoils; and in Scotland the greed of the landowners wrought the same result in opposition to the throne. It was for the same reason, and not through any special narrow-headedness, that the German princes promoted the Reformation.[1] For the rest, the sphere of the Reformation was largely fixed in respect of simple remoteness from Roman influence; and it was much more a political (and financial) resentment of Italian interference than any theory of anti-sacerdotalism that spread Protestantism in the northern countries.

2. The Catholic religion had been as "congenial to the North" as to the South for some eight hundred years; and one of the elements of the Reformation movement was the conviction in the North *that the Italian priesthood was in large part unbelieving.*

3. *Luther, as Dr Taylor elsewhere notes, was of the brachycephalic race.*

4. *Calvin was a French Swiss; and Calvinism, the religion of Presbyterian Scotland, is a more rigid system of dogma than Catholicism itself.*

5. To decide that the Lowland Scotch are "averse to sacerdotalism and have shaken off priestly guidance" is to fall into an extraordinary misconception. Scotch Presbyterianism is one of the most marked developments of sacerdotalism in history; and Buckle was right in saying that the Presbyterian Scotch have been more priestridden than any other European people save the Spanish.

6. To call Protestantism the religion of Reason is to fly in the face of all relevant history. Luther was as anti-rationalistic as any Catholic, and more anti-scientific than many Italian cardinals. The aim of Lutherans and Calvinists alike was not in the least to leave the reason free but to formulate all belief on the basis of the Sacred Books.

7. Instead of being specially given to Reason, the hyper-Teutonic peoples of Scandinavia have been among the last to contribute to the rationalist movement.

8. The rationalistic movement which began in Germany last

[1] Poesche and Penka would doubtless set down to brachycephaly, at a hazard, the fact that of old, in the strife of Guelph and Ghibeline, the common people of Germany were often on the side of the Pope and against the Emperor. But the diplomacy of the priesthood would secure that end with peasant heads of any type.

century is obviously traceable to beginnings made in England and France, which again derived partly from Italy.

9. While Dutch scholars have done much for Biblical criticism, there is more of popular rationalism in Belgium than in Holland.

10. In Paris, so far from the mass of the people being submissive Catholics, they are Voltairean. The Municipal Council, which supplies a fair test, is notoriously freethinking. And the great majority of the more educated classes are agnostics.

11. The same holds true of educated men in Italy, and in Russia.

12. *If* the Methodism of the Welsh is "emotional," it is not more so than the Methodism of the English in general.

13. The Highlanders of Scotland, "Celtic" and other, are to-day in the main as rigidly Presbyterian as the Lowlanders were two centuries ago; and now that the Lowland clergy are growing incoherently heterodox, the Highlands are the stronghold of orthodox Calvinism.

14. It is quite true that Protestantism makes no converts in Southern Europe—or in Northern either. But Catholicism *does* make converts in the North, notably in England. It is not at all a matter of racial boundary. What is happening is a gradual movement of the more emotional or ritual-loving types of religionist to Catholicism; and of the more rational types to agnosticism.

15. To single out the neighbourhood of Toulouse as hereditarily Teutonic and therefore inclined to Protestantism is an extraordinary stroke of argument. Toulouse was one of the most bigoted of Catholic cities and one of the most active centres of the Inquisition!

16. To single out Nîmes, again, as a "stronghold of the Visigoths," is to adjust the evidence to the theory. There were many other old-Teutonic "strongholds" in France. Why did not they also yield multitudes of Huguenots? And how comes it that La Rochelle, the Huguenot capital, cannot be described as a centre of ancient Teutonism? As a matter of fact, the Huguenots were stronger in La Rochelle than in Nîmes, which latter city, as it happened, had been largely settled from Spain in the reign of Charlemagne, and to this day shows some Spanish affinities. The Protestantism of the people of Nîmes, as of many other places, was fundamentally a matter of revolt against the governmental religion rather than a matter of any theological predilection.

17. On Dr Taylor's own showing, "the Swiss" in general are brachycephalic. This applies to Geneva, a centre of Protestantism from its outset.

18. To say that England is "orthocephalic" is again to obscure the case. In England there are multitudes of brachycephalous people. But it cannot be pretended that they are mostly Catholic, though there is as much sacerdotalism in the High Church party as anywhere.

The thesis, in fine, breaks down at every point. The straits to which the framers are driven can be seen in the resort to the proposition that the Celtic peoples are "submissive to authority and conservative in instincts"—the exact negative of the common charges with which we have dealt above. It is certainly true that the social and political sequel of the Reformation in Germany was an unparalleled period of moral and physical anarchy and ferocious war, a long riot of evil beside which the French Revolution seems but a brief tempest, clearing the air. All this is conveniently forgotten by those who desire to convict "the Celt," in the person of the French, of an excessive disorderliness. But while Germany as a whole has endured more internecine war than any other European country, it remains the historic fact that the modern Germans, like the ancient, are more and not less "submissive to authority" and "conservative in instinct" than their French neighbours. All the same, it is in Germany, the alleged home of "individualism," that there has arisen the most systematic organisation for the spread of Socialism. If only sociologists, amateur and other, would but look at all the facts of a case before generalising on it, we should have been spared much of the present discussion. One after another, every theory of "innate tendency," the positive and the negative, the most flatly contradictory propositions, all in turn are overthrown; and the nations successively show every sort of faculty except the master bias which is said to sum them.

If we were to estimate the "innate capacity" in terms of the date of development, we should be led to put the Teutonic-speaking peoples not among the first but among the last. The great political and intellectual development of Germany, above all the organisation of Germany, it cannot be too emphatically said, is a late modern development; and this precisely because the German peoples, late as they were in undergoing civilisation from the outside, had no special bias to union and harmony, but on the contrary as strong a bias to intestine strife as any people in history. In the sixteenth century, Ulrich von

Hutten could declare that absolute disunion was the special characteristic of Germans; and after the Thirty Years' War, the German people seemed the most decisively divided, as they had become in many ways the most backward of the civilised peoples of Europe. The practice of private war between citizens and cities, long abolished in the other civilised States, still subsisted among them down till the sixteenth century, guilds and cities being even then known to challenge each other to combat.[1]

The development of the very idea of a German unity belongs to the present century, the beginning of which saw the German States unable to combine against Napoleon, Saxony and Wirtemberg fighting on his side against Prussia. And after Prussia had built up her organisation and her power, in virtue not of any gift of race but of the science acquired by her educated administrators, a war between her and the Germanic State of Austria was the first proof of her strength. Finally, it was only on the enormous impulse given to nationalist sentiment by the triumphs of 1870 that the so-called unification of Germany has been achieved. But for that chance, the result of the folly of the French Emperor, whose accession to his throne had represented the rise of new elements of civil disunion in France—elements of disunion which have since grown apace in Germany itself—there would to-day have been no German Empire. The voluntary or federal union of German States revived in the first half of the century was by the mass of Germans themselves reckoned a despicable failure, for which they had only terms of the coarsest contempt.[2] It was only on a monarchic and militarist footing that they could combine.[3]

[1] Pütter, *Hist. of Pol. Const. of German Empire*, Eng. tr., 1790, i. 378, &c. It is a German publicist who speaks of "that singular German disposition to seek combat *solely for the pleasure of fighting*." (Eberweck, *L'Allemagne et les Allemands*, trad. fran. 1851, p. 186.)

[2] Compare the old rhymes:

Der deutsche Bund
Ein tolles Hund,

and

Der deutsche Bund,
Ist Gift und Schund.

"The German Union—a mad dog": "The German Union is poison and filth."

[3] Dr Eberweck, writing his hopeful forecast of German development in 1851, declared that "it will assuredly not be the German princes to whom the German people will confide the task of centralising the Fatherland. The German *people* will centralise Germany." (*L'Allemagne*, p. 8.) The sequel

What remains to be said of the course of Teutonic civilisation? This, that within a hundred and fifty years the scattered States of Germany have passed from separateness to political (albeit monarchic) unity, and from a backward and dependent intellectual condition to the status of the most systematically intellectual of the European peoples. It is but a hundred years since the ideal of a German literature was grasped by the German people, previously possessed only of learned specialists, and looking to France, England, and Italy, for light and leading in art and letters.[1] What inference then shall a rational inquirer draw? That it was "race" that worked the change, after centuries of impotence; or that what one race has done other races may do, given but the favouring conditions, and relief from the burdens and barriers of the past?

A generation ago, a great sociological historian laid it down that, by reason not of race but of antecedents, the French people for a long time to come would be incapable of constitutional self-government. It was in one of his rash moments that Buckle wrote:—

"The consequence of all this [long supremacy of the protective spirit] has been that the French, though a great and splendid people —a people full of mettle, high-spirited, abounding in knowledge, and perhaps less oppressed by superstition than any other in Europe—

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has not borne him out. The Eberwecks of that day are to be looked for in the United States.

[1] The old question of the foreign influence on German literature (discussed by the author in *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 160-174) is thus characteristically dealt with by the too patriotic Herr von Treitschke:—"Poetry remains always the specially national art. Even as its speech is entirely understood only by those of the inner national stock (*Volksgenossen*), so does the poet shape the ideal of his conscious striving directly out of the life of his own people: all great Christian nations, however much they may owe to foreign thought-contacts, have made their classical poetry essentially out of their own force. . . . The spirit (*das Gemüth*) is national. Ear and eye are cosmopolitan." (*Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 5ter Theil, 1894, S. 395.) If this merely means that every people brings its own modifying influence to the culture it absorbs, it is a truism: if it means that there is anything superlatively national in the poetry of Germany, it is a vain saying. There has been no more cosmopolitan culture and no more cosmopolitan poetry than that of Goethe, to whom we owe the maxim that "national literature to-day has no longer much significance: the time of universal literature has come; and every one now ought to strive to hasten it on."—And Teutology must be in somewhat sore straits if it is to take to claiming Teutonic credit for the Semitic and Parisian Heine.

have always been found unfit to exercise political power. Even when they have possessed it, they have never been able to combine permanence with liberty. One of these two elements has always been wanting. They have had free governments, which have not been stable. They have had stable governments, which have not been free. Owing to their fearless temperament they have rebelled, and no doubt will continue to rebel, against so evil a condition. But it does not need the tongue of a prophet to tell that, for at least some generations, all such efforts must be unsuccessful. For men can never be free unless they are educated to freedom."[1]

It is worth while to note how, in this attempt to limit, even on quasi-scientific grounds, and in no spirit of prejudice, the possibilities of development in a nation, even a rationalistic writer falls into fallacy after fallacy. If French history has latterly been, as Buckle here says, an alternation of free and unfree governments, then the unfree governments of recent times (to which the proposition must be held to apply) were *not* stable. The rebellions to which he alludes had latterly been successful in overthrowing the governments rebelled against—those of Louis XVI., Charles X., and Louis Philippe. Then these governments were no more stable than the others. Again, the proposition that men "can never be free unless they are educated to freedom" is a plain counter-sense. Men can only be "educated to freedom" *in* relative freedom. There must be a beginning somewhere. In England, says the too patriotic sociologist, "self-discipline, self-reliance, and self-government . . . are matters of *hereditary descent*, traditional matters which we imbibe in our youth, and which regulate us in the conduct of life. The old associations of the French all point in another direction." The last sentence was true; but the "hereditary descent" is a sad misnomer. The phrase should have been "matters of long custom"—not so very long custom either. And whereas the non-prophet confidently prophesied that the French could not "for at least some generations" set up a free and stable government, they did as a matter of fact, thirteen years later, set up a republic which has lasted ever since, and now seems tolerably stable, despite the misleading show of instability set up by their adoption of the inconsistent English system of cabinets. He who now looks back on French history, from the Revolution onwards, can see that the frequent subversions of French Government come in the main from the facts (1) that the French industrial system is always closer to the

[1] *Introd. to Hist. of Civilisation in England*, 3-vol. ed., ii. 126.

exploding point by reason of its definiteness and lack of room for expansion, and (2) that the upper classes, knowing this, are ready to anticipate the democratic action of the workers, and to make revolutions in turn. The revolution of 1848, like that of 1830, was semi-democratic. The *coup d'état* of 1852 was supported by the monied classes. It is a question of special conditions. All the while, France is a Republic, while England and Germany alike seem still far removed from that consummation.

While delimiting as above the capacity of the French people for self-government, Buckle still more straitly limited the capacity of the Germans. "The German people," he decided, "are . . . more unfit to guide themselves than are the inhabitants either of France or of England."[1] Here, without attempting to measure the degrees of unfitness in question, we have simply to note that United Germany, though certainly tyrannised by its Kaiser about as outrageously as was France under either Napoleon, or England under the third and fourth Georges, shows an ever-growing capacity for self-government, especially in the organisation and maintenance of the Socialist movement—which, however, constitutes a risk of future "instability." In short, all propositions denying to any nation the capacity for self-government, whether they be founded on the presuppositions of prejudice or on a simple inference from negative evidence in the past, are to be regarded with utter distrust.

Apart from the grounds above dealt with, there is only one on which propositions as to racial tendencies can be quasi-scientifically founded, and that is the fact that individuals do undoubtedly differ in capacities and proclivities. If individuals thus differ, it is asked, why not nations? The answer is that, precisely because individuals thus vary, there is no collective "national character." The surprising thing is that men who, like Mill, have expressly rejected the notion of racial character in particular cases,[2] and who even, like him, have unreasonably disputed the existence of innate peculiarities in the individual,[3] have yet maintained the abstract thesis that nations have collective characters.[4] Apparently the confusion turns partly on the habit of identifying temperament with character, and aspect with temperament. We have seen above how several writers

[1] Vol. I. p. 238.
[2] See the *Political Economy*, B. II. ch. ix., § 3.
[3] See Professor Bain's biography, *J. S. Mill*, p. 146.
[4] See the *Logic*, B. vi., c. ix., § 4.

make out the "blond race" to have been in the mass "lymphatic."[1] Yet we have all known blonds who were very vivacious and dark people who were sluggish and dreamy. It may be true that, setting aside points of complexion, there is more vivacity of temperament in some nations than in others—in Frenchmen and Irishmen than in Englishmen, in Italians than in Germans. Such difference of temperament might in some cases plausibly be assumed to result from climate. But here again there is perplexity, for the Spanish are traditionally regarded by many as a grave and dignified people, and the Italian as in comparison undignified and volatile; while as against the "blind hysterics of the Celt" of France we have the vaunted "furor Teutonicus" and the Berserker-rage of the ancient Norseman. It is extremely difficult to say how much of the outward manner of any nation is a result of recent reactions. Gravity and reserve have come to be fashionable at the conventually-controlled English universities; and stiffness of manner is said to be peculiarly English; but though Froissart considered the English of his day to "take their pleasures sadly" it does not appear that before the Puritan period they were more sombre than other peoples. And latterly the Germans have been as loud as the French in their strictures on English stiffness. Certainly a German dinner-party makes more noise than any; but it is hard to see here what becomes of the factor of "race."

When we look at any nation through the eyes of its own satirists, writing in oblivion of race antagonisms, we seem to find a singular identity of weakness in all. Ibsen, studying Teutonic Scandinavia from within, seems to find in it every species of vice, moral and intellectual, that has been diagnosed in other lands, whether by natives or by enemies; and he is said to have drawn his *Peer Gynt*—a type of anything but

[1] The Baron de Belloguet, who as we have seen takes this view, while insisting that the Galli were not Germani, yet contrives to make them the worse of the two main elements in the French amalgam. He then allots the characteristics of the tall blond and the short dark types:—"To the Gaul *pur sang*, a fierce and headlong nature, animal irreflexion and impulse, intemperance, the passion for dress, excessive pride in his race and his exploits, frankness, credulity, magnificent hospitality, simplicity and sluggishness of mind. To the conquered race, vivacity and intelligence, natural eloquence, a jesting humour (which we call to-day *l'esprit gauloise*), unquiet curiosity, acuteness, and the faculties of invention and imitation, whence that remarkable aptitude of the transalpine cities for a rapid civilisation." (*Le Génie Gaulois*, p. 47.) Needless to say, this estimate has no more value to-day than those which give all the virtues to the Teutons.

stedfastness of character—as a kind of emblem of his nation. However that may be, his personages show none of that monopoly of merit which legend ascribes to Teutondom at large. If, again, we could suppose the apparition in a "Celtic" country of two such monarchs as the present German Kaiser and his granduncle, who was king of Prussia in 1848, we can imagine how confidently two such "types" would have been cited as being possible only in the Celtic races. If "types" there be, they are singularly hard to isolate on racial lines.

Nothing is commoner, as we have seen, than the drawing of contrasts between Germans and French, Teutons and non-Teutons, the Teuton being usually conceived by himself and his worshippers, in these latter days, as a fine compound of profundity and practicality, sagacity and strength. Yet it is only some half-a-century since Freiligrath's phrase, "Germany is Hamlet," passed current among Teutophiles as a true generalisation; and when we go behind the outworks of German patriotism we find that there is no special consciousness of unity of type in the Fatherland when its children forget to be patriotic. They of the north have a more or less genial contempt for those of the south, somewhat as happens in "united" Italy. And a cosmopolitan-minded German has made out type-portraits for northern and southern Germany which play a good deal of havoc with other pictures of Teuton *versus* Celt. "In the south, you find naïveté, spontaneity: in the north reflection, ratiocinative meditation. Yet it is not practical good sense that is lacking among the southerns; the cunning of the Wirtembergers and the Swiss, in matters of self-interest, is proverbial. . . . The northern German distinguishes himself from his southern compatriot by a brilliant and cutting intelligence, cold and pitiless,"[1] and so on. And it is this same northerner who for Taine and a dozen other generalisers is the typical "dreamy," introspective, mystical Teuton. It only needs to compare the formulas of any score of type-drawers to see that no outline whatever holds good for the judgment of any group concerned, the pretended unity always dissolving in a multitude of differences.[2]

[1] Eberweck, as cited, pp. 603-610.

[2] The good Eberweck, while giving professed proofs that Germans differ greatly among themselves by latitude and longitude, pauses to protest that all the same they are at bottom homogeneous: "In each nationality there exist opposed qualities: each is composed, so to speak, of living contradictions; but the contradictions are at bottom only the diverse sides of the same fundamental force" (Work cited, p. 608). We seem to be reading a paraphrase

But whether or not there be preponderating types of temperament in nations, it is quite clear that temperaments do not determine political history any more than they do the processes of logic. There are mathematicians and chemists, poets and artists, soldiers and thinkers, rationalists and pietists, in one nation as in another; and the clash of class interests, which is the fundamental factor in politics, goes on alike in all. England was the scene of a long civil war, ending in a regicide, and of a second revolution, ending in a king's exile, when France was thoroughly monarchic. When France in turn effected a revolution and a regicide, aristocratic England, being now unitedly monarchic, saw the explanation in vices of French character. Sociology might by this time be a little more intelligent. The destinies of nations are the outcome not of any special heredity but of special conditions. The people of the United States, with an inheritance of self-government, underwent a dreadful civil war by reason of the peculiar difficulty of one of their problems. If any other nation suffers specially from civil strife or disunion the cause is to be looked for in its case, in the same way, in conditions, and not in any imaginary tendency of "character." If we found any nation predominantly given to murder, or to theft, or to fallacy, we might begin to surmise some total heredity of characteristics; but when we find that whatever measurable differences exist — as in matters of sobriety and religiosity — are perfectly explicable in terms of climate and institutions, it is mere primitive empiricism to assume a heredity of political or industrial character.[1] Even supposing that French revolutionary heat or Irish industrial discouragement were inheritable, and not rather matters likely to set up reaction and a contrary

of the Athanasian creed. All the while, Eberweck, as we have seen, was pleading for international fraternity, and repudiating the spirit of race-antagonism.

[1] It has been argued, by an ethnologist who maintained the permanence of differences of skull types, that "the consequent permanence of moral and intellectual peculiarities of types cannot be denied" by naturalists. (J. C. Nott, in Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind*, 1854, p. 50.) But even if it were true that *general types* of skull persisted as this writer claims, it does not in the least follow that minor modifications of skull shape were not visible in the very specimens under his eyes. Such modifications could perfectly permit of modifications of brain development, both as to form and as to convolution, sufficient to carry profound modifications of mental and temperamental tendency. Indeed, the occurrence of the latter modifications lies on the face of all history.

bias in posterity, it would not in the least follow that they would be inherited. If special characteristics of individuals are found in multitudes of cases *not* to be inherited, all heredity depending on certain combinations in the parents, on what ground can we suppose that any predominant intellectual or moral characteristic in a nation—supposing one to exist at a given moment—will persist under changed conditions? Cromwell's sons were un-Puritanical. Then, on the very principle under dispute, a nation may change its characteristics in a generation. In fact, a large part of the proof currently offered for the assertion that certain races have a persistent collective character turns out to be proof, on the contrary, that the alleged national bias changes. French characteristics, we are told, for example, remain the same. But Frenchmen have changed their form of government in essentials nine or ten times since the Revolution. Then it is a French characteristic to be changeable. But for a hundred and fifty years before the Revolution their government had been stable. Then it is characteristic of Frenchmen to be submissive to despotism.

In the same way we have all been accustomed to hear the French people described, even by some of themselves, as ill-fitted for colonisation, partly by reason of infecundity, partly by reason of special devotion to their motherland. From these premisses we reach the conclusion that the Anglo-Saxon "race" is in comparison innately fruitful, and hereditarily given to colonising. We have only to turn to Canada to get a clear proof to the contrary. In sheer fecundity, the French settlers there have excelled all others, and, other things being equal, they are just as effective citizens. Their case suffices to show once for all that it was simply the special political conditions of French and English development in the seventeenth century that determined the advance of one race and the check of the other in colonisation and conquest. France was in a period of political anchylosis and artificially paralysed powers, while England, as a result of certain political accidents,[1] was in a period of free energy and unhampered expansion.

[1] I use this term, which is sometimes loosely employed and sometimes unintelligently condemned, to signify, in politics, such turns of affairs as a change of dynasty vitally affecting the practice of government. Such a turn occurred when James II. turned Catholic; when the many children of Anne predeceased her; when the succession of the House of Hanover brought to the English throne kings who could not speak English, and so on. The advent to power of an administrator of genius like Chatham may also be termed an accident.

Even as regards the supposed insurmountable lothness of Frenchmen to leave their native land—a lothness which, so far as it exists, is reasonably to be attributed to the special brightness of French life—we meet with emphatic testimony which, so far as it goes, reverses the current doctrine. It is a typical Englishman who thus contrasts English and French colonisation in the East:—

"You cannot convince an English settler that he will be abroad for an indefinite number of years, the idea would be equivalent to transportation: he consoles himself with the hope that something will turn up to alter the apparent certainty of his exile; and in this hope, with his mind ever fixed upon his return, he does little for posterity in the colony. He rarely even plants a fruit-tree, hoping that his stay will not allow him to gather from it. This accounts for the poverty of the gardens and enclosures around the houses of the English inhabitants, and the general dearth of any fruits worth eating.

"How different is the appearance of French colonies, and how different are the feelings of the settler! The word 'Adieu' once spoken, he sighs an eternal farewell to the shores of 'La belle France,' and with the natural light-heartedness of the nation, he settles cheerfully in a colony as his adopted country. He lays out his grounds with taste, and plants groves of exquisite fruit-trees, whose produce will, he hopes, be tasted by his children and grandchildren. Accordingly, in a French colony there is a tropical beauty in the cultivated trees and flowers which is seldom seen in our own possessions. . . . A Frenchman is necessarily a better settler: everything is arranged for permanency, from the building of a house to the cultivation of an estate. He does not distress his land for immediate profit, but from the very commencement he adopts a system of the highest cultivation."[1]

When one after another of the most confidently vended generalisations as to national gifts and defects are found thus astray, it is surely time to abandon such principles of interpretation in political science. They do but cumber the ground of rational political construction, and obscure the problems of international ethics. In the least provincial form, as in the attribution of certain civilising qualities to "Aryans," they are as vicious and as pernicious as in the narrow forms in which the people of the provinces of one State, and of the villages of one province, express their unreasoned sense of superiority to each other. Even on the current hypothesis, the "Aryan race"

[1] Sir Samuel W. Baker, *Eight Years in Ceylon*, ed. 1890, pp. 88-89.

was later civilised than the "Semitic" or "Hamitic"; and there is no reason to believe that it would ever have been civilised at all but for its contacts with previous civilisations. Herr Poesche, after working out his hypothesis of albinoism, cannot forbear to throw in a peroration on the adorable Aryanity of the Aryans, for which he can offer no true scientific justification. First he exults over the primitive chastity of the red-haired Germani,[1] as described by Tacitus:—"What a noble picture of a simple, chaste, brave people! No wonder that in this wedlock were born the conquerors of the world."[2] The same trait of constitutional chastity, be it observed, has been attributed to some tribes of North American Indians,[3] who like the Germani were proud of making wastes round their villages, and of plundering other tribes, and who were equally disdainful of agriculture. On the other hand, the ethnologist says nothing of the drunkenness of his chaste barbarians; nothing of the fact that the world they overran was a decaying one; nothing of their own rapid vitiation and decay, nothing of their admitted disappearance from the scene of their ancient conquests. Taken together, the facts suggest, if anything at all, that the Teutonic race in the days of its greatest real diffusion (that is, in the period 400-1200 of our era) was a mere vehicle of brute force, counting against rather than for civilisation. It seems to have had the combined military advantages of numbers (drawn however from a very wide area), of good physical development (though not of endurance of heat and toil), and of constant practice in hunting,[4] as against races who for various reasons multiplied less freely and lived more industrial lives. This holds true of the success of the so-called "Celts," whom we have seen to resemble the Teutons, against the so-called "Iberians" or the "Ligurians" or "Silurians." A writer who is scientifically impartial as between so-called Celt and Teuton, is found weighting the

[1] Despite his principle of pan-Aryanism, Herr Poesche must needs make the usual remark (S. 176) on the similarity between the modern (dark) French and the ancient (blond) Galli, of whom Cato said that they chiefly cared for war and rhetoric (*rem militarem et argute loqui*). If modern Germans have not attained the *argute loqui*, it is surely not for want of trying. As regards the *rem militarem*, they may surely claim to have out-Galled the Galli.

[2] *Die Arier*, S. 209.

[3] Kingsley, while accusing the Redskins of universal licentiousness, acknowledges the combination of chastity and ferocity among the Caribs. *Roman and Teuton*, p. 8.

[4] Compare the preparation of the Macedonians of Alexander, as discussed by Professor Mahaffy in his *Alexander's Empire*.

scales for both against the "Iberian," apparently because the Iberian was defeated. Contrasting an abnormally narrow Iberian skull with an abnormally broad Celtic skull, Dr Taylor decides[1] that in the latter "the broad, capacious forehead and the short square chin indicate mental power and determination of character," while he judges that the former is "weak" because the upper lip and the chin are long. Now, the forehead of the broad skull is not at all "capacious" *relatively to the mass of bony structure;* the Iberian forehead, which he calls "narrow," is relatively much more capacious; and the face need no more have been weak, even in appearance, than that of Sir Walter Scott, whose upper lip was long, and whose head was narrow. There is really nothing to tell us whether or not the Iberian character was weaker or less tenacious than the Celtic, even in the solitary and extreme instances here contrasted.[2] There is not even valid evidence for the assertion[3] that the more powerful race at the time of contact "possessed a higher civilisation." The only proof offered is that "in the long barrows [of the smaller or "Iberian" race] metal is absent and pottery is rare, while the presence of pottery is a distinctive feature of the [Celtic] round barrows, and bronze is not unknown." But it may have been the practice of one race to put pottery in its graves, while the other might possess pottery without so depositing it; and the possession of bronze, even if peculiar to the former race, may have been attained only at a late period. For all we know, the so-called Iberian race, with its delicate osseous structures, may have been much the more civilised of the two; as the conquering Anglo-Saxons of a later period seem, on Dr Taylor's own testimony, to have had absolutely smaller brains, despite their much greater stature, than the much earlier "Iberians" of Britain.

"The skulls from the Anglo-Saxon graves, although dolichocephalic, like those from the long barrows, are unmistakably dissimilar. The forehead is more retreating, the cranial vault lower, *and the mean cranial capacity much less*, in the one case amounting to 1524 cubic centimetres, or 93 cubic inches, in the other only to 1412 cubic centi-

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[1] As cited, p. 73.

[2] It is odd that while phrenology is commonly tabooed in the name of exact science, the loosest guesses from physiognomy pass current among scientific men, and the relatively exact tests of phrenology are ignored in these matters.

[3] *Id.*, p. 78.

metres, or 86 cubic inches. . . . Moreover, one [the Anglo-Saxon] race was tall, often over six feet, the other exceptionally short."[1]

So that the conquest by the Celts may but have been the physical triumph of the less-evolved and more numerous race over the higher, and the conquest of the mixed race by the Saxons a further triumph of a lower race still. In which case the modern dwindling of the old Teutonic type would represent, not any victory of race over race, but the final victory of civilisation over forces which threw it back ages ago.

Yet the Teutophile persists in crediting modern civilisation itself to the virtue of his small-brained ancestors. It is after noting with other inquirers how generally the blond type, which

[1] *Id.*, p. 102. In the tables of skull capacity given by Topinard (*Anthropology*, Eng. tr., p. 230) the skull capacity of the Merovingians is similarly placed very low—between that of the Chinese and the New Caledonians. If all these measurements be accurate, they go far to quash one of the premisses of some writers of the school of Weismann. Professor Haycraft, for instance (*Darwinism and Race Progress*, p. 115), argues concerning the Anglo-Saxon skulls in question that "when we look at them we feel that there is no reason to assume that they are of a lower type than our own, or that the men and women of whom they are the remains would not, were they possessed of our advantages of education, &c., take an equal status in society with us." If such problems are to be settled by what "we feel when we look," this may hold good; but one would expect a professed biologist to look for a more scientific test. Nobody doubts that some of the skulls "from the Vikings' graves must have belonged to magnificent specimens of humanity"—in respect of stature and strength—but there is really no reason whatever for, and many against, the assumption that the Vikings in question, if educated in our day, would constitute normal civilised types. Of course there are still many people of extremely small intelligence and strong combative passions in all classes, from the "upper" to the lowest; many of our aristocrats, for instance, being but well-bred microcephali, or "grooms in the wrong place." But if by "us" is understood the average of our non-criminal class, including the more as well as the less intellectual people, then Professor Haycraft's thesis cannot stand. It is one of those assumptions which exhibit Weismannism as in part a process of finding pretexts for a presupposition. If we are to frame any hypothesis in the matter at all we are bound first of all to make comparative measurements of skull capacities, with especial regard to the frontal convolutions, and if we are scrupulous we shall further recognise the probability that development of convolutions within a given cranial space may vary with osseous characteristics. (*Cp.* De Quatrefages, *Human Species*, Eng. tr., p. 382.) But here again, while the relatively scientific and inductive method of phrenology is set aside in the schools as charlatanism, we find professed and trained biologists reaching conclusions as to brain capacity by the merest guess-work.

for him is the Aryan, is being superseded by others up to the very verge of Scandinavia, that Herr Poesche exclaims:—"They have been for thousands of years the active part of mankind, to whom all the initiative in history belongs, the inheritors of all previous historic periods and cultures, the creators of all the coming ones"; going on to picture the "Aryan spirit ruling and ordering everywhere." "The Aryans possess force and might"—they and they alone.[1]

It is wholesome to turn from such rhetoric to historic retrospect, and to remember how twelve hundred years ago the Saracens overran the Aryan kingdoms of northern Africa and Spain; how five hundred years ago the Turks captured still-Aryan Constantinople; and how much of modern Aryan science derives originally from Saracen contact in the Middle Ages. The Saracen civilisation, after wonderful developments, was arrested, the elements of progress within it being strangled by the elements of conservatism, represented by the cult of the Sacred Book; and the political framework being overthrown by the revived militarism of the Christian foe. But it was no special heredity of race that wrought the failure, any more than it was any gift of race which saved Western Christendom from a similar strangling of the spirit of science by the spirit of superstition. What saved Christian Europe was its miscellaneity and the interaction of its component parts, somewhat as the interaction of the city-states of Greece so long sustained and stimulated Greek civilisation. The distribution of the intellectual forces of Europe through so many independent States made impossible their simultaneous suppression; and if the Saracen civilisation had been in anything like free and friendly contact with the Christian polities it too might have gained enough from the stimulus to overcome the malady of creed. But Christian malice, concurring with Mohammedan, kept Islamic civilisation isolated; and the faculties which, even thus, had done so much to develop science in Europe, were lost to the common cause of intelligence. How little "race" has to do with the matter may be realised by any one who will estimate the extent to which intelligence in Christian Spain has been eliminated or paralysed during the three hundred years since the religious factor obtained in her polity the same fatal predominance that had ruined the previous civilisation of the Moors.

Rationally considered, every one of the races under notice is capable of an intellectual renascence, given the fitting sociological conditions. Even the civilisation of Turkey, the history of which

[1] As cited, S. 238.

Buckle declared he could write on the back of his hand, is no dead trunk, but one capable of blossoming into fruitfulness if fed with the sap of a freshly-stirred soil.[1] The due conditions may or may not occur: as to that we can make no prediction: but we can confidently say that there is nothing in "race" to exclude the possibility, though an era of inertia is not easily to be countervailed. Inertia may supervene in any race under certain conditions. We have heard much of the theoretic superiority of the stock of the Pilgrim Fathers, to whose original virtues, real and imaginary, some people attribute most of the progress made in modern times in the United States, putting down to Irish immigration all the blemishes of modern American politics. As a matter of fact, the Pilgrims promptly proved themselves to be quite average people in respect of their incapacity for coöperative industry;[2] and their fanaticism was a profoundly anti-social influence throughout the whole of the really Puritan period. The Revolution itself was clearly made by the combination of such new forces as the idealistic political devotion of Washington, not at all a Puritanic type, and the intellectual stimulation given by Paine, who was still less so. Finally it would appear that in our own day the old Puritan stock, where living as nearly as possible in the original conditions, is as distinctly marked by moral and intellectual atrophy as any civilised population of which we have knowledge. The stories, for instance, of Miss Mary Wilkins, pronounced by her most competent compatriots an excellent observer, reveal in New England life a kind of anchylosis of character, a running down of all elements into a kind of imbecile passive malignity,[3] that seems far further away from healthy civilisation than any of the faults of the Irish peasantry.

Here we have a bad case of stagnation, if not of decadence, in a stock which was probably much over-praised at its best, but which in any case passes as a crack "Teutonic" type. The stagnation is seen to be like all other phenomena a matter of conditions; and to conditions, accordingly, we are to trace similar phenomena in other races, the more readily because all alike can claim positive achievements in favourable circum-

[1] As to the case of China, see the author's *Introduction to Modern English Politics* in the *Free Review*, Nov. 1894, pp. 175, 182.

[2] See Mr Goldwin Smith's *History of the United States*, p. 23, and compare his earlier language concerning the Pilgrim Fathers in *Three English Statesmen*, 1867, People's ed., p. 74.

[3] See in particular Miss Wilkins' novel, *Pembroke*.

stances. It lies on the face of Herr Poesche's own thesis that the progress of modern Europe, which he says is due to the Aryan race, is rather due to non-Aryans — the "pigmented" brachycephalic breeds who have so nearly crowded-out the blonds.[1] If one or more non-Aryan stocks can thus successfully compete with the Aryan, so may any of the rest, given the necessary culture-conditions. The "Aryan" creed in sociology is finally no better founded than the Athanasian creed in theology. When all is said it is found that the "Semites" alone, though declared by some to show constant signs of degeneration, are the toughest of all the competing races of the world. The Jews, — scourged, as the physicians tell us, by neurosis and diabetes — are yet the most generally indestructible.[2] And while the self-styled Aryan prates of the predominance of his species, the lands in which his tongue is spoken are chronically convulsed by wild outcry against the domination of the Semite, who wields the all-compelling power of the purse; yet at the same time, as if to show at a glance the nullity of the theory which in turn makes him merely a manipulator of money, contributes to "the general deed of man" the most opposing influences, producing at once Lassalle and Rothschild, Marx and Hirsch, Ricardo and Disraeli, Jew and Philistine. The spontaneous variation of the stock defies alike the ideal of the Rabbin, the pressure of Christian animus, and the sentimental exhortations of the neo-separatists, who found their mouthpiece in George Eliot, in the years of her declining powers and dissolving principles. The Jew, despite all such appeals, verily will not go back to Jerusalem. "Except for the comparative infrequency of the more bestial types of men and women," says a brilliant observer of that race, "Judæa [=modern Jewry] has always been a cosmos in little; and its prize-fighters and scientists, its philosophers and 'fences,' its gymnasts and money-lenders, its scholars and stock-brokers, its musicians, its chess-

[1] Compare Dr Taylor: "The genius of Germany comes from the other [the brachycephalic] race, to which Luther and Goethe both belonged. . . . The intellect and genius of Europe, the great writers, and more especially the men of science, belong rather to the brachycephalic race which has so profoundly modified the physical type in Germany, France, Italy, and England" (*Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 245-246). I do not say these assertions are proved, but *they follow from the Teutonist premisses.*

[2] "Nur die Juden acclimatisiren und erhalten sich in allen Ländern." Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, S. 95, citing Boudin, *Du non-cosmopolitisme des races humaines* (Mém. de la Soc. d'anthrop. de Paris, i. 93-123).

players, poets, comic-singers, lunatics, saints, publicans, politicians, warriors, poltroons, mathematicians, actors, foreign correspondents, have always been in the front rank."[1] And in the sections of this "race," which, though in antiquity it was certainly an amalgam like all others, has probably been the least mixed of all for some two thousand years,[2]—even within this we find in full play the very spirit of irrational discrimination which has branded the whole race, (on its own invitation) as "peculiar." "Spanish Jews," says our Jewish observer, "earliest arrivals [in England] by way of Holland, after the restoration, are a class apart, and look down on the later imported Ashkenazim, embracing both Poles and Dutchmen in their impartial contempt. But this does not prevent the Pole and the Dutchman from despising each other. To a Dutch or Russian Jew, the 'Pullack' or Polish Jew is a poor creature; and scarce anything can exceed the complacency with which the 'Pullack' looks down on the 'Litvok' or Lithuanian, the degraded being whose 'Shibboleth' is literally 'Sibboleth,' and who says 'ee' where rightly-constituted persons say 'oo.' To mimic the mincing pronunciation of the 'Litvok' affords the 'Pullack' a sense of superiority almost equalling that possessed by the English Jew, whose mispronunciation of the Holy Tongue is his title to rank far above all foreign varieties."[3] The humorist goes on to assure that "yet a vein of brotherhood runs beneath all these feelings of mutual superiority; like the cliqueism which draws together 'old clo' dealers, though each gives fifty per cent more than any other dealer in the trade." It is even so. Such are in reality the brotherhoods of races, a mirage of sentiment beyond the desert of self-seeking, a mood that comes and goes.

There might be found, one thinks, in the history of the Jewish race in particular, the most overwhelming demonstration of the deadliness of the spirit of racial separateness when erected into a cult, though it has been possible to quasi-scientific minds even in our own day to read the lesson backwards. Among all the nations of antiquity it stood out by reason of the enormous arrogance of its pretence of superiority, resting as it did its whole culture on a doctrine of racial monopoly in religion. To that

[1] I. Zangwill, *Children of the Ghetto*, proem.

[2] Yet Mr Zangwill seems to take it for granted that the Jews of the different countries not only assimilate the moral characteristics of their neighbours (*e.g.*, p. 45) but approximate to their facial type (*e.g.*, p. 252). And indeed the difference between the Peninsular type of Jew and some others is often so great as to suggest a considerable interfusion of Moorish blood.

[3] *Id.*, pp. 16-17 (1-vol. ed.). *Cf.* p. 328.

insane claim the world has given its brutal answer[1] during two thousand years, till in our own day there rises here and there the hope that the claim and the retort will together pass out of the problem of civilisation, so hard to solve even apart from such insensate complications. Surely we may cherish so circumspect a hope. It is a Jewish scholar, I believe, who undertakes most diligently to dispel "the oriental mirage." Surely we may hope ere long to do more, and to dissipate for Jew and Gentile that still more ancient mirage which is distilled from the primordial prejudice of race.

§ 7. *The Ethic of the Race Instinct.*

There is, however, a final aspect of the race question which it may be well to consider before we turn from it to study the Irish problem on lines of inductive science. I mean the philosophic aspect. Racial antipathy or prejudice, with which we have thus been dealing, is obviously correlative with racial enthusiasm, such as confronts us in the Irish nationalist movement. Men belittle what they suppose to be an alien race because they esteem their own. And I may be accused of accepting and justifying the instinct of race on the positive side,

[1] If we may judge from Mr Zangwill's pages, it does not seem to be often realised, even by the most intelligent Jews, that in the matter of exclusiveness and arrogance it was the Jews who began, and that it is they—the orthodox among them—who most zealously keep up the note. The best among them continue dutifully the prayer: "Pour out Thy wrath on the heathen who acknowledge thee not, and upon the kingdoms which invoke not Thy name. . . . Pursue them in wrath, and destroy them from under the heavens of the Lord" (Work cited, p. 237). Compare the racial self-glorifications put in the mouths of some of the best characters in the book. And even the half-free-thinking Esther is made to sob: "Surely the people of Christ have been the Christ of peoples"—using the expression in the Christian connotation. The whole of Mr Zangwill's book is thus instructive as to the psychology of the racial fallacy. The brilliant author himself, even while picturing the most mindless formalism among the orthodox of his race, credits them with "omnipresent ability," and claims at the outset that the faults of the Ghetto "are bred of its hovering miasma of persecution"—as if there would be no faults but for that. And after all this, we find Mr Zangwill making violent fun of the so-called "Celtic Renaissance," as if it were not philosophically on all fours with much of the Jewish sentiment which he sets forth so sympathetically. George Eliot professed to revere the race instinct all round, while preaching it to the Jews; but some of her auditors seem to wish to keep it as an exclusively Judaic possession, like the Jehovah of the past and the roast-Leviathan of the future state.

the side of the claim of a population to separate political institutions on grounds of race, while discrediting it on the negative side, in respect of all pretences that certain races, as such, lack any capacity essential to self-government. If it is absurd for Englishmen to disparage the Celt, I may be told, it is equally absurd for Irishmen to stand on their Celticity. There is here a possibility of confusion which may as well be guarded against.

All racial self-glorification, it is clear, is an irrational play of instinct. It is habitually indulged-in, tolerated, and applauded in civilised countries, where individual self-praise is regarded as a clear sign of fatuity when not resorted to in self-vindication against blame. Yet praise of one's nation is certainly a product of self-regarding vanity, and is at the same time, in the eye of strict reason, more absurd. Self-praise, though unpleasing to others, may be just—may be such as another could justly bestow. But to take personal pride in vaunting one's nation is, rationally speaking, the merest inconsequence. If our nation has in any way distinguished itself, we are individually no more entitled to plume ourselves on the fact than is a single undistinguished person to plume himself on being descended from a famous man. Aristocratic pride of birth has long been laughed out of discussion; and it is not found that descendants of great writers or artists seek on that score to claim any social deference. But we are here on that borderland of rational ethics which is sooner or later reached in the analysis of all problems of conduct, and we must go warily. Pride in one's nation, like pride in friends, is after all a spontaneous emotion, like joy in another's beauty, or in one's own success. There is but one test. Emotion is the ultimate fact in well-being, as indeed in consciousness; and, there being no thought as there is no fear of stamping out all emotion that is joyous, the business of ethical criticism is found to consist in settling what forms of joy are anti-social.[1] Once recognised as such, they are more or less nearly destroyed; the loss, however, bringing its compensation in the higher and broader if less violent satisfaction of a substituted good-will.[2]

Now, it is obvious at a glance that though racial ill-will

[1] This point is dealt with at some length in the author's lecture on *The Pleasures of Malignity* (South Place Institute, London).

[2] "It is not, as Spinoza has shown, by arguing away our emotions, but by confronting them with still stronger emotions, that they are, if necessary, to be overcome." (Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*, 1882, ii. 94, citing Spinoza, *Ethica*, Pars. iv., Prop. 7.)

depends upon a primary instinct of patriotism, that primary instinct does not necessarily involve a correlative ill-will to the point of ill-doing. When Mr Green writes that "no spot in Britain can be so sacred to Englishmen as that which first felt the tread of English feet," irrational as the sentiment is, it can hardly be said to promote anything worse than similar sentiment. It does not set up any tendency to applaud the deeds of the brutal crews of Hengist and Horsa, slayers of women and babes. And so when Mr Freeman, writing for Englishmen who are descended alike from Saxons and Normans, gravely tells how "our fathers" cried "Out" to the Normans in the stockade at Hastings, he is not likely to move an adult reader to anything more than a smile. In other directions, of course, a similar primitiveness of feeling easily takes on a sinister colour and works unqualified harm. Thus there is downright maleficence where race-prejudice confirms Englishmen in a policy of oppression towards Ireland, and in a less degree where it moves Frenchmen and Germans to a chronic reciprocity of insolence. But where on the other hand the sentiment of race moves a misgoverned and unhappy population to demand its freedom, its choice of its system of government, as in the case of the Italian majority resisting Austria, or the Irish majority demanding Home Rule, the ethical situation is profoundly different. The emotion here is substantially self-regarding; it is malevolent only in so far as it resents maleficence; it is a demand to stand on that footing of equality which is the necessary condition of any true moral relation. If the Italian is content to be free, planning no further conflict; if the Irishman is content with federal Home Rule (we shall consider later what are the just conditions), there is a clear gain to human well-being, in that a whole population is put on the plane of responsible self-government where formerly it was below that plane. That an Englishman, then, should cease to contemn and vilify his Irish neighbours, by way of ceasing to over-esteem his own race, is a step forward in morals. He has the gain of substituting a higher for a lower emotion: and he loses no motive-power for good. But that an Irishman should over-esteem his own race in his resentment of English oppression is not in turn an evil, so long as it is part of his motive-power to strive for a political reform. That he should in many cases bear ill-will to the Englishman as Englishman, and deny *his* capacity for certain kinds of well-doing—such as justice, mercy, and truth—is a deplorable concomitant of the state of bitter political strife;

but there is only one possible way to the cure of the evil, and that is, not that the Irishman's should rise to the supernormal height of loving his enemy while the enemy remains unchanged, but that the enemy should consent to cease from provocation. After that, both alike may purify themselves of the animal instinct of patriotism, and rise to that higher form of feeling which, desiring good for our own community, and striving of necessity first for that, equally desires good to all others and contemns none. In short, as the normal man cannot rise to the highest forms of goodness so long as he is enslaved, so a nation cannot rise above the pride or passion of race till after it has known of itself what the successful self-assertion of race means. It must stand on the ordinary plane of nations before it can be expected to cast out a form of primitive emotion which, in the terms of the case, nations already on that plane still cherish. And it cannot be too emphatically said that any man who calls on a dependent people to be satisfied to remain dependent, and to put the sentiment of race equality out of its thoughts, is rather ethically obtuse than ethically superior. We may be quite sure that the Englishman who in the present posture of affairs affects to despise the Irish sentiment of nationality, would, had he been born an Irishman, have been a hater of England—unless he be altogether incapable of a social sympathy. Any one so far from normal altruism must be either a pure egotist or a pure tribalist.

Once a nation has attained freedom from alien coercion, however, once it stands on a footing either of federation or of independence, there is little or nothing to be said for its cultivation of the sentiment of race, from the point of view of ethical reason.[1] Nearly everything that has been said for it in

[1] It is very doubtful whether the Welsh Eisteddfod, though involving no malevolent emotion, does not do more to retard than to promote Welsh culture. It has indeed the advantage claimed for it of enabling all Welsh people to meet on a common ground of feeling; and in this way it probably counteracts to some extent the bad effects of religion. But on the other hand it tends to maintain complacency over a low standard of achievement. Educated Welshmen have often pointed out (what might almost have been assumed *a priori*) that the poetry of the prize odes has no literary value; and a careful musical critic of the last Eisteddfod protests that even on the musical side—that which most interests the great majority of the audience,—there are small signs of progressive culture, the prize cantatas being "musical drivel," though the Welsh voices are often good. It is true that Professor Rhys has noted, as a remarkable advance on previous years, that out of five competition

modern times is either a display of mental confusion or a brazen pursuit of declamation. Mr Ruskin has protested that all good art, whether of colour or speech, is redolent of its birthplace. If so, there can be no fear of hurting it by teaching the artist to recognise that all birthplaces are in the terms of the case of equal virtue for those born in them. And if it be good to think of oneself as one of a small group of brothers, there can be nothing but good in feeling brotherhood for all civilised men. It is a childish fallacy to identify cosmopolitanism with egotism. There are egotists in every tribe, in every community: it is they and they only who are egotists abroad.

In its commonest form, patriotism so-called is so far from being a substantially beneficent emotion that it flourishes most rankly alongside of malignant emotion towards even fellow-citizens. The Englishman who is most vaporous of enmity towards foreign races is commonly he who is most ready to break English heads on a point of domestic strife. And the way in which national aggregates of mankind, themselves divided by a hundred enmities of interest and bias, are yet chronically unified for the most part in temper, and sometimes in action, by the breath of a common fury towards some other aggregate—this is one of the most sombre aspects of civilised life. In every great State in the world, there are marked divisions of class jealousy and party animosity, over and above the infinity of individual hostilities which constitute the physical and moral struggle for existence. And yet in each State there are multitudes who, either sinking for the moment the smaller passions in the greater or caring only to gratify each as it is aroused, will at a word shout insult and furious menace at some other State whose official head commits an indiscretion, or whose official underlings commit an offence. Within a year we have seen the press of the four or five most civilised countries in the world braying hoarse hatred from each against some of the others. The psychological process is absurdly primitive. For perhaps the bulk of political Frenchmen, Germans, and Americans, there is an imaginary entity, "England," which is guilty of all the misdeeds of all Englishmen in international life, and which is always plotting treasons, stratagems, and spoils. And while in England we are normally aware of being divided into parties bent determinedly on frustrat-

essays on the Welsh language, three were sanely scientific. This, however, is a development that has very little to do with the Eisteddfod as an institution. Good may be done by the prizes for products of artistic handicraft; but that kind of influence need not be provincial.

ing each other's policy and ideals, we in turn are capable of setting up for ourselves an imaginary entity, "England," which is but an abstraction of the military power of the community, exercised with the presumed approval of the majority. Both abstractions are about as far from the reality as is an average Chinaman's notion of European character. At the same time we preposterously conceive of an entity "France" and of an entity "Germany," each actuated by a single or corporate volition, presenting no trace of the conflict of parties which we normally know to go on in France and Germany. It is the same with each of the other nations in turn. Most Americans individually answer proudly for the other sixty millions as "we," though "we" are honeycombed like the other "we's" with clashing interests and political animosities; the farmers of the West protesting that they are ruined by the East, and the clamourers for war with England being told by fellow-countrymen that they are ignorant blunderers. France, full of intense partisan hatreds, becomes *la patrie* in a flash of hysteria at the thought of the German; and the average Frenchman cherishes a besotted vision of an entity "Russia" which is France's friend, because the average Russian also hates Germany; when all the while the populations of both Germany and England have a hundredfold more of the realities of ethical life in common with the people of France than has the bureaucratic world which is the main political actuality behind "Russia." It seems as if, throughout the ages, men must needs grow inebriate of one lying formula after another; and that when religious superstitions cease to be pretexts for systematic war, political superstitions suffice to play the same part.

Some of the manifestations of the sentiment of race by bodies of grown men are so absolutely on a level with the doings of schoolboys, and some are so absolutely on a level with the doings of barbarians, that they almost seem to negate the notion of political evolution. When, some years ago, an American horse won in an English horse-race, the entire New York Stock Exchange was reported to have burst into long-continued transports of cheering. One hesitates to think what greeting would meet any man asking the assembly in question to perform collectively any act for the good of the community—beyond perhaps subscribing towards the relief of some flagrant public distress. Most of the members, probably, would not have a twinge of conscience about an operation in shares which would beggar thousands of their countrymen, and take the bread from the mouths of their colleagues' children. But they were unfeignedly ecstatic over the

superior speed of a horse that happened to have been foaled in the North American continent; and if frog-jumping happened to be the modish sport rather than horse-racing they would doubtless be as ecstatic in the case of an American success in that line.

In England more recently we have had an exhibition of cognate feeling of which the model is to be looked for rather in a palaver of redskins than in the school-playground. The Minister for the Colonies, speaking at a Conservative reunion shortly after the Teutonic Kaiser had with characteristic judgment interposed in the trouble set up by local English aggression on the Transvaal —always so-called Teutons embroiling themselves with Teutons— the English Minister at this juncture thought fit, instead of seeking to allay foolish irritation with words of common sense, to declaim to his after-dinner audience the assurance that under no circumstances should "we" permit foreign interference—in respect of our interference with foreigners. Whereupon the entire audience, the reports say, spontaneously rose to their feet, shouting their applause, waving their handkerchiefs, and emptying their glasses. And these sober-sided gentlemen, with their spokesman, are of those who inform us that the Celtic race, lacking self-control, is incapable of self-government, and likely to do ill by the strangers within its gates. The critics in question have since exhibited themselves to the world as the brazen defenders of the act of brigandage which gave rise to the whole outbreak of ill-will between the nominal head-centres of Teutonia—London shouting Billingsgate at Berlin, and Berlin bellowing insult back. The defenders of the piratical raid on the Transvaal, be it observed, prosers and poets alike, are those who asperse as "rebels" the Irishmen who constitutionally demand Home Rule for Ireland; and if the clash of German with English braggadocio had led to a pan-Teutonic war, the Teuton-hating Teutons of England would have expected the Celtic "rebels" to fight by their side— or, to put it more exactly, would have expected Irishmen to go and fight for them. Such are the consistencies of race-sentiment.

When one remembers the internecine conflict that in every case is proceeding behind the parade of national flags, the cries which pass between the aggregates seem to yield a ring of hideous irony, as of the mirth of madmen behind their bars. Everywhere there is the mining war of classes, the inner corrosion of penury and the rage of despair, the clamorous appeal from the sufferers for permanent succour, the futile paltering of a few in the attempt to give it, the hard refusal of the rest; and over all sound the cries of protested national unity, the roar of animal

pride and hate which outpeals the cry of pain. Everywhere distress and social disease, everywhere the mutual exasperation of factions, everywhere reciprocal disbelief, everywhere "a pasteboard portico without, and a deliquium of deadly weakness within."

It would be inconceivable that all this should long subsist, were it not that it has so long subsisted. We are all so constantly criticising each other within our own frontiers, demonstrating the imbecility of some and the baseness of others, one half of the electorate crying shame on the other half as a medley of knaves and fools, that it seems psychologically impossible that we should ever get into the attitude of putting our race collectively in the right and another race collectively in the wrong. We realise on one day that many Germans are wiser than many English, and on another day that many French are more civilised than many Australians or Americans: certain movements, certain ideals draw sections of all races into fraternity; and there is hardly a citizen, however little-travelled, who has not met some member of an alien race whom he likes and esteems. Yet all the aggregates alike seem capable of drowning all such reminiscence in a flood of such instinct as hurled at each other's throats the "dragons of the earlier prime."

As regards the disputes of man and man, there are outsiders who can sit in judgment: even recrimination may at times have the effect of reminding a disputant that he has not done as he demands to be done by. But in the hatreds and strifes of nations, each side seems to forget all its sins and think only of its wrongs—each side's combatants, that is, for in every war there are some who condemn their own nation. Much has been made, and is still made, in the United States, of the amount of sympathy shown by many of the upper classes in England with the South during the Civil War, and of the lack of any sort of sympathy with either side, or with the people of the States as a whole, on the part of many other Englishmen. Yet any consultation of current American literature before the war will reveal that, whatever might be the weight of English opinion and English models in some spheres of American life, there was in others an enormous amount of crude vituperation of all things English. Such vituperation, which was often far more virulent than the inconsiderate criticism of American life by English travellers, naturally set up ill-will among many of those abused; but when the war came, many American patriots were unfeignedly indignant that "England" for a time showed so little fellow-

feeling. We are all so ready to forget our past blows in the thrill of our tingling perception of our present hurts. The new nations seem in this respect no wiser than the old. The late Mr Lowell, in his early and angry essay "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners," exhibited the latter form of sensation with much energy; but it will not be found that Mr Lowell in any of his works, early or late, ever forbore a good opportunity to treat other nationalities with the simple-minded condescension of race which so exasperated him when flaunted by obtuse Englishmen. Be it over German clumsiness, or French flashiness, or Scotch unattractiveness, the good gentleman's humour and good humour are one when he can make play against another community as others had made play against his. And his example is freely followed among his countrymen. That some of them have sold Remington rifles to Turks wherewith to repel Russians, and military stores to Cuban insurrectionists wherewith to baffle Spain,—all this is not felt to be a reason for regarding the outfitting of the Alabama in England as a similar commercial transaction. Despite the compensation which followed, the original offence, with many another, is still scored by many to the general account of the entity "England." As a matter of fact, there were many sympathisers with the South in the Northern States, as there were "loyalists" in the Southern;[1] but these things are forgotten in the ethical convenience of settling all accounts by imputing wrong-doing in the lump to another nation in the lump. Thus Mr Howells, privately one of the most amiable of men, seems quite serious at times—as serious as Mr Marion Crawford—in representing Englishmen in general and in particular as without exception detestable.[2] Some offence personally received, or some offensive English action or utterance concerning Americans, has apparently sufficed these amateur sociologists as ground for furious indictments of a whole nation.

When men who, albeit of the irritable genus, are vowed to peaceful pursuits, thus lend themselves to the spirit of national malice, it is a matter of course that nations in the lump, or the bellicose sections of nations, should hold themselves as always

[1] Compare Walt Whitman's *Specimen Days and Collect*, Glasgow ed., 1883, pp. 258-261, and an article *England and America in* 1863, in *Harper's Magazine*, May 1896, p. 847.

[2] Readers of Mr Howells' novel, *A Fearful Responsibility*, and of Mr Crawford's romance, *Mr Isaacs*, wlll remember the passages in point.

the wronged and never the wrongers in war, every citizen being primed in such views by the lamentable compositions employed everywhere as manuals of history in the common schools. The German people have been taught for eighty years to exult over their old War of Liberation—liberation from the French invader—with no thought of the fact that wanton German invasion of France had been the beginning of that particular strife, and indeed one of the determining circumstances which led to the rise of Napoleon. In the same way the French people in the mass[1] are taught to hold their nation wronged by England and by Germany, even as the English schoolboy is taught to regard France as the aggressive enemy of England in the modern period, yet at the same time to take satisfaction in the wanton invasions of France by the older kings of England. Everywhere reflection is made to subserve one of the worst instinctive lusts of the animal man.

With such an infinite heritage of strife in all our veins, it would indeed be visionary to preach an ideal of absolute strifelessness, of all-embracing goodwill. The religion which specially claims to expound the principle of mutual love has been in practice but a new pretext for enmity. I have seen a programme of a "Young People's Society of Christian Endeavour" where, under the device of Christian solidarity, the members of groups are counselled among other things to develop the instinct of "loyalty" to their own particular church. A text for the theme is duly supplied.[2] The average man can come no nearer than that to a general philanthropism. Even the political movement which can claim to be creating a new hope for the ending of the reign of militarism by founding itself on the community of interest between the workers of all nations—even scientific Socialism is the organisation of world-wide strife between the working-class and its exploiters; while the Socialism of the streets is too often a grim gospel of hate. But at least we can hope for the continuous transformation of strife from an animal

[1] The present opportunity may be taken to note with satisfaction and with praise the efforts of M. Robin, so long director of the Prevost Orphanage at Cempuis, to substitute a sane and civilised teaching in these matters for what is normally given. M. Robin has had his reward in being deprived of his post and vilified alike by pietists and pagans in the French press, but his record will not be forgotten nor his example let pass into oblivion.

[2] Psalm lxxxiv. 1-12. "A review of the history of your own denomination" is the suggested exercise.

energy, so to speak, to an energy of the reason; a continuous shifting of the grounds of hostility from primary passions to purified ideals, from the plane of barbarism to the plane of intelligence. And it is because the prejudice of race, with all its cargo of historical fallacy and political iniquity, is just an energy of mere animal passion, surviving unpurified from the stage of sheer barbarism, that it is here impugned.

II.

THE LESSON OF IRISH HISTORY.

§ 1. *The Causation of the Past.*

We have already seen enough to satisfy us that at the dawn of history there was no "Irish race" in the special sense, no specific type of human being, whether "Celtic" or "Iberian" or "Ligurian" or "Silurian" or "Lappanoid," or "Teutonic," constituting a main part of the Irish population. In Ireland, as nearly everywhere else in the scope of our survey, there had been wave on wave of immigration, whether of "pure" or of "mixed" races; and in the earliest literature we find abundant record of golden-haired as well as of dark-haired people. And though these data are not proofs of difference of stock, there are other reasons[1] for believing that among the groups in question there were tribes of "Teutonic" kinship as well as tribes of "Celts." We may at least be sure that in prehistoric Ireland there had occurred a mixture of inhabitants very much like what has occurred in historic Ireland, where we note the successive addition of Danes, Anglo-Normans, Elizabethan English, Cromwellian English, and Lowland Scotch to the previous blend. If then we are ever to explain the course of Irish history, and any broad peculiarities which may exist in modern Irish character, it must be *a posteriori* and not *a priori*—from conditions and not from first causes. It is sufficiently idle to set up race character in any case as an explanation of national facts; but it is worse than idle to do so when the race is admittedly a medley of many stocks. At this day, though one or two types of face are generally recognised among us as Irish, because apparently much less common outside of Ireland, there is no general Irish type[2] whether as regards skull, hair, skin,

[1] Penka (*Herkunft der Arier*, S. 174) sees evidence in Irish tradition for the view that the Gaël came from Scandinavia.

[2] "The 'macrognathism' [largeness of jaw] . . . popularly supposed to be characteristic of the Irish face, and always appearing in the Irishmen of

eyes, or stature, save in so far as we find there, as in England and Scotland, a majority of dark or brown-*haired* people. The common notion that Irishmen are mostly dark-*eyed* is an error. "It is a curious and suggestive fact," says Dr Beddoe, "—suggestive of the worthlessness of unsystematic observation and hasty generalisation—that the Irish are very frequently spoken of as a dark-eyed race; whereas the preponderance of light eyes (grey, blue, or bluish grey, often with a narrow dark rim round the iris), is very decided, and obtains without a single exception in all the forty or fifty localities where I have made observations. Sir W. Wilde, dealing with people from all parts of Ireland, but in larger proportion from Dublin and its neighbourhood, found in 1130 the following proportions:—blue eyes, 34·1 per cent.; grey eyes, 54·6; hazel eyes, 2·4; and brown eyes, 8·8 per cent."[1] And this is further confirmed by a German anthropologist already cited. "We constantly meet," says Herr Poesche, "the notion that the Irish in general have dark eyes. In reality there are among them relatively fewer dark-eyed people than among the English and the German. Probably 90 per cent. of the Irish have blue-grey eyes. On the other hand they are in general less blond than the Germans and the English, as one can readily see by the children."[2] Further, the average stature of Irishmen is greater than that of Englishmen.[3] We can thus find in Ireland no general type answering either to the Celtic or the Ligurian or

English caricature, is really not common in the Irish, although very common in the lower type of Scotch face" (Richey, *Short History of the Irish People*, p. 27, *notes*).

[1] Art. *The Kelts of Ireland*, in *Journal of Anthropology*, Oct. 1870, p. 119. *Cp.* Dr Beddoe's article in the *Memoirs of the Anthropological Society*, vol. ii., 1866, p. 43, where he notes the dark eyes of the Welsh as distinguishing them from the Irish.

[2] *Die Arier*, S. 24. Herr Poesche falls into an error, or at least a laxity of terms, when he asserts that "Holland, England, and Scotland are predominantly blond." This is not true as regards England and Scotland unless we reckon as "blond" many brown-haired people. Blonds proper are certainly in a minority in England and Scotland; and Herr Poesche in another part of his book cites a letter from a Scotchman pointing this out. On the other hand, I have observed in Celtic-speaking Wales a great predominance of semi-blonds and dun-haired people over the black-haired. At an Eisteddfod one sees four or five of the medium type for one distinctly dark, and about as many blonds or red-haired as black-haired. The latter are said to preponderate in Denbighshire. (Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, p. 68.) Personally, I have not noticed there any such preponderance.

[3] In the far west of Kerry, commonly held to be peopled by an "Iberian" type, Dr Beddoe found the stature high (as first cited, p. 121).

the Iberian or the Scandinavian, as described by the anthropologists.[1] And while there seems to have been one "Celtic" language spoken throughout Ireland at the beginning of the historic period, it is quite impossible to decide whether this language "originated" with dark or fair or tall or short or broad-headed or narrow-headed people, or with very early inhabitants or with later.

What we do seem to find, about a thousand years ago, is the *débris* of a measure of civilisation which on some sides compares rather remarkably with those of contemporary northern Europe, apart from Wales. The Irish, like the Welsh, seem to have cultivated the intelligence, or more strictly the imagination, on the side of literature and song, much more extensively than had been done by the then inhabitants of England or of Germany.[2] If we proceeded on assumptions of inherent racial tendencies, we should be led to decide, accordingly, that the peoples speaking the Celtic languages have an innate or racial æsthetic bent[3] which is lacking in some of the peoples speaking the Teutonic languages. It seems to be among the races who existed in northern and southern France at the beginning of our era—among them or their presumed kindred—that there arose in modern Europe the faculty for and the practice of imaginative literature on the plane of the adult intelligence. Northern and Southern French poets—trouvères and troubadours—and Welsh and Irish bards, were practically the first representatives, in the modern period, of the force which did more than any other to lift semi-civilised life above the mortal monotony that in times of semi-civilisation, as of barbarism, is one of the main provocatives to war. If gifts of "races" to civilisation are to be

[1] *Cp.* Dr Beddoe as first cited, pp. 127-131.

[2] "It may be said that the two oldest collections of secular Irish literature which Dublin possesses, the *Leabar nah hUidhre* and the Book of Leinster, (end of 11th and middle of 12th century) are 'collections of the débris of a rich manuscript literature which has been destroyed with the monasteries by the invasions of the Northmen, in the ninth and tenth centuries.' The two collections contain many pieces composed before these invasions; and even in MSS. of the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries, literary works antedating the 9th century are found in abundance. One cannot otherwise explain the persistence with which these MSS. conserve, in a multitude of words, letters which had ceased to be pronounced at the time of last writing." (D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Introduction à l'étude de la littérature celtique*, 1883, pp. 382-383, citing Zimmer, *Keltische Studien*, Heft I. pp. 26, 28.)

[3] Mr Elton (*Origins of English History*, 2nd ed. p. iii.) cites ancient testimonies going to show that the ancient Gauls had tartans.

posited, this is a gift of which it would not be easy to speak too highly.

To attribute, however, a special faculty to a race because its members were forward in showing that faculty, is only to repeat the fallacy of race prejudice on the positive side. If the so-called Celtic peoples developed humanist poetry and secular fiction before some of the so-called Teutonic peoples, it must have been in virtue of certain institutions, which may or may not have been set up with the conscious purpose of promoting the ends which they finally served. When the Romans created annual consuls, it was not with the knowledge that that was the best available plan to evoke the maximum of the military faculty in the State, and to breed a caste of captains. These results were secured incidentally, the design being simply to check the engrossing of power. So, among the peoples of France and Wales and Ireland, it cannot be supposed that there was any early determination to promote poetry. What seems to have happened in France and Wales is, first, the development of the Druid order (above considered), and later the gradual transformation of that order, especially after the coming of Christianity, into an order of bards.[1] The Germans were no more racially incapable of such a development than the Norsemen, who to some extent paralleled it: they simply did not come so early under the conditions essential to such a development. We know from Tacitus that they had a habit of singing a chant before battle—a chant which he says they called the *barditus*. There was there the germ of a bardic system; perhaps a form of the very word. Only there lacked the conditions and influences which could readily fecundate the germ—among the first of these being the use of letters, which reached Gallia and Britain through Marseilles, and possibly through Carthaginian commerce, while Germany was still untraversed by civilised men.

As a matter of fact, however, there has been among us much less of anti-Teutonic than of anti-Celtic apriorism, even in this connection; and the sociological truth in the matter may be brought out by following up the anti-Celtic view as it is indicated by the late Mr Russell Lowell in his *Letters*. Mr Lowell, being of opinion that M. Littré had in some of his writings[2] allowed

[1] Diodorus Siculus (v. 31) mentions "bards" in addition to priests among the Galli.

[2] I cannot recall any passage in Littré which seems to me to give occasion for such a criticism. It is true that he combated the view, which Mr Lowell seems to have adopted, that early French represents the contact of the

too much credit to the Celtic element in early French literature, protested that "As for the Kelts, there is no early French literature of any value in which the Teutonic blood did not supply the *fond*. The history of the language proves it, if nothing else did." Now, the history of a language simply *cannot* prove such a proposition as is here laid down. Nothing could prove it save an amount and a kind of biographical evidence which in the nature of the case does not exist. The *fond* of Mr Lowell's doctrine is visibly his own raw race-prejudice, which reveals itself crudely enough in his further self-confounding confession: "I like Man better than I do any special variety of man—*and I think the Keltic variety one of the poorest.*"[1] Mr Lowell indeed put his case in the weakest way he well could when he staked it on the ground of linguistics. A Teutonic basis for the early French literature could be much more plausibly argued on the score of the Teutonic *matter* of the Chanson de Roland, for instance, than on the score of any Teutonic elements in its language. The fact of the language being so definitely Romance must surely tell in favour of the Gallic culture force. As regards the Teutonic matter in the epos, however, the answer is that, inasmuch as the "Teutonic blood" had in its original environment produced nothing even remotely approaching the Chanson de Roland, whatever share it had in the new literary growth was absolutely conditioned by the new environment, which must receive an equal credit, if the apportioning of racial credit is to be the business of either literary or sociological criticism. The true and scientific conclusion, surely, here as elsewhere, is that the crossing of stocks, of temperaments, of cultures, yielded a result far superior to what was possible for either side without it. Without the "Teutonic blood," probably, the new literary growth had not arisen; but it is quite clear that it could not have arisen in a purely Teutonic sphere.

Germanic invaders with the Latin language (*Histoire de la langue française*, édit. 1863, i. 102-104). Littré showed that there is no evidence of any preponderating Germanic influence, and insisted further on the numerical smallness of the invading element. But on the other hand he noted as distinctly (ii. 104) that the old Celtic counted for as little in determining the new speech. In his essay on the *Nouvelle Exégèse de Shakspere*, again (a review of the English book so entitled), he sets his face against a number of the pro-Celtic assumptions of his author (*Littérature et Histoire*, 1875, pp. 96-98, &c.); and he is equally judicial in his estimate of the elements which went to the building up of modern European civilisation (for instance, in the *Études sur les barbares et le moyen age*, 3e édit., pp. 84-92, 124-136).

[1] *Letters of James Russell Lowell*, i. 442-443.

It used to be assumed that in the earlier Scandinavian literature the "Teutonic genius" had exhibited its innate and independent literary bent, though the mere fact that the gift had been exhibited only in the northern branch of the supposed homogeneous stock, leaving the southern to develop it much later by imitation, might be supposed to discredit the racial thesis in advance. But we now know that the Eddas, like other parts of the old Scandinavian literature, have been antedated alike as regards form[1] and matter. Much of the Scandinavian mythology is now held to have had a post-Christian origin; and the Eddas in particular are found to show a marked foreign influence. And that influence, notably enough, appears to be "Celtic." The Eddas are now dated between 800 and 1100; and their latest expositors hold them to have been composed, albeit by Norsemen, within the culture-sphere of Ireland.

"Where . . . shall we find a place to which the conditions of life depicted in the poem shall apply—a temperate country, with Kelts in or near it, with a certain amount of civilisation and refinement and foreign trade, with Christian influences, with woods and deer and forest trees, with a fine coast and islands, where there were fortified places, where there was plenty of rich embroidered tapestry; where hunting, hawking, bird-clubbing went on as common pastimes, where slavery was widely prevalent (the slaves being often of a different racial type to their masters), where harping and carping went on in the hall to the merry clink of cup and can kept filled with beer and wine, where there was plenty of 'Welsh' cloth, 'Welsh' gold and 'Welsh' steel, where the Scandinavians led a roving life, fighting and sailing, and riding and feasting, by turns? Where but in the Western Isles?

"Again, where could those curious mythologic fancies, which created Walhall, and made of Woden a heavenly Charlemagne, which dreamed, like Caedmon, of the Rood as a tree that spread through the worlds, which pictured the final doom as near, and nursed visions of an everlasting peace, holier even than Cynewulf's Phœnix figures—where could such ideas as these, alien as they are to the old Teutonic religion and ritual and thought, have been better fostered than in the British Isles, at a time when the Irish Church, with her fervent faith

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1 "Down to the present century, and far into it, the most extravagant views were held with regard to the 'Eddic poems.' . . . Even Grimm placed them long before Charles the Great. These opinions, however, a careful examination of the poems will show to be untenable, and the positive evidence of language proves them to be absolutely mistaken." (Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, 1883, Introd., Vol. i., p. lvii.)

. . . and curious half-Eastern legends, was impressing the poetic mind on one side, while the rich and splendid court of Eadgar or Canute would stimulate it on the other?"[1]

If then even the early Scandinavian poetry itself owes its generation in part to Celtic contacts, it is an act of the merest partisanship to credit in mass the early literature of France, in a non-Teutonic tongue, to the "Teutonic blood" of the Frankish invaders who had so speedily adopted the tongue of the native majority. When the dogmas of blondness and dolichocephalism have collapsed, the dogma of "blood" must share their fate. We may certainly decide that any one stock may profitably be crossed with any other in the same or a similar culture-stage; but it would be folly to credit to one stock, on no substantive evidence, an innate literary endowment which we finally do not allow even to a race which earlier gave proof of literary faculty. To this attitude we return. What we have to do with regard to the early literature of Ireland, bardic and legalist, is just to accept the phenomenon for what it is. There is a danger of over-estimating the importance of the proto-civilisation of Ireland in itself, as apart from the developments which we have above assumed to have followed on such beginnings. Primeval bardism was certainly not a force that could constitute a civilisation even remotely comparable to those of the Mediterranean world. It was simply an intellectual nucleus,[2] which new culture forces could advantageously fructify. And when Christianity arrived, though of course it was a culture force of no lasting value, the efficacy of the nucleus was at once seen in the extraordinary development of Christian propaganda which followed. The facts of the zealous cultivation of Christian letters in Ireland in the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, and of the spread of Christian teaching thence by Irish missionaries and pupils of Irish schools, are indisputable and undisputed. What is urged by the critics of Irish claims is that this phase of civilisation was not progressive or permanent; that, apart from any interference by England, the proto-civilisation of Ireland either stagnated or succumbed to the shock of the Danish irruption of the ninth century; and that if it so succumbed it cannot be held to have had any great inherent vigour. To which we answer, Exactly so. The mediæval civilisation of

[1] Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, Vol. i., Introd., pp. lxii.-lxiii.

[2] I say nothing here on the disputed question of early Irish decorative art, on which I have reached no decided opinions.

Ireland, like the civilisation of Anglo-Saxon England, was incapable of progress beyond a certain point in the absence of certain political conditions and certain fresh outside influences. The course of things proved clearly enough how weak a civilising force is mere "Christianity."[1] Indeed, save in so far as the conflicting ethics of ancient Syria may be higher than that of an uncivilised race to which it is communicated, mere Christian doctrine is not a civilising agent at all; and it is quite conceivable that but for outside influences the early Irish and the Anglo-Saxons might have remained absolutely unprogressive at the intellectual and artistic level of the ninth century. Christianity can subsist fixedly at the level of semi-barbarism, just as it can at the level of a negro camp-meeting. The determining forces of Christian civilisation, so-called, have really been quite apart from the Christian religion, consisting as they did (1) among the early Irish and English in the study of language and the practice of letters which the use of the Christian literature involved, and (2) since then in the successive acquisition of non-Christian literary and scientific ideas, by way of fresh contact with ancient literature and Saracen science, and of the cumulative process of thought and discovery following on these impulses.

Christian Ireland then might well stagnate as did Christian England, in the absence of fresh contact with the progressive life of the Continent. The fatality of the Christian influence, in a primitive community where the Christian doctrines are really believed in, is that in time it positively unfits the people for self-defence against barbarian enemies. Thus the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks and the Irish alike seem to have grown collectively timorous as they grew Christian, the later Teutons being glad to buy off menacing Danes and Norsemen with tribute, while the Irish, though never overrun by the Danes as were the Saxons, were long incapable of making headway against them. Christianity, of course, did nothing to unite the tribes—less, apparently, than Druidism had done in Gaul; and there was enough in-

[1] The Duke of Argyll, while insisting on the "utter sterility of the Celtic Church as regards any good influence on the economic condition, or on the social state, or on the political organisation of the people," sets down the failure to Celticity. "The Celtic Church carried in its hands, indeed, the precious seed of Christian belief. But it carried that seed in the most earthy of all earthen vessels" (*Irish Nationalism*, pp. 16, 17). The metaphor here is obscure, but the passage at least plainly implies that it is not in the "seed" but in the "hands" or the "vessel" that the civilising force lies. That is to say, the creed in itself is impotent.

ternecine war to arrest civilisation had the Danes never appeared. On the other hand, the Danish civilisation being higher on its commercial side than the Irish, the Danish contact, but for its disastrous effect on literature, might even have been a civilising agency. In so far, then, as the case of "Ireland *versus* England" takes the shape of a claim on the Irish side that England destroyed a pre-existent Irish civilisation, it must be disallowed. The Irish tribes in the eleventh century had at last worsted the Danes, without showing any gain from the Danish influence; while on the other hand the Danes had almost destroyed the old germs of culture. It was not England that wrought the havoc.[1] The valid statement of the case is something very different. What Ireland needed for development was peaceful contact with European civilisation. What occurred instead was mere oppressive and maleficent interference on the part of England, whose rulers were at once unable so to conquer Ireland as to assimilate its polity to theirs; unfit so to administer law as to exert a moral

[1] The Duke of Argyll, rebutting the claims made for the early Christian civilisation of Ireland, has insisted that the heathen Danes were much more civilised than the Christian Irish. Coming from a Christian polemist, the proposition has weight; but it is nevertheless probably overcharged. Says the Duke:—"It is literally true that the heathen Danes, who began their invasions of Ireland in the year A.D. 795, and were finally defeated in 1014, did more, during these two hundred and nineteen years, to establish the beginnings of commerce, of wealth, and of the civilisation which depends on these, than the Celtic Church or people did during all the centuries of their previous, or of their subsequent and separate existence" (*Irish Nationalism*, pp. 17-18). Granted that the Christian Church did little, it cannot be made out that the Danes did much more. The Duke carefully cites Professor Richey as to the superior building of the Danish cities, which were fortified places; but he entirely ignores the following verdicts by the same authority:—"Little plunder could be obtained from the Celtic inhabitants, and the efforts of the [Danish] invaders were, therefore, directed against the ecclesiastical establishments. *The monastery of Armagh was rebuilt ten times, and as often destroyed.* It was sacked three times in a month. The result of these constant invasions was the extinction of the feeble sparks of civilisation which had been kindled among the monks—the schools of learning were dispersed, and the Celtic nation more disorganised than before" (*Short History of the Irish People*, p. 108). "Their [the Danes'] civilisation was not conspicuously superior to that of the natives. . . . . All the circumstances which enabled the colony of Marseilles to exercise so beneficial an influence in southern Gaul were utterly wanting to the Danish trading towns" (*Id.*, p. 110). "No civil wars could have produced the ruin and national and moral deterioration which were the result of the first invasion and continued presence of the Danes" (*Id.*, p. 112).

influence without a military; and incapable of the wisdom or generosity of leaving the Irish populations to their own devices. It is not necessary to put the argument in the form of a charge of premeditated wickedness against the successive rulers of England, though it is important to remember that their doings were very much on a par with those which many Englishmen characterise as wicked in the case of foreign powers in modern times. The Turkish Porte never misused opportunities more grossly, or maintained its authority with more heartless egoism, than did the rulers of England in their dealings with Ireland during five hundred years. But if we want simply to understand the matter, instead of dealing out denunciation, which in such a case can now have little corrective value for anybody, it may suffice to say that the relation set up between England and Ireland was from the first an immense fatality, such as would have been ruinous—and this is the great point to be enforced here—such as would have been ruinous to the development of *any civilisation and any race whatever*, placed as Ireland was. The business of a rational historian to-day is not to convict dead Englishmen of evil-doing, but to show living Englishmen how things worked together for evil in Ireland under their ancestors, and how impossible it is that things in Ireland should ever go well unless they absolutely rise above their ancestors' point of view.

What would conceivably have happened in Ireland but for inconclusive English interference, was the normal process of subjugation of warring septs by a ruler of military capacity.[1] There seems no other way by which a primitive pastoral and hunting people, divided into hostile groups, can reach a progressive state of peaceful agriculture and industry. Certainly the Irish population had taken a long time to approach the solution. But the Anglo-Saxons had not reached it at the time of the Norman Conquest, after five or six hundred years of miserable experiment. In either case it could probably have been reached only by way of conscious imitation of the doings of more civilised rulers, and by employment of some of their means, as the Teutonic leaders and kings were led to the idea of empire by the spectacle of that of Rome. That the Irish should not have spontaneously attained to the Roman solution was clearly due to no special incapacity for it, but rather to the fact of the natural difficulties in the way[2]—difficulties which

[1] Compare Hallam, *Const. Hist.*, 10th ed., iii. 348, 365; Lecky, *History of Ireland*, i. 3, and Maine, *Early History of Institutions*, p. 54.

[2] "Although compact in form, and not intersected by mountain ranges of

cannot be said to have existed to anything like the same extent in Anglo-Saxon England. To this day Ireland is a country not easy to traverse, and in the days of enormous bogs and enormous forests it was much worse. Even in the sixteenth century, the English armies found it extremely hard to overrun. That a native ruler or series of rulers, with no precedents to guide them, should have kept such a land in steady subjection would have been miraculous. But even as the much more physically-divided Greece could at length be brought into subject unity, after ages of division, by the advance of military and administrative skill, so might Ireland have been, especially after the famous precedent created by Brian.

In that way the mere example of the Norman Conquest of England might very well have served to set up a definite unifying movement in Ireland. If even the Norman Conquest had effectively extended to Ireland, the fusion there could have been at least as complete as in England. But what happened, as everybody knows, was a process of merely partial interference, which left Ireland always chained to England as it were by one foot, unable to scramble to even such measure of equilibrium as was attained in England and Scotland. Every possible adjustment was sure to be tripped up by a jerk of English intervention. For the English ruler, living out of touch with the Irish population, never came to regard them as his fathers had soon learned to regard the Saxon population of England —as subjects and neighbours to be arranged with and to be assimilated. This belonged to the physical circumstances. To understand the relation between England and Ireland, it is important to remember at all times the simple fact, that in respect of difficulty of intercourse *Ireland is much further away from England than France, and Dublin much further away from London than Paris.* The "estranging sea," by rupturing the tissue of contacts which means unity in a State as in an organism, made it predestinately impossible that one pulse of regular life should ever run from England to Ireland, even as the same factor made it impossible that England should maintain her later conquests in France. Even to-day the mere geographical aloofness of Ireland and England counts for a great deal in limiting acquaintanceship; and in days of scanty

unusual elevation, it [Ireland] is broken up into several distinct districts without means of easy communication; and its political divisions, and the fortune of each of them, are clearly referable to physical conditions" (Richey, as cited, p. 11).

navigation it must have counted for much more. Added to difference of language, it set the politics of the two countries, under their single nominal king, fatally at variance; and despite some isolated steps towards statesman-like courses, the relation settled down into one of cat and dog. This was recognised by one of the English writers who began to consider the case reasonably three hundred years ago. "It was manifest," says Sir John Davies, the Attorney-General of James I. for Ireland, in his *Discovery of the True Causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued* (1612)—"It was manifest that such as had the government of Ireland under the crown of England did intend to make a perpetual separation and enmity between the English and Irish, pretending, no doubt, that the English should in the end root out the Irish." But as the sentiment of race hostility is essentially unintelligent, it needs not, to feed upon, any real difference of heredity—not even, as later history shows, the real distinction set up by difference of language. It was doubly impossible to "root out the Irish," because the simple factors of remoteness and separateness at once began to raise up new "Irish" in the persons of the English settled in Ireland. Indeed we may say with perfect confidence that *if in the twelfth century all the native Irish had been utterly exterminated, the "Irish trouble" would in great measure have afterwards gone on just as it has done.* That the English conquerors, once settled in Ireland, became "more Irish than the Irish themselves," is one of the commonplaces of British history. In virtue of being a commonplace it has of course never availed to check the habit of generalising on "the Irish character" and "the Celt;" though it at once convicts all such generalisations of nonsense.

It is indeed a great lesson on the real forces of universal politics, to realise how the blind egoism of the Norman conquerors to begin with, and of the English governments in later ages, turned to naught the very aspirations that moved them. In England there was gradually wrought an immense compromise—the adoption by the conquerors of the language of the conquered, the common people, who did nearly all the work. In Ireland the same thing inevitably took place, since the handful of mailed conquerors were dependent on the natives for all manner of service, while the natives had nothing to gain from learning the speech of their masters. Every Norman baron's child would learn Irish from his nurses and his grooms, as his cousins learned English in England. But where in England the result was a fairly homogeneous population, divided only by status, in Ireland

it meant, by reason of the chronic influx of new English, the maintenance of the sharp line set up by difference of speech, involving difference of tradition, law, literature, sympathy, ideals.

The native population, clearly, had plenty of reproductive animal vigour. Before the Norman Conquest (1014), it had overthrown the Danes. In the following centuries the natural assimilation of the English minority would gradually have made Ireland wholly "Irish." The English Pale, the line within which English law was administered, and Irishmen were treated as worse than outlaws, always tended to recede towards Dublin, and would inevitably have disappeared but for the chronic reintervention of the English kings, using their power to "keep open the wound." And, to worsen matters, there was the added evil that the English garrison, new and old, was largely made up of an anti-social type. Immeasurably more real than distinctions of race are the differences set up in communities by certain processes of social selection. In such enterprises as the conquest of Peru by Pizarro, and the invasion of Ireland by Strongbow, there come to the front certain semi-criminal types, the types of the restless adventurer and the outlaw, men blood-stained and ostracised, men eager for wealth without toil, bent on ruling others but little given to ruling themselves. And in every fresh infusion of English blood in Ireland, down till the seventeenth century, there was a large share of that type of character. It is easy, of course, to exaggerate its effect in a community. Leaders of nominally unspotted character have frequently been guilty, in Ireland as elsewhere, of atrocities which no Pizarro could outdo; and experience seems to show that the posterity of the unstable and criminal types, when duly mixed with other stocks, tends to become normal. It is clear, however, that at the time of first contact the interlopers would always be prone to violence and all manner of unconscientiousness, and would thus help to keep up in Ireland that atmosphere of distrust and animosity, uncertainty and passion, which belonged to the old state of tribal strife to start with, and which the institution of the Pale had malignly conserved.[1] On scanning

[1] As against hostile English accounts of Irish character, it is interesting to note an old Irish proverbial opinion of the English with whom they came in contact:

> "With one of English race no friendship make:
> Shouldst thou, destruction will thee overtake;
> He'll lie in wait to ruin thee when he can:
> Such is the friendship of an English man."

Hardiman, *History of Galway*, 1820, p. 68, translating from the Erse.

Irish history down to the Parliamentary period, we shall find that scarcely a generation passed without England's doing something to recreate the evil.

The advantage of a strong monarchy in the Middle Ages was that it checked feudal anarchy. But the English monarchy in Ireland never attained this end. Its own fiefs were at chronic strife among themselves, the Norman barons having from the first reproduced the state of things formerly on foot among the natives; and the king was in the nature of the case rather pleased than otherwise. Strife among the barons prevented the growth of a common interest, which would naturally tend to be Irish, and to alienate Ireland from English rule. It was not to the king's interest even to check the tyrannies of his Anglo-Irish vassals over their native retainers: the real danger in his eyes was that the barons should assimilate too closely to the natives, and so cease to be English. This state of mind was exhibited by Henry II., at the very moment of the conquest; and it seems never to have passed away. The English crown appears to have been constantly in a state of jealous suspicion even of its own official representatives at Dublin; for it stands on record that in the thirteenth century Ireland had forty-six lord-lieutenants, in the fourteenth century ninety-five, and in the fifteenth century eighty-five.[1] Such a statistic tells volumes of the system of government. To develop Irish civilisation, to hold the balances between the races and between the barons, to put law on a sound footing and promote the spirit of peace, was a task for the most patient statesmanship. But whether a lord-deputy of Ireland were competent or not it was all the same; he could effect nothing of importance before he was recalled; and the tendency in England would be to recall him the sooner, the more desirous he seemed to be of doing any good.

The first thought of any intelligent viceroy in Ireland, we might suppose, would be to equalise the laws and make intercourse between the races easy and peaceful. This was doubtless proposed by some; though it is hard to trace in the history of the English administration before the end of the fifteenth century a gleam of intelligent statesmanship. So far from revealing any "innate" English political faculty, that history reveals an almost inconceivable destitution of such faculty. After the failure of the first attempts to rule Ireland on English lines, with no machinery of legal adaptation and conciliation, it became a first principle with the English government to prevent the extension

[1] Lappenberg, cited by Hassencamp, *History of Ireland*, Eng. tr., p. 4.

of English law to the natives, much more to avoid any working compromise between the two systems. It cannot indeed be said that the English government even at the outset really sought to bring its laws to bear on the native Irish. By the latter, we are told, the early laws "were not taken notice of," but "the English Government made no attempt to enforce them."[1] It is thus peculiarly absurd to blame the Irish race in mass for remaining so long under their own primitive laws. Many of them seem to have been at one time very willing to come under the English laws, and permission was refused,[2] save by way of special charters to individuals, which, though numerous, emphasised the general exclusion. One of the landmarks in the record is the "Statute of Kilkenny," passed in 1367, in the reign of Edward III. By this amazing edict it was enacted that any Englishman in Ireland who should (1) connect himself with the Irish either by marriage or sponsorship, or (2) sell a horse or armour to an Irishman, or (3) present a Church living to an Irishman, or (4) receive an Irishman into a monastery, or (5) give hospitality to an Irish

[1] *Historical Review of the Legislative Systems Operative in Ireland*, by the Rt. Hon. J. T. Ball, ed. 1889, p. 6.

[2] Despite the abundant rewriting of Irish history in modern times, this point remains obscure. Beaumont (*L'Irlande*, 7e édit., i. 40) puts it that the natives had "no disposition to accept the new law of the victor," but his sole authority is the statement of Leland (*History of Ireland*, 1773, i. 225) that they "neither *claimed* nor enjoyed the benefits of the English constitution." Hassencamp (p. 5) expressly asserts that "the benefit of English laws was denied to the Irish, although they specially requested that it might be extended to them;" but he only gives a general reference to Davies. The truth seemingly lies about mid-way between these statements. Leland somewhat confusedly states (i. 225-226, text and note) that "a few of the most peaceable" of the Irish in the reign of Henry III. sued for "a royal patent by which they might enjoy the rights of English subjects," and were "admitted by the king to a participation of these rights, *notwithstanding they were denied to their countrymen in general;*" going on to say: "*There are innumerable records of these grants made to individuals of Irish race.*" And he cites some of the documents. From all this it is clear that a general amalgamation might have been effected if the English authorities had had the requisite patience and capacity, and if they had been prepared to begin by using the native language, as their descendants do to-day in India, trusting to natural interest to secure the later acceptance of the tongue of the more civilised nation. It does not appear that the native Irish chiefs were ever, save in very rare instances, invited to attend the Irish Parliaments; and if they showed disinclination for such attendance, the Norman barons did exactly the same thing. In the case of the latter, fines for non-attendance were imposed from an early period. (Ball, *Legislative Systems*, as cited, pp. 10, 263.)

bard, should be held guilty of high treason and be put to death accordingly; while (6) an Englishman who should take an Irish name, or (7) wear the moustache (then an Irish peculiarity), or (8) wear the Irish costume, was to be punishable by imprisonment and confiscation of property. Such legislation obviously excluded all notion of assimilation between the peoples; and it was not a new departure, for already it had been enacted (1) that no Irishman should hold any ecclesiastical preferment, or (2) be admissible as a witness in a court of law.[1] It has been claimed for these statutes that they aimed rather at maintaining English law among an English population which tended to lapse rapidly into barbarism[2] than at injuring the natives, who remained under their own laws; and no doubt the object was rather to sustain English civilisation than to depress Irish. But it is obvious that a system which admitted of no legal arrangement between the two portions of the Irish population could only serve to drive the minority still more in the direction of the majority; and this was what actually happened, the Statute turning out to be a total failure from the point of view of its framers. The English area steadily shrank, as measured by the range of English speech and institutions. There was all the difference in the world between this half-inert clinging of a feudal power, itself but half-civilised, to a territory which it could not administer, and the all-assimilating sway of Rome, which sent the fibres of its puissant organisation to the furthest corners of its empire, imposing its speech and its laws, its arts and its method, on all races alike. The contact of the half-impotent intruder and the unsubdued native seems to have been purely mischievous to both alike,[3] the intruder always tending to lapse to the culture level of the old population, while the latter, instead of gaining from the culture-contact, learned only to associate outside civilisation with antagonism. It was a mere deadlock.

The worst of the case was that the normal decadence of the English element was never allowed to reach the stage of dissolution, as it would have done had the elements in Ireland been left to themselves. From the moment of disillusion after the Conquest, the English population tended to drift back; but the

[1] Hassencamp, citing Theiner's *Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum historiam illustrantia* (Rome, 1864), p. 16.

[2] See the subject very judicially discussed by Professor Richey, *Short History*, pp. 207-214.

[3] "The English Government during this period was a source of unmixed evil to the country" (Richey, p. 218).

English Government would not, could not let the problem so solve itself. When disgusted holders of land grants, large and small, anticipating thus early the fatal absenteeism of later times, came back to England, leaving their lands to be managed or captured as might be,[1] they were met with menaces of fine and confiscation. The king could not consent to let English fief lands be quietly retaken by the natives, and already in 1353 we find laws passed to punish and prevent withdrawals.[2] Even these would have failed to fasten an unwilling English population to the soil, were it not that the king had always the resource of instating new adventurers,[3] there being at all times plenty of men of broken fortunes ready to clutch at any means of restoring them. Thus the incessant decay of the English garrison was chronically repaired, bad material tending to be replaced by worse, all for the sake of maintaining, in accordance with feudal ideals, the phantom dignity of the overlord, while the mass of the Irish people, neither forced under nor attracted to the rule of feudal civilisation, but rather held at the spear's length and taught to see in the intruder the worst of enemies, remained absolutely unprogressive.

This is substantially the history of the Anglo-Irish connection for over three hundred years. During the greater part of that time, indeed, civilisation had made but small advance in England. On the side of literature, it had gone back from the rich accomplishment of Chaucer to a state of almost abortion under the long storms of chronic civil war; and only in respect of a slow extension of commerce and the arts of life had there been any growth. Thus when, under Henry VII., there was set at work in Ireland the forcible rule which had begun to work stability and to shelter progress in England, it might have been held that the possibilities of the dependency were not so very far behind those of the main State. Sir Edward Poynings' Act of 1495, framed by that Lord Deputy with a retrospective eye to the various attempts of Anglo-Irish to renew the Wars of the Roses, in which they had shared, had the effect of making the Irish Parliament entirely subordinate to that of England, decreeing as it did that an Irish Parliament should not even be convoked until all the proposed bills had been seen and sanctioned by the English Privy Council, and that

[1] Richey, pp. 182-184.

[2] *Id.*, p. 206. Hassencamp (p. 4) asserts that "no effort was made to retain the landlords on their estates." On the next page he shows that an effort *was* made.

[3] Richey, p. 186.

the bills so authorised must be either passed or rejected without alteration. At the same time, all the recent English statutes were decreed to be applicable in Ireland.[1] Here of course there was small prospect of self-development for Ireland; but in the circumstances of the time the gain from the restriction of the oppressive powers of the Anglo-Irish nobility, who were now forced like the English to limit their feudal following, was probably greater than any harm arising from the checking of their schemes of legislation. The mass of the people were apparently no worse off, if not actually better. And in the next reign, the regal conscientiousness which is at times as notable in the rule of Henry VIII. as his lawless egoism, gave rise to some vigorous efforts towards good government in Ireland. The state of the country was in many respects very like that of Germany at the same period, private war being chronic;[2] and a strong government was the likeliest civilising force conceivable in the circumstances. Henry was nearly as remarkable, in his day, for his lenity towards the common people as for his ferocities towards his dignitaries and his wives; and as he was in England, so he was in Ireland. "As regards his Irish policy," Dr Richey decides, "his State papers disclose a moderation, a conciliating spirit, a respect for the feelings of the Celtic population, a

[1] This had already been done by an Act of Edward IV.; and the principle had long been held to apply in a general way. See Hallam, *Const. Hist.*, 10th ed., iii. 362, *note*.

[2] The Duke of Argyll, after citing from Professor Richey, with other details, the crowning item that in 1524 "the cities of Cork and Limerick carried on a war against each other by sea and land, sent ambassadors, and concluded a treaty of peace," goes on: "*In short, civilised society did not exist in Ireland*" (*Irish Nationalism*, p. 147). The idea thus conveyed will probably be considerably modified when it is remembered that a similar state of things existed in the Germany of Luther, where, despite repeated imperial enactments against private war, the practice was still common in the first half of the sixteenth century, having been normal in the fifteenth. Thus Goetz von Berlichingen, who flourished 1480-1562, declared war in 1513 against the city of Nürnberg, and took many merchants prisoners; and in the previous year the Diet complained of innumerable similar acts among individuals, private citizens attacking, kidnapping, imprisoning, blinding, selling, and assassinating their enemies. In 1519, again, Ulrich of Würtemberg made war on the free town of Reutlingen, captured it, and held it till dispossessed by the Swabian League. (Cp. Pütter, *Historical Development of the Germanic Empire*, Eng. tr., 1790, 1, 91, 378-379; Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, 3te Aufl., Cap. 364, *Städtische Unruhen;* Kohlrausch, *Hist. of Germany*, Cap. xv., xvi., Eng. tr., 1844, pp. 339, 343, 354; Hallam, *Europe during the Middle Ages*, ch. v., one-vol. ed., pp. 368-375.)

sympathy with the poor, which no subsequent English ruler has ever displayed."[1] But whatever were the normal possibilities of a well-meaning despotism in Ireland—and the clear failure in England to solve the pressing economic problems of the time leaves the case very doubtful—Henry had already sown the seed of a new growth of evil which was destined to turn all good hopes for Ireland to despair.

Of all the elements of strife with which civilisation has been cursed, the most inveterate and the most malignant is that of religious hate; and this new curse it was that Henry unchained for Ireland when he effected what is called the Reformation in England. That act, so far as his reign was concerned, was simply the expression of his determination to be ecclesiastically as well as politically the master in his own realm. In creed and ritual he was an orthodox Roman Catholic to the last, having no more sympathy with the new Protestant doctrines than he had felt when he called on Ludwig of Bavaria to burn together Luther and his works.[2] And inasmuch as his determining motive was simply his need to control the marriage law to his domestic exigencies, he had at first no concern to attempt any such measures of ecclesiastical change in Ireland as he carried out in England. At home, the readiness of his personal adherents to enrich themselves with Church property gave him the motive power he needed: in Ireland, there was little of the kind to do; and what was done followed on the suppression of the Geraldine rebellion. And whereas there gradually grew up in England in his despite, and afterwards in despite of his daughters, a Protestantism of creed and ritual, there was in the Ireland of that age no possibility of a similar growth. It was not at all a question of race, as we are so often told: it was a question simply of economic conditions and of culture-stage.

When we turn from the racial and other formulas commonly offered to explain the course of the Reformation, and seek instead an explanation in terms of real social forces, we find that the problem broadly resolves itself into one of a varying balance of interests. In Italy and Spain, as elsewhere, there were outbreaks of the critical spirit which underlay the Reformation; but in these countries, roughly speaking, the ecclesiastical interest was far too powerful in point of wealth and numbers to be over-

[1] *Short History*, p. 268.

[2] Letter of 20th May, 1521, cited from Gerdes by Tytler, *Life of Henry VIII.*, p. 134.