

In Portugal, as in Spain, the period of incipient political decay is the period of brilliant literature; the explanation being that in both cases middle-class and upper-class incomes were still large and the volume of trade great, there being thus an economic demand for the arts, while the administration was becoming inept and the empire weakening. In both cases, too, there was less waste of energy in war than in the ages preceding. As Lope de Vega and Calderon build up a brilliant drama after the Armada and the loss of half the Netherlands, and Velasquez is sustained by Philip IV, so Camoens writes his epic, Gil Vicente his plays, and Barros his history, in the reign of John III, when Portugal is within a generation of being annexed to Spain, and within two generations of being bereft of her Asiatic empire by the Dutch. At such a stage, when wealth still abounds, and men for lack of science are indifferent to such phenomena as multiplication of slaves and rural depopulation, a large city public can evoke and welcome literature and art. It was so in Augustan Rome. And the sequel is congruous in all cases.

Mr. Morse Stephens in this connection affirms (*Portugal*, p. 259) that "it has always been the case in the history of a nation which can boast of a golden age, that the epoch of its greatest glory is that in which its literature chiefly flourished.It was so with Portugal. The age which witnessed the careers of its famous captains and conquerors was also the age of its greatest poets and prose writers." The proposition on inquiry will be found to be inaccurate in its terms and fallacious in its implications. As thus: (1) Greek literature is, on the whole, at its highest in the period of Plato, Aristophanes, Euripides, and Aristotle; while the period of "glory" or expansion must be placed either earlier or later, under Alexander, when the golden age of literature is past. (2) The synchronism equally breaks down in the case of Rome. There is little literature in the period of the triumph over Carthage; and literature does not go on growing after Augustus, despite continued military "glory." Trajan had neither a Horace nor a Virgil. (3) In England the "glory" of Marlborough's victories evokes Addison, not Shakespeare, who does most of his greatest work under James I. And though Chaucer chanced to flourish under Edward III, there is no fine literature whatever alongside of the conquests of Henry V. (4) In Germany, Schiller and Goethe, Fichte and Hegel, wrote in a period of political subordination, and Heine before the period of Bismarckism. Who are the great writers since? (5) In France, the period of Napoleon is nearly blank of great writers. They abounded after the fall of his empire and the loss of his

conquests. (6) The great literary period of Spain begins with the decline of the Spanish empire. (7) The great modern literature of the Scandinavian States has arisen without any national "glory" to herald it.

N. It is hardly necessary to bring further evidence. It remains only to point out that in Portugal itself the brilliant literary reign is not the period of discovery, since all the great exploration had been done before John III came to the throne. It is true that the retrospect of an age of conquest and effort *may* stimulate literature in a later generation; but the true causation is in a literary plus a social sequence, though the arrest of literary development is always caused socially and politically. Portuguese and Spanish literature and drama alike derive proximately from the Italian Renaissance. When both polities were in full decadence, with the Inquisition hung round their necks, their intellectual life necessarily drooped. But it is pure fallacy to suppose—and here Mr. Stephens would perhaps acquiesce—that a period of new conquest is *needed* to elicit new and original literature. Homer, Plato, Dante, Boccaccio, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Bacon, Molière, Voltaire, Goethe, Leopardi, Poe, Balzac, Heine, Flaubert, Hawthorne, Tourguenief, Ruskin, Ibsen—these are in no rational sense by-products of militarism or "expansion." Given the right social and economic conditions, Spain and Portugal may in the twentieth century produce greater literature than they ever had, without owning a particle of foreign empire any more than do Sweden and Norway.

ex. The causes of the decline of the Portuguese empire are very apparent. At the best, with its narrow economic basis in home production, it would have had a hard struggle to beat off the attack of the Dutch and English; but the royal policy, reducing all Portuguese life to dependence on the throne, had withered the national energies before the Dutch attack was made. Hence the easy fall of the crown to Philip of Spain when, the succession failing, he chose to grasp it (1581): the nation had for the time lost the power of self-determination; and under the Spanish dominion the Portuguese possessions in the Indies were defended against the Dutch and English with but a moiety even of the energy that a Portuguese king might have elicited. So the imposing beginnings came well-nigh to naught, the Portuguese empire lasting in its entirety, as a trade monopoly, for just a hundred years. Within the first thirty or forty years of the seventeenth century Dutch and English, Moslems, and even Danes, had captured from Spain-ruled Portugal the Moluccas, Java, most of its Indian territory, its Persian and Chinese settlements, and much of the coast of Brazil; and the

two former enemies harried at sea what Oriental trade it had kept. The rest of the Indian settlements were lost in the next generation. "Empire" had run for Portugal the usual course.

It was at this stage that the new life of the nation began. In 1640 came the successful revolt against Spain; and the Dutch power in Brazil, which had seemed decisively established under Prince Maurice of Nassau, was entirely overthrown within ten years after his recall in 1644. In Portugal the revolution was primarily the work of the nobility, exasperated by Spanish arrogance and exclusiveness; but they were effectually supported by the people for the same reason; and the state of Spain, financially decrepit and embroiled in war abroad and rebellion in Catalonia, left the new dynasty of Braganza able to maintain itself, with French help, against the clerical and other elements of pro-Spanish reaction. The overthrow of the Dutch in Brazil was almost against the new king's will, for they had at first supported him against Spain; but the movement there was as spontaneous, and fully as well justified, as the revolt at home against Spain itself.

§ 2. *The Colonisation of Brazil*

Brazil was and is in fact for Portugal the analogue to the North American colonies of Britain. Where "empire" was sought in the Indies as a means of revenue, savage Brazil, after the gold-seeking rush of 1530 which first raised it above the status of a penal settlement, was a colony, resorted to by men—many of them Jews—seeking freedom from the Inquisition, and men driven from the soil by slave-labour seeking land to till for their own subsistence.¹ All things considered, it has been one of the soundest processes of colonisation in history. The low state of the autochthonous inhabitants is sufficient proof of Buckle's proposition that there the combination of great heat and great moisture made impossible a successful primary civilisation, nature being too unmanageable for the natural or primitive man.² The much higher development of pre-European civilisation not only in Mexico and Peru but among the North American Indians³ can be explained in no other way.

*Natural
conditions
in Brazil.*

¹ Stephens, pp. 227, 228.

² *Introduction*, 3-vol. ed. i, 103-108; 1-vol. ed. pp. 60-61. The formula of heat and moisture, however, applies only generally. One of the climatic troubles of the great province of Ceará in particular is that at times there is no wet season, and now and then even a drought of whole years. See ch. iii, *Climatologie*, by Henri Morize, in the compilation *Brésil en 1889*, pp. 41, 42.

³ Cp. the extremely interesting treatises of Mr. Lucien Carr, *The Mounds of the Mississippi Valley* (Washington, 1893), *The Position of Women among the Huron-Iroquois Tribes* (Salem, 1884), and on the *Food and Ornaments of Certain American Indians* (Worcester, Mass., 1895-97).

ex. (But that science may not in time so exploit the natural forces as to turn them to the account of a high tertiary civilisation is an assumption we are not entitled to make, though Buckle apparently inclined to it. When he wrote, the population of Brazil was computed at six millions. To-day it stands at over twenty-three millions;¹ and in Brazil the prospect has never been reckoned otherwise than hopeful. The progress all along, relatively to the obstacles, has been so great that there is no visible ground for anticipating any arrest in the near future.

In Brazil, from the first, individual and collective energy had the chance that the royal monopoly denied to the Asiatic settlements. There was here no exigible revenue to arrange for; and the first colonists, being left to themselves, set up local self-government with elected military magistrates called captains²—an evolution more remarkable than any which took place in the first century of English colonisation in North America. The first governor-general sent out, Alfonso de Sousa, had the wisdom to preserve and develop the system of captaincies;³ and colonisation went steadily on throughout the century. It was first sought, as a matter of course, to enslave the natives; but the attempt led only to a race-war such as grew up later in the New England colonies; and in the Catholic as later in the Protestant colonies resort was had to the importation of negroes, already so common as slaves in Portugal. With a much slower rate of progress, the Brazilians have in the end come much better than the North Americans out of the social diseases thus set up.

In the first place, the Jesuits had a missionary success among the aborigines such as the Puritans never approached in North America, thus eventually arresting the race-struggle and securing the native stock as an element of population—a matter of obvious importance, in view of the factor of climate. And whereas the labours of the Jesuits in India had been turned to naught by the Inquisition which they brought in their train, Brazil was by the wisdom of the early governors saved from that scourge.⁴ Thus fortunately restrained by the civil power, the Jesuits did a large part of the work of civilising Brazil. So long as the stage of race-war lasted—and till far on in the seventeenth century it was

¹ Increase of eight millions since 1890.

² Stephens, p. 225.

³ Mr. Stephens (p. 226) states that there were created three vast "chief captaincies." Baron de Rio-Branco, in his *Esquisse de l'histoire du Brésil*, in the compilation *Brésil en 1889*, specifies a division by the king (1532-35) into twelve hereditary captaincies. Both statements seem true. The policy of non-interference was wisely adhered to by later governors, though Thomas de Sousa (*circa* 1550) introduced a necessary measure of centralisation.

⁴ Stephens, pp. 231, 232.

chronic and murderous¹—they strove to protect the natives whom they converted.² It is noteworthy, too, that just before expelling the Jesuit order from Portugal in 1759, by which time it had become a wealthy and self-seeking trading corporation in Brazil,³ the Marquis of Pombal secured the emancipation in Brazil⁴ of all the Indians who had there been enslaved as a result of the old race-wars, thus giving effect to a law which the Jesuits had got passed in 1680 without being able to enforce it against the slave-owners.⁵ And it is apparently due in part to the culture they maintained⁶ that, though the emancipation of the negroes was to be delayed till late in the nineteenth century, an energetic plea was made for them by a Portuguese advocate of Batria at the time of the emancipation of the Indians.⁷ Their own degeneration into a wealth-amassing corporation was an exact economic duplication of the process that had occurred in Europe among all the monastic and chivalrous orders of the Middle Ages in succession.⁸

In the eighteenth century Brazil, still limited, for its direct trade, to Portugal, so prospered that the loss of empire in Asia was much more than compensated even to the royal revenue of Portugal; the new discoveries of gold bringing for a time as much as £300,000 a year to the treasury under the system by which, the goldfields remaining free to their exploiters, the crown received a fifth of the total export.⁹ The trouble was that the influx of gold in Portugal, as in Spain, paralysed industry; and the country became poorer in a double ratio to its bullion revenue;¹⁰ and not till this was scientifically realised could a sound polity be raised. But in Portugal itself, after the advent of the anti-clerical Marquis of Pombal, there went on as striking a regeneration of government (1750–77) as occurred in Spain under Charles III; and though the storms of the French Revolution, and the tyrannous reactions which followed it, fell as heavily on Portugal as on the rest of the peninsula, its lot is to-day hopeful enough. In common with those of Spain and Italy, its literature shows plenty of fresh intellectual life; and, again as in their case, its worst trouble is a heritage of bad finance, rather than

¹ Baron de Rio-Branco, *Esquisse*, as cited, pp. 127–32.

² *Id.* p. 149; Stephens, p. 231.

³ Stephens, p. 359.

⁴ By decree of June, 1755. Conde da Carnota, *The Marquis of Pombal*, as cited, p. 40.

⁵ Rio-Branco, p. 132. ⁶ As to which see Rio-Branco, p. 149.

⁷ *Id.* p. 148.

⁸ As to this see the author's *Dynamics of Religion*, pp. 24–27; and *Short History of Freethought*, 2nd ed. i, 375 sq.

⁹ Stephens, pp. 348, 376.

¹⁰ This is very trenchantly set forth in one of the writings of the Marquis of Pombal, given by Carnota in his memoir, pp. 75–77. Pombal was on this head evidently a disciple of the French physiocrats, or of Montesquieu, who lucidly embodies their doctrines on money (*Esprit des Lois*, 1748, xxi, 22; xxii, 1 sq.). On the general question of the impoverishment of Portugal by her American gold and silver mines, cp. Carnota pp. 4, 72–73, 207.

any lack of progressive intelligence. With sound government, the large outlet offered by Brazil to emigration should make Portugal a place of plenty—if, that is, its burden of debt be not too great. But herein lies a problem of special importance for the people of Great Britain. Portugal, like Britain, began to accumulate a national debt in the period of chronic European war; but between 1850 and 1890 the sum had actually multiplied tenfold, rising from twenty-five to two hundred and fifty-eight millions of milreis; and at the close of 1910 it stood at over one thousand millions, the interest upon which constitutes two-fifths of the total national expenditure. All the while, the balance of productivity is more and more heavily on the side of Brazil. As a similar evolution may conceivably take place within the next century or two in England, it will be of peculiar interest to note how Portugal handles the problem. When the English coal supply is exhausted, a vast debt, it is to be feared, may be left to a population ill-capable of sustaining it; and the apparently inevitable result will be such a drift of population from Britain to America or Australia as now goes from Portugal to Brazil, leaving the home population all the less able to bear its financial burden. It is difficult to see how any arrangement, save a composition with creditors, can meet the Portuguese case.¹ Yet within the last twenty years Lisbon has been enormously improved; and if but the law of 1844 prescribing compulsory education could be enforced, Portuguese resources might be so developed as to solve the problem progressively. As it is, the nation is still largely illiterate—a heavy handicap.

Meanwhile Brazil, after passing from the status of colony to that of kingdom or so-called "empire," has become a republic, like the other Iberian States of South America; and throughout the nineteenth century its development has been comparatively fortunate. The flight of the Portuguese king² thither in 1808 gave it independent standing without its paying the price of war; whence came free trade with the friendly States of Europe; and when on the return of the king it insisted on maintaining its independence under his son, against the jealous effort of the Portuguese Cortes to reduce it to a group of dependent provinces,³ the tradition of freedom set up by its past prevailed. Thus the Brazilians effected peacefully what the English colonies in North America achieved only by an embittering and exhausting war; and so far as those of us can judge who are

¹ This has been repeatedly suggested. See the pamphlet of Guilherme J. C. Henriquez (W. J. C. Henry) on *Portugal*, 1880.

² This had been several times proposed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Rio-Branco, p. 154).

³ Rio-Branco, p. 163.

not at home in Portuguese literature, the culture evolution in Brazil at the date of the French Revolution had on some lines equalled that of the United States.¹ But where the United States were in educative and enriching contact with the relatively high civilisations of England and France, Brazil could still draw only on the relatively small intellectual and commercial stores of Portugal, with some addition from general commerce with Europe. It was in the latter half of the century, when intellectual influences from France had been prevalent, that Brazilian possibilities began to emphasise themselves.

North American evolution has in the nineteenth century been especially rapid because of several great economic factors: (1) the tobacco and cotton culture of the period before the civil war; (2) the very large immigration from Europe; (3) the rush for gold to California, hastening the development of the West; (4) the abundant yield of coal and iron, quickening every species of manufacture, especially after (5) a large influx of cheap European labour in the last decades of the nineteenth century. No one of these special factors has been potent in Brazil, save for the latterly rapid increase of immigration; there is no great staple of produce that thus far outgoes competition, unless it be caoutchouc; the precious metals are not now abundant; and there is practically no coal, though there is infinite iron. But these are conditions merely of a relatively slow development, not of unprogressiveness; and the presumption is that they will prove beneficent. The rapid commercial development of the United States is excessively capitalistic, in virtue largely of the factor of coal, and the consequent disproportionate stress of manufactures. The outstanding result is a hard-driven competitive life for the mass of the population, with the prospect ahead of industrial convulsions, in addition to the nightmare of the race-hatred between black and white—a desperate problem, from which Brazil seems to have been saved. There the problem of slavery was later faced than in the United States, partly, perhaps, because there the slave was less cruelly treated; but the result of the delay was altogether good. There was no civil war; the process of emancipation was gradual, beginning in 1871 and finishing with a leap in 1885–88; and no race-hatred has been left behind.² Those whose political philosophy begins and ends with a belief in the capacities of the “Anglo-Saxon race” would do well to note these facts.

¹ Cp. Rio-Branco, *Esquisse*, as cited, p. 151.

² F. J. de Santa-Anna Nery, “Travail servile et travail libre,” in vol. *Brésil en 1889*, pp. 205, 206; E. da Silva-Prado, “Immigration,” ch. xvi of same compilation pp. 489, 490.

In Brazil the process of emancipation, long favoured as elsewhere by the liberal minds,¹ was peacefully forced on by economic pressure. It was seen that slave labour was a constant check to the immigration of free labour, and therefore to the development of the country.² When this had become clear, emancipation was only a question of time. The same development would inevitably have come about in North America; and it is not a proof of any special "Anglo-Saxon" faculty for government that the process there was precipitated by one of the bloodiest wars of the modern world, and has left behind it one of the blackest problems by which any civilisation is faced. The frequent European comments on the revolutions of South America are apt to set up an illusion. All told, those crises represent perhaps less evil than was involved in the North American Civil War; and they are hardly greater moral evils than the peaceful growth of financial corruption in the North. In any case, the only revolution in Brazil since the outbreak of 1848 has been the no less peaceful than remarkable episode of 1889, which dethroned the Emperor Pedro II and made Brazil a republic. There was as much of pathos as of promise in the event, for Pedro had been one of the very best monarchs of the century; but at least the bloodless change was in keeping with his reign and his benign example,³ and may indeed be reckoned a due result of them.

In fine, Brazil—in common with other parts of South America—has a fair chance of being one day the scene of a civilisation morally and socially higher than that now evolving in North America. What may be termed the coal-civilisations, with their factitious rapidity of exploitation, are in the nature of the case relatively ugly and impermanent. That cannot well be the highest civilisation which multiplies by the myriad its serfs of the mine, and by the million its slaves of the machine. In South America the lack of coal promises escape from the worst developments of capitalism,⁴ inasmuch as labour there must be mainly spent on and served by the living processes and forces of nature, there so immeasurable and so inexhaustible of beauty. Fuel enough for sane industry is supplied by the richest woods on the planet; and the Brazilian

¹ Rio-Branco, p. 186, note.

² From 1857 to 1871, the fifteen years preceding the process of emancipation, the total immigration was only 170,000. From 1873 to 1887 it amounted to 400,000, and it has since much increased. Cp. Santa-Anna Nery, as cited, p. 212; and E. da Silva-Prado, "Immigration" as cited, pp. 489-91.

³ It is interesting to note that whereas he was, for a king, an accomplished and enlightened philosopher, of the theistic school of Coleridge, the revolutionist movement was made by the Brazilian school of Positivists. It would be hard to find a revolution in which both sides stood at so high an intellectual level.

⁴ See, in *Brésil en 1889*, the remarks of M. da Silva-Prado, p. 559.

climate, even now singularly wholesome over immense areas,¹ may become still more generally so by control of vegetation. It is a suggestive fact that there the common bent, though still far short of mastery, is in an exceptional degree towards the high arts of form and sound.² It may take centuries to evoke from a population which quietly embraces the coloured types of South America and Africa the æsthetic progress of which it is capable;³ but the very fact that these types play their physical and artistic part in the growth is a promise special to the case. And if thus the "Latin" races—for it is Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and French-speaking Belgians who chiefly make up the immigrants, though there is a German element also—build up a humanly catholic and soundly democratic life in that part of the planet most prodigally served by nature, subduing to their need the vast living forces which overpowered the primitive man, and at the same time escaping the sinister gift of subterranean fuel—if thus they build up life rather than dead wealth, they will have furthered incomparably the general deed of man. But it is part of the hope set up by the slower rate of a progress which overtakes and keeps pace with nature, instead of forestalling the yearly service of the sun, that when it reaches greatness it will have outlived the instincts of racial pride and hate which have been the shame and the stumbling-block of the preceding ages. Should "little" Portugal be the root of such a growth, her part will surely have been sufficient. But in the meantime Portugal and Brazil alike suffer from illiteracy, the bane of the Catholic countries;⁴ and that priest-wrought evil must be remedied if their higher life is to be maintained.

Until this vital drawback is removed the possible social gain to Portugal from the revolution of 1910 cannot be realised. A republic is more favourable to progress than a monarchy only in so far as it gives freer play and fuller furtherance to all forms of energy; and

¹ See the section (ch. iii) on "Climatologie," by Henri Morize, in *Brésil en 1889*; in particular the section on "Immigration" (ch. xvi) by E. da Silva-Prado, pp. 503-505.

² See, in the same volume, the section (ch. xviii) on "L'Art," by da Silva-Prado. He shows that "Le Brésilien a la préoccupation de la beauté" (p. 556).

³ The probabilities appear to be specially in favour of music, to which the native races and the negroes alike show a great predilection (*id.* pp. 545, 546). As M. da Silva-Prado urges, what is needed is a systematic home-instruction, as liberally carried out as was Pedro's policy of sending promising students of the arts to Europe. Thus far, though education is good, books have been relatively scarce because of their dearness. Here again the United States had an immense preliminary advantage in their ability to reproduce at low prices the works of English authors, paying nothing to the writers; a state of things which subsisted long after the States had produced great writers of their own.

⁴ In Portugal, "by a law enacted in 1844, primary education is compulsory; but only a small fraction of the children of the lower classes really attend school" (*Statesman's Year-Book*). In Brazil there has been great educational progress in recent years; and in 1911 a decree was issued for the reform of the school system, a Board of Education being established with control over all the schools. Education is still non-compulsory.

in the still priest-ridden Peninsula the resistance of sacerdotalism to democratic rule is a great stumbling-block. The Republic of Portugal needs time to establish itself aright. Citizens of more "advanced" countries are wont to criticise with asperity shortcomings of administration in the "new" States of our time which were fully paralleled in their own in the past. Englishmen who make comparisons between their own political system and that of countries whose constitutions have been reshaped within the present century would do well to consider the state of English government in the latter part of the eighteenth century, after a hundred years of constitutional freedom. Nay, in a country where the great parties in our own time perpetually accuse each other of gross and unscrupulous misgovernment, disparagements of the politics of countries which only recently attained self-government are obviously open to discount. Suffice it that Portugal, albeit by a *via dolorosa* of violence trodden by other peoples before her, has reaffirmed her part in the movement of civilisation towards a larger and a better life, thus giving the hundredth disproof to the formulas which deny the potentiality of advance to States which have known decadence.

PART VI

ENGLISH HISTORY DOWN TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE GREAT REBELLION

IT is after the great Civil War that English political development becomes most directly instructive, because it is thenceforward that the modern political conditions begin to be directly traceable. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchy takes at that point a virtually new departure. But we shall be better prepared to follow the play of the forces of attraction and repulsion, union and strife, in the modern period, if we first realise how in the ages of feudal monarchy and personal monarchy, as the previous periods have been conveniently named, the same fundamental forces were at work in different channels. The further we follow these forces back the better we are prepared to conceive political movement in terms of naturalist as opposed to verbalist formulas. Above all things, we must get rid of the habit of explaining each phenomenon in terms of the abstraction of itself—as Puritanism by “the Puritan spirit,” Christian civilisation by “Christianity,” and English history by “the English character.” We are to look for the causation of the Puritan spirit and English conduct and the religion of the hour in the interplay of general instincts and particular circumstances.

§ 1

At the very outset, the conventional views as to the bias of the “Anglo-Saxon race”¹ are seen on the least scrutiny to be excluded by the facts. Credited with an innate bent to seafaring, the early

¹ “The distinctive characteristics of the Saxon race—talents for agriculture, navigation, and commerce” (T. Colley Grattan, *The Netherlands*, 1830, p. 2).

Note

English are found to have virtually abandoned the sea after settling in England;¹ the new conditions altering the seagoing bent just as the older had made it, and continued to do in the case of the Scandinavians. Credited in the same fashion with a racial bias to commerce, they are found to have been uncommercial, unadventurous, home-staying; and it took centuries of continental influences to make them otherwise. Up to the fourteenth century "almost the whole of English trade was in the hands of aliens."² And of what trade the "free" Anglo-Saxons did conduct, the most important branch seems to have been the slave trade.³ As to the mass of the population, whatever were their actual life-conditions—and as to this we have very little knowledge—they were certainly not the "free barbarians" of the old Teutonic legend. Unfree in some sense they mostly were; and all that we have seen of the early evolution of Greece and Rome goes to suggest that their status was essentially depressed. In the words of a close student, English economic history "begins with the serfdom of the masses of the rural population under Saxon rule—a serfdom from which it has taken a thousand years of English economic evolution to set them free."⁴ This is perhaps an over-statement: serfdom suggests general predial slavery; and this cannot be shown to have existed. But those who repel the proposition seem to take no account of the *tendency* towards popular depression in early settled communities.⁵ If we stand by the terminology of Domesday Book, we are far indeed from the conception of a population of freemen.

That the mass of the "Saxon" English (who included many of non-Saxon descent) were more or less "unfree" is a conclusion repeatedly reached on different lines of research. Long ago, the popular historian Sharon Turner wrote that "There can be no doubt that nearly three-fourths of the Anglo-Saxon population were in a state of slavery" (*History of the Anglo-Saxons*, 4th ed. 1823, iii, 255); and he is here supported by his adversary Dunham (*Europe during the Middle Ages*, Cab. Cyc.

¹ A. L. Smith, in *Social England*, i, 201, 202. When Alfred built ships he had to get "Frisian pirates" to man them. It was clearly the new agricultural facilities of England that turned the original pirates into thorough landmen. Cp. Dr. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 3rd ed. 1896, App. E. pp. 640, 641.

² H. Hall, in *Social England*, i, 464. Cp. ii, 101; Prof. Ashley, *Introduction to English Economic History*, 1888-93, i, 111; Hallam, *Middle Ages*, 11th ed. iii, 327; Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, 1889, i, 1. When the Jews were expelled by Edward I, Lombards were installed in their place. Later, as we shall see, the Hansards seem to have tutored natives up to the point of undertaking their own commerce.

³ Cp. A. L. Smith, as cited, p. 203.

⁴ Seebohm, *The English Village Community*, 3rd ed. 1884, pref. p. ix. Cp. Prof. Ashley, *Introduction to English Economic History*, i, 13-16.

⁵ Prof. Maitland, the most circumspect opponent of the "serf" view, did not consider this when he asked (*Domesday Book and Beyond*, ed. 1907, p. 222) how either the Saxon victors could in the mass have sunk to serfdom or the conquered Britons, whose language had disappeared, could be so numerous as to constitute the mass of the population.

1834, iii, 49–52). J. M. Kemble later admitted that the “whole population in some districts were unfree” (*The Saxons in England*, reprint, 1876, i, 189). Yet another careful student sums up that “at the time of the Conquest we find the larger portion of the inhabitants of England in a state of villenage” (J. F. Morgan, *England under the Normans*, 1858, p. 61). (The interesting question of the racial elements of the population at and after the Conquest is fully discussed by the Rev. Geoffrey Hill, *Some Consequences of the Norman Conquest*, 1904, ch. i.)

Later and closer research does but indicate gradations in the status of the unfree—gradations which seem to have varied arbitrarily in terms of local law. (On this, however, see Morgan, p. 62.) The Domesday Book specifies multitudes of *villani*, *servi*, *bordarii* (or *cotarii*), as well as (occasionally) large numbers of *sochmanni*, and *liberi homines*. In Cornwall there were only six chief proprietors, with 1,738 *villani*, 2,441 *bordarii*, and 1,148 *servi*; in Devonshire, 8,246 *villani*, 4,814 *bordarii*, and 3,210 *servi*; in Gloucestershire, 3,071 *villani*, 1,701 *bordarii*, and 2,423 *servi*; while in Lincolnshire there were 11,322 *sochmanni*, 7,168 *villani*, 3,737 *bordarii*; and in Norfolk 4,528 *villani*, 8,679 *bordarii*, 1,066 *servi*, 5,521 *sochmanni*, and 4,981 *liberi homines*. (Cp. Sharon Turner, as cited, vol. iii, bk. viii, ch. 9.) Thus the largest numbers of ostensible freemen are found in the lately settled Danish districts, and the largest number of slaves where most of the old British population survived (Ashley, *Economic History*, 1888, i, 17, 18; Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 1891, i, 88). “The eastern counties are the home of liberty” (Maitland, *Domesday Book and Beyond*, p. 23). The main totals are: *bordarii*, 82,119; *villani*, 108,407; *servi*, 25,156; that is, 215,000 heads of families, roughly speaking, all of whom were more or less “unfree,” out of an entire enumerated male population of 300,000.

The constant tendency was to reduce all shades to one of *nativi* or born villeins (Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, 4th ed. i, 465); that is to say, the number of absolute serfs tends to lessen, their status being gradually improved, while higher grades tend to be somewhat lowered. Prof. Vinogradoff's research, which aims at correcting Mr. Seebohm's, does but disclose that villenage in general had three aspects:—“Legal theory and political disabilities would fain make it all but slavery; the manorial system ensures it something of the character of the Roman *colonatus*; there is a stock of freedom in it which speaks of Saxon tradition” (*Villainage in England*, 1892, p. 137; cp. Seebohm, as cited, p. 409; and Stubbs, § 132, i, 462–65). Even the comparatively “free” socmen were tied to the land and were not independent yeomen (Ashley, i, 19); and even “freedmen” were often tied to a

specified service by the act of manumission (Dunham, as cited, iii, 51). As to Teutonic slavery in general, cp. C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, French tr. 1878, i, 41-44, and U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, Hume's ed. 1900, i, 116; as to France, cp. Guizot, *Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, édit. 1847, pp. 162-72; *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, 13e édit. iii, 172, 190-203; and as to the Netherlands, see above, pp. 295-96.

There is a tendency on the one hand to exaggerate the significance of the data, as when we identify the lot of an ancient serf or villein with that of a negro in the United States of sixty years ago;¹ and on the other hand to forget, in familiarity with scholarly research, the inevitable moral bearing of all degrees of bondage. The *villanus* "both is and is not a free man"; but the "not" is none the less morally significant: "though he may be *liber homo*, he is not *francus*";² and his name carries a slur. An immeasurable amount of moral history is conveyed in the simple fact that "slave" was always a term of abuse; that "villain" is just "villein"; that "caitiff" is just "captive"; and that "churl" is just "ceorl." So the "neif" (= *naif* = native) becomes the "knave";³ the "scullion" the "blackguard"; and the homeless wanderer the "vagabond"; even as for the Roman "the guest," *hostis*, was "the enemy." The "rogue" has doubtless a similar descent, and "rogue and peasant-slave" in Tudor times, when slavery had ceased, stood for all things contemptible. Men degrade and impoverish their fellows, and out of the created fact of deprivation make their worst aspersions; never asking who or what it is that thus turns human beings into scullions, churls, blackguards, knaves, caitiffs, rogues, and villains. The Greeks knew that a man enslaved was a man demoralised; but saw in the knowledge no motive for change of social tactics. Still less did the Saxons; for their manumissions at the bidding of the priest were but penitential acts, in no way altering the general drift of things.

Green (*Short History*, ch. i, § 6, ed. 1881, pp. 54, 55), laying stress on the manumissions, asserts that under Edgar "slavery was gradually disappearing before the efforts of the Church." But this is going far beyond the evidence. Green seems to have assumed that the laws framed by Dunstan were efficacious; but they clearly were not. (Cp. C. Edmond Maurice, *Tyler, Bale, and Oldcastle*, 1875, pp. 14-18.) Kemble rightly notes—here going deeper than Prof. Vinogradoff—that there was a constant process of new slave-making (*Saxons*, i, 183-84; cp.

¹ That the serf or villein was not necessarily an abject slave is noted by Kemble (*Saxons in England*, as cited, i, 213) and Stubbs (*Const. Hist.* 4th ed. i, 466).

² Maitland, *Domesday Book*, pp. 43, 46.

³ This seems a more probable etymology than the derivation by spelling from *Knabe*.

Maitland, p. 31); and in particular notes how "the honours and security of service became more anxiously desired than a needy and unsafe freedom" (p. 184). There is in short a law of worsenment in a crude polity as in an advanced one. Green himself says of the slave class that it "sprang mainly from debt or crime" (*The Making of England*, 1885, p. 192; cp. *Short History*, p. 13). But debt and "crime" were always arising. Compare his admissions in *The Conquest of England*, 2nd ed. pp. 444, 445. Elsewhere he admits that slaves were multiplied by the mutual wars of the Saxons (p. 13); and Kemble, recognising "crime" as an important factor, agrees (i, 186) with Eichhorn and Grimm in seeing in war and conquest the "principal and original cause of slavery in all its branches." A battle would make more slaves in a day than were manumitted in a year. Some slaves indeed, as in the Roman Empire, were able to buy their freedom (Maurice, as cited, p. 20, and refs.; Dunham, as cited, iii, 51); but there can have been few such cases. (Cp. C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, French tr. i, 41-44, as to the general tendencies of Teutonic slavery.) The clergy for a time promoted enfranchisement, and even set an example in order to widen their own basis of power; but as Green later notes (ch. v, § 4, p. 239) the Church in the end promoted "emancipation, as a work of piety, on all estates but its own." Green further makes the vital admission that "the decrease of slavery was more than compensated by the increasing degradation of the bulk of the people.....Religion had told against political independence"—for the Church played into the hands of the king.

During the Danish invasions, which involved heavy taxation (*Danegeld*) to buy off the invaders, slavery increased and worsened; and Cnut's repetition of the old laws against the foreign slave trade can have availed little (Maurice, as cited, pp. 23-24). Prof. Abdy, after recognising that before the Conquest English liberties were disappearing like those of France (*Lectures on Feudalism*, 1890, pp. 322, 326-27, 331), argues that, though the tenure of the villein was servile, he in person was not bond (App. p. 428). "Bond" is, of course, a term of degree, like others; but if "not bond" means "freeman," the case will not stand. The sole argument is that "had he been so [bond], it is difficult to understand his admission into the conference [in the procedure of the Domesday Survey] apparently on an equality with the other members of the inquest." Now he was plainly not on an equality. The inquest was to be made through the sheriff, the lord of the manor, the parish priest, the reeve, the bailiff, and *six* villeins out of each hamlet (*Id.* p. 360). It is pretty clear that the villeins were simply witnesses to check, if need were, the statements of their superiors.

The weightiest argument against the darker view of Saxon serfdom is the suggestion of the late Prof. Maitland (*Domesday Book*, p. 223) that the process of technical subordination, broadly called feudalism, was really a process of infusion of law and order. But he confessedly made out no clear case, and historical analogy is against him.

Finally, though under the Normans the Saxon slaves appear to have gained as beside the middle grades of peasants (Morgan, *England under the Normans*, p. 225; Ashley, i, 18), it is a plain error to state that the Bristol slave-trade was suppressed under William by "the preaching of Wulfstan, and the influence of Lanfranc" (Green, *Short History*, p. 55; also in longer *History*, i, 127; so also Bishop Stubbs, i, 463, *note*. The true view is put by Maurice, as cited, p. 30). The historian incidentally reveals later (*Short History*, ch. vii, § 8, p. 432, proceeding on Giraldus Cambrensis, *Expugnatio Hiberniæ*, lib. i, c. 18) that "at the time of Henry II's accession Ireland was full of Englishmen who had been kidnapped and sold into slavery, in spite of Royal prohibitions and the spiritual menaces of the English Church." (Cp. Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii, 316, *note*.) He admits, too (p. 55), that "a hundred years later than Dunstan the wealth of English nobles was sometimes said to spring from breeding slaves for the market." The "market" was for concubines and prostitutes, as well as for labourers. (Cp. Southey, *Book of the Church*, ed. 1824, i, 115, following William of Malmesbury; and Hallam, as last cited.) Gibbon justifiably infers (ch. 38, Bohn ed. iv, 227) that the children of the Roman slave market of the days of Gregory the Great, *non Angli sed angeli*, were sold into slavery by their parents. "From the first to the last age," he holds, the Anglo-Saxons "persisted in this unnatural practice." Cp. Maurice, as cited, pp. 4-5. Gregory actually encouraged the traffic in English slaves after he became Pope. (*Ep. to Candidus*, cited in pref. to Mrs. Elstoh's trans. of the Anglo-Saxon Homily, p. xi.)

Thus, under Saxon, Danish, and Norman law alike, a slave trade persisted for centuries. As regards the conditions of domestic slavery, it seems clear that the Conquest lowered the status of the half-free; but on the other hand "there was a great decrease in the number of slaves in Essex between the years 1065 and 1085" (Morgan, as cited, p. 225; cp. Maitland, p. 35).

In Saxondom, for centuries before the Conquest, "history" is made chiefly by the primitive forces of tribal and local animosity, the Northmen coming in to complicate the insoluble strifes of the earlier English, partly uniting these against them, dominating some, and getting ultimately absorbed in the population, but probably constituting for long an extra source of conflict in domestic politics.

A broad difference of accent, as in the Scandinavian States down to our own day, is often a strain on fellowship. In any case, the Anglo-Saxons at the time of the Conquest, as always from the time of their own entry, showed themselves utterly devoid of the "gift of union" which has been ascribed to their "race," as to the Roman. No "Celts" were ever more hopelessly divided: the Battle of Hastings is the crowning proof.¹ And in the absence of leading and stimulus from a higher culture, so little progressive force is there in a group of struggling barbaric communities that there was only the scantiest political and other improvement in Saxon England during hundreds of years. When Alfred strove to build up a civilisation, he turned as a matter of course to the Franks.² The one civilising force was that of the slight contacts kept up with the Continent, perhaps the most important being the organisation of the Church. It was the Norman Conquest, bringing with it a multitude of new contacts, and an entrance of swarms of French and Flemish artificers and clerics, that decisively began the civilisation of England. The Teutonic basis, barbarous as it was, showed symptoms of degeneration rather than of development. In brief, France was mainly civilised through Italy; England was mainly civilised through France.

Bishop Stubbs, after admitting as much (§ 91, i, 269, 270) and noting the Norman "genius for every branch of organisation," proceeds to say "that the Norman polity had very little substantial organisation of its own, and that it was native energy that wrought the subsequent transformation." His own pages supply the disproof. See in particular as to the legislative and administrative activity of Henry II, § 147, i, 530-33. As to the arrest or degeneration of the Saxon civilisation, cp. § 79, i, 227, 228; Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. i, 1, 73; H. W. C. Davis, *England under the Normans and the Angevins*, 1905, p. 1; Pearson, *History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, 1867, i, 288, 308-12, 321, 343, 346, 347; Abdy, as cited above. Mr. Pearson's testimony, it should be noted, is that of a partisan and eulogist of the "race."

Gneist, after deciding that the number of the unfree population "erscheint nicht übergross," admits that the dependent stratum of the population must needs always increase, "as a result of the land system. In time of war the class increased through the ruin of the small holdings; in time of peace through the increase of the landless members of families. The favourable

¹ Cp. the Rev. G. Hill, *Some Consequences of the Norman Conquest*, 1904, pp. 60-61.

² Green, *History* (the longer), 1885, i, 79.

effects of a new acquisition through conquest and booty were a gain only to the possessing class" (*Geschichte des englischen Self-Government*, 1863, p. 7). He concludes that "the social structure of the Anglo-Saxons appears to be on the whole unchanging, advancing only in the multiplication of the dependent classes." Among the symptoms of degeneration may be noted the retirement of nearly thirty kings and queens into convents or reclusion during the seventh and eighth centuries. This was presumably a result of clerical management.

In Normandy itself, however, half a century before the Conquest, there had arisen a state of extreme tension between the peasantry and their lords; and a projected rising was crushed in germ with horrible cruelty.¹ William's enterprise thus stood for a pressure of need among his own subjects, as well as for an outburst of feudal ambition; and in making up his force he offered an opportunity of plunder to all classes in his own duchy, as well as to those of other provinces of France. Domesday Book, says one of its keenest students, "is a geld book"—a survey made to facilitate taxation on the lines of the old Danegeld.² William was repeating a Roman process. His invasion, therefore, hardly represented the full play of the existing forces of civilisation. These, indeed, had to be renewed again and again in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But the conditions of the Conquest were important for the direction of English political evolution. Its first social and psychological effect was to set up new class relations, and in particular a marked division between aristocracy and people, who spoke different languages. This involved a relation of distrust and close class union. When the people's speech began to compete with that of their masters, and the nobles separately began to be on good terms with their people, there would arise wide possibilities of strife as between neighbouring nobles and their retainers; and in Scotland the weakness of the crown long gave this free play. But in England, especially after the period of anarchy under Stephen, when the early baronage was much weakened and many estates were redivided,³ the strength of the crown, rooted in military custom and constantly securing itself, tended to unite the nobles as a class for their own aggrandisement and protection. King after king, therefore, sought the support of the

¹ Thierry, *Histoire de la Conquête de l'Angleterre*, édit. 9e, 1851, i, 152-55; Duruy, *Hist. de France*, ed. 1880, i, 289.

² Maitland, *Domesday Book and Beyond*, 1907, pp. 3-5.

³ Cp. Buckle, 3-vol. ed. ii, 116, 1-vol. ed. p. 351; Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* i, 280; Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. i, 213. "The princes who lived upon the worst terms with their barons seem accordingly to have been the most liberal in grants.....to their burghs." Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. iii, ch. iii.

people¹ against the baronage, as the baronage sought their help against the king; while the Church fought for its own share of power and privilege.

The history of Christendom, indeed, cannot be understood save in the light of the fact that the Church, a continuous corporation owning much property as such, is as it were a State within the State,² representing a special source of strife, although its non-military character limits the danger. What the Church has repeatedly done is to throw in its lot with king or nobles, or with the democracy (as in Switzerland and Protestant Scotland), according as its economic interests dictate. The famous case of Becket, transformed from the king's friend into the king's antagonist, is the most dramatic instance of the Church's necessary tendency to fight for its own hand and to act as an independent community. And it is in large part to the check and counter-check of a church, crown, and baronage, all jealously standing on their rights as against each other, that the rise of English constitutionalism is to be traced; the baronage and the Church, further, being withheld from preponderance by the strifes arising within their own pale. For even the Church, unified at once by its principle, its celibacy, its self-interest, and the pressure of outside forces, exhibits in its own sections, from time to time, the law of strife among competing interests.³

The mere strife of interests, however, could not evolve civilisation in such a polity without a constant grafting-on of actual civilising elements from that southern world in which the ancient seeds were again flowering. Mere mixing of Norman with Saxon blood, one Teutonic branch with another, could avail nothing in itself beyond setting up a useful variability of type; and the element of French handicraft and culture introduced in the wake of the Conquest, though not inconsiderable,⁴ could ill survive such a pandemonium as the reign of Stephen. Like Henry I, Stephen depended on the English element as against the baronage; but the struggle brought civilisation lower than it had been since the Conquest. With the accession of Henry II (1154) came a new influx of French culture

¹ The Conqueror himself not only took pains to protect and attach native freemen who accepted his rule, but sought to retain their laws and usages. Cp. Stubbs, i, 281, 290, 298. The statement that he aimed specially at the manumission of serfs (Sharon Turner, as last cited, i, 135, 136) proceeds on a fabricated charter. That, however, is not later than Henry I.

² Cp. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, bk. xiv, ch. i.

³ *E.g.* the rivalries of mendicant friars and secular priests and monks, and of the different orders of monks and friars with each other. Cp. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, 4th ed. ix, 145, 146, 155, 156; Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, iii, 123-26, 137, etc. The strifes between popes and prelates are innumerable, in all countries.

⁴ As to this see Dr. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 3rd ed. 1896, Appendix E. Cp. Green, *Short History*, ch. ii, § 6, p. 88.

and French speech,¹ albeit without any departure from the monarchic policy of evoking the common people as against the nobles. Thenceforward for over a hundred years the administrative methods and the culture are French, down to the erection of a French-speaking Parliament by the southern Frenchman Simon de Montfort. The assumption that some inherent "Teutonic" faculty for self-government shaped the process is one of the superstitions of racial and national vanity.

Dr. C. H. Pearson's reiteration of the old "race" dogma (*History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, i, 277) is its sufficient *reductio ad absurdum*. In the English manner, he connects with old *Welsh* usages of revenge the late *Irish* tradition of "lynch law" that has been "transplanted to *America*"—as if it were Irishmen who are to-day lynching negroes in the southern States. He explains in the same way "the contrast of French progress by revolutionary movements with the slow, constitutional, onward march of English liberty." On his own showing there was not progress, but deterioration, as regards liberty among the Saxons; and the later history of the English common people is largely one of their efforts to make revolutions. In France the revolutions were rather fewer. In Denmark and Germany, again, there was long relapse and then revolution. For the rest, Mr. Pearson has contrasted *Welsh* usage of the *sixth* century with *Saxon* usage of the *eleventh*, this while admitting the lateness of the latter development (pp. 275, 276). We should require only to go back to the blood-feud stage in Teutondom to prove the ineradicable tendencies of the Anglo-Saxon to the *Faust-recht*, which in Germany survived till the sixteenth century, and to the fisticuffs which occurred in 1895 in the English Parliament. The reasoning would be on a par with Mr. Pearson's.

Mr. J. H. Round's way of taking it for granted (*The Commune of London*, 1899, pp. 138-40) that a tendency to strife is permanently and "truly Hibernian," belongs to the same order of thought. Irishmen are represented as abnormal in inability to unite against a common foe, when just such disunion was shown through whole centuries in Saxondom and in Scandinavia and in Germany; and they are further described as peculiar in leaving their commerce in foreign hands, when such was the notorious practice of the Anglo-Saxons.

One of the most remarkable reversions to the racial way of reasoning is made by Mr. H. W. C. Davis in his *England under the Normans and Angevins* (1905). After setting out with the avowal that the Anglo-Saxons at the Conquest were "decadent," he reaches (p. 223) the conclusion that the Teutonic races

¹ As to which see Earle, *Philology of the English Tongue*, 3rd ed. pp. 54-66.

“climb, slowly and painfully it is true, but with a steady and continued progress, from stage to stage of civilisation,” while the Celtic, “after soaring at the first flight to a comparatively elevated point, are inclined to be content with their achievement, and are.....passed by their more deliberate competitors.” How a Teutonic race, given these premises, could be “decadent,” and be surpassed and finally uplifted by a “Latin civilisation” (*id.* p. 2), the theorist does not attempt to explain.

To no virtue in Norman or English character, then,¹ but to the political circumstances, was it due that there grew up in island England, instead of an all-powerful feudal nobility and a mainly depressed peasantry, as in continental France, a certain balance of classes, in which the king's policy against the nobility restrained and feudally weakened them, and favoured the burghers and yeomen, making sub-tenants king's liegemen; while on the other hand the combination of barons and Church against the king restrained him.² A tyrant king is better for the people than the tyranny of nobles; and the destruction of feudal castles by regal jealousy restrains baronial brigandage. Regal prestige counts for something as against baronial self-assertion; but aristocratic self-esteem also rests itself, as against a reckless king, on popular sympathy. On the other hand, the town corporations, originating in popular interests, became in turn close oligarchies.³ Even the class tyranny of the trade guilds, self-regarding corporations in their way,⁴ looking to their own interests and indifferent to those of the outside grades beneath them,⁵ could provide a foothold for the barons in the town mobs, whom the barons could patronise.⁶ What was done by the Parliaments of Edward III to allow free entrance to foreign merchants was by way of furthering the interests of the aristocracy, who wanted to deal with such merchants, as against the English traders who wished to exclude them. Yet again, the yeomanry and burghers, fostered by the royal policy, develop an important military force, which has its own prestige.

Nothing can hinder, however, that foreign wars shall in the end aggrandise the upper as against the lower classes, developing as they do the relation of subjection, increasing the specifically military

¹ This is explicitly admitted by Buckle (3-vol. ed. ii, 118; 1-vol. ed. p. 352), though he does not thereafter speak consistently on the subject.

² Cp. Buckle, as last cited; Green, *History* (the larger), 1885, i, 300. ³ Stubbs, iii, 606.

⁴ Karl Hegel notes (*Städte und Gilden der germanischen Völker im Mittelalter*, pp. 33-34) that the Anglo-Saxon guilds seem to have had no connection with towns or communes, and that their societies might serve as a type for any class-association.

⁵ Cp. Green, *Short History*, ch. iv, § 4, pp. 192, 193; ch. vi, § 3, p. 285; Prof. Ashley, *Introd. to English Economic History*, 1888-93, i, 71, 75, 85, 87, 89; ii, 12, 14, 19, 49. Prof. Ashley notes a great change for the better in the fifteenth century (work cited, ii, 6), and a further advance in the sixteenth (ii, 42).

⁶ Cp. J. H. Round, *The Commune of London*, 1899, p. 224.

upper class, and setting up the spirit of force as against the spirit of law. In particular, the king's power is always aggrandised when nobility and people alike are led by him to foreign war.¹ Edward III, indeed, had to make many legislative concessions to the Commons in order to procure supplies for his wars; and the expansion of commerce in his reign,² furthered by the large influx of Flemish artisans³ encouraged by him,⁴ strengthened the middle classes; but all the while the "lower orders" had the worst of it; and the jealousy between traders and artisans, already vigorous in the reign of John, could not be extinguished. And when, after nearly eighty years without a great external war, Edward I invaded Scotland, there began a military epoch in which, while national unity was promoted, the depressed class was necessarily enlarged, as it had been before the Conquest during the Danish wars;⁵ and the poor went to the wall. Instinct made people and baronage alike loth at first to support the king in wars of foreign aggression; but when once the temper was developed throughout the nation, as against France, the spirit of national union helped the growth of class superiority by leaving it comparatively unchecked. In the period between the Conquest and Edward I the free population had actually increased, partly by French and Flemish immigration in the train of the Conquest; partly by Norman manumissions; partly through the arrivals of Flemish weavers exiled by domestic war;⁶ partly by the new growth of towns under Norman influence; partly by reason of the development of the wool export trade, which flourished in virtue of the law and order at length established under the Angevin kings, and so stimulated other industry. But from the beginning of the epoch of systematic national war the increase was checked; and save for the period of betterment consequent on the destruction of population by the Black Death, the condition of the peasantry substantially worsened.⁷ Frenchmen were struck by the

¹ "After Crécy and Calais, Edward felt himself strong enough to disregard the Commons.....His power was for the most part great or small, as his foreign policy was successful or disastrous" (Pearson, *English History in the Fourteenth Century*, pp. 224, 225). See also Stubbs, iii, 608; and compare the case of Henry V.

² Cp. Prof. Ashley, i, 88.

³ As to Flemish influence on early English progress, see Prof. Thorold Rogers, *Industrial and Commercial History of England*, 1892, pp. 10, 11, 301-303.

⁴ Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii, 321, 322.

⁵ Gardiner, *Student's History of England*, p. 69; Gneist, as cited above, p. 376. Cp. Gardiner's *Introduction to the Study of English History*, p. 91: "Even the House of Commons, which was pushing its way to a share of power, was comparatively an aristocratic body. The labouring population in town and country had no share in its exaltation. Even the citizens, the merchants and tradesmen of the towns, looked down upon those beneath them without trust or affection." Magna Carta itself was a protection only for "freemen."

⁶ Cp. Gibbins, *Industrial History of England*, pp. 36, 37; Pearson, *History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, ii, 378.

⁷ See Pearson's *English History in the Fourteenth Century*, pp. 23, 228, 253, etc.; cp. p. 225. In the thirteenth century Frederick II had enfranchised all the serfs on his own

number of serfs they saw in southern England as compared with France, and by the stress of their servitude.¹

An apparently important offset to the general restriction of freedom is the beginning of a representative parliamentary system under the auspices of Simon de Montfort (1265). It is still customary to make this departure a ground for national self-felicitation, though our later historians are as a rule content to state the historical facts, without inferring any special credit to the "Anglo-Saxon race."² As a matter of fact, Simon de Montfort's Parliament was the application by a naturalised Frenchman, under stress of the struggle between his party in the baronage and the king, of an expedient set up a generation before by the Emperor Frederick II in Sicily, and a century before in Spain. There, and not in England, arose the first Parliaments in which sat together barons, prelates, and representatives of cities. Simon de Montfort, son of the leader of the crusade against the Albigenses, may well have known of the practice of Spain, where in the twelfth century the householders in the cities elected their members. But he must at least have been familiar with the details of the system set up in Sicily, to which English attention had been specially called by the effort of Henry III to obtain the Sicilian crown for his son Edmund; and Simon imitated that system in England, not on any exalted principle of justice, but because the smallness of his support among the barons forced him to make the most of the burgher class, who had stood by him in the struggle. He may even, indeed, have taken his idea proximately from the practice of the rebels in Normandy before the Conquest, when deputies from all the districts met in general assembly and bound themselves by a mutual oath.³ Thus accidentally⁴ introduced, under a French name,⁵ the representative system is one more of the civilising factors which England owed to Southern Europe; and, as it was, baronage and burgesses alike failed to maintain Simon against the power of the crown, the monarchic superstition availing to divide even the malcontents, as had previously happened after the granting of Magna Carta by King John.

domains (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, vi, 153); and a similar policy had become general in the Italian cities. Louis VI and Louis VII of France had even enfranchised many of their serfs in the twelfth century, and Louis X carried out the policy in 1315. Cp. Duruy, *Hist. de France*, i, 291, note. England in these matters was not forward, but backward.

¹ Froissart, liv. ii, ch. 106, éd. Buchon, 1837. The southern counties, however, were perhaps then as now less democratic, less "free," than the northern.

² Compare Mackintosh's rhetoric as to Magna Carta constituting "the immortal claim of England on the esteem of mankind" (*History of England*, 1830, i, 222), and as to Simon de Montfort, whom he credits with inventing the idea of representation in Parliament for cities (p. 238).

³ Duruy, *Hist. de France*, i, 289.

⁴ Cp. Guizot, *Essais sur l'histoire de France*, 7e édit. p. 322.

⁵ This had, however, been employed as early as 1246.

Reiterated claims had secured in the eighteenth century the general acceptance of the view that England "set the example" of admitting cities to representation in national diets (so Koch, *Histor. View of the European Nations*, Crichton's tr. 3rd ed. p. 46). But as to the priority of the institution in Spain, see U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, Hume's ed. i, 370; and Prescott, *Hist. of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella*, Kirk's ed. 1889, p. 10 and refs. As to its existence in Sicily (*circa* 1232), see Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, vi, 154, proceeding on Gregorio, *Considerazioni sopra la Storia di Sicilia*, 1805 (ed. 2a, 1831-39, vol. ii, cap. v); and Von Raumer, *Geschichte der Hohenstaufen* (Aufg. 1857-58, B. vii, Haupt. 6, Bd. iii, p. 249). Cp. Von Reumont, *The Carafas of Maddaloni*, Eng. tr. 1854, p. 61, and refs. Frederick's assemblies, too, were called *Parlamente*. He in turn had, of course, been influenced by the practice, if not of Spain, at least of the Italian cities, which he wished his own to rival.

As to Simon's object in summoning burgesses, Hallam admits (*Europe during the Middle Ages*, ed. 1855, iii, 27) that it "was merely to strengthen his own faction, which prevailed among the commonalty," though the step was too congruous with general developments not to be followed up. Compare the admissions of Green, pp. 151-53; Stubbs, ii, 96, 103; and the remark of Adam Smith (*Wealth of Nations*, bk. iii, ch. iii) that the representation of burghs in the states-general of all the great European monarchies originated spontaneously in the desire of the kings for support against the barons. Freeman's statement (*General Sketch of European History*, p. 184) that under Simon we find "the whole English nation, nobles, clergy, and people, acting firmly together" against the king, is quite erroneous. Cp. Gneist, *Geschichte des Self-government in England*, 1863, p. 143. Dr. Gardiner (*Student's History*, p. 245), speaking of the presence of city burgesses and knights of the shire in the same Parliament under Edward III, writes that "in no other country in Europe would this have been possible." He seems to have been entirely unaware of the Spanish practice.

As the roots of the temper of equality are weakened, the relative prestige of the king is heightened,¹ provided that in a turbulent age he is strong enough for his functions; though, again, he runs new risks when, in peace, he is weak enough to make favourites, and thus sets up a source of jealousy in the act of surrendering some of his own special prestige. Then he doubles the force against him. History has generally represented favourites as unworthy; but there is no

¹ Cp. Pearson, as last cited, p. 8.

need that they should be so in order to be detested; and whether we take Gaveston, or Buckingham, or Bute, we shall always find that the animosity of the favourite's assailants is so visibly excessive as to imply the inspiration of primordial envy quite as much as resentment of bad government. Whether it is noble denouncing favoured noble or Pym impeaching the Duke, there is always the note of primary animal jealousy.

§ 2

A very obvious and familiar general law, here to be noted afresh, is that the constant and extensive employment of energy in war retards civilisation, by leaving so much less for intellectual work. Some sociologists have arrived at the optimistic half-truths that (1) warfare yields good in the form of chivalry, and that (2) great wars like the Crusades promote civilisation by setting up communication between peoples. But it is not asked whether the good involved in chivalry could not conceivably have been attained without the warfare, and whether (as before noted) there could not have been commerce between East and West without the Crusades.¹ The ancient Phœnicians had contrived as much in their day. Even the expansion of Italian commerce which followed on the Crusades went on the lines of a trade already in existence, as is proved once for all by the mere numbers of the vessels supplied to the crusaders by the Pisans, Genoese, and Venetians;² and inasmuch as these republics fought furiously for the monopoly, each grabbing for special privileges,³ till Genoa overthrew Pisa, the total expansion must have been small, and the political disintegration great.

Note

Nor was it on the whole otherwise with the spirit of chivalry, of which Guizot⁴ gives such an attractive picture. It was with the Church-made code of chivalrous morals as with the Church's code of Christian virtue: the ideal and practice were far asunder. As a matter of fact, the rules of chivalry were in part but the rules of prize-fighters,⁵ without which the game could not continuously be played; and they in no way affected the relations of the prize-fighters with other classes, or even their moral relations with each other save in the matter of fighting. To the "common herd" they were not only brutal but base,⁶ recognising no moral obligations in

¹ As to what traffic actually took place in the Dark Ages, cp. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce de Levant*, Fr. tr. 1886, i, 94-99. ² Cox, *The Crusades*, p. 146.

³ Pignotti, *History of Tuscany*, Eng. trans. 1823, iii, 256-62.

⁴ *Hist. de la Civ. en France*, ed. 13e, iii, 6e leçon.

⁵ Down even to the points of chastity and "training."

⁶ This is now pretty generally recognised. Among recent writers compare Green, *Short History*, ch. iv, § 3; Pearson, as last cited, p. 220; Gardiner, *Student's History of*

that direction. So too the Crusades represent a maximum of strife yielding a minimum of intercourse, which (save for the spirit of religious hate which wrought the strife) could have been attained in peace in tenfold degree by the play of the energy spent in preliminary bloodshed.

It is, of course, idle to speak as if the age of warfare might have been different if somebody had anachronistically pointed out the possibilities; but it is worse than idle, on the other hand, to impute a laudable virtue to its impulses because other impulses followed on them. The task of the sociological historian is first to trace sequences, and then to reason from them to the problems of his own age, where most are praise and blame profitable exercises. The lesson of early English history is neither that chivalry is good nor that the feudal knights and kings were ruffians; but that certain things happened to retard civilisation because these had their way, and that similar results would tend to accrue if their ideals got uppermost among us now. Thus we have to note that during the long period of frequent dynastic and other civil war from the Conquest to the reign of Henry II there was almost no intellectual advance in England, the only traceable gain arising when the king was fighting abroad with his foreign forces. There was no such cause at stake as thrilled into fierce song the desperately battling Welsh; and though in the reign of Edward III we have the great poetic florescence of which Chaucer is the crown, the inspiration of that literature had come from or through France; and with the depression of France there came the Nemesis of depression in English culture.

The triumph of Edward over France was, broadly speaking, a result of financial rascality, inasmuch as he succeeded by means of the money which he had borrowed from the Florentine bankers, and which he never repaid.¹ He was thus well equipped and financed when the French were not; and he was able to buy off the princes of the Empire on the north and east of the French frontier. But though the enterprise thus begun was continued by means of a home revenue raised mainly on the wool trade, the English attempt to dominate France ended in the inevitable way of imperialism, the humiliation of the victors duly following on the misery and humiliation of the vanquished. Only the depopulation of the Black Death prevented extreme misery among the English population; and the

England, p. 235; and *Introduction to the Study of English History*, p. 91. See also Buckle, 3-vol. ed. ii, 133; 1-vol. ed. p. 362. The sentimental view is still extravagantly expressed by Ducoudray, *Histoire sommaire de la civilisation*, 1886.

¹ Pignotti, as cited, iii, 279; G. Villani, *Cronica*, xii, 54-56.

conquering king ends his life, as William had done before him, in isolation and ignominy.

It may or may not have been a gain that Edward's victories over France practically determined the adoption of the middle-class, gallicised English speech¹ by the upper classes, who had hitherto been French-speaking, like the kings themselves. An Anglicising process, such as had been interrupted at the advent of Henry II, had set in when Normandy was lost (1204), to be again interrupted on the accession of Henry III, and resumed in the civil wars of his reign. But Edward I habitually spoke French, and so did his nobles. They had hitherto looked with true aristocratic scorn on the pretensions of the bourgeoisie—"rustici Londonienses qui se barones vocant ad nauseam," in the fashion satirised in all ages, down to our own; but in their new relation of hostility and superiority to Normandy and to France, they insensibly adopted the language that had been framed by that very bourgeoisie out of Saxon, and French and French idioms translated into Saxon.

Cp. Pearson, *Fourteenth Century*, pp. 222, 233. Prof. Earle's quasi-theory of the cause of the recovery of the native tongue (*Philology of the English Tongue*, 3rd ed. pp. 44, 66) is purely fanciful. In the end, as he admits, it was not any native dialect, but the artificial composite "King's English," much modified by French, that survived. It is noteworthy that many locutions which pass in the Bible for specially pure archaic English, as "fourscore and ten," are simply translations of a French idiom, itself ancient Celtic translated into Romance. (Cp. the *Introduction to the Study of the History of Language*, by Strong, Logeman, and Wheeler, 1891, p. 393.)

The Rev. W. Denton, in his learned and instructive survey of the subject (*England in the Fifteenth Century*, 1888, pp. 1-7), remarks that "from some cause, now difficult to trace, great encouragement was given to French in the reign of Henry III. Probably the foreign tastes and partialities of the king had something to do with this" (p. 4). They certainly had. As soon as he could wield power, "hordes of hungry Poitevins and Bretons were at once summoned over to occupy the royal castles and fill the judicial and administrative posts about the Court" (Green, *Short Hist.*, ch. iii, § 5, p. 140), as had happened before under Henry II. Mr. Denton rightly notes (p. 6) how "in the reign of Henry III the descendants of Norman barons, and the sons of Anglo-Norman fathers, were proud of the name of Englishmen, and took up arms against the king's Norman and

¹ Cp. Thierry, *Histoire de la Conquête*, iv, 210. As Thierry notes (p. 247), John Ball's English is much less Gallicised than that which became the literary tongue.

Angevin favourites, whom they despised as foreigners." This is the true line of causation. There is doubtless something in the theory that the general resort to the use of English in the schools was a result of the Black Death—the majority of the clergy being destroyed and the new teachers being unable to instruct in French (Gasquet, *The Great Pestilence*, 1893, p. 202); but there were certainly other causes involved. Mr. de Montmorency (*State Intervention in English Education*, 1902, pp. 19–23) develops Gasquet's argument with much force, noting further that many of the foreign priests who survived forsook their charges. It might be added that the native peasantry necessarily counted for more in a social as in an economic sense, after the great fall in their numbers. But the fact that the Death came in the period of the successful French wars of Edward III is clearly of capital importance. But for the moral reaction from these wars, the tendency would have been to procure new relays of French priests.

It is indeed conceivable that, but for hostilities with France, French would have steadily gained ground through literature, depressing and discrediting the vernacular. On this view it was the continuance of resistance by the Welsh that probably prevented the absorption of the Saxon speech by that of the conquered British; and it is similarly arguable that it was the relation of hostility between the Carlovingian Franks and the more easterly Germans that determined the supremacy of the Romance speech in French. The point is worth psychological investigation.

Though, however, Chaucer's own new-English work is part of the result, the intellectual gain stops there for the time being. No nation, from Rome to Napoleonic France, ever helped its own higher culture by destroying other States.¹ The French wars of Henry V were not less injurious to English civilisation² than the desperate civil wars which followed them, when English medieval culture reached, relatively to the rest of Europe, its lowest point.³ And these wars, it is always important to remember, were the result of the young king's acting on the doctrine (doubtfully ascribed to his father, but in any case all too easily acquired by kings) that whereas peace gave headway to domestic sedition, foreign war unified the mass of the people and fixed them to their leader. The shameless aggression on France did so unify them for the moment, as imperialism among an unmoralised public may always be trusted

¹ "Depuis les dominateurs de l'Orient jusqu' aux maîtres de Rome asservie..... quiconque détient la liberté d'autrui dans la servitude, perd la sienne....." (Morin, *Origines de la démocratie*, pp. 137–38).

² Cp. Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, 1892, i, 6.

³ Stubbs, *Const. Hist.*, iii, 632, 633; Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, i, 81; Green, ch. vi, § 3, pp. 267, 268, 287, 288.

to do; and it left them more demoralised and divided than ever, in due sequence. In all likelihood it was the new bribe of foreign plunder that first drew men away from Lollardism, considered as an outcome of economic discontent, thus preparing the collapse of the movement on its moral side.¹ One man's egoism could thus sway the whole nation's evolution for evil,² setting up for it the ideal which haloed him, and which survived him in virtue of the accident that the Nemesis of his course fell upon his successors rather than on him.

§ 3

In the matter of plebeian subjection, the second half of the fourteenth century supplies the proof of the tendency of the period of war. The great gain to the serfs in that period was the result of the depopulation caused by the Black Death (1348-50)—a relation of cause and effect which is still ignored by some writers, in their concern to insist that English labour was once better off than at present. But it was later in the same half-century that the rising of the "Jacquerie," which appears to have been in its origin strictly a revolt against taxation,³ was so bloodily repressed. The manner of the revolt sufficiently proves that the peasantry had gained new heart with the improvement in their lot which followed on the pestilence, in spite of laws to keep down wages;⁴ but even this improvement could not strengthen them sufficiently to make them hold their own politically in 1381 against the aristocracy, gentry, and middle class, now hardened in class insolence. It would seem as if those who rose to the status of tenants⁵ after the depopulation sought in their turn to keep down those who remained landless servitors. After the southern and eastern risings had been crushed, the men of Essex were told by Richard, who had given them charters of freedom and immediately afterwards revoked them, inclined as he was to protect the serfs in a measure against their masters, that "bondsmen they had been and bondsmen they should remain, in

¹ Cp. Gardiner, *Student's History*, p. 330.

² The clergy and the Parliament seem to have applauded the project of an invasion of France instantly and without reservation (Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, ii, 383). And already in the minority of Henry VI "the Parliament was fast dying down into a mere representation of the baronage and the great landowners" (Green, ch. vi, p. 265). "Never before and never again for more than two hundred years were the Commons so strong as they were under Henry IV" (Stubbs, iii, 73).

³ Pearson, *English History in the Fourteenth Century*, pp. 250, 251. Among the minor forms of oppression were local vetoes on the grinding of the people's own corn by themselves in their handmills. Thus "the tenants of St. Albans extorted a licence to use querns at the time of Tyler's rebellion" (Morgan, *England under the Normans*, 1858, p. 161).

⁴ As to the failure of these laws see Gasquet, *The Great Pestilence*, 1893, p. 196 sq.

⁵ *Id.* p. 200.

worse bondage than before"; and the following Parliament declared that the landowners would never consent to the freeing of the serfs, "were they all to die for it in a day." It is noteworthy, on the side of economics, that despite this temper serfage did gradually die out, the people being for long unable to multiply up to the old level, by reason of restraint, ill-usage, civil war, the decline of tillage and the grouping of holdings, and the high death-rate. Jack Cade's rebellion, in 1450, indicated the persistence of the democratic spirit, contending as it did for the suppression of the system under which the nobles plundered the kingdom while the king was imbecile.

The question as to the rate at which the population recovered from the Black Death has been discussed by Prof. Thorold Rogers, Mr. Seebohm, and Prof. Cunningham (see the latter's *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 1891, i, 304). Prof. Rogers, on the one hand, maintains that by 1377, when the tax rolls seem to give a population of about two and a half millions (cp. Dunton, *England in the Fifteenth Century*, p. 130), the population had recovered all it had lost in the Plague, he being of opinion that the England of that age could not at any time support more than two and a half millions. Mr. Seebohm, with whom Dr. Cunningham substantially concurs (see also Pearson, *Fourteenth Century*, p. 249, and Gasquet, *The Great Pestilence*, 1893, p. 194), thinks that the return of the Plague in 1361 and 1369, and the unsettled state of the country, must have prevented recuperation; and, accepting the loose calculation that the Plague destroyed half the population (Mr. Pearson says "one-half or two-thirds"; Dr. Gasquet endorses the general view that "fully one half" were destroyed), he concludes that the population before 1348 may have been five millions.

The truth surely lies between these extremes. That the population should not at all have recovered in twenty-five years is extremely unlikely. That it should have restored a loss of thirty-three per cent in twenty-five years, which is what Prof. Rogers's position amounts to, is still more unlikely (see his *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, pp. 223, 226, where the mortality is estimated at one-third). It is besides utterly incongruous with Prof. Rogers's own repeated assertion that "during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries the population of England and Wales was almost stationary" (*Industrial and Commercial History of England*, pp. 46, 49; *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 337; *Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 53). How could a medieval population conceivably stand for half a century at a given figure, then, having been reduced by one-third, replace the loss in twenty-five

years, and thereafter continue to subsist without further increase for two centuries more?

On the other hand, there is a natural tendency in every suddenly depleted population to reproduce itself for a time at a quickened rate; and in the England of the latter half of the fourteenth century the conditions would encourage such an effort. The lack of house-room and settlement which normally checked increase (cp. Stubbs, § 493) was remedied for a large number of persons; and the general feeling would be all in favour of marriage and repopulation (cp. Rogers, *Six Centuries*, p. 226, where, however, evidence obviously bad is accepted as to multiplied births), though just after the Plague there would be a great stimulus to the extension of pasture, since that needed fewer hands than tillage.

On the whole, we may reasonably surmise that the population before 1348 was, not five millions, but between three and four millions (so Green, ch. v, § 4, p. 241, who, however, takes the somewhat excessive view that "more than one-half were swept away," and further, p. 239, that the population "seems to have all but tripled since the Conquest"), and that it was prevented regaining that figure in the next century by the economic preference of sheep-farming to tillage. Mr. Rogers expressly admits (*Six Centuries*, p. 233) that "the price of labour, proclamations and statutes notwithstanding, did not ever fall to its old rates," and repeatedly asserts that "the labourers remained masters of the situation." On his own principles, this goes to prove that their numbers remained lower than of old. He infers a "considerable loss of life" in the famine of 1315-16 from the immediate rise of agricultural wages (from 23 to 30 per cent), of which on the average 20 per cent was permanent. Here there is a presumption that even before 1315 the population was greater than afterwards. Yet again he states (p. 326, etc.) that "the *fifteenth* century and the first quarter of the *sixteenth* were the golden age of the English labourer"—a proposition which staggers credence. Cp. W. J. Corbett, in *Social England*, ii, 382-84.

It is impossible, however, to attain demonstration either on that head or as regards the numbers of the population in the periods under notice. Mr. Rogers's claims to give decisive evidence show a serious misconception of what constitutes proof; and there is special reason to distrust his conclusion that population was no greater at the end of Elizabeth's reign than in that of Henry IV. Cp. Mr. Gibbins's *Industrial History of England*, pp. 107-108. Prof. J. E. Symes (in *Social England*, iii, 128, 129) decides that a "great increase of the population undoubtedly took place in the reign of Henry VIII," adopting the estimate that the total at the death of Henry VII was about two and a half millions, and at

the death of Henry VIII about four millions. As to the population at the Conquest, see Sharon Turner's *History of the Anglo-Saxons*, bk. viii, c. 9, vol. iii, and Dunton, as cited, pp. 128-29. It was then probably below two millions; and in the reign of Edward II it may well have been over three millions; for Bishop Pecock about 1450 (cited by Dunton, p. 130 *note*) speaks of a long-continued decrease, such as would be caused by the wars in France and at home. But the assertion of Tyndale in 1532 (*id. ib.*), that the population was then less by a third than in the time of Richard II, must be dismissed as a delusion set up by the phenomena of agrarian depopulation in certain districts. On this see below, p. 405.

It is important to note, finally, that it was in the age of raised standard of comfort that there occurred the first wide diffusion of critical heresy in England. Wiclif's popular Lollardry was one phase of a movement that went deeper in thought and further afield in social reform than his, since he himself felt driven to confute certain opponents of belief in the Scriptures, and at the same time to repudiate the doctrine that vassals might resist tyrant lords.¹ Had he not done so, he might have had a less peaceful end; but it is clear that many men were in the temper to apply to lay matters the demand for reform which he restricted to matters ecclesiastical.² John Ball's rising, however, promptly elicited the much superior strength of the feudal military class; and though in 1395 there were still Lollards to petition to Parliament for the abolition of "unnecessary trades," as well as war and capital punishment and the Catholic practices afterwards rejected by Protestantism, their Utopia was as hopeless as that of the insurgent peasants. Even had the invasion of France not come about to bribe and demoralise the nation at large, turning it from domestic criticism to the plunder of a neighbouring State, the nobility of the period were utterly incapable of an intellectual ideal; and any sympathy shown by any section of them for Lollardry was the merest opportunism, proceeding on resentment of Papal exactions or on a premature hope of plundering the Church.³ The moment Lollardry openly leant towards criticism of nobility as well as clergy, they were ready to give it up to destruction; and the determining cause of the fall of Richard II was that, besides alienating the nobles at once by maintaining a peace policy, and by refusing to

¹ Lewis's *Life of Wiclif*, ed. 1820, pp. 224, 225; Lechler's *John Wycliffe and his English Precursors*, Eng. tr. 1-vol. ed. pp. 371-76; Prof. Montagu Burrows, *Wiclif's Place in History*, p. 19.

² Green, *Short History*, ch. v, § 4; Gardiner, *Introduction*, pp. 94-98; Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 272.

³ Cp. Sharon Turner, *England during the Middle Ages*, ii, 263; iii, 108; Milman, *Latin Christianity*, viii, 213, 215.

let them go to all lengths in oppressing the labourers, he alienated the clergy by sheltering the Lollards.¹ It was the clergy who turned the balance, embracing the cause of Henry IV, who in turn systematically supported them,² as did his son after him. Henry V, the national hero-king, and his father were the first burners of "Protestant" heretics; and it was under Henry IV, in 1401, that there was passed the Act suppressing the voluntary schools of the Lollards.³ Doubtless it was a push of the Lollards that carried the later Act of 1406, permitting all men and women to send their sons and daughters "to any school that pleaseth them in the realm;"⁴ but the limitation of school-keeping to the Church was an effective means of limiting the education given; and "by 1430 the Church had recovered from the Lollard revolt against her universal authority."

Mr. Lecky, in his theory of the English aristocracy, credits the nobility with an "eminently popular character" from time immemorial, and cites Comines as to "the singular humanity of the nobles to the people during the civil wars" (*History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, small ed. i, 212, 213). The nobility, in the circumstances, had need to treat the people better than those of France normally did (which was what Comines was thinking of). Their own wealth—what was left of it—came from the people, to whom, further, they looked for followers. And Comines in the same passage (bk. v, ch. xx) notes that the English people were "more than ordinarily jealous" of their nobility. Of course, the difference between French and English practice dates further back, as above noted.

Similarly misleading is Mr. Lecky's statement that "the Great Charter had been won by the barons, but.....it guaranteed the rights of all freemen." Mr. Gardiner expressly points out (*Student's History*, p. 182; cp. his *Introduction to English History*, pp. 66-67) that the Charter "was won by a combination between all classes of freemen." London had harboured and aided the barons' force; and the clergy were closely concerned. (Cp. McKechnie, *Magna Carta*, 1905, p. 41.) The

¹ Green, ch. v, § 5, p. 255; Stubbs, iii, 609-10. He further refused the petition from the Commons in 1391, demanding that no "neif or villein" should be allowed to have his children educated. Cp. de Montmorency, *State Intervention in English Education*, 1902, p. 27.

² Green, p. 258; Stubbs, iii, 32. It is plain that among the factious nobility, and even the courtiers, of the time there was a strong disposition to plunder the Church (Stubbs, iii, 43, 48, 53). Doubt is cast by Bishop Stubbs on Walsingham's story of the Lollard petition of 1410 for the confiscation of the lands of bishops and abbots, and the endowment therewith of 15 earls, 1,500 knights, 6,000 esquires, and 100 hospitals (Stubbs, iii, 65; cp. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, viii, 214; ix, 17-18); but in any case many laymen leant to such views, and the king's resistance was steadfast. Yet an archbishop of York, a bishop, and an abbot successively rebelled against him. On his hanging of the archbishop, see the remarkable professional reflections of Bishop Stubbs (iii, 53).

³ Act 2 Hen. IV, c. 15. Cp. de Montmorency, *State Intervention in English Education*, 1902, p. 36.

⁴ Stubbs, iii, 626; de Montmorency, p. 29; Act 7 Hen. IV, c. 17.

representative assembly summoned by John in 1213 stood for the combination of the three classes. Green (*Short History*, illust. ed. i, 242, 243) uses language which countenances Mr. Lecky, but shows (pp. 235-43) the need the barons felt for aid, and the influence of the Church and the traders. Compare the language of his longer history (1885, i, 244), and his express admission as to the depression the baronage had undergone a century later (*id.* p. 300). Dr. Stubbs (*Const. Hist.* i, 571, 583) also indicates that the people co-operated, though he uses expressions (pp. 570, 579) which obscure the facts in Mr. Lecky's favour. Guizot (*Essais*, p. 282) recognises that the movement was national. Buckle, too, made the point clear long ago (3-vol. ed. ii, 114-20; 1-vol. ed. pp. 350-54). But it is noted even in what he called "the wretched work of Delolme," and was in Buckle's day a generally accepted truth. Cp. Ch. de Rémusat, *L'Angleterre du 18ième siècle*, 1856, i, 33.

It is worth noting in this connection that the Magna Carta, considered in itself, is a rather deceptive historical document. Not only did it need the defeat of John and his German and Flemish allies by the French at Bouvines to enable even the combined lords and commons and clergy to extort the Charter, but the combination was being progressively destroyed by John, by means of his army of French mercenaries, when the barons in despair persuaded the French king to send an invading force, which was able to land owing to the ruin of John's fleet in a storm. Thereupon John's French troops deserted him. Cp. Green, pp. 122-26; Stubbs, ii, 3, 9-16; and McKechnie, pp. 53-57, as to the King's energy and the weakness and inner divisions of the national combination. Thus it was indirectly to French action that England owed first the Magna Carta and then the check upon the King's vengeance, as it was to the Frenchman, Simon de Montfort, later, that it owed the initiative of a three-class Parliament. And, indeed, but for the King's death, the constitutional cause might well have collapsed in the end.

§ 4

The Wars of the Roses, by destroying in large part the nobility, relatively advantaged the middle class,¹ as well as the king whose reign followed. Already under Edward IV the powers of Parliament were much curtailed, and indeed paralysed;² this, which is charged

Note

¹ Schanz (*Englische Handelspolitik*, i, 349, 350) decides that the middle class was the only one which gained. The lower fared as ill as the upper. Cp. Stubbs, iii, 610.

² Hallam (*Constitutional History*, 10th ed. i, 10) doubts whether Henry VII carried the power of the Crown much beyond the point reached by Edward. Busch, who substantially agrees (*England unter den Tudors*, i, 8, note), misreads Hallam in criticising him, overlooking the "much." Edward had so incensed the London traders by his exactions that it was by way of undertaking to redress these and similar grievances that Richard III ingratiated himself (Green, pp. 293-94).

as a sin upon the monarch, being the natural result of his gain of power on the ruin of the baronage. Edward IV only did what Edward I and III would have done if in their situation it had been possible, and what Edward II and Richard II sought to do, but were too weak to compass. The fourth Edward's situation and his force of will together made his power. Not only was the nobility half exterminated, but the trading and middle classes alike desired a strong ruler who should maintain order, by whatever straining of constitutional forms—the invariable sequel of anarchy—at least up to the point of intolerable taxation.¹ The actual increase of commerce during the wars² is a good proof of the separateness of class interests, and of the decline of the military ideal. Much of it would seem to have been due to the example set by the Hansa merchants, who had factories at London,³ Boston, and Lynn, and whose famous League was then powerful enough to force from Edward IV a renewal of its English privileges in return for a concession of a share in the Baltic trade.⁴ In any case, the new development was on the old lines of energetic self-seeking; and already in the reign of Edward IV the cloth manufacture was carried on by capitalists in the modern spirit.⁵ And as the tyrannies of the king were less general and oppressive than the tyrannies of the nobles, the erection of the regal power on the collapse of the old class cohesion gave a new scope for the strife of classes among and for themselves. No national ideal existed (as apart from the readiness to unite in hate of a foreign nation) in monarchic England any more than in old republican Greece or modern republican Italy. The trade guilds were strictly self-seeking institutions, aiming at keeping down the number of competitors in each trade, without providing in any way for the aspirants. Unitary egoism was the universal mainspring. The Church sought above all things to be protected against heresy; the town and trade corporations sought protection for their privileges; and the landowners sought to be supported against the labourers, who from the time of Henry VI are found revolting against enclosures of public land, and were temporarily reinforced by the disbanded retainers of the

¹ Cp. Green, pp. 285-86.

² Stubbs, iii, 283; Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii, 326, 328; Green, ch. vi, § 3, p. 282. This, however, did not mean the maintenance of English shipping, which declined. See Act 4 Hen. VII, c. 10; and cp. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry*, § 121. "France seems to have had a considerable share of foreign commerce near a century before England was distinguished as a commercial country" (Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. iii, ch. iv). Yet fishing and seafaring ranked as the main national industries (Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, i, 251).

³ See Stubbs, i, 675, as to the large foreign element in the London population, apart from the Hansa factory; and cp. Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, ii, 209.

⁴ The fact that the Scandinavian kings were eager to damage the Hansa by encouraging English and Dutch traders would be a special stimulus.

⁵ Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, i, 392.

barons. Every modern force of social disintegration was already nascent.

Cp. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, i, 395-96, 413, 425; Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, §§ 486-92 (iii, 586-616). "In every great town there was, every few years, something of a struggle, something of a crisis.....between trade and craft, or craft and craft, or magistracy and commons" (Stubbs, iii, 616). Prof. Ashley (*Introd. to Econ. Hist.* i, 79) disputes that there was "any such contest in this country between burghers and artisans" as took place on the continent; and cites another passage from Bishop Stubbs (§ 131; i, 453) partly suggesting such a view. But Prof. Ashley goes on (pp. 79-84) to show that there *was* a good deal of struggling even in England between burghers and artisans. Cp. his conclusions, pp. 6-10, 42, as to the process of evolution towards at least formal unity. It is to be noted that the guilds dispensed charity (Stubbs, iii, 616, 619).

§ 5

Under Henry VII the same conditions subsisted. There was no sufficiently strong body of aristocracy left to rebel effectually against his exactions, though exactions had always been the great cause of discontent; and, all rivals collapsing, there grew up round the new dynasty that hedging superstition which had always counted for much, and which was in England to become a main factor in politics. Henry VII wrought assiduously and astutely to build up his power, seeking no less to increase the merchant class than to depress the aristocracy. From both he thus drew his revenue; from the latter by exaction; from the former by customs duties on the trade he carefully encouraged (as Richard had done before him), finding in such revenue his surest income.¹ Gradually the monarchic system was made firm. Richard III owed his failure mainly to the sense of the illegality of his position; and the same inversion of the superstition troubled Henry VII in turn, as it had done Henry IV. It seems to have been his possession of the one train of artillery in the kingdom that mainly preserved his power against rebels.² But with Henry VIII the dynasty was secure; and from this point onward the monarchic spell can be seen very clearly in English affairs. The instinct of "loyalty," a moral prepossession religiously

¹ Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, i, 250-65. Edward had actually traded extensively on his own account, freighting ships to the Mediterranean with tin, wool, and cloth (Green, p. 287; Henry, *History of Great Britain*, ed. 1823, xii, 309, 315-16; Act 4 Hen. VII, c. 10; Hall's *Chronicle*, under Henry VII.

² Green, p. 295.

sanctioned, becomes a social force as truly as the simpler instincts of self-seeking and class spirit. By virtue of it, and of his own force of brute will, Henry VIII could commit violences of almost every description, his own personality having some of the characteristics most likely to intensify the spell. Energy such as his hypnotised or terrorised all but the strongest. Even his crimes were not such as revolted average sympathy: the suppression of the Church, as in nearly all the "Teutonic" countries, was a direct bribe to many of the nobles and landowners,¹ and for the multitude meant the overthrow of an alien jurisdiction; and his domestic procedure satisfied the popular ethic which demurs to mistresses but respects bigamy, and finds a wife's adultery more criminal than her husband's murder of her. For the rest, he had at the beginning of his reign executed his father's minions, and conciliated the scholars, who made opinion. Yet under Henry VIII we find middle-class England, heavily taxed for war, beginning to stand on its rights as upper-class England had done in earlier times; and in the new England as in the old the weakest class went to the wall. The ever-increasing mass of poor, thrown idle and hungry by the continuous rise of sheep-farms in the place of tillage, were the natural enemies of the governing class as well as of the landowners; and in cruelly repressing them the monarchy strengthened the landowners' allegiance.

Thus arose the typical personal monarchy, employing middle-class ministers, who served it zealously and with increasing power, Thomas Cromwell far outgoing Wolsey. The passing coalition of nobles and yeomen in the north in the cause of the old religion was followed by the crushing of the remains of the old nobility, now being rapidly replaced by the new, established on the plunder of the Church. It is to be noted that in England, as in so many other countries, the virtual subjection of the old nobility to the crown was for a time followed by stirrings of new life in all directions, as if feudalism had everywhere meant a repression of possible energy. The process is seen in Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella;² in France under Richelieu and Mazarin; in Sweden under Gustavus Vasa; and is thus plainly a product not of doctrinal Protestantism, as some suppose, but of the comparative social and political liberty that follows on the restriction of ubiquitous feudal tyranny, so much

¹ "Something like a fifth of the actual land in the kingdom was.....transferred from the holding of the Church to that of nobles and gentry" (Green, ch. vii, § 1, p. 342).

² Cp. E. Armstrong, *Introduction to Martin Hume's Spain*, 1898, pp. 13, 19, 29; Prescott, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella*, pt. i, ch. vi, *end*; Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii, 331.

more searching and pervasive a force than the simpler tyranny of the feudal king. It may be doubted, indeed, whether the Tudor suppression of the power of the old aristocracy was not as vital a determination of the nation's course as the overthrow of the Catholic Church.

As against Mr. Lecky's indiscriminate panegyric of the English nobility, it is instructive to note Hallam's judgment on the peerage under Henry VIII: "They yielded to every mandate of his imperious will.....they are responsible for the illegal trial, for the iniquitous attainder, for the sanguinary statute, for the tyranny which they sanctioned by law, and for that which they permitted to subsist without law. Nor was this selfish and pusillanimous subserviency more characteristic of the minions of Henry's favour than of the representatives of ancient and honourable houses, the Norfolks, the Arundels, and the Shrewsburys. We trace the noble statesmen of these reigns concurring in all the inconsistencies of the revolutions; supporting all the religions of Henry, Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth; adjudging the death of Somerset to gratify Northumberland, and of Northumberland to redeem their participation in his fault; setting up the usurpation of Lady Jane, and abandoning her on the first doubt of success, constant only in the rapacious acquisition of estates and honours from whatever source, and in adherence to the present power" (*Constitutional History*, 10th ed. i, 48).

§ 6

And now effectively arose the new political force of Protestant and Bible-worshipping fanaticism, turning the democratic instinct into its channel, and complicating afresh the old issues of classes. It is not to be forgotten that this was a beginning of popular culture, inasmuch as the desire to read the worshipped book must have counted for more than anything else in making reading common.¹

Practically, however, the opposed causes of Lollardism and orthodoxy may at the outset be regarded as the democratic and the conservative instincts, taking these channels in the absence of political development and knowledge.² In imperial Rome, the

¹ See Stubbs, iii, 626-28, as to the extent to which ability to read was spread among the common people. As to the general effect on mental life see the vigorous though uncritical panegyric of Hazlitt, *Lectures on the Literature of the Age of Elizabeth*, ed. 1870, pp. 12-17.

² As to the democratic element in Calvinism, which develops from Lollardism, see the interesting remarks of Buckle, 3-vol. ed. ii, 339; 1-vol. ed. p. 481. Prof. Gardiner sums up (*Introduction to the Study of English History*, pp. 97, 98) "that as soon as Lollardism ceased to be fostered by the indignation of the labouring class against its oppressors, it dwindled away." Compare the conclusions of Prof. Thorold Rogers, *Six Centuries of*

spread of Christianity was substantially a movement of class cohesion among the illiterate slaves, aliens, and workers, the instinct of attraction taking this form when political grounds of union were lacking. So it was in the England of the period under notice; but whereas in imperial Rome the autocracy went far to annul class distinctions, and so helped the slaves' cult to absorb superstitious patricians, especially women, whose wealth maintained the poor of the Church as the emperor's doles had maintained the poor of the State, in England the vigour of class distinctions fostered differences of sect. The phenomena of political Protestantism in the Reformation era in England, as in Germany, offer many parallels to those of the French Revolution. The revolt of many priests from the routine and restrictions of their office is notable in both epochs. On the other hand, the mass of the well-to-do classes, being unprepared for change by any educative process, were as ready to restore Catholic usages as were those of France later; and when the innovating forces, consisting in a little reasoning and much rapine, had run to seed and to corruption under the Protectorate and Edward VI, the reaction towards the old forms set in powerfully. Nothing, however, could carry it to the length of restoring the Catholic Church's property; and the failure of Mary was due not nearly so much to Protestant dislike of the ceremonial of Rome as to the grip of the new owners on the confiscated lands. In England as in Scotland, in Germany, in the Scandinavian States, and in Switzerland, though Henry stood for a special initiative, the driving forces of the Reformation were mainly those of wealth-seeking; and the financial records of the Protectorate show a conspiracy of plunder to which the annals of monarchy could offer no parallel. The Protestant aristocracy simply encouraged the new Lollardism by way of gaining their personal ends, as they had crushed the old because it menaced their property.

“Crown lands to the value of five millions of our modern money had been granted away to the friends of Somerset and Warwick. The royal expenditure had mounted in seventy years to more than four times its previous total” (Green, ch. vii, § 1, and p. 353). A system of wholesale corruption and waste had grown up under Henry VIII, who, after all his confiscations, was fain to seek funds by adulterating his coin. So Edward VI, the church and college plunder being gone, had to be granted

Work and Wages, p. 272, and see above, p. 390. Prof. Rogers (p. 273) traces the success of the Reformation in the Eastern counties to the long work of Lollardism there. In the same district lay the chief strength of the Rebellion. Compare his *Economic Interpretation of History*, pp. 79-91.

taxes on manufactures which tended to stop them. "Yet I cannot find," says Sir Roger Twysden, "all this made the crown rich. Hayward observes Edward's debts were £251,000—at least said to be so. Camden, that Queen Elizabeth received the crown *afflictissima.....aere alieno quod Henricus VIII et Edwardus VI contraxerant oppressa.....*I cannot but reckon the treasure spent in fifteen years, more than half the kingdom to be sold" (*Historical Vindication of the Church of England*, ed. 1847, pp. 4, 5). So obviously had the treasure gone into the pockets of courtiers and their hangers-on, that the fact gives some excuse for the habitual miserliness of Elizabeth.

A new channel had thus been made for the forces of union and strife. An instructive part of the process was the movement towards a new sacerdotalism on the side of the new Calvinistic clergy—a movement much more clearly visible in Scotland than in England. Whether or not it be true that "it was by no means the intention of Knox and his fellow-labourers to erect a new hierarchy upon the ruins of the old,"¹ it is clear that his immediate successors counted on wielding a power strictly analogous to that of the papacy. Andrew Melville, in haughty colloquy with King James and his councillors, threw down his Hebrew Bible on the table as his authority for his demands. Since all alike professed to accept it, the next step in the argument plainly was that it lay with the presbyter to interpret the sacred book;² and Melville, who took the king by the sleeve and called him "God's silly [= weak] vassal," was quite ready to play Gregory to James's Henry had he been able. The effective check lay in the new Church's lack of revenue, the lands of the old Church having of course been retained by the nobles, who carried through the Reformation simply in order to get them. But even in its poverty, with an indifferent nobility³ in possession of the feudal power, the Scottish clergy were nearly as tyrannous socially as their teacher Calvin had been at Geneva; and for nearly two hundred years Scottish life was no freer and much more joyless, under the new presbyter, than under the old priest, though the democratic machinery of the Kirk obviated any need or opportunity for fiscal exaction.

¹ Gardiner, *History of England, 1603-42*, ed. 1893, i, 45.

² Cp. Pulszky, *The Theory of Law and Civil Society*, p. 206. "Theocracy in itself, being the hierarchical rule of a priestly class, is but a species of aristocracy." And see Buckle's chapter, "An Examination of the Scotch Intellect during the Seventeenth Century" (3-vol. ed. iii, 211, 212; 1-vol. ed. pp. 752-53; and notes 36, 37, 38) for the express claims of the Scotch clergy to give out "the whole counsel of God."

³ Dr. Gardiner writes:—"Nor was it indifference alone which kept these powerful men aloof; they had an instinctive feeling that the system to which they owed their high position was doomed, and that it was from the influence which the preachers were acquiring that immediate danger was to be apprehended to their own position" (last cit.). One is at a loss to infer how the historian can know of or prove the existence of such an instinct.

§ 7

As it is with the Reformation period that the play of sheer opinion begins to appear distinctly in English politics, so it is in this period that the phenomena of reactions first begin to be in a manner traceable as distinct from military fluctuations. All faction, of course, is a form of the play of opinion; but after the fading away of feudalism the opinion is more easily to be contemplated as a force in itself, alongside of the simpler instincts; and the ebbing and flowing of causes suggests a certain consequence of action and reaction in human affairs. The gain-getting Protestant movement under the Protectorate was followed by the Catholic reaction under Mary; which again bred reaction by ferocity. Catholics grew cold in their allegiance when Romanism yielded such bloody fruits. Protestantism, besides, flourished on the continual poverty of the lower orders, and on the abeyance of international strife—conditions which necessarily set up new movements of combination and repulsion; and when Elizabeth succeeded to the throne, she served to represent, however incongruously, the religious leanings of the democracy, as well as to unite them in the name of patriotism against Rome and Spain. She, again, profited by the monarchic superstition, while she was menaced by its inversion; and it is to be observed that as a woman she gained immunity with her subjects for flaws of character which in a man would have been odious and despicable, where her rival, Mary of Scotland, suffered deposition for actions of a kind which in a man would have been almost spontaneously forgiven. Mary's complicity in the assassination of a base and unfaithful husband was an unpardonable crime from the reigning ethical point of view, which was purely masculine; and the same ethic held in amused toleration the constant bad faith and personal absurdity of Elizabeth,¹ which rather flattered than endangered the pride of sex. Thus could monarchic politics be swayed by the prevailing psychology of a period, as well as by its class preponderances and interests. The personality of the monarch always counted for much in the determination of his power.

Where Elizabeth gained, however, James lost. Her power was consolidated by the triumph over the Armada, which in the old fashion fused religious strifes in a common warlike exultation, and definitely made England Protestant by setting her in deadly enmity

¹ In her partialities she was fully as ill-judging as Mary of Scotland. To the eye of the Spanish ambassador Dudley was "heartless, spiritless, treacherous, and false" (Bishop Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth*, ed. 1899, p. 65). Essex in turn was a furious fool.

ed.
 towards the great Catholic power;¹ just as the state of aggressive hostility towards France under Edward I and Edward III drew Englishmen of all classes into the habit of speaking English and discarding the hitherto common use of French. At the same time the Queen's collisions with Parliament and people were always the less dangerous because she was a woman, and so could yield without indignity where a man would have been humiliated and discredited—an advantage overlooked by the historians who praise her sagacity. Such as it was, it was in large part the sagacity of unscrupulousness; and her success is much more the measure of popular infatuation than of her wisdom. All the while, she had wiser councillors than almost any English monarch before or since; and much of her sagacity was theirs, perhaps even down to some of the unscrupulousness; though on the other hand her fickleness often put them in an evil aspect. Burghley might say what he would, in the loyalist manner, about her inspired judgment; but he knew that she imposed Leicester on the Dutch expedition against his advice, then starved her troops, then upset everything because of the easily predictable disobedience of Leicester in accepting the title of Governor-General from the Dutch.² To say in the face of such methods, as does Mr. Green, that while she had little or no political wisdom, "her political tact was unerring," is to frame a spurious paradox. The more than countervailing admission that "in the profusion and recklessness of her lies Elizabeth stood without a peer in Christendom" is perhaps overcharged: she could not lie more habitually and systematically than did Philip; but in both alike the constant resort to falsehoods for which their antagonists were more or less prepared, is a proof of want of political tact, no less than of want of wisdom.³ That she should have been idolised as she was is one of the best proofs of the power of the monarchic feeling; for there has rarely been a less trustworthy woman on a throne. In any circle of sound human beings she would have been disliked and

¹ As to the change in English feeling between 1580, when the Catholic missionaries were widely welcomed, and the years after 1588, see *The Dynamics of Religion*, by "M. W. Wiseman" (J. M. R.). Cp. Gardiner, *History of England, 1603-42*, ed. 1893, i, 15: "Every threat uttered by a Spanish ambassador rallied to the national government hundreds who in quieter times would have looked with little satisfaction on the changed ceremonies of the Elizabethan Church."

² Cp. Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, 1867, i, 391 sq.

³ In his *Introduction to the Study of English History* (1881) Prof. Gardiner, through a dozen pages, discusses the action of Elizabeth's government solely in terms of her personality, never once mentioning her advisers. On this line he reaches the proposition that "the homage, absurd as it came to be, which was paid to the imaginary beauties of the royal person was in the main only an expression of the consciousness that peace and justice, the punishment of wickedness and vice, and the maintenance of good order and virtue, came primarily from the queen and secondarily from the Church." One is moved to suggest that the nonsense in question was not so bottomless as it is here virtually made out.

distrusted; yet English tradition celebrates her as admirably English, in the act of blackening by comparison foreign rulers who were at least not conspicuously falser,¹ meaner,² or more egotistic. What is true is that many of the forces with and against which she intrigued were either unscrupulous or irrational, and that her home tyrannies were no worse than those which would have been committed by Puritans or Catholics or Churchmen had these been free to go at each other's throats as religion bade. Her trickeries on the whole kept things in equilibrium. But conscienceless trickeries they were, and, as such, singular grounds for historical enthusiasm. And it cannot have been any concern for her celibacy, or subtle intuition of its effects on her character, that endeared her to her subjects; for her often alleged virginity, despite the gross scandals to the contrary, was an element in the hallucination concerning her. "Loyalty" haloed her personality. When, however, she was succeeded by a man certainly not worse or more ungenerous, the spell was for the most part broken. James was a Scotchman—a member, albeit a king, of a hostile nation long evilly spoken of; a prince without personal dignity; a pedant without gravity; and the indulgence paid to falsehood and folly in the capriciously headstrong Elizabeth ceased to be accorded to the unmanly and unregal ways of her not unconscientious successor, whose plans for pacifying Europe were much more creditable to him than were her diplomacies to her. But the very preservation of peace served to undo the king's prestige, inasmuch as it furthered the growth of sects and the spirit of criticism. And there can be no doubt that the psychological shrinkage of the monarchy in public esteem in the person of James prepared the way for the resistance to it in the reign of his son.

As against the foregoing views of Henry's and Elizabeth's characters, note should be taken of the doctrine of Dr. Gardiner (*History*, as cited, i, 43) that "Henry VIII must be judged by" [*i.e.* in view of the merits of] "the great men who supported his daughter's throne, and who defended the land which he set free when 'he broke the bonds of Rome.' Elizabeth must be judged by the Pym and Cromwells, who.....owed their strength to the vigour with which she *headed* the resistance of England against Spanish aggression. She had cleared the way for liberty, though she understood it not." It seems necessary to enter a demurrer

¹ "There was no truth nor honesty in anything she said" (Bishop Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth*, p. 60; cp. pp. 76, 91, 112, 181, 216, 228-31).

² Her practice of leaving her truest servants to bear their own outlays in her service, begun with Cecil (Creighton, p. 63), was copied from Charles V and Philip II, but was carried farther by her than ever by them. All the while she heaped gifts on her favourites.

to such moral philosophy, of which there is too much in recent English historiography. Considering that the action of Henry towards all who thwarted him was one of brutal terrorism, and that, save as regards his bribes, he cowed alike his peers and his people, the courage shown by their descendants might as rationally be credited to Philip of Spain as to him. And to credit Elizabeth personally with the defeat of the Armada, and consequently with the strength of the later Pym and Cromwells, is not only to reiterate the same paralogism but to negate common sense as regards the facts of the Armada episode, in which the nation did one half of the work, and the storm the other. Dr. Gardiner, like Mr. Froude, who preaches a similar doctrine, overlooks the consequence that Catholicism on these principles must be credited with the production of Henry and Elizabeth, and therefore with their alleged services. As against such an unmeaning theory we may note another verdict of Dr. Gardiner's (p. 33): "Elizabeth has a thousand titles to our gratitude, but it should never be forgotten that she left, as a legacy to her successor, an ecclesiastical system which, unless its downward course were arrested by consummate wisdom, threatened to divide the nation into two hostile camps, and to leave England, even after necessity had compelled the rivals to accept conditions of peace, a prey to theological rancour and sectarian hatred." How then is the account to be balanced? Dr. Cunningham, we may note, sums up as to the preceding reigns that "the scandalous confiscations of Henry VIII and Edward VI were fatal to rural economy and disastrous to mercantile dealings. The disintegration of society became complete;.....with some exceptions in regard to shipping and possibly in regard to the repair of the towns, there is no improvement, no reconstruction which can be traced to the reign of the Tudor kings" (*English Industry*, i, 433). Cp. Prof. Rogers's *Industrial and Commercial History*, p. 12.

N.B.

§ 8

While such changes were being wrought at one end of the political organism, others no less momentous, and partly causative of those, had taken place at the other. By economic writers the period of the Reformation in England is now not uncommonly marked as that of a great alteration for the worse in the lot of the mass of the peasantry.¹ The connection between the overthrow of the Catholic Church and the agrarian trouble, however, is not of the primary character that is thus supposed: it might be rather called accidental than causal. Suppression of the monasteries

¹ *E.g.*, Mr. Gibbins's *Industrial History of England*, pp. 84-89, 105. The point of view seems to have been set up by Cobbett's *History of the Reformation*.

could at most only throw into prominence the poverty which the monasteries relieved, but which monasteries always tend to develop.¹ Wholesale eviction of husbandmen to make way for sheep-farms had taken place, the Church helping, before Henry VIII began to meddle with the Church; and vagabondage and beggary were common in consequence.² The distress was there to begin with, and was increasing, from what period onward it were hard to say.

The early fifteenth-century riots against "enclosures," above mentioned, arose out of the policy of systematically extending pasture, and point to a distress set up by the gradual growth of gain-seeking methods among land-owners as against the common people,³ whose normal tendency to multiply was a constant force making for poverty, though it was met half-way by the aggression of landlords who found it more profitable to raise and export wool than to farm.⁴ A fresh source of dislocation was the enforcement of laws against the keeping of bands of retainers, a process to which Henry VII specially devoted himself,⁵ thus securing his throne on the one hand while intensifying the evil of depopulation and decreasing tillage, for which on the other hand he tried remedial measures,⁶ of the customary description. Laws were passed forbidding the peasantry to seek industrial employment in the cities—this course being taken as well in the interests of the trades as with the hope of restoring agriculture. One outcome of the circumstances was that sheep-farming, like the cloth manufacture, began to be carried on by capitalists;⁷ the moneyed classes beginning to reach out to the country, while the gentry began to draw towards the towns.⁸ Thus we find in existence long before the Reformation all the economic troubles which some writers attribute to the methods of the Reformation; though the Protestant nobles who scrambled for the plunder of the Church in the reigns of Henry and of Edward VI seem to have done more sheep-farming and depopulating than any others, thereby disposing the people the more to welcome Mary.⁹

¹ Cp. Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, ii, 312-15.

² Cp. More's *Utopia*, bk. i (Arber's ed. p. 41; Morley's, p. 64); and Bacon's *History of Henry VII*, Bohn ed. p. 369. More expressly charges certain Abbots with a share in the process of eviction.

³ Cp. Green, ch. vi, § 3. Green goes on to speak of the earlier Statutes of Labourers as setting up the "terrible heritage of a pauper class" (p. 286, also p. 250). This is a fresh error of the same sort as that above dealt with. A pauper class was inevitable, whatever laws were made.

⁴ Bishop Stubbs puts it (iii, 283) that the increase of commerce during the Wars of the Roses was "to some extent a refuge for exhausted families, and a safety-valve for energies shut out of their proper sphere." The proposition in this form is obscure.

⁵ On this see Stubbs, ch. xxi, §§ 470, 471. ⁶ Act 4 Hen. VII, c. 12, preamble, and c. 19.

⁷ Cp. Moreton on *Civilisation*, 1836, p. 106; Cunningham, *English Industry*, i, 392.

⁸ Cp. Cliffe Leslie, *Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy*, p. 267; Toynbee, *The Industrial Revolution*, pp. 63, 66; Gibbon's *Memoirs*, beginning.

⁹ Gardiner, *Introd. to Eng. Hist.* 1881, p. 118; Cunningham, *Industry and Commerce*, i, 434.

Even Prof. Thorold Rogers, who (overlooking the Act 4 Henry VII) seems to hold that the enclosures in the fifteenth century were not made at the expense of tillage, and that the earliest complaints are in the sixteenth century (*History of Agriculture and Prices*, iv, 63, 64 note, 109: cp. Cunningham, *English Industry*, i, 393 note), still shows that there were heavy complaints as early as 1515 (6 Hen. VIII, cc. 5, 6) of a general decay of towns and growth of pastures—long before Henry had meddled with the Church. Bishop Stubbs is explicit on the subject as regards the period of York and Lancaster:—"The price of wool enhanced the value of pasturage; the increased value of pasturage withdrew field after field from tillage; the decline of tillage, the depression of the markets, and the monopoly of the wool trade by the staple towns, reduced those country towns which had not encouraged manufacture to such poverty that they were unable to pay their contingent to the revenue, and the regular sum of tenths and fifteenths was reduced by more than a fifth in consequence. The same causes which in the sixteenth century made the enclosure of the commons a most important popular grievance, had begun to set class against class as early as the fourteenth century, although the thinning of the population by the Plague acted to some extent as a corrective" (*Constitutional History*, iii, 630; cp. Green, ch. v, § 5, p. 251; ch. vi, § 3, p. 285).

The troubles, again, were fluctuating, the movement of depopulation and sheep-farming being followed in due course by a revival of tillage, while contrary movements might be seen in different parts of the country, according as commercial advantage lay for the moment. In one district it might pay best to rear sheep; in another, by reason of nearness to town markets, it might pay best to grow corn; but the competition of corn imported from the Baltic in return for English exports would be a generally disturbing force. The very improvement of agricultural skill, too, in which Holland led the way,¹ would tend to lessen employment in the rural districts. Peace and progress, in the absence of science, always thus provide new sources of distress, multiplying heads and hands without multiplying the employment which secures for the multitude a share in the fruits, but always aggrandising those who have contrived to become possessed of the prime monopolies. What went on was a perpetual transference and displacement of well-being, one class rising on another's distress; and after the apparently steady decay of the towns under Henry VIII,² the new lead given to industry in

¹ Rogers, *Story of Holland*, p. 217, and *Six Centuries*, p. 184; W. T. McCullagh's *Industrial History of the Free Nations*, 1846, ii, 42, 272; Gibbins, pp. 104, 109.

² Rogers, *History of Agriculture and Prices*, iv, 106, 108, citing Acts 6 Hen. VIII, c. 6, and 32 Hen. VIII, cc. 18, 19.

the reign of Elizabeth, by the influx of Protestant refugees from the Netherlands, went to build up an urban middle class which for the time had no political motives to discontent.

Sir Thomas More, in the very passage of the *Utopia* in which he speaks of the wholesale eviction of husbandmen, tells how "handicraft men, yea, and almost the ploughmen of the country, with all other sorts of people, use much strange and proud new fangleness in their apparel, and too much prodigal riot and sumptuous fare at their table" (bk. i, Robinson's trans.). New wealth and new poverty co-existed. "Cheapness and dearness, plenty and scarcity, of corn and other food, depopulation and rapidly increasing numbers, really co-existed in the kingdom. There were places from which the husbandman and labourer disappeared, and the beasts of the field grazed where their cottages had stood; and there were places where men were multiplying to the dismay of statesmen." Cliffe Leslie, essay on *The Distribution and Value of the Precious Metals*, vol. cited, p. 268. The whole of this essay is well worth study. Cp. Prof. Ashley, *Introduction to Economic History*, ii, 50-54.

§ 9

Hence there was no continuous pressure of agrarian or industrial politics, and the stress of the instinct of strife went in other directions. The modern reader, seeking for the class politics of the later Tudor period, finds them as it were covered up, save for such an episode as the revolt of 1549, by the record of foreign policy and ecclesiastical strifes, and is apt to condemn the historian for leaving matters so. But in reality class politics was for the most part superseded by sect politics. The new pseudo-culture of bibliolatry, virtually a sophisticated barbarism, had made new paths for feeling; and these being the more durable, the miseries of the evicted rural populations, which forced a Poor Law on the administration, never set up anything approaching to a persistent spirit of insurrection. By the suppression of the old feudal nobility, as already noted, life in general had been made freer; and the monarch for the time being was become a relatively beneficent and worshipful power in the eyes of the mass of the people, while the landowners were grown weak for harm. The destructive passions were running in other channels, and religious hate swallowed up class hate. For the rest, the new aristocracy was thoroughly established; and in the life and work of Shakespeare himself we see the complete acceptance of the readjusted class relation, though we can also see in his pages the possibilities of a new upper class of rich merchants. In his impersonal way he

flashes the light of Lear's tardy sympathy on the forlorn world of the homeless poor; and in many a phrase he condenses an intense criticism of the injustices of class rule; but even if, as seems certain, he did not write the Jack Cade scenes in *Henry VI*, he has little of the purposive democrat in him: rather—though here it is hard indeed to get behind the great humanist's mask—some touch of the fastidious contempt of the noble, himself fickle enough, for the changing voice of the ignorant populace.

On one point of current psychology, however, as on the great issue of religion, Shakespeare's very silence is more significant than speech. After the passionate outburst put in the mouth of the dying John of Gaunt, and the normal patriotism of *Henry V*, utterances of his early manhood, proceeding upon those of the older plays which he re-wrote, we find in his dramas a notable aloofness from current public passion. This would of course be encouraged by the regulations for the stage; but no regulation need have hindered him from pandering habitually to popular self-righteousness in the matter of national animosities. In 1596 the multitude were all on the side of the fire-eating Essex and against the prudent Burghley in the matter of aggressive war upon Spain; hope of plunder and conquest playing as large a part in their outcry as any better sentiment. The production of *Henry V* in 1599, with its laudatory allusion to Essex's doings in Ireland, whither he had been accompanied by Shakespeare's patron Southampton, would suggest, if the passage were of his penning,¹ that the dramatist was one of Essex's partisans. But whichever way he then leaned, no man can gather from his later plays any encouragement to natural passion of any species. It is not merely that he avoids politics after having been compromised by contact with them:² it is that he rises to a higher plane of thought and feeling.³ He, if any man, could see the fatuity with which Englishmen denounced cruelty in Spaniards while matching Spanish cruelty in Ireland, and cursed the Inquisition while mishandling Jesuit priests in the Inquisition's own temper. The story of English cruelty in Ireland in Elizabeth's and James's day is one of the most sickening in the history of the

¹ It is in the prologue to Act v, ll. 30-34. I affirm without hesitation that the prologues to all five Acts are non-Shakespearean, and plainly by one other hand. Compare the chorus prologues to Dekker's *Old Fortunatus*, which are in exactly the same style. In the latest biography, however (Lee's, p. 174), there is no recognition of any such possibility. It is surprising that Steevens and Ritson, who pronounced the prologue to *Troilus and Cressida* non-Shakespearean, should not have suspected those to *Henry V*, which are so signally similar in style. Dekker's connection with *Troilus and Cressida* is indicated by Henslowe's Diary. The style is a nearly decisive clue to his authorship of the *Henry V* prologues.

² Lee's *Life*, pp. 175, 176.

³ A theory of this is suggested in the author's *Montaigne and Shakespeare*.

epoch.¹ But no sense of guilt ever checked the blatant self-sufficiency with which the general run of Englishmen of the time inveighed against the misdeeds of the Spaniards: no twinge of self-criticism ever modified their righteous thanksgiving over the defeat of the Armada, which was manned partly to avenge their own massacre and torture of Catholic priests. Their Drakes and Hawkinses, playing the pirate and the slave-stealer, and holding with no qualms the conviction that they were doing God service, made current the cant of Puritanism in the pre-Puritan generation. Godly ruffianism could not later go further than it did in "the Elizabethan dawn"; for Milton's swelling phrase of "God and his Englishmen" did not outgo the self-satisfaction of the previous age, any more than of the later period of "Teutonic" self-glorification. To Shakespeare alone seems to have been possible the simple reflection that God's Spaniards, equating with God's Englishmen, left zero to the philosopher.

It seems clear that the mass of the people, and such leading men as Essex and Raleigh, desired a continuance of the state of war with Spain because of the opportunities it gave for piratical plunder. The queen, who had shared in the loot of a good many such expeditions, might have acquiesced but for Burghley's dissuasion. It was an early sign of predilection to the path of imperialism, on which Cromwell later put one foot, on which Chatham carried the nation far, and which it has in later days at times seemed bent on pursuing. In Elizabeth's day enterprises of plunder, as one writer has pointed out, "became the usual adventure of the times, by which the rich expected to increase their wealth and the prodigal to repair their fortunes"; and the general imagination was fired with similar hopes, till "the people were in danger of acquiring the habits and the calculations of pirates." (J. M'Diarmid, *Lives of British Statesmen*, 1820, i, 239, 240; cp. Furnivall and Simpson in the latter's *School of Shakespeare*, 1878, i, pp. x, 32-40; and see Rogers, *Industrial and Commercial History*, p. 12, as to the contemporary lack of commercial enterprise.) Cecil, in his opposition to the war policy of Essex, remarkably anticipates the view of rational historical science (see Camden's *Annales*, ed. 1717, iii, 770-71, as to the conflict.) Burghley had equally been the resisting force to the popular desire for an attack on France after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. His remarkable hostility to militarism is set forth in his *Advice* to his son, on

¹ Cp. Froude, *History of England*, ed. 1875, x, 500, 507, 508, 512, xi, 197; Spenser's *View of the Present State of Ireland*, Globe ed. of Works, p. 654; Lecky's *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, i, 8; Gardiner, *History of England, 1603-42*, ed. 1893, i, 363, 427, 429, 430; J. A. Fox, *Key to the Irish Question*, 1890, ch. xxix; and the author's *The Saxon and the Celt*, pp. 148-54.

the head of the training to be given to his children: "Neither, by my consent, shalt thou train them up in wars; for he that sets up his rest to live by that profession can hardly be an honest man or a good Christian." Yet he planned well enough against the Armada. Cp. Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth*, pp. 236, 237.

§ 10

The culture history of the period from Chaucer to Shakespeare is perhaps clearer than the political. It is in the first great lull of the Wars of the Roses, under Edward IV, that we find printing established in England. Original literature had virtually died out, as in northern Europe, in the long stress of physical strife; but the love of reading took a new growth when peace intervened, and a printer found a public for reproductions of the literatures of the past. This culture proceeded under Henry VII, till at the advent of Henry VIII there was a mature movement of scholarship, a product of classical study and reflection, yielding for England the singular and memorable fruit of More's *Utopia*. That was truly a "Pallas of the brain," not "wild" as in the phrase of the conservative poet, but well-nigh pure of the blind passion of normal life,¹ and therefore no more than a radiant vision for an age in which blind passion was still plenipotent. More's mind had ripened as it were independently of his temperament; and his life is the tragedy of an intelligence, more haunting and more profoundly instructive than any *Hamlet*. The serene spirit that dreamed and planned the *Utopia* grew to be capable of a bitterness of dogmatic fanaticism on a level with the normal passions of the time.² It is matter for surprise that he has not ere now been studied or cited as an apparition of the "Celtic" mind on the arena of brutal English life,³ a prematurely penetrating intelligence thrust back upon and enveloped by a temperament kept passionate by the shocks of an animal environment. From his eyes, limned by the great Holbein, there looks out the sadness of flawed and frustrate wisdom; even as blood and passion and fleshly madness are written in the beastlike face of the king, whose little son, ruddy and hardy in his babyhood, pales and pines away through portrait after portrait to puberty and death, the victim of some secret malady.

¹ Compare the very just appreciation of Green, ch. vi, § 4, p. 311.

² See Isaac Disraeli's study, "The Psychological Character of Sir Thomas More," in the *Amenities of Literature*.

³ Compared with Henry VIII, More might be pronounced a specifically "Celtic" as opposed to an aggressively "Saxon" type. Henry seems a typical English beef-eater. Yet he too was of Welsh descent!

Neither on the psychological line of More nor on that of Henry could the national culture proceed. It went on naïvely, being for long neither Puritan nor anti-Puritan, though the loquacious and commonplace utterance of preachers already abounded before the accession of Elizabeth. The Protestantism of the Protectorate was too much a matter of mere plunder to admit of a great religious literature; and nothing is more remarkable in the great imaginative efflorescence under Elizabeth than its un-Puritan secularity. It drew, indeed, from a soil too rich to be yet overrun by fanaticism. The multiplying printing-presses showered forth a hundred translations; the new grammar-schools bore their fruit; the nation grew by domestic peace, even while tillers of the soil were being made beggars; the magic of discovery and travel thrilled men to new exercises of mind and speech; the swarming life of the capital raised the theatre to fecund energy in a generation; and transformed feudalism survived in the guise rather of a guardian to art and letters than of organised class oppression. A new economic factor, conditioned by a new resource, was at work. In More's day there was no such thing as a professional writer, and there were few printed books. The great controversy between Protestants and Catholics gave a new and powerful stimulus to printing, and printing in turn invited literary effort, books finding multiplying purchasers. Then came the growth of the new theatre, an apparent means of livelihood to a crowd of poet-dramatists. No such sudden outcrop of manifold literature had ever before occurred in human history; the mental distance between Elyot and Bacon, between the old interludes and Shakespeare, is as great as that between Hesiod and Euripides. But the secret of continuous progress had not yet been found: it lies, if anywhere, with the science of the future: and the development after the reign of Elizabeth necessarily began to take new lines.

The later profusion of the poetic drama was the profusion of decay. Artistic abundance must mean artistic change or deterioration; but in the drama there was no recasting of the artistic formulas, no refining of the artistic sense, because there was no progress in general culture sufficient to force or educe it. Rather the extraordinary eloquence of the earlier and greater dramatists, and in particular of the greatest, bred a cultus of conventional rhetoric and declamation in which the power and passion of the masters were lost. Powerful men could not go on attending to an infinity of such blank-verse dramas; powerful men could not go on producing dramas, because the mind of the time made no progress

complementary to the great flowering of the Elizabethan peace. That was essentially a late rebirth of the classic or bookish culture of the Renaissance. New germinal ideas, apart from those of religion, were yet to come. Already the spell of Bibliolatry was conquering the average intelligence, unprepared to digest Hebraism as the *élite* of the previous generation had digested classicism; and the Protestant principle led the Protestant peoples in the mass into the very attitude needed for a social hypnotism such as that of Jewry, the fatal exemplar. Bibliolatry is the culture of the ignorant; church government, the politics of the unenfranchised and the impractical; their conditions exclude them from a truer culture and more vital political interests. Already in Henry's time the newly-translated Scriptures were, to his wrath, "disputed, rhymed, sung, and jangled in every tavern and alehouse"; the very stress of his own personal rule being a main part of the cause. Under the Protectorate of Somerset the gross rapacity of the Protestant nobles identified the new Church with upper-class selfishness as completely as the old had ever been; and the Norfolk revolt of 1549 avowedly aimed at the overthrow of the gentry. When that was stamped out in massacre, the spirit of popular independence was broken, save in so far as it could play in the new channel of personal religion and ecclesiastical polemic, always being dug by the disputation of the new clergy. And when in the reign of Mary crowds of Protestant refugees fled to Geneva, of which the polity had already been introduced to the students of Oxford by Peter Martyr, there was set up a fresh ferment of Presbyterian theory among the educated class which the ecclesiastical conditions under Elizabeth could not but foster. The new dramatic literature and the new national life of anti-Spanish adventure kept it all substantially in the background for another generation; but the lack of progressive culture and the restriction of expansive enterprise at length gave the forces of pietism the predominance. Thus, in ways in which the historians of our literature and politics have but imperfectly traced, the balance of the nation's intellectual activity shifted towards the ground of religion and the ecclesiastical life. And only this change of mental drift can account for the new energy of resistance incurred by Charles when he took up with greater obstinacy the lines of policy of his father, meddling with church practice and normal government on the same autocratic principles. Religion and worship were not the sole grounds of quarrel, but they commanded all the other grounds.

The decadence of English poetic drama after the death of