

[As to the proportional success of Lutheranism and Calvinism, see Motley, pp. 132, 133; and Grattan, pp. 110, 111. (On p. 110 of Grattan there is a transposition of "second" and "third" groups, which the context corrects.) Motley, an inveterate Celtophobe, is at pains to make out that the Walloons rebelled first and were first reconciled to Rome, "exactly like their Celtic ancestors, fifteen centuries earlier." He omits to comment on the fact that it was only the French form of Protestantism, that of Calvin, that became viable in the Netherlands at all, or on the fact that indecent Anabaptism flourished mainly in Friesland; though he admits that the Lutheran movement left all religious rights in the hands of the princes, the people having to follow the creed of their rulers. The "racial" explanation is mere obscurantism, here as always. The Walloons of South Flanders were first affected simply because they were first in touch with Huguenotism. That they were never converted in large numbers to Protestantism is later admitted by Motley himself (p. 797), who thereupon speaks of the "intense attachment to the Roman ceremonial which distinguished the Walloon population." Thus his earlier statement that they had rebelled against "papal Rome" is admittedly false. They had rebelled simply against the Spanish tyranny. Yet the false statement is left standing—one more illustration of the havoc that may be worked in a historian's intelligence by a prejudice. (For other instances see, in the author's volume *The Saxon and the Celt*, the chapters dealing with Mommsen and Burton.)

It was the Teutonic-speaking city populations of North Flanders and Brabant who became Protestants in mass after the troubles had begun (Motley, p. 798). When the Walloon provinces withdrew from the combination against Spain, the cities of Ghent, Antwerp, Bruges, and Ypres joined the Dutch Union of Utrecht. They were one and all reduced by the skill and power of Alexander of Parma, who thereupon abolished the freedom of Protestant worship. The Protestants fled in thousands to England and the Dutch provinces, the remaining population, albeit mostly Teutonic, becoming Catholic. At this moment one-and-a-half of the four-and-a-half millions of Dutch are Catholics; while in Belgium, where there are hardly any Protestants, the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking populations are nearly equal in numbers.

Van Kampen, who anticipated Motley in disparaging the Walloons as being Frenchly fickle (*Geschichte*, i, 366), proceeds to contend that even the Flemings are more excitable than the Dutch and other Teutons; but he notes later that as the Dutch poet Cats was much read and imitated in Belgium, he was thus proved to have expressed the spirit of the whole Netherlands (ii, 109). Once more, then, the racial theory collapses.]

Thus the systematic savagery of the Inquisition under Philip, for which the people at first blamed not at all the king but his Flemish minister, Cardinal Granvelle, served rather to make a basis and pretext for organised revolt than directly to kindle it. In so far as the people spontaneously resorted to violence, in the image-breaking riots, they compromised and imperilled the nationalist movement in the act of precipitating it. The king's personal equation, finally, served to make an enemy of the masterly William of Orange, who, financially embarrassed like the lesser nobility,<sup>1</sup> could have been retained as an administrator by a wise monarch. A matter so overlaid with historical declamation is hard to set in a clear light; but it may serve to say of William that he was made a "patriot," as was Robert the Bruce, by stress of circumstances;<sup>2</sup> and that in the one case as in the other it was exceptional character and capacity that made patriotism a success;<sup>3</sup> William in particular having to maintain himself against continual domestic enmity, patrician as well as popular. Nothing short of the ferocity and rapacity of the Spanish attack, indeed, could have long united the Netherlands. The first confederacy dissolved at the approach of Alva, who, strong in soldiership but incapable of a statesmanlike settlement, drove the Dutch provinces to extremities by his cruelty, caused a hundred thousand artisans and traders to fly with their industry and capital, exasperated even the Catholic ministers in Flanders by his proposed taxes, and finally by imposing them enraged into fresh revolt the people he had crushed and terrorised, till they were eager to offer the sovereignty to the queen of England. When Requesens came with pacificatory intentions, it was too late; and the Pacification of Ghent (1576) was but a breathing-space between grapples.

What finally determined the separation and independence of the Dutch Provinces was their maritime strength. Antwerp, trading largely on foreign bottoms, represented wealth without the then indispensable weapons. Dutch success begins significantly with the taking of Brill (1572) by the gang of William van der Marck, mostly pirates and ruffians, whose methods William of Orange could not endure.<sup>4</sup> But they had shown the military basis for the maritime States. It was the Dutch fleet that prevented Parma's from joining "the" Armada under Medina-Sidonia,<sup>5</sup> thereby perhaps saving

<sup>1</sup> Motley, p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> See Davies, ii, 149, 150, for a criticism of William's development, worth considering as against the unmixed panegyric of Motley.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. M'Cullagh, p. 211.

<sup>4</sup> Motley, pp. 462-67, 506, 527, 829.

<sup>5</sup> Van Kampen, i, 512. Camden (*Hist. of Elizabeth*, trans. 3rd ed. 1635, p. 369) states

England. Such military genius and energy as Parma's might have made things go hard with the Dutch States had he lived, or had he not been called off against his judgment to fight in France; but his death well balanced the assassination of William of Orange, who had thus far been the great sustainer and welder of the movement of independence. Plotted against and vilified by the demagogues of Ghent, betrayed by worthless fellow nobles, Teutonic and French alike; chronically insulted in his own person and humiliated in that of his brother John, whom the States treated with unexampled meanness; stupidly resisted in his own leadership by the same States, whose egoism left Maestricht to its fate when he bade them help, and who cast on him the blame when it fell; thwarted and crippled by the fanaticism and intolerant violence of the Protestant mobs of the towns; bereaved again and again in the vicissitude of the struggle, William turned to irrelevance all imputations of self-seeking; and in his unfailing sagacity and fortitude he finally matches any aristocrat statesman in history. Doubtless he would have served Philip well had Philip chosen him and trusted him. But as it lay in one thoroughly able man, well placed for prestige in a crisis, to knit and establish a new nation, so it lay in one fanatical dullard<sup>1</sup> to wreck half of his own empire, with the greatest captains of his age serving him; and to bring his fabled treasury to ruin while his despised rebels grew rich.

As to the vice of the Dutch constitution, the principle of the supremacy of "State rights," see M'Cullagh, p. 215; Motley, *Rise*, pp. 794, 795 (Pt. vi, ch. ii, end), and *United Netherlands*, ed. 1867, iv, 564. Wicquefort (*L'histoire des Provinces-Unies*, La Haye, 1719, pp. 5, 16), following Grotius, laid stress long ago on the fact that the Estates of each province recognised no superior, not even the entire body of the Republic. It was only the measure of central government set up in the Burgundo-Austrian and Spanish periods that made the Seven Provinces capable of enough united action to repel Spanish rule during a chronic struggle of eighty years. Cp. Van Kampen (i, 304), who points out (p. 306) that the word "State" first appears in Holland in the fifteenth century. It arose in Flanders in the thirteenth, and in Brabant in the fourteenth. Only in 1581, after some years of war, did the United Provinces set up a General Executive Council. In the same year the Prince of Orange was chosen sovereign (Motley, pp. 838, 841).

NOTE.

that Parma was unready to sail when called upon, but adds that the Dutch ships of war lay so placed that he "could not put from shore."  
<sup>1</sup> While Charles V spoke all the languages of his empire, Philip spoke only Spanish. Motley, p. 74. See the notes for a sample of his cast of mind.

§ 3. *The Supremacy of Dutch Commerce*

The conquest of Flanders by Alexander of Parma, reducing its plains to wolf-haunted wildernesses, and driving the great mass of the remaining artisans from its ruined towns,<sup>1</sup> helped to consummate the prosperity of the United Provinces, who took over the industry of Ghent with the commerce of Antwerp.<sup>2</sup> Getting the start of all northern Europe in trade, they had become at the date of their assured independence the chief trading State in the world. Whatever commercial common sense the world had yet acquired was there in force. And inasmuch as the wealth and strength of these almost landless-States, with their mostly poor soil and unavoidably heavy imposts, depended so visibly on quantity of trade turn-over, they not only continued to offer a special welcome to all immigrants, but gradually learned to forego the congenial Protestant strife of sects. It was indeed a reluctantly-learned lesson. Even as local patriotisms constantly tended to hamper unity during the very period of struggle, so the primary spirit of self-assertion set the ruling Calvinistic party upon persecuting not only Catholics and Lutherans, but the new heresy of Arminianism:<sup>3</sup> so little does "patriotic" warfare make for fraternity in peace. The judicial murder of the statesman John van Olden Barneveldt (1619) at the hands of Maurice of Orange, whom he had guarded in childhood and trained to statesmanship, was accomplished as a sequel to the formal proscription of the Arminian heresy in the Synod of Dort; and Barneveldt was formally condemned for "troubling God's Church" as well as on the charge of treason.<sup>4</sup> On the same pretexts Grotius was thrown into prison; and the freedom of the press was suspended.<sup>5</sup> It was doubtless the shame of the memory of the execution of Barneveldt (the true founder of the Republic as such),<sup>6</sup> on an absolutely false charge of treason, and the observation of how, as elsewhere, persecution drove away population, that mainly wrought for the erection of tolerance (at least as between Protestant sects) into a State principle.

The best side of the Dutch polity was its finance, which was a lesson to all Europe. Already in the early stages of the struggle

<sup>1</sup> Davies, ii, 199.

<sup>2</sup> M'Culloch (*Treatises*, p. 347) states that even in its prosperous period Antwerp had little shipping of its own. He refers to Guicciardini's *Descrizione*, but I cannot trace the testimony; and Guicciardini, while speaking of the multitudes of foreigners always at Antwerp (French tr. ed. 1625, fol. p. 114), mentions that the population included a great number of mariners (p. 95).

<sup>3</sup> Grattan, pp. 232, 233, 237; Davies, ii, 452-65, etc.; Motley, *United Netherlands*, ed. 1867, iv, 537.

<sup>4</sup> Van Kampen, ii, 35.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* p. 37.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* p. 36.

with Spain, the States were able on credit to make war, in virtue of their character for commercial honour. Where the king of Spain, with all his revenues mortgaged past hope,<sup>1</sup> got from the Pope an absolution from the payment of interest on the sums borrowed from Spanish and Genoese merchants, and so ruined his credit,<sup>2</sup> the Dutch issued tin money and paper money, and found it readily pass current with friends and foes.<sup>3</sup>

Of all the Protestant countries, excepting Switzerland, the Dutch States alone disposed of their confiscated church lands in the public interest.<sup>4</sup> There was indeed comparatively little to sell,<sup>5</sup> and the money was sorely needed to carry on the war; but the transaction seems to have been carried through without any corruption. It was the suggestion of what might be accomplished in statecraft by the new *expertise* of trade, forced into the paths of public spirit and checked by a stress of public opinion such as had never come into play in Venice. Against such a power as Spain, energy ruled by unteachable unintelligence, a world-empire financed by the expedients of provincial feudalism, the Dutch needed only an enduring resentment to sustain them, and this Philip amply elicited. Had he spent on light cruisers for the destruction of Dutch commerce the treasure he wasted on the Armadas against England and on his enormous operations by land, typified in the monstrous siege of Antwerp, he might have struck swiftly and surely at the very arteries of Dutch life; but in yielding to them the command of their primary source and channel of wealth, the sea, he insured their ultimate success. In the Franco-Spanish war of 1521–25 the French cruisers nearly ruined the herring fishery of Holland and Zealand;<sup>6</sup> and it was doubtless the memory of that plight that set the States on maintaining predominant power at sea.<sup>7</sup>

Throughout the war, which from first to last spread over eighty years, the Dutch commerce grew while that of Spain dwindled. Under Charles V, Flanders and Brabant alone had paid nearly two-thirds of the whole imperial taxation of the Netherlands;<sup>8</sup> but

<sup>1</sup> Motley, *Rise*, p. 149; Prescott, *Philip II*, ed. cited, p. 659.

<sup>2</sup> Davies, ii, 304; Watson, *Hist. of Reign of Philip II*, ed. 1839, p. 527, citing Grotius, lib. v. In 1600, however, Philip III seems to have either acknowledged the debt to Genoa or borrowed anew to a large amount; and at his death he is said to have doubled the debt (Howell, *Epistolæ Ho-elianæ*, ed. Bennett, 1891, i, 138).

<sup>3</sup> Davies, ii, 32, 33. Cp. G. Brandt, *History of the Reformation in the Low Countries*, Eng. tr. 1720, folio, bk. xi, i, 310.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. Motley, *Rise*, pp. 581, 646; *United Netherlands*, iv, 558; M'Cullagh, p. 206 (where the chronology is inaccurate).

<sup>5</sup> See Motley, *Rise*, pp. 37, 38, as to the curtailment of clerical wealth in the Netherlands from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries by the feudal superiors, who, unlike their overlords, did not need to look to the Church for support.

<sup>6</sup> Grattan, p. 69; Davies, i, 294.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. the *Mémoires de Jean De Witt*, as cited, p. 101, ptie. ii, ch. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Grattan, p. 71.

after a generation or two the United Provinces must have been on an equality of financial resources with those left under Spanish rule, even in a state of peace. Yet in this posture of things there had grown up a burden which represented, in the warring commercial State, the persistent principle of class parasitism; for at the Peace of Münster (1648) the funded public debt of the province of Holland alone amounted to nearly 150,000,000 florins, bearing interest at five per cent.<sup>1</sup> Of this annual charge, the bulk must have gone into the pockets of the wealthier citizens, who had thus secured a mortgage on the entire industry of the nation. All the while, Holland was nominally rich in "possessions" beyond sea. When, in 1580, Philip annexed Portugal, with which the Dutch had hitherto carried on a profitable trade for the eastern products brought as tribute to Lisbon, they began to cast about for an Asiatic trade of their own, first seeking vainly for a north-east passage. The need was heightened when in 1586 Philip, who as a rule ignored the presence of Dutch traders in his ports under friendly flags, arrested all the Dutch shipping he could lay hands on;<sup>2</sup> and when in 1594 he closed to them the port of Lisbon, he forced them to a course which his successors bitterly rued. In 1595 they commenced trading by the Cape passage to the Indies, and a fleet sent out by Spain to put down their enterprise was as usual defeated.<sup>3</sup> Then arose a multitude of companies for the East Indian trade, which in 1602 were formed by the government into a great semi-official joint-stock concern, at once commercial and military, reminiscent of the Hanseatic League. The result was a long series of settlements and conquests. Amboyna and the Moluccas were seized from the Portuguese, now subordinate to Spain; Java, where a factory was founded in 1597, was in the next generation annexed; Henry Hudson, an English pilot in the Dutch Company's service, discovered the Hudson River and Bay in 1609, and founded New Amsterdam about 1624. In 1621 was formed the Dutch West India Company, which in fifteen years fitted out 800 ships of trade and war, captured 545 from the Spanish and Portuguese, with cargoes valued at 90,000,000 florins, and conquered the greater part of what had been the Portuguese empire in Brazil.

No such commercial development had before been seen in Europe.

<sup>1</sup> Davies, ii, 636. Already at the death of Charles V the debt of the entire Netherlands was five or six million florins. At the armistice of 1609 the debt of the province of Holland alone was twenty-six millions. By 1648 the war was reckoned to have cost Spain in all fifteen hundred millions. M'Cullagh, ii, 330, 331.

<sup>2</sup> Davies, ii, 290.

<sup>3</sup> Of 250 Dutchmen who sailed, however, only 90 returned.

About 1560, according to Guicciardini,<sup>1</sup> 500 ships had been known to come and go in a day from Antwerp harbour in the island of Walcheren; but in the spring of 1599, it is recorded, 640 ships engaged solely in the Baltic trade discharged cargoes at Amsterdam;<sup>2</sup> and in 1610, according to Delacourt, there sailed from the ports of Holland in three days, on the eastward trade alone, 800 or 900 ships and 1,500 herring boats.<sup>3</sup> At the date of the Peace of Münster these figures were left far behind, whence had arisen a reluctance to end the war, under which commerce so notably flourished. Many Hollanders, further, had been averse to peace in the belief that it would restore Antwerp and injure their commerce, even as Prince Maurice of Orange, the republic's general and stadthouder, had been averse to it as likely to lessen his power and revenue.<sup>4</sup> But between 1648 and 1669 the trade increased by fifty per cent.,<sup>5</sup> Holland taking most of the Spanish trade from the shipping of England and the Hansa, and even carrying much of the trade between Spain and her colonies. When the Dutch had thus a mercantile marine of 10,000 sail and 168,000 men, the English carried only 27,196 men; and the Dutch shipping was probably greater than that of all the rest of Europe together.<sup>6</sup>

This body of trade, as has been seen, was built up by a State which, broadly speaking, had a surplus wealth-producing power in only one direction, that of fishing; and even of its fishing, much was done on the coasts of other nations. In that industry, about 1610, it employed over 200,000 men; and the Greenland whale fishery, which was a monopoly from 1614 to 1645, began to expand rapidly when set free,<sup>7</sup> till in 1670 it employed 120 ships.<sup>8</sup> For the rest, though the country exported dairy produce, its total food product was not equal to its consumption; and as it had no minerals and no vineyards, its surplus wealth came from the four sources of fishing, freightage, extorted colonial produce, and profits on the handling of goods bought and sold. *Par excellence*, it was, in the phrase of Louis XIV, the nation of shopkeepers, of middlemen; and its long supremacy in the business of buying cheap and selling dear was due firstly to economy of means and consumption, and secondarily to command of accumulated money capital at low rates of interest. The sinking of interest was the first sign that the

<sup>1</sup> *Description des Pays Bas*, ed. 1625, p. 319.

<sup>2</sup> *Mémoires de Jean De Witt*, as cited, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Davies, ii, 407. The clergy were of the war party.

<sup>4</sup> M'Culloch, p. 353; Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, 1804, ii, 596; Petty, *Essays*, ed. 1699, p. 165; Keymor, *Observations made upon the Dutch Fishing about 1601*, rep. in *The Phoenix*, 1707, i, 223.

<sup>5</sup> *Mémoires* cited, pp. 48, 50.

<sup>6</sup> Davies, ii, 328.

<sup>7</sup> *Mémoires* cited, p. 194.

<sup>8</sup> Davies, iii, 556.

limits to its commercial expansion were being reached; but it belonged to the conditions that, with or without "empire," its advantage must begin to fall away as soon as rival States were able to compete with it in the economies of "production" in the sense of transport and transfer.

N. In such economies the Dutch superiority grew out of the specially practical basis of their marine—habitual fishing and the constant use of canals. There is no better way than the former of building up seamanship; and just as the Portuguese grew from hardy fishers to daring navigators, so the Dutch grew from thrifty fishers and bargemen to thrifty handlers of sea-freight, surpassing in economy the shippers of England as they did in seamanship the marine of Spain. Broadly speaking, the navies which owed most to royal fostering—as those of Spain, France, and in part England—were the later to reach efficiency in the degree of their artificiality; and the loss of one great Spanish navy after another in storms must be held to imply a lack of due experience on the part of their officers.

One of the worst military mistakes of Spain was the creation of great galleons in preference to small cruisers. The sight of the big ships terrorised the Dutch once, in 1606; but as all existing seacraft had been built up in small vessels, there was no sufficient science for the navigation of the great ones in stress of weather, or even for the building of them on sound lines. The English and Dutch, on the other hand, fought in vessels of the kind they had always been wont to handle, increasing their size only by slow degrees. In the reign of Henry VIII, again, nothing came of the English expeditions of discovery fitted out by him (Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, i, 321), but private voyages were successfully made by traders (*id.* pp. 321, 327).

In the seventeenth century, however, and until far on in the eighteenth, all Dutch shipping was more economically managed than the English. In all likelihood the Dutch traders knew and improved upon the systematic control of ship-construction which the Venetians and Genoese had first copied from the Byzantines, and in turn developed. (Above, p. 197.) Raleigh was one of the first to point out that the broad Dutch boats carried more cargo with fewer hands than those of any other nation (*Observations touching Trade*, in *Works*, ed. 1829, viii, 356). Later in the century Petty noted that the Dutch practised freight-economies and adaptations of every kind, having different sorts of vessels for different kinds of traffic (*Essays in Political Arithmetic* [1690], ed. 1699, pp. 179, 180, 182, 183). This again gave them the primacy in shipbuilding



for the whole of Europe (*Mémoires de Jean De Witt*, ptie. i, ch. vi), though they imported all the materials for the purpose. When Colbert began navy-building, his first care was to bring in Dutch shipwrights (Dussieux, *Étude biographique sur Colbert*, 1886, p. 101). Compare, as to the quick sailing of the Dutch, Motley, *United Netherlands*, ed. 1867, iv, 556. In the next century the English marine had similar economic advantages over the French, which was burdened by royal schemes for multiplying seamen (see Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. p. 37).

The frugality which pervaded the whole of Dutch life may, however, have had one directly disastrous effect. Sir William Temple noted that the common people were poorly fed (*Observations upon the United Provinces*, ch. iv: *Works*, ed. 1814, i, 133, 147); and though their fighting ships were manned by men of all nations, the tendency was to feed them in the native fashion. Such a practice would tell fatally in the sea-fights with the English. Cp. Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii, 123.

In addition to this expertness in handling, the Dutch traders seem to have bettered the lesson taught them by the practice of the Hansa, as to the importance of keeping up a high character for probity. At a time when British goods were open to more or less general suspicion as being of short measure or bad quality,<sup>1</sup> the Dutch practice was to insure by inspection the right quality and quantity of all packed goods, especially the salted herrings, which were still the largest source of Dutch income.<sup>2</sup> And that nothing might be left undone to secure the concourse of commerce to their ports, they maintained under almost every stress<sup>3</sup> of financial hardship the principle of minimum duties on imports of every description. The one notable exception to this policy of practically free trade—apart from the monopoly of the trade in the Indies—was the quite supererogatory veto on the importation of fish from other countries at a time when most of the fishing of Northern Europe was in Dutch hands.<sup>4</sup> Where imports were desirable they were encouraged. Thus it came about that landless Amsterdam was the chief European storehouse for grain, and treeless Holland the greatest centre of the timber trade. Before such a spectacle the average man held up his hands and confessed the incomparable ingenuity of the Hollanders. But others saw and stated the causation clearly enough. "Many writing on this subject,"

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Latterly the regulations failed to check fraud, and even hampered trade (M'Culloch, *Treatises*, p. 371). But for a long time the effect was to sustain the business credit of the Dutch.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *Mémoires of Jean De Witt*, p. 103, as to exceptions.

<sup>4</sup> Keymor, as cited, p. 224. Hamburg about the same period, as Keymor notes, enacted that foreigners should not be allowed to sell herrings in the port until its own boats had come in and sold theirs.

remarks Sir William Petty, "do magnifie the Hollanders as if they were more, and all other nations less, than men, as to the matters of trade and policy; making them angels, and all others fools, brutes, and sots, as to those particulars; whereas," he continues, giving a sound lesson in social science to his generation, "I take the foundation of their achievements to be originally in the situation of the country, whereby they do things inimitable by others, and have advantages whereof others are incapable."<sup>1</sup> And Sir Josiah Child, of the same generation, declared similarly against transcendentalism in such matters. "If any," he roundly declares, "shall tell me it is the nature of those people to be thrifty, I answer, *all men by nature are alike*; it is only laws, custom, and education that differ men; their nature and disposition, and the disposition of all people in the world, proceed from their laws."<sup>2</sup> For "laws" read "circumstances and institutions," adding reservations as to climate and temperament and variation of *individual* capacity and bias, and the proposition is the essence of all sociology. Economic lessons which Petty and Child could not master have since been learned; but their higher wisdom has hardly yet been assimilated.

The sufficient proof that Holland had no abnormal enlightenment even in commerce was that, like her rivals, she continued to maintain the system of monopoly companies. Her "empire" in the East, to which was falsely ascribed so much of her wealth, in reality stood for very little sound commerce. The East India Company being conducted on high monopoly lines, the profits were made rather through the smallness than the greatness of the trade done. Thus, while the Company paid enormous dividends,<sup>3</sup> the imports of spice were kept at a minimum, in order to maintain the price, large quantities being actually destroyed for the purpose. For a time they contrived to raise pepper to double the old Portuguese price.<sup>4</sup> Such methods brought it about that when the republic had in all 10,000 sail, the East India trade employed only ten or twelve ships.<sup>5</sup> All the while the small class of capitalists who owned the shares were able to satisfy the people that the merely monetary and factitious riches thus secured to the Company's shareholders was a form of public wealth.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Essays in Political Arithmetic*, ed. 1699, p. 170. Cp. p. 181.

<sup>2</sup> *New Discourse on Trade*, 4th ed. p. 61.

<sup>3</sup> For the years 1605-10, an average of 36 per cent; for 1616, 62½ per cent.

<sup>4</sup> M'Culloch, *Treatises*, pp. 366-67, and refs. It is told in the *Mémoires de Jean De Witt* (as cited, p. 52, note, ptie. i, ch. xi) that cargoes of pepper were wilfully sunk near port.

<sup>5</sup> *Mémoires* cited, pp. 24, 51, 52.

<sup>6</sup> M'Culloch, pp. 368-69. The Dutch ideal being almost necessarily one of small consumption and accumulation of nominal or money capital, there was no improvement in the popular standard of comfort.

It is a complete error to say, as did Professor Seeley (*Expansion of England*, p. 112), that Holland "made her fortune in the world" because the war with Spain "threw open to her attack the whole boundless possessions of her antagonist in the New World, which would have been closed to her in peace. By conquest she made for herself an empire, and this empire made her rich." In the first place it was not in the New World that she mainly sought her empire, but in the East Indies, in the sphere of the Portuguese conquests. Her hold of Brazil lasted only from 1621 to 1654, and was not a great source of wealth, though she captured much Spanish and Portuguese shipping. But even her eastern trade was, as we have seen, small in quantity, and as a source of wealth was not to be compared with the herring fishery. In 1601 John Keymor declared that more wealth was produced by the northern fisheries "in one year than the King of Spain hath in four years out of the Indies" (*Observations made upon the Dutch Fishing about the Year 1601*—reprint in *Phoenix*, 1707, i, 225). The Dutch takings in six months' fishing were then reckoned at 3,600,000 barrels, valued at as many pounds sterling (*id.* p. 224); the fishing fleet numbered 4,100 sail of all kinds, with over 3,000 tenders, out of a roughly estimated total of 20,000; while the whole Indian fleet is stated at only 40 or 50, employing 5,000 or 6,000 men (*id.* p. 223), as against a total of some 200,000 of Dutch seafaring population. Howell, writing in 1622 (ed. Bennett, 1891, vol. i, 205), also puts the Amsterdam ships in the Indian trade at 40. Professor Seeley's statement cannot have proceeded on any comparison of the European Dutch trade with the revenue from the conquered "empire." It stands for an endorsement of the vulgar delusion that "possessions" are the great sources of a nation's wealth, though Seeley elsewhere (p. 294) protests against the "bombastic language of this school," and notes that "England is not, directly at least, any the richer" for her connection with her "dependencies."

Against the class-interest behind the East India Company the republican party, as led and represented by De Witt, were strongly arrayed. They could point to the expansion of the Greenland whaling trade that had followed on the abolition of the original monopoly in that adventure—an increase of from ten to fifteen times the old quantity of product<sup>1</sup>—and the treatise expounding their policy strongly condemned the remaining monopolies of all kinds. But there was no sufficient body of enlightened public opinion to support the attack; and the menaced interests spontaneously turned

<sup>1</sup> *Mémoires* cited, ptie. i, ch. x, xi, pp. 47, 48, 50.

to the factor which could best maintain them against such pressure—the military power of the House of Orange. The capitalist monopolists and “imperialists” of the republic were thus the means first of artificially limiting its economic basis, and later of subverting its republican constitution—a disservice which somewhat outweighs the credit earned by them, as by the merchant oligarchies of Venice, for an admirable management of their army.<sup>1</sup>

#### § 4. *Home and Foreign Policy*

The vital part played by William the Silent at the outset of the war of independence gave his house a decisive predominance in the affairs of the republic, grudging as had often been its support of him during life. As always, the state of war favoured the rule of the imperator, once the institution had been established. Fanatical clergy and populace alike were always loud in support of the lineage of the Deliverer; and with their help William's son Maurice was able to put to death Barneveldt. Then and afterwards, accordingly, war was more or less the Orange interest; and after the Peace of Münster we find the republican party sedulous at once to keep the peace and to limit the power of the hereditary stadthouder. The latter, William II, aged twenty-four, having on his side the great capitalists, tried force in a fashion which promised desperate trouble,<sup>2</sup> but died at the crisis (1650), his only child being born a week after his death.

It was substantially the pressure of the Orange interest, thus situated, that led to the first naval war between Holland and England, both then republics, and both Protestant. Orangeist mobs, zealous for Charles I, as the father of the Princess of Orange, insulted the English republican ambassadors who had come to negotiate on Cromwell's impossible scheme for a union of the two republics; and the prompt result was the Navigation Act, intended<sup>3</sup> to hurt Dutch commerce. It was really powerless for that purpose; but the Dutch people in general believed otherwise, and, being not only independent but bellicose, they were as ready as Puritan England for a struggle at sea. While, however, they held their ground in the main as fighters, they suffered heavily in their trade. By 1653 they had lost over sixteen hundred ships through English privateering; so that the two years of the English war had done

<sup>1</sup> Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv, 561, 562.

<sup>2</sup> As to the stress of party spirit in Holland about this period, see Davies, ii, 725, 726.

<sup>3</sup> See hereinafter, pt. vi, ch. ii, § 5.

them more injury than the eighty years of the Spanish.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, though forced again to war by Charles II, the republican party put it as a maxim of policy that Dutch prosperity depended on peace.<sup>2</sup> It is nevertheless one of the tragedies of their history that John de Witt, the great statesman who owed most heed to this maxim, was inveigled by the English Government into an ill-judged alliance against France,<sup>3</sup> and was then deserted by England, whereupon the republic was invaded by France, and De Witt was murdered by his own people. Of all the nations of Europe the Dutch were then the best educated; but no more than ancient Athens had their republic contrived to educate its mob. The result was a frightful moral catastrophe.

It is easy at this time of day to find fault with De Witt's policy of two hundred years ago, but hard to reckon aright the practical possibilities of his situation. Suffice it to say that the formation of the Triple Alliance of Holland, England, and Sweden against Louis XIV proved a ruinous mistake. France had supported the republic against Spain; and Louis had stood by it when Charles II invited him to join in dismembering it. Yet, after sending its fleet up the Medway and forcing Charles to the humiliating Peace of Breda, and in the full knowledge that he hated the republic which had harboured and criticised him, De Witt was persuaded by Sir William Temple, the English ambassador, to sign, albeit reluctantly,<sup>4</sup> a treaty of union (1668) which made France a strenuous enemy, and from which Charles nevertheless instantly drew back, making secretly a treacherous treaty with Louis, and leaving Holland open to French invasion. It was the bane of the diplomacy of the age to be perpetually planning alliances on all hands by way of maintaining the "balance of power"; and De Witt, while justly suspicious of England, could not be content to drop the system. His excuse was that Louis was avowedly bent on the acquisition or control of the Spanish Netherlands; and that after that there would be small security for the republic. Yet he had better have remained the ally of France than leant on the broken reeds of the friendship of Spain

<sup>1</sup> Davies, ii, 721; Van Kampen, ii, 149. Cp. Temple, *Essay upon the Advancement of Trade in Ireland*, Works, iii, 15, 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Mémoires de Jean De Witt*, ptie. ii, ch. ii, iii (iii, iv). It is there noted (ch. ii, p. 113) that when in time of war the States-General gave letters of marque to privateers there were always bitter complaints that the Dutch privateers took Dutch goods as well as the enemy's. Again it is asked (p. 163), "What plunder is there for us to gain at sea when we are almost the only traffickers?"

<sup>3</sup> It is to be noted that De Witt diverged fatally from the doctrine of his friend Delacourt in thus leaning to foreign alliances, which Delacourt altogether opposed. See Lefèvre Pontalis, *Jean De Witt*, 1884, i, 317-18, where an interesting account of the *Mémoires* is given.

<sup>4</sup> Davies, iii, 68, 69; Rogers, *Holland*, p. 266. Temple was of course the unconscious instrument of the treachery of Charles. Cp. Lefèvre Pontalis, *Jean De Witt*, i, 451-55.

and the English king. Charles needed only to appeal to the English East India Company, whose monopoly was pitted against that of the Dutch Company, to secure a parliamentary backing for a fresh war with Holland; and the sudden invasion of the republic by France (1672) was the ruin of the De Witts. It was an Orange mob that murdered them; and the young William of Orange pensioned those who had formally accused them of treason.

The action of Charles in 1672 had been a masterpiece of baseness. After secretly betraying his Dutch allies to Louis, he caused his own fleet, before war had been declared, to attack a rich Dutch merchant fleet in the Channel, with the worthy result of a capture of only two ships. His declaration of war, when made, included such pretexts as that there is "scarce a town in their territories that is not filled with abusive pictures and false historical medals and pillars," which "alone were cause sufficient for our displeasure, and the resentment of all our subjects"; and he alleged breach of a non-existent article in the Treaty of Breda.<sup>1</sup> It was in this disgraceful war that Shaftesbury gave out as the true policy of England the maxim of Cato—*Delenda est Carthago*—and the end of it was that in 1673, after a war without triumphs, in which finally the English fleet under Rupert was defeated by that of the Dutch while the French fleet stood idly by (1673), the betrayed betrayer made peace with Holland once more (1674).

N. The hostility of France on the other hand practically ended Dutch republicanism, though at the same time it brought about the wreck of the "empire" of Louis XIV. Had he accepted the submission offered by De Witt, he might have made a sure ally of Holland as against England. But his policy of conquest, insolently formulated by his minister Louvois, first put the Dutch Government in the hands of the Prince of Orange, and then turned the English interest, despite the King, against France. It may be taken as a law of European politics that any power which arrogantly sets itself to overbear the others will itself, in the course of one or two generations at furthest, be beaten to its knees. The end of the insolent aggression of Louis came when, after William had become King of England and set up a new tradition of Protestant union against France, the military genius of Marlborough in the next reign reduced France to extremities. Meanwhile Holland was past its period of commercial climax, past the ideals of De Witt, past republicanism for another era. Henceforth it was to be subservient to its stadt-

<sup>1</sup> See the Declaration and the Dutch reply, printed in 1674, reprinted in *The Phoenix*, 1707, i, 271 sq.

houder, and to become ultimately a kingdom, on the failure of the republican movement at the French Revolution.

§ 5. *The Decline of Commercial Supremacy*

It follows from what has been seen of the conditions of its success that the Dutch trade could not continue to eclipse that of rival States with greater natural sources of wealth when once those States had learned to compete with Dutch methods. But it belonged to the culture-conditions that the rival States should take long to learn the lesson, and that the Dutch should be the first to adapt themselves to new circumstances. The blunders of their enemies lengthened the Dutch lease. Louis XIV gave one last vast demonstration of what Catholicism can avail to wreck States by revoking the Edict of Nantes (1686), and so driving from France a quarter of a million of industrious subjects, part of whom went to England, many to Switzerland, but most to Holland, conveying their capital and their handicrafts with them. The stroke hastened the financial as well as the military exhaustion of France in the next twenty-five years. England, on the other hand, maintained its trade monopolies, which, with the system of imposts, drove over to the Dutch and the French much trade that a better policy might have kept.<sup>1</sup> But all the Dutch advantages were consummated in the command of money capital at low rates of interest, and consequent capacity to trade for small profits.

This accumulation of money capital was the correlative of the main conditions of Dutch commerce. A community drawing its income—save for the great resource of fishing—from its middleman-profits and freightage, and from its manufacture of other nations' raw products in competition with their own manufacture, must needs save credit capital for its own commerce' sake. Thus, whereas the earlier Flemings were luxurious in their expenditure,<sup>2</sup> the Dutch middle-class were the most frugal in north-western Europe,<sup>3</sup> their one luxury being the laudable one of picture-buying. But when, through mere increase of population and consequently of trade, interest gradually fell<sup>4</sup> in the rival communities, who in turn could

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Child, *New Discourse of Trade*, 4th ed. pref. pp. xx-xxv; Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. pp. 28, 47-57.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Grattan, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> "Never any country traded so much and consumed so little; they buy infinitely, but it is to sell again." "They furnish infinite luxury, which they never practise, and traffic in pleasures which they never taste" (Temple, *Observations*, 1814 ed. of *Works*, i, 176). Cp. Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv, 559. Sometimes the citizens were taxed fifty per cent on their incomes.

<sup>4</sup> M'Culloch's dictum that the low rate of interest in Holland was wholly due to heavy taxation is an evident fallacy, framed in the interest of *laissez-faire*.

practise fishing, who had better harbours, who extended their marine commerce, began to manufacture for themselves, and had natural resources for barter and production that Holland wholly lacked, the Dutch trade slowly but surely fell away. And as against the sustaining force of their frugality and their systematic utilisation of their labour-power, the Dutch lay under burdens which outweighed even those imposed on France and England by bad government. Not only did the national debt force a multiplication of imposts on every article of home consumption,<sup>1</sup> but the constant cost of the maintenance of the sea-dykes was a grievous natural tax from which there was no escape. Nor would the creditor class on any score consent to forego their bond.

Thus it came about that after the Peace of Utrecht (1713), which left Holland deeper in debt than ever, there was an admitted decline in the national turnover from decade to decade. It is one of the fallacies of the non-economic interpretation of history to speak of the United Provinces as thenceforth showing a moral "languor";<sup>2</sup> the rational explanation is that their total economic nutrition was curtailed by the competing environment. Yet it must be admitted that the merchant class themselves, when called on by the stadthouder William IV to compare notes as to the decline, showed little recognition of the natural causes beyond dwelling on the effect of heavy taxes, which had been insisted on long before by the party of De Witt.<sup>3</sup> Dwelling as they do on the value of the old maxims of toleration, which were now beside the case, and failing to realise that the sheer produce of the other countries was a decisive factor in competition, they seem to invite such a reaction in economic theory as was set up by the French Physiocrats, who laid their finger on this as the central fact in industrial life.

France, indeed, had learned other vital lessons after the great defeat of Louis XIV. Nothing in the history of that age is more remarkable than the fashion in which the immense blunder of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was *pro tanto* cured under the Regency and under Louis XV by the infiltration of fresh population. Dean Tucker noted, what the Dutch

<sup>1</sup> It was a common saying at Amsterdam in the seventeenth century that every dish of fish was paid for once to the fisherman and six times to the State. As early as 1619 taxes on goods were nearly equal to their wholesale price (Howell, letter of May 1, 1619, in *Epistolæ Ho-elianæ*, Bennett's ed. 1891, vol. i, 27). See *La Richesse de Hollande*, 1778, ii, 21-42, for details of the extraordinary multiplication of Dutch taxes from the war-period onwards. In Temple's time a common fish-sauce paid thirty different duties (*Observations*, in *Works*, i, 187). And still taxes increased. Cp. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, M'Culloch's ed. 1839, pp. 396, 397, 411.

<sup>2</sup> So Seeley, *Expansion of England*, p. 132.

<sup>3</sup> See the Dissertation drawn up on this occasion (1750), Eng. tr. 1751. It is largely quoted from by M'Culloch, *Treatises*, pp. 354-62.



merchants apparently did not, that "Flanders, all Germany on this side of the Rhine, Switzerland, Savoy, and some parts of Italy, pour their supernumerary hands every year into France" (*Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. p. 27). At that time (1750) there were said to be 10,000 Swiss and Germans in Lyons alone, and the numbers of immigrants in all the commercial towns were increasing (*id.* pp. 27, 28), the Government having become "particularly gentle and indulgent to foreigners." At that period, too, the French peasantry were prolific (*id.* p. 45).

Above all, the Dutch Provinces were bound to be outclassed in manufactures by England when England began to manufacture by machinery and by steam. Anciently well-forested,<sup>1</sup> they had long been nearly bare of wood, so that their fuel had become, as it still is, scarce and expensive.<sup>2</sup> They had done wonders with windmills; but when coal came into play as driving power the coal-producing State was bound to triumph. It must, however, be kept on record that when England's commerce had thus begun to distance that of her old rival in virtue of her mere economic basis, Englishmen were none the less ready to resort to wanton aggression. Throughout the eighteenth century the ideal of monopoly markets continued to rule in Europe; and that ideal it was that inspired the struggles of France and England for the possession of India and North America. In the course of those imperialist wars the Government of the elder Pitt gave to privateers the right to confiscate, as "contraband of war," nearly all manner of commerce between France and other nations, and in particular that of Holland, Pitt's aim being to force the Dutch into his alliance against France. The injury thus wrought to their trade was enormous. "Perhaps at no time in history were more outrageous injuries perpetrated on a neutral nation than those which the Dutch suffered from the English during the time of the elder Pitt's administration."<sup>3</sup> It was the method of imperialism; and the usual sequel was at hand in the revolt of the American Colonies. In that crisis also, because the Dutch Council of State, despite the wish of the stadthouder, refused to take part against the Colonies, the English Government as before gave letters of marque to privateers, and told the plundered Dutch that if they increased their fleet to protect their own commerce the action would be taken as hostile. "In 1779 the English commander, Fielding, captured the Dutch mercantile fleet, with four Dutch men-of-war; and in 1780 Yorke, the English Ambassador at The

<sup>1</sup> Wenzelburger, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i, 51.

<sup>2</sup> Laing, *Notes of a Traveller*, 1842, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Rogers, *Holland*, pp. 362, 363.

Hague, demanded subsidies from the States, whom his Government had just before plundered."<sup>1</sup>

Needless to say, Dutch wealth and power had greatly dwindled before this insult was ventured on by the rival people. Holland's primary source of wealth, the fisheries, had been in large part appropriated by other nations, in particular by Britain, now her great competitor in that as well as in other directions.<sup>2</sup> But all the while Holland's own "empire" was a main factor in her weakening. Deaf to the doctrine of De Witt, her rulers had continued to keep the East Indian trade on a monopoly basis, ruling their spice islands as cruelly and as blindly<sup>3</sup> as any rival could have done; and it was the false economics and false finance bound up with their East India Company that ruined the great Bank of Amsterdam, which at the French Revolution was found to have gambled away all its funds in the affairs of the Company, in breach of the oath of the magistrates, who were the sworn custodians of the treasure. So situated, the Government could or would make no effort in the old fashion against English tyranny. The State's economic basis being in large part gone, and the capitalistic interest incapable of unifying or inspiring the nation, Holland had, so to speak, to begin life over again. But it would be a delusion to suppose that the political decline meant misery; on the contrary, there was much less of that in Holland than in triumphant England. There were still wealthy citizens, as indeed always happens in times of decline of general wealth. At that very period "the Dutch were the largest creditors of any nation in Europe";<sup>4</sup> and Smith in 1776 testified that Holland was "in proportion to the extent of the land and the number of its inhabitants by far the richest country in Europe," adding that it "has accordingly the greatest share of the carrying trade of Europe,"<sup>5</sup> and again that its capitalists had much money in British stocks. But these were not as broad foundations as the old; nor were they easily expansible, or even maintainable. As soon, indeed, as the rise of other national debts enabled them to invest abroad, they did so. Temple has recorded how, when any part of the home debt was being paid off in his time, the scripholders "received it with tears, not knowing how to dispose of it to interest with such safety and ease." England soon began to relieve them of such anxiety. But though Holland could thus gain from the annual

<sup>1</sup> Rogers, p. 365.

<sup>2</sup> See Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. iv, ch. v, as to the British encouragement of fisheries in the eighteenth century.

<sup>3</sup> Crawford, *Eastern Archipelago*, iii, 388; (cited by M'Culloch, p. 365); Temminck, *Possessions Néerlandaises dans l'Inde Archipelagique*, 1847-49, iii, 202-11.

<sup>4</sup> M'Culloch, p. 363.

<sup>5</sup> *Wealth of Nations*, bk. ii, ch. v, end.

interest-tribute paid by borrowing States, as England does at this moment, such income in a time of shrinking industry stands only for the idle life of the endowed class, a factor neither industrially nor intellectually wholesome. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Keymor, an English observer who studied Dutch commercial life closely, exclaimed: "And not a Beggar there; everyone getting his own Living is admirable to behold."<sup>1</sup> This seems to have been an exaggeration, since in 1619 we find Howell praising the "strictness of their laws against mendicants, and their hospitals of all sorts for young and old, both for the relief of the one and the employment of the other."<sup>2</sup> Later there grew up, however carefully provided for,<sup>3</sup> a notably large pauper population; and so late as 1842 Laing, who liked Holland, wrote of it as "a country full of capitalists and paupers."<sup>4</sup> In the main, modern Dutch life has of necessity had to find sounder bases; and the chief feature in it during the past generation has been the new and great industrial expansion.

#### § 6. *The Culture Evolution*

From first to last the culture-history of Holland illustrates clearly enough the importance of the freer political life to the life of the mind. It is in the period of independence that Holland begins to play a great part in European culture. Previously, the multitude of popular "chambers of rhetoric,"<sup>5</sup> and so forth, yielded no fine fruits; but in the stress of self-government the republic begins to produce scholars, thinkers, and men of science, who affect those of surrounding nations. Already in 1584, when nothing of the kind existed in France or England, a Dutch literary academy published a Dutch grammar;<sup>6</sup> and the republic was "the peculiarly learned State of Europe throughout the seventeenth century,"<sup>7</sup> producing more of original classical research and scholarly teaching in its small sphere than any other. Freedom and endowment of university teaching brought in such Germans as Gronovius and Graevius; and Leibnitz looked to little Holland as a model in many things for backward Germany.<sup>8</sup> Printing became one of the industries of the country; and the Elzevirs were long the great classic publishers for

<sup>1</sup> Keymor, *Observations on the Dutch Fishing*, in *The Phoenix*, as cited, p. 231.

<sup>2</sup> *Epistolæ Ho-elianæ*, Bennett's ed. 1891, i, 25.

<sup>3</sup> Child, *New Discourses of Trade*, 4th ed. p. 88. Cp. Menzel, *Gesch. der Deutschen*, cap. 491, note, citing Browne's work of 1668.

<sup>4</sup> *Notes of a Traveller*, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> As to these see Motley, *Rise*, pp. 46-48. He admits that they were set up by French culture-contacts. But cp. Grattan, p. 75.

<sup>6</sup> Hallam, *Literature of Europe*, ed. 1872, iii, 249.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* iv, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Cp. Biedermann, as cited in the author's *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 169-73.

Europe. Free universities and a free press, indeed, were the main conditions of the Dutch classical renaissance.

The conditions of progress in *belles lettres*, on the other hand, being less propitious, the development was inferior. All Europe could buy Latin books printed in Holland; but few foreigners read Dutch, and the finer native literature was sustained only by the necessarily small class which had both leisure and culture. The very devotion to culture which, as was claimed by Grotius, made the well-to-do Dutch in his youth the greatest students of languages in Europe,<sup>1</sup> wrought rather for the importation of foreign literature than the fostering or elevation of the native. So that though the Catholic poetess Anna Bijns,<sup>2</sup> and later the Catholic Spreghel, "the Dutch Ennius" (1549-1612), and Hooft, "the Dutch Tacitus" (1581-1647), made worthy beginnings, there was no great florescence. In the terms of the case, the two former represent the general Catholic culture-influence; and Hooft, eminent alike as poet and historian, owed his artistic stimulus to the three youthful years he spent in Italy studying Italian literature.<sup>3</sup> Of the more celebrated native poets, Cats is prosaic, though to this day highly popular, suiting as he does the plane of taste developed under a strenuous commercialism; and Vondel alone, by his influence on Milton, enters into the blood of outside European literature.

Fanatical Calvinism,<sup>4</sup> again, was not primarily favourable to philosophic thought; and it is to the influence of Descartes, who made Holland his home for many years, that the possibility of the later great performance of Spinoza is to be ascribed. But the impulse, once given, and sustained by such an atmosphere as was set up by Bayle and other French refugees, developed a new culture-force; and in the eighteenth century the Dutch press was a disseminator of French and English rationalism, as well as of the classic erudition which still flourished. All along, though none of the supreme names in science is Dutch, scientific culture was in general higher than elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> Such influences made afresh for a revival of native literature, and throughout the eighteenth century it is the foreign stimulus that is seen at work. Thus Van Effen (1684-1725) read much English and wrote much French, but was also the best Dutch writer of his time; the brothers Van Haren (1710-79) were diplomatists, and friends of Voltaire; and the two lady

<sup>1</sup> Van Kampen, i, 608, 609.

<sup>2</sup> Her works were issued in 1528, 1540, and 1567.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Mr. Gosse's article on Dutch literature, in *Ency. Brit.* 10th ed. vol. xii.

<sup>4</sup> As to this see Cerisier, vi, 267.

<sup>5</sup> Van Kampen, i, 607, 608; ii, 106; Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv, 570.

novelists, Wolff and Deken, produced their three admired books (1782-92) under the influence of Richardson and Goethe.

But as against these debts to foreign example, the Dutch Republic in its time of flower produced a great and markedly native body of art, which to this day ranks in its kind with that of the great age in Italy. It may have been the example set in the Spanish Netherlands by the Austrian archdukes, after the severance, that gave the lead to the Dutch growth; but there is no imitation and nothing nationally second-rate in their total output. The Flemish Rubens (1577-1640) precedes by twenty-one years his pupil Vandyck and the great Spaniard Velasquez, and by nearly thirty years the Dutch Rembrandt; but no four contemporary masters were ever more individual; and the Dutch group of Rembrandt, Hals, Van der Helst, Gerard Dow, and the rest, will hold its own with the Flemish swarm headed by Rubens and Vandyck. It is worth while in this connection to note afresh how closely is art florescence bound up with economic forces. Dutch and Flemish art, like Italian, is in the first place substantially a product of economic demand, the commercial aristocracy of the Netherlands commissioning and buying pictures as did the clerical aristocracy of Italy. It has been denied that there is any economic explanation for the eventual arrest of great art in the Netherlands; but when we note the special conditions of the case the economic explanation will be found decisive.

Great art, it is true, always tends to set up a convention, which is the stoppage of greatness; but even great art can so arrest progress only when the economic and social sphere is curtailed; and the Dutch economic sphere, as we have seen, was practically non-expansive after the disaster of 1672, which date also begins a new period of ruinous war for Flanders. Rembrandt died in 1664. He and his contemporaries and their pupils had produced a body of painting immense in quantity; and the later and poorer generations, having such a body of classic work passed on to them, naturally and necessarily rested on their treasure. The population of the United Provinces, estimated to have reached a million-and-a-half in the Middle Ages,<sup>1</sup> had risen in the great period to three or three-and-a-half millions.<sup>2</sup> From this figure it positively fell away in the eighteenth century.<sup>3</sup> Here then was a shrinking population, loaded with old and new debt and overwhelmed with taxes, consciously growing poorer, with no prospect of recovery, and already stocked

<sup>1</sup> Wenzelburger, i, 54.

<sup>2</sup> Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv, 556.

<sup>3</sup> At 1829 it was only 2,613,487.

with a multitude of pictures<sup>1</sup> by great masters. That it should go on commissioning new pictures with the old munificence was impossible: it was more concerned to sell than to buy; and what demand had elicited lack of demand arrested. There is no clearer sociological case in history.

### § 7. *The Modern Situation*

After all that has come and gone, it is important to realise, in correction of the megalomaniac view of things, that Holland is to-day literally larger,<sup>2</sup> more populated,<sup>3</sup> and more productive than she was in the "palmy days"; and that her colonial "empire," now administered on just principles, includes a population of over 30,000,000. Over sixty years ago M'Culloch wrote that "though their commerce be much decayed, the Dutch, even at this moment, are *the richest and most comfortable people of Europe.*"<sup>4</sup> The latter part of the statement would not be very far out to-day, though popular comfort perhaps does not now keep pace with population. Otherwise it no longer holds. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there began a vigorous revival of Dutch commerce and industry, Holland becoming once more expansive. From 1872 to 1906 Dutch exports, measured by weight, increased ninefold, imports sixfold, and transit trade over threefold; and the expansion steadily continues; the value of the transit trade rising from 9,392 million guilders in 1906 to 12,684 millions in 1910; while imports increased by nearly 30 per cent and exports by 26 per cent. Much of this expansion appears to be due to the advantages accruing to Holland as a free-trade country alongside of protectionist Germany, whose far greater natural resources redound largely to the gain of the free-trading neighbour.

In detail, the commercial situation of to-day is curiously like the old at many points. The debt is still relatively great—about £97,000,000 sterling;<sup>5</sup> and about a fourth of the whole expenditure is interest; another fourth going for "defence." Always making the best of their soil, alike with roots and cereals, the people go on increasing the area under cultivation and the yield per hectare.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Some of course were destroyed by various causes. Rubens's "Descent from the Cross" at Antwerp, though repeatedly retouched, was ruined when Reynolds saw it; but the number of good pictures preserved in the Low Countries is immense.

<sup>2</sup> In 1833 there were 2,270,959 hectares of land = 8,768 square miles. In 1877 there were 3,297,268 hectares = 12,731 square miles—the result of systematic reclamation from sea and river.

<sup>3</sup> Population in 1897 slightly over 5,000,000; at the end of 1910, 5,945,155.

<sup>4</sup> Compare, however, the verdict of Laing, cited above, p. 325.

<sup>5</sup> An increase of some seven millions since 1900.

<sup>6</sup> Chief crops rye, oats, potatoes.

Still, as of old, much food and raw material is imported to be exported again<sup>1</sup>—in large part to Germany. Fishing now employs only 20,000 men with over 5,300<sup>2</sup> boats; the annual product is valued at under £1,000,000; and of over 10,800 clearances of vessels from Dutch ports in 1910 only 4,533 were Dutch, representing a total mercantile navy of only 764.<sup>3</sup> But of Dutch vessels engaged in the carrying trade between foreign ports there were 4,383 in 1909,<sup>4</sup> with more than seven times the tonnage of the home navy. Thus the nation still subsists largely by playing middleman, partly by manufactures, partly by dairy and other produce, little by fishing,<sup>5</sup> but still largely by freightage. Java does not figure as a source of revenue for Holland, being administered in its own interest,<sup>6</sup> with less taxation of the people than goes on in British India.

Of the conditions which in Holland tell against increase of well-being, the most notable is the large birth-rate resulting there as elsewhere from the rapid modern expansion of industry. With a population less by 1,580,000 than that of Belgium, Holland has annually a larger surplus of births over deaths. It may be interesting to compare Dutch statistics with those of Portugal and Sweden, which have nearly the same population, as regards birth-rate and emigration. Each of the three States at 1895 had slightly over or under 5,000,000 inhabitants; and in 1909 slightly over or under 6,000,000. Their marriages and their emigration were:—

	MARRIAGES.			EMIGRATION.		
	Portugal.	Holland.	Sweden.	Portugal.	Holland.	Sweden.
1895 .....	33,018	35,598	28,728	44,746	1,314	14,982
1908, 1909, or 1910	34,150	42,740	33,131	40,056	3,220	23,529

The emigration from Portugal in 1895 was abnormal; but in

<sup>1</sup> The clear exports are chiefly margarine, butter, cheese, sugar, leather, paper, manufactured woollen and cotton cloths, flax, vegetables, potato-flour, oxen, and sheep. In 1891 Great Britain imported from the Netherlands £3,093,595 worth of margarine and £770,460 worth of butter; in 1909, £2,782,636 worth and £843,318 worth respectively; while sugar stood at £2,043,724. Oil seed rose from £345,210 in 1909 to £721,266 in 1910; and condensed milk in the latter year stood at £795,937.

<sup>2</sup> Increases of 5,000 men and 1,300 boats since 1900.

<sup>3</sup> An increase of 143 since 1900.

<sup>4</sup> An increase of 2,206 (over 100 per cent.) since 1891.

<sup>5</sup> This source of wealth, as we have seen, was much curtailed in the eighteenth century by British competition. Laing (*Notes*, pp. 7, 8) shows how small it had become at his time, but is quite mistaken in assuming that it had never been great.

<sup>6</sup> About 60 per cent. of the revenue is from Government produce and monopolies.

1896 the figures were 24,212, and in 1907 they reached 41,950. In Sweden in 1895 the excess of births over deaths was as high as 60,000. In Portugal it was 47,997; a figure which in 1896 fell to 38,134; rising again to 64,312 in 1909. In Holland, the average excess in 1879-84 was 54,751; in 1897 it had risen to 77,586; in 1909 to 90,483. Under such circumstances it needs the alleged doubling of Dutch commerce between 1872 and 1891, and the subsequent continued expansion, to maintain well-being. As it is, despite the tradition of good management of the poor, the number of the needy annually relieved temporarily or continuously by the charitable societies and communes<sup>1</sup> appears to be always over five per cent. of the population—or about twice the average proportion of paupers in the United Kingdom. The Dutch figures of course do not stand for the same order of poverty; and there is certainly not in Holland a proportional amount of the sordid misery that everywhere fringes the wealth of England. But it is clear that Holland is becoming relatively over-populated; and that the industrial conditions are not making steadily for popular elevation, standing as they do for low wages and grinding competition in many occupations.

NOTE.

Nor are these conditions favourable in Holland to general culture, as apart from forms of specialism, any more than in England. Dutch experts in recognised studies latterly hold their own with any—witness the names of Kuenen, Tiele, van t'Hoff, de Goeje, de Vries, Dozy, Kern, Lorentz, Waals—and the middle-class has probably a better average culture than prevails in England or the United States; but the lapsed Republic has yet to prove how much a small State may achieve in the higher civilisation. Meantime, it is plainly not smallness but too rapid increase in numbers that is the stumbling-block; and the possession of a relatively great "empire" in Java does not avail, for Holland any more than for England, to cure the social trouble at home.

<sup>1</sup> The communes make provision only where charity does not; there is no poor-rate.



## CHAPTER V

### SWITZERLAND

The best general history of Switzerland available in English is Mr. E. Salisbury's translation (1899) of the *Short History* of Prof. Dändliker. It has little merit as literature, but is abreast of critical research at all points. For the Reformation period, the older history of Vieusseux (*Library of Useful Knowledge*, 1840) is fuller and better, though now superseded as to early times. The work of Sir F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham on *The Swiss Confederation*, 1880 (translated and added to in French by M. Loumyer, 1890), is an excellent conspectus, especially for contemporary Swiss institutions. As regards the first half of the last century, Grote's *Seven Letters concerning the Politics of Switzerland* (1847, rep. 1876) are most illuminating.

Of fuller histories there are several in French and German. The longer *Geschichte der Schweiz* of Prof. Dändliker (1884-87) is good and instructive, though somewhat commonplace in its thinking. Dierauer's *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft* (1887), which stops before the Reformation period, is excellent so far as it goes, and gives abundant references, which Dändliker's does not; though his *Short History* gives good bibliographies.

Zschokke's compendious *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte* (9te Aufgabe, 1853) is lucid and very readable, but is quite uncritical as to the medieval period. That is critically and decisively dealt with in Rilliet's *Les Origines de la Confédération Suisse*, 1868, and in Dierauer.

IN more than one respect, the political evolution of Switzerland is the most interesting in the whole historic field. The physical basis, the determinations set up by it, the reactions, the gradual control of bias, the creation of stability out of centrifugal forces—all go to form the completest of all political cases.<sup>1</sup> Happier than those of Greece, if less renowned, the little clans of Switzerland have passed through the storms of outer and inner strife to a state of something like assured republican federation. And where old

<sup>1</sup> "To one whose studies lie in the contemplation of historical phenomena [the Swiss Cantons] comprise between the Rhine and the Alps a miniature of all Europe.....To myself in particular they present an additional.....interest from a certain political analogy (nowhere else to be found in Europe) with.....the ancient Greeks" (Grote, *Seven Letters concerning the Politics of Switzerland* [1847], ed. 1876, pref.).

Greece and Renaissance Italy and Scandinavia have failed to attain to this even on the basis of a common language and "race," the Swiss Cantons have attained it in despite of a maximum diversity of speech and stock. As does Japan for Asia, they disprove for Europe a whole code of false generalisations.

The primary fact in the case, as in that of Greece, is the physical basis. Like Hellas, the Swiss land is "born divided"; and the first question that forces itself is as to how the Cantons, while retaining their home rule, have contrived to escape utterly ruinous inter-tribal strife, and to attain federal union. The answer, it speedily appears, begins with noting the fact that Swiss federation is a growth or aggregation, as it were, from a primary "cell-form." From the early confederation of the three Forest Cantons of Schwytz, Uri, and Unterwalden, a set of specially congruous units, led to alliance by their original isolation from the rest of Helvetia and their common intercourse through the Lake of Lucerne, came the example and norm for the whole. The primary influence of mere land-division is proved by the persistence of the cantonal spirit and methods to this day;<sup>1</sup> but the history of Switzerland is the history of the social union gradually forced on the Cantons by varying pressures from outside. That it is due to no quality of "race" is sufficiently proved by the fact that three or four languages, and more stocks, are represented in the Republic at this moment.

### § 1. *The Beginnings of Union*

In the union of the Forest Cantons, as in the rooting of several Swiss cities and the cultivation of remote valleys, the Church has been held to have played a constructive part. At the outset, according to some historians,<sup>2</sup> Schwytz and Uri and Unterwalden had but one church among them; hence a habit of congregation. But the actual records yield no evidence for this view, any more than for the other early dicta as to the racial distinctness of the people of the Forest Cantons, and their immemorial freedom. Broadly speaking, the early Swiss were for the most part serfs with customary rights. The first documentary trace of them is in the grant by Louis of Germany to the convent at Zurich, in the year

<sup>1</sup> "What the Cantons mostly stand chargeable with, is the feeling of cantonal selfishness" (Grote, as cited, p. 20). Compare, in the work of Sir F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham on *The Swiss Confederation* (éd. française par Loumyer, 1890, p. 29), the account of how, after the most fraternal meetings in common of the citizens of the different Cantons, "each confederate, on returning home, begins to yield to his old jealousy, and thinks of hardly anything but the particular interests of his Canton."

<sup>2</sup> Vieusseux, *History of Switzerland*, 1840, p. 39.

853, of his *pagellus Uroniae*, with its churches, houses, serfs, lands, and revenues.<sup>1</sup> This did not constitute the whole of the Canton; but it seems clear that the bulk of the population were in status serfs, though when attached to a royal convent they would have such privileges as would induce even freemen to accept the same state of dependence.<sup>2</sup> In the Canton of Schwytz, again, the people—there in larger part freemen—seem to have been always more or less at strife with the great monastery of Einsiedeln, founded about 946 by Kaiser Otto, and largely filled by men of aristocratic birth seeking a quiet life,<sup>3</sup> who held by the usual interests of their class as well as their corporation.<sup>4</sup> It was a question of ownership of pastures, the main economic basis in that region; and the descendants of the early settlers were fighting for their subsistence. Unterwalden, finally (then known only as the higher and lower valleys, *Stanz* or *Stannes* and *Sarnen* or *Sarnon*), was led in its development by Uri and Schwytz, each of which possessed some communal property, the former in respect of its beginnings as a royal domain, the latter in respect of the association of its freemen.

Whatever earlier combinations there may have been,<sup>5</sup> it is in the year 1291<sup>6</sup> that the first recorded pact was made between the three Cantons; and it arose out of their making a stand for their customary local rights as against the House of Hapsburg.<sup>7</sup> Uri had in 1231 been granted by King Henry VII of Germany, son of the emperor Frederick II, the cherished privilege of enrolment as an imperial fief, an act which in theory withdrew it from its former feudal subordination to the Count of Hapsburg; and in 1240 Frederick himself gave the same privilege to Schwytz.<sup>8</sup> On the unhinging of the imperial system after Frederick's death, the Hapsburgs, who even in his life had treated the Cantons as contumacious vassals, fought for their own claims; whereupon in due course was formed the Pact of 1291. Thus the Swiss Confederation broadly began in the special strife which arose between the new order of higher feudal princes and the civic or rural communes on the disintegration of the

<sup>1</sup> Rilliet, *Les origines de la Confédération Suisse*, 1868, pp. 26-28; Dierauer, *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, 1887, i, 84.

<sup>2</sup> Rilliet, pp. 21, 27, 28.

<sup>3</sup> J. von Müller, *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, ed. 1824, i, 287.

<sup>4</sup> Müller, i, 288; Rilliet, pp. 39-42. The men of Schwytz were associated as concurrenrs with the powerful Counts of Lenzburg in disputes with the monastery.

<sup>5</sup> It seems just possible that a confederation of tribes existed in the Alps at the beginning of the fifth century—on the theory, that is, that the *Bagaudæ* of that period were so called from a Celtic word *Bagard*, meaning a cluster. See the editorial note in Bohn ed. of Gibbon, iii, 379.

<sup>6</sup> Rilliet, pp. 88 ff.; Dierauer, i, 78.

<sup>7</sup> Having sworn an oath to stand by each other, they called themselves *Eidgenossen*=Oathfellows, Confederates. The old spellings, *Eitgnozzen* and *Eidgnossschaft* (Dierauer, i, 265, n.; Dändliker, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, i, 636—in the old Tell song), show how easily could arise the later French form "Huguenots."

<sup>8</sup> Dierauer, pp. 85, 90; Rilliet, pp. 50, 67, 68.

Germanic empire in the thirteenth century.<sup>1</sup> The familiar story of William Tell and the oath-taking at Rütli or Grütli in 1308 appears to be pure myth. There is no historic mention till over a hundred years later of any such acts by the Austrian bailiff as that story turns upon, or of any strife whatever in 1308. A pact of confederation had actually been made seventeen years earlier than that date; and a new and rather more definite pact was made on the same general grounds in 1315; but the romance of 1308 remains entirely unattested, and it bears the plainest marks of myth.

The histories of J. von Müller, Zschokke, Vieusseux, and others of the first half of the nineteenth century, are vitiated as regards the early period by acceptance of the traditions; though the untrustworthiness of the Tell story had been pointed out as early as the year 1600 by Franz Guillimann of Fribourg, and again in the eighteenth century by Iselin, and by Freudenberger in his *Guillaume Tell: Fable danoise*, 1760. (See Dändliker's *Short History of Switzerland*, Eng. tr. 1899, pp. 53, 54.) A full and decisive examination of it will be found in Rilliet's *Les origines de la Confédération Suisse*, 1868. Compare Dierauer, *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, 1887, Buch ii, Kap. i, § iii; Cox, *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ed. 1882, pp. 337-41, and the essay *William Tell* in Baring-Gould's *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, 1888. Some very judicial attempts have been made to show that there is reason to think *some* fighting occurred in 1308. See, for instance, the pamphlets *Le Grütli* and *La querelle sur les traditions concernant l'origine de la Confédération Suisse*, by Prof. H. Bordier, in reply to Prof. Rilliet, 1869. Dierauer, again, declines to go the whole way in negation, and stands for the view "not fable, but legend—on some basis of fact" (as cited, i, 150). But even M. Bordier reduces Tell to a mere "somebody"; and every student surrenders the apple story, which is at least as old as the twelfth-century Danish version of it in Saxo Grammaticus.

M. Rilliet holds that the Swiss reproduction was not a local survival of the Teutonic myth, but a deliberate adaptation made in Lucerne from the abridgment of Saxo Grammaticus produced by a German monk, Gheysmer, about 1430 (*Les origines*, pp. 214-16, 327, 328). At Lucerne there was a local school of poetry of the kind then common in Holland; and the old ballad, which closely follows Saxo's tale, and which is the probable basis of the story as given in the later chronicles, seems to have been composed by way of securing for the Canton of Uri the main honours of the founding of the Confederation,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Rilliet, p. 53.

which were being claimed by the sister Cantons. Whatever be the basis, the Tell legend is finally untenable, and the tradition of an immemorial state of freedom in the Forest Cantons is abandoned even by the conservative critics. See Bordier, *La querelle*, p. 7. The only point on which a case against the criticism of M. Rilliet seems to be made out is as regards his view that the Forest Cantons were not colonised before the eighth century. As M. Bordier contends, the grant of Louis of Germany seems to describe a long-settled district. M. Rilliet also goes somewhat beyond the evidence in assuming that Uri was mainly colonised under royal influence, Unterwalden by lay and ecclesiastical proprietors, and Schwytz by freemen (*Les origines*, pp. 20, 21).

The rise of a durable federation in the central Swiss group is thus a product of three main factors; the first being their primary physical union through the Lake of Lucerne, their common highway. But for this they would probably have been as hostile as were Uri and Glarus, which had fought from time immemorial.<sup>1</sup> Next was needed the chronic hostile pressure of an outside force, creating a common political interest. The septs of pre-Norman Ireland and England, and of the Scottish Highlands down till modern times, remained at strife long after Christianisation, because within their own country they were so free to struggle, and because the examples of forcible centralisation elsewhere were so remote and so hard to assimilate. But when the Forest Cantons emerge as such in history in the thirteenth century they are already menaced by a power which, without undertaking or compassing the toil of conquering them, habitually drives them to formal combination by its interference. Its continued pressure evolves the definite political agreement of 1315, after the victory of Morgarten, in which was made clear the special difficulty of conquering a race of mountaineers with the normal cavalry forces and armour-clad or servile infantry of medieval feudalism<sup>2</sup>—a difficulty which must rank as the third factor in the beginnings of Swiss independence.

Thus far the half-feudal, half-commercial city of Lucerne, though in touch with the Forest Cantons through the uniting lake, was their enemy, as being feudatory of the Hapsburgs; but as the chronic state of war was ruinous to its trade with Italy, and peculiarly harassing to all industry, the commercial element forced a coalition, and in 1332 Lucerne joined the Confederation as Fourth Canton. Now

<sup>1</sup> Rilliet, *Origines*, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> At Morgarten the infantry of the Austrian force was in large part furnished by the other Germanic towns and Cantons of Zurich, Winterthur, Zug, Lucerne, Sempach, and Aargau. When the cavalry were discomfited, the foot would not be very energetic.

emerges in the affairs of the Confederation the element of civic class strife, so familiar in the republics of Italy; for the accession of Lucerne is promptly followed in that city by a conspiracy of nobles, which is put down by the help of the allied Cantons; whereupon the nobles are exiled and a civic council set up, the Duke of Austria being unable to hinder. The same trouble arises in the case of Zurich, the next accession to the union. In the ordinary medieval course there had there arisen an oligarchic government of aristocratic citizens in place of the early dominion of the Abbess; and the city was made an imperial fief by Frederick II. On this basis it made commercial treaties in the manner then common among the cities of Germany, joining the Swabian, Rhenish, and South-German Leagues, and developing a large trade with Italy and Germany, and even a silk manufacture. At length the large craftsman class revolted (1336) under the leadership of a dissentient patrician, Brun or Braun, who established a constitution in which he as burgomaster held office for life, with a council of thirteen gildmasters and thirteen aristocrats, six of the latter being named by Brun. For the firm support of the guilds he duly paid them by laws checking foreign competition in manufactured goods, and denying even to the rural population the right to manufacture. The dispossessed oligarchs kept up a raiding strife on the frontiers, till at length some who were permitted to return formed a conspiracy against the burgomaster, which he suppressed with slaughter. This leading to a league against the city among the Hapsburgs and the surrounding nobles and the Cantons in treaty with them, Zurich petitioned to join the Forest Confederation, and was readily accepted (1351), finally triumphing by their help.

Zurich on its part enabled the Forest Cantons to protect themselves against Austria by conquering Glarus (1351), which offered little resistance, and was ranked as a protected territory under the Confederation. This now formed a compact territorial group save for the Canton of Zug, intervening between Lucerne and Zurich. As that could not defend itself against its neighbours, it joined their Confederation perforce (1352), being received as a full member. The same status was readily granted to the city of Berne, which, imperially enfranchised in 1218, had carried on a remarkable independent policy on Italian lines, acquiring territory from the decaying nobles around by mortgage, purchase, and conquest, till in 1339 they combined against her. Succour was then given by the Forest Cantons, securing for Berne the victory of Laupen; and when in 1352 they invited her to join their union, her rulers accepted. So tepid, however, was still the spirit of union that at

the Peace of Brandenburg in 1352, confirmed by that of Regensburg in 1355, Glarus and Zug consented to withdraw, returning for a time to the Austrian allegiance;<sup>1</sup> and the confederation of the remaining six Cantons was still one of the loosest cohesion, differing only in the fact of its territorial continuity and its organic growth from the many city-unions which flourished in Germany in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> Only the three original Cantons were pledged to make no separate treaties; Zurich was specifically permitted to do so; in 1352 Berne was in alliance with the towns of Fribourg and Soleure; in the next generation Lucerne made a compact with the towns of Sempach and Richensee; and in 1393 a burgomaster of Zurich carried through a treaty of alliance with the common enemy, the Duke of Austria.

In this case the mass of the citizens were induced to reverse the policy and banish those who had planned it; but the right of the city to make such an alliance was not technically challenged by the Confederation; and even in Schwytz a few loyalists paid old feudal dues to Austria up till 1394. A more serious ground of division was the jealousy duly arising between the rural and the city Cantons, from which came about the forcible intervention of Schwytz in a dispute between the town and country sections of Zug. The remaining Cantons insisted on subjecting the action of both Zug and Schwytz to the verdict of the union, thus effectually establishing a precedent of federal practice; but in the first decade of the fifteenth century the Cantons of Schwytz and Glarus are found on their own account helping the men of Appenzell to win their independence; and when the successful Appenzellers, who had developed a turn for aggression and confiscation, sought to join the union, they were accepted only as allies by the Cantons individually, Berne holding aloof. Yet again, when the house of Austria (which had abandoned its claims on the Cantons in 1412) was under the ban of the Empire in 1415, and the city Cantons led a movement of attack upon its territories, Uri and the Appenzellers took no part; while in 1422 Uri and Unterwalden acted alone in their unsuccessful war with the Duke of Milan.

Thus far the Confederation, in its different degrees of union, had included only German-speaking Cantons; but in 1420 the French-speaking Valais (Ger. Wallis, from the Latin *Vallis Poenina*? or

<sup>1</sup> This fact, as well as the unequal status of Glarus, was till recently slurred over in the patriotic tradition. See, for instance, the account of Vieusseux, *History of Switzerland*, pp. 58-60. Cp. the results of exact research in Dierauer, i, 217; Dändliker, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, 1884, i, 480, and *Short History*, Eng. tr. pp. 62, 63, 68, 69. Zug returned to the Confederation in 1368; Glarus, as a connection only, in 1387, and as a full member in 1394.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Dierauer, i, 265, and Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, ed. 1893, pp. 5, 6.

foreigners), in 1424 Upper Rhætia, and in the same year the Romance-speaking Engadin, also in Rhætia, won their virtual independence. In all, three leagues were formed in Rhætia, forming their own confederation, known as the Grisons (= "the Greys," the *Graubünden* or Grey Leagues, from the colour of the peasants' smocks).

As the sphere of self-government widened, new risks of strife arose. All the while the older Cantons, in particular the cities, had been acquiring lands in the feudal fashion; and in 1440 a general scramble for an inheritance in Rhætia evolved first a war between Zurich on the one hand and Schwytz and Glarus on the other, and next a joint coercion of Zurich by all the other Cantons. This led to a fresh alliance between Zurich and Austria, and a new and exceptionally ferocious war, lasting for four years. Meantime Basle, assailed by the Armagnacs under the dauphin of France, was succoured by the union and received into alliance. Next came the Burgundian wars, whereafter, not without much friction and quarrelling over booty, Soleure (Solothurn) and Fribourg were taken into the union, and a new pact framed (1481), defining afresh the general law of the Confederation. Lastly, after the Swabian war, the last in which the Swiss had to defend themselves against German aggression, the cities of Basle and Schaffhausen, become self-governing, were received into the League; and in 1513 Appenzell followed. Thus was rounded the number of thirteen Cantons, which constituted the Swiss Confederation till the end of the eighteenth century. They were: Schwytz (which gradually gave its name to the whole people), Uri, Unterwalden, Zurich (the "Forest" group), Lucerne, Glarus, Zug, Berne, Fribourg, Soleure, Basle, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell. Aargau and Thurgau, conquered in the wars with Austria in 1415 and 1460, remained subject lands, the property of the allied Cantons; and the Valais and the Grisons remained outside the union as connections or *Zugewandte*, the League proper being restricted to German-speaking Cantons. It will be seen too that the territory of the Confederation remained a compact and connected mass; the Vaud, the Valais, Ticino, and the Grisons forming a long band of territory outside.

### § 2. *The Socio-Political Evolution*

The outstanding feature of the Swiss social evolution up to the end of the fifteenth century is the acquisition of municipal estates by the chief cities, after the manner of those of Italy. The lead



given by Berne was zealously followed by Zurich<sup>1</sup> and Lucerne, till nearly all the old feudal lordships around them had fallen into their hands by purchase, mortgage, or conquest; and by 1477 the Hapsburgs had not a rood of land left in all Helvetia, even the family castle being lost. It was impossible that the revenues thus acquired by the cities should fail in that age to enrich the patrician or ruling class, no matter how revolutions might alter its membership. Herein lay one of the effective checks to the growth of the Confederation from 1513 onwards. The rural Cantons and the aristocratic governments of the cities were alike disinclined to enfranchise the rural populations they held in feudal subjection; and the status of the mass of the townspeople and subject peasantry, though probably better than in France and Germany, was that of men without political rights,<sup>2</sup> save those secured by feudal or civic custom.

Nor can it be said that in the pre-Reformation period the flourishing Swiss cities did much for culture; a main part of the explanation doubtless being (1) the chronic stress of war, which in such communities tended to be borne by all classes alike.<sup>3</sup> When the Italian cities had produced Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio; when England had produced Chaucer; and France the *Roman de la Rose*, Villon, Joinville, Froissart, and Comines, Switzerland had a literature only of average German lyrics and a few average medieval chronicles. But the comparison will be quite misleading if it be not kept in mind (2) that the whole Swiss population up till 1500 never amounted to a million, and that the surplus males were being constantly drained off in the fifteenth century in military service outside of Switzerland. The conditions which made for military strength and independence were entirely unfavourable to culture. There remains, however, to be noted in the case of German Switzerland (3) the fundamental drawback of relative homogeneity of race. The one important aspect of "race" in sociology is as a statement of relative lack of intellectual variability; and this condition in modern Europe can be seen to exist only at certain periods, in the case of one or two peoples, chiefly the Germanic.

If the whole process of the renascence of civilisation be considered *seriatim*, it will be found that the growth took place

<sup>1</sup> Zurich alone is said to have spent two million francs in buying land between 1358 and 1408.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, Kap. 30, 9te Aufl., p. 147.

<sup>3</sup> Prof. Dändliker, in his *Short History* (Eng. tr. p. 41), has the odd expression that "in those times of the surging of party strife the towns formed a quiet refuge for the cultivation of the intellectual life." The whole of his own history goes to show that no such quiet cultivation took place, or could take place.

primarily in virtue of degree of access to (*a*) the remains of Græco-Roman culture and (*b*) to Saracen lore; and, secondarily, in virtue of degree of admixture of physical type in the different communities. Thus (1) the first great new-birth (before the age of the Renaissance so-called) took place in Italy, in a population already highly mixed at the end of the Roman period and repeatedly invaded thereafter by northern stocks, from Odoaker down to the Normans. The reviving Italian culture, being communicated northwards through the Church and otherwise, is next developed by (2) the highly-mixed population of France and (3) that of England after the Norman Conquest—the Welsh element being here prominent. At the same time the literary germination set up in (4) ancient Ireland, under stormy conditions, by the early missionaries of the Græco-Roman Church, reaches after some centuries the Scandinavian peoples by way of the Hebrides and (5) Iceland, where, however, after a brilliant start, the evolution is arrested by the restrictive environment, the main body of Scandinavian life being too homogeneous (though constantly at strife) for any complex evolution. In the south, again, the populations of (6) Spain and Portugal, mixed to begin with in the Roman period and later crossed by Teutonic invasion, became specially capable of variation after the subdual of the Moors, whose reaction on their conquerors was extensive and important.

All this while the Teutonic stocks in their old homes are noticeably backward, save where, as in (7) the Netherlands, they are in constant contact with other peoples on land and by sea. Culture begins to be at once original and brilliant in the Netherlands only in the period after (*a*) special contact with Spain and (*b*) the large immigration of Protestant refugees from other countries. At first strongly influenced by classical scholarship, it is later affected by the influence of France and England. All the more strictly Teutonic cultures were either unprogressive or similarly vitalised from without; and Germany, after the Thirty Years' War, begins almost afresh with an academic literature in Latin, to be followed by new native developments only on French and English stimuli.<sup>1</sup> But it is specially significant that (8) the German renaissance of the eighteenth century takes place after (*a*) the large influx of French Protestant refugees at the end of the seventeenth, and after (*b*) a fresh influx of French taste, French teachers, and French literature under Frederick the Great, in whose armies, it should be remembered,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the author's *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 160-74.

there fought no fewer than nine generals of French Protestant descent, as well as others of alien heredity.

The case of Switzerland is thus on this side tolerably clear. Swiss intellectual life, long primitively Teutonic, begins to become notable only at the period of the Reformation, when for the merely diplomatic and military and commercial contacts of the past there is substituted a fresh differentiation and interaction from Italian, French, and German Protestantism—a new intellectual impulse—and from the influx of refugees, as in Holland. And the French-speaking city of Geneva, not yet a member of the Confederation, at once takes the lead. The Teutonic population, from the fifteenth century onwards, had in large numbers sought subsistence in mercenary soldiery. It was the medieval analogue to the emigration of to-day, the opening even serving to curtail the agricultural and pastoral life;<sup>1</sup> but the result, by the common consent of historians,<sup>2</sup> was disastrous to the higher life at home, the returning mercenaries being in many cases spoilt for steady industry, rural or civic. Their military success and prestige in fact tended to demoralise the Swiss as the success of Hellas against Persia tended to demoralise Athens, making them, in the words of Aristotle, unfitted to rest. Dwelling on past patriotic glories is never the way to discipline the mental life; and the Swiss militia of the end of the fifteenth century, wont to sell their services as fighters to French and Italians, often thus opposing each other, and otherwise wont to interpose arrogantly in other people's concerns,<sup>3</sup> were not on the line of social or intellectual progress. Pensions to leading men from the French and Italian courts wrought a further and even more sinister corruption. But after their defeat by Francis I in 1516 at the desperate battle of Marignano, becoming allies of France, the Swiss ceased to play the part of holders of the balances between contending neighbours; and after their heavy share in the loss of Francis at the battle of Pavia they grew for a time loth even to play the part of auxiliaries on a national footing, though individual enlistment continued. It is at this stage that the Reformation supervenes, creating a new source of strife between Canton and Canton, and so paralysing the Confederation for centuries.

Nowhere is the study of the process of the Reformation more instructive, more subversive of the conventional Protestant view, than in the case of Switzerland. In the first place, it is not the

<sup>1</sup> Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, 9te Aufl. 1853, p. 149.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Dändliker, ii, 620, 722; *Short History*, pp. 124, 125, 131; Dierauer, ii, 473; Vieusseux, pp. 119, 124, 211; Zschokke, as above cited.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, 2nd ed. pp. 272, 273.

old Forest Cantons, with their ingrained independence and "Teutonic conscience," that do the work. They remained obstinately Catholic. Swiss Protestantism, under the independent lead of Zwingli, began indeed in Glarus and Schwytz, but became an effective movement only in the city of Zurich, and it is notable that in the primitive and poor Canton of Uri<sup>1</sup> there was as little buying of indulgences as there was heresy. The two phenomena went together in the richer Cantons, where the common desire to buy pardons evoked the protest against them. Indeed, the special traffic in indulgences in Germany and Switzerland, and the special laxity of life of their priesthoods, were concomitants of the special grossness of German life;<sup>2</sup> for in no other country did the Reformation proceed nakedly on the basis of protest against indulgence-selling. There the pardoners shamefully overrode all the official and accepted teaching of the Church as to indulgences; and the protests of Luther and Zwingli were properly demands for a reform on strictly orthodox grounds, as against an abuse which was locally excessive. But it lay in the economic and political conditions that when a movement of protest began it should succeed in view rather of the economic and social impulses to break with Rome than of the spontaneous desire for reform. In Germany in particular the movement among the upper and educated classes was nakedly financial as regarded the nobles, and to a large extent the reverse of ascetic among the scholars, many of whom, however, were much more spontaneously alive to the doctrinal crudities of the orthodox system than was Luther himself. It was the facile combination, on socio-political grounds, of the five forces of (1) moral indignation among the more conscientious leaders, (2) gain-seeking on the part of nobles and ruling burghers, (3) racial aversion to Italian priests and Italian revenue-drawing among the people in general, (4) critical revolt against primitive superstitions among the more learned, and (5) anti-clerical freethinking and licence among many who had served in the Italian wars,<sup>3</sup> that made the revolt proceed so rapidly in Germany and Switzerland. If the mass of the people, in all save the most primitive Swiss Cantons, were grossly eager to buy the indulgences so grossly offered by Samson and Tetzl, the people clearly were not zealous reformers to start with. Of those who most resented the traffic, many remained steady Catholics.

<sup>1</sup> Vieusseux, p. 193.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, Kap. 417; Dändliker, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, ii, 623-26; Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, Kap. 30, p. 148; Vieusseux, p. 118.

<sup>3</sup> On this see Vieusseux, p. 130.

When, however, it became known that Samson carried away with him from Switzerland to Italy 800,000 crowns, besides other bullion and jewels, even the buyers of indulgences could share the general inclination to stop the enrichment of Italy at Swiss expense. The intellectual revolt of the educated supplied the basis of the revolution in church management; but without the accruing financial gains the former could have availed little; and while there was the usual violence on the part of the mob, the city authorities were judicious in their procedure. To the clergy they offered on the one hand freedom to marry, and on the other hand a provision for life. Thus in Zurich, under the skilful guidance of Zwingli, the whole chapter of twenty-four canons gave up their rights and property to the State, becoming preachers, teachers, or professors with life-allowances: a plan generally followed elsewhere, save where the parties fell to blows.<sup>1</sup> In Zurich the further steps were: 1523, ecclesiastical marriages; 1524, pictures abolished and monasteries dissolved; 1525, mass discontinued.

In French-speaking Geneva, destined to become the leading Swiss city, the process was more stormy. Having grown to importance under its bishops, it had been made an imperial city in 1420, thereby finding a foothold in its resistance to the constant claims of the House of Savoy, which in 1519 forced it into a defensive alliance with Fribourg. There were now two Genevan parties, the Savoyards and the republicans, which latter, imitating Swiss usage, called themselves Eidgenossen, whence the French corruption *Huguenots*, ultimately applied to the Calvinistic Protestants of France. Out of the faction strife came the religious, under the fanning of Farel; and in this case the anti-democratic leaning of the Savoyards kept the rich pro-Catholic, while the common people declared for Protestantism. In the end the latter took violent possession of the churches, destroying the altars and images, whereupon most of the Catholics fled, the city retaining the clerical lands; and there immigrated many French, Italian, and Savoyard Protestants. To the community thus made for him came Calvin in 1537.

Meanwhile, Berne, conquering the Pays de Vaud from the Duke of Savoy, made it Protestant. Elsewhere, some communes and districts passed and repassed between Catholicism and Protestantism as neighbouring influences prevailed; in some districts the peasants, hoping for release from tithes and taxes, welcomed the revolution,

<sup>1</sup> Vieusseux, pp. 128-32, 142.

but renounced it when they found it made no difference to their lot.<sup>1</sup> The magistrates of Berne were prompt to make it clear that their Protestantism made no difference as to their tithe-drawing from their rural subjects.<sup>2</sup> When the period of transformation was over—with its bitter wars, which cost the life of Zwingli, its manifold exasperations, its Anabaptist convulsions, its forlorn and foredoomed peasant risings, its severance of old ties, and its profound impairment of the half-grown spirit of confederation—it was found that the old Cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Unterwalden, Schwytz, and Zug stood fast for Catholicism; that Soleure, after being for a time predominantly Protestant, had joined them, with Fribourg, making seven Catholic States; that the city Cantons of Berne, Zurich, Basle, and Schaffhausen were Protestant, as were Geneva and the Vaud, not yet in the union; and that Glarus and Appenzell were mixed. The achievement of the landamman Cœbly of Glarus, in securing a peaceful and lasting compromise in his own Canton—the two bodies in some parishes actually agreeing to use the same church—was beyond the moral capacity of the mass of the Swiss people, for Appenzell bitterly divided into two parts, on religious lines. Each of the other Cantons imposed its ruling men's creed on its subjects. They were still as far from toleration in religion as from real democracy in politics.

While Protestantism, by dividing the realm of religion, doubtless wrought indirectly and ultimately for the intellectual freedom of Europe, it is clear that it had no such result for many generations in Switzerland. Calvin's rule in Geneva, while associated with a new activity in printing, chiefly of theological works,<sup>3</sup> became a byword for moral tyranny and cruelty. To say nothing of the executions of Servetus and Gruet for heresy, and the expulsions of other men, the records show that in that small population there were between 800 and 900 persons imprisoned between the years 1542 and 1546, and 58 put to death; no fewer than 34 being beheaded, hanged, or burned on charges of sedition in three months of 1545. Torture was freely applied, and any personal criticism of Calvin was more or less fiercely punished.<sup>4</sup> The conditions were much the same in Zurich and Berne, where a press censorship was set up (in Zurich as early as 1523), and zealously maintained for centuries. It prohibited, under heavy penalties, the sale of the works of Descartes, and in

<sup>1</sup> Zschokke, Kap. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Vieusseux, p. 140. Zurich, however, on Zwingli's urging, restricted villenage and lessened tithes (Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 135).

<sup>3</sup> The number printed rose speedily to thirty-eight in a year, then again to sixty. Two thousand men were employed in the printing industry (Dändliker, ii, 560).

<sup>4</sup> Dändliker, ii, 558, 559; *Short History*, p. 157.

both places Cartesians were prosecuted;<sup>1</sup> while in Protestant Switzerland generally the Copernican theory was denounced as heresy, and the reformed Calendar, as a work of the Pope, was furiously rejected. So high did passion run that in Berne and Zurich any who married Catholics were severely punished.<sup>2</sup> The Zurich criminal calendar of the sixteenth century gives a sample of the Protestant city life of the period. There were 572 executions in all, 347 persons being beheaded, 61 burned, 55 hanged, 53 drowned. Only 33 were cases of murder; 2 were executed for abuse of Zwingli, who thus appears to have given a lead to Calvin; 73 for blasphemy, 56 for bestiality, and 338 for theft<sup>3</sup>—a clear economic clue.

Broadly speaking, the settled Protestant period was one of relapse alike from freedom and from union. Class division deepened and worsened throughout the seventeenth century;<sup>4</sup> the people of the subject lands were less than ever recognised as having rights,<sup>5</sup> Puritanism taking to oppression as spontaneously in Switzerland as in England; the stimulus given to culture and art in the controversial period died away, leaving retrogression;<sup>6</sup> and in the personal and the intellectual life alike clerical tyranny was universal.<sup>7</sup> The municipalities became more and more close corporations, as the guilds had become long before;<sup>8</sup> and at Berne in 1640 the city treasurer was put to death for exposing abuses.<sup>9</sup> After the Peasants' War of 1653 the aristocratic development was still further strengthened, till in Berne, Soleure, and Fribourg—Catholic and Protestant cities alike—the roll of burghers was closed (1680–90), Soleure stipulating that it should remain so till the number of reigning families was reduced to twenty-five.<sup>10</sup> The practice of taking pensions from France revived, for the old service of supplying mercenary troops; so that “the Swiss were never more shamelessly sold to the highest bidder” than in the seventeenth century.<sup>11</sup> As of old, the municipalities amassed and invested capital, Catholic Soleure lending great sums to France, while the still wealthier city of Berne lent money in all directions;<sup>12</sup> but though they raised handsome public buildings, it was the small ruling class and not the workers that were enriched. In the rural Cantons even the small economic advance made at the outset of the Reformation was lost.<sup>13</sup> It seems

<sup>1</sup> Dändliker, *Geschichte*, ii, 743.    <sup>2</sup> *Id. Short History*, p. 192.    <sup>3</sup> *Id. Geschichte*, ii, 626.

<sup>4</sup> *Id. ib.* ii, 722.

<sup>5</sup> *Id. ib.* ii, 609–12; *Short History*, pp. 172, 203.

<sup>6</sup> *Id. Geschichte*, ii, 731, 742–45.

<sup>7</sup> *Id. ib.* ii, 556 ff., 622 ff., 728, 729.

<sup>8</sup> *Id. ib.* i, 569–71. Only masters were admitted to membership.

<sup>9</sup> *Id. Short History*, pp. 169, 170, 179.

<sup>10</sup> *Id. ib.* p. 179.

<sup>11</sup> *Id. ib.* p. 192. The abuse was at its height in the Catholic Cantons, but the Protestant participated, even soon after the Reformation (*id.* p. 157; *Geschichte*, ii, 626).

<sup>12</sup> *Id. Short History*, p. 182.

<sup>13</sup> *Id. Geschichte*, i, 572; ii, 722; *Short History*, p. 169.

difficult to dispute that as a force for social progress the Reformation was naught.

One factor there was to its credit: the establishment of secondary schools, which had not previously existed in Switzerland, and the provision of better common schools;<sup>1</sup> and though the ecclesiastical and religious forces, as in Scotland, prevented the common schools being turned to any higher account at home than that of qualifying to read and write and learn catechisms, even that small tuition gave the Swiss some advantages in the neighbouring countries. All the while the higher political evolution went backwards. In 1586 the Catholic Cantons of Schwytz, Uri, Unterwalden, Lucerne, Zug, Fribourg, and Soleure ejected from the League the Protestant State of Mülhausen; and, ignoring the laws of the Confederation, proceeded to make a separate offensive and defensive alliance among themselves, and with Spain and the Pope. As late as 1656 war broke out between Berne and Schwytz, Lucerne intervening, over a dispute about Protestant refugees; whereafter the principle of cantonal sovereignty reigned supreme for a hundred and forty years. It would seem difficult to maintain, in the face of all the facts, that Protestantism had made for peace, freedom, or civilisation.

On the other hand, the distribution of Protestantism in the Swiss Cantons disposes once for all of the theory that the "Teutonic conscience" or anything else of an ethnic order was the determining force at the Reformation. A rough conspectus of the language and religion of the Cantons as at the year 1900 will present the proof to the contrary:—

NAME.	LANGUAGE.	RELIGION.
Berne... ..	Five-sixths German-speaking	Seven-eighths Protestant
Zurich ... ..	Nearly all German	" "
Lucerne ... ..	" " "	Nearly all Catholic
Vaud... ..	Mostly French dialects	Nine-tenths Protestant
Aargau ... ..	Mostly German	Four C. to five P.
St. Gall ... ..	" "	Three-fifths Catholic
Ticino ... ..	Italian dialects	Nearly all Catholic
Fribourg ... ..	Half French, half German	Four-fifths Catholic
Grisons ... ..	Half Romansch, three-eighths German, one-eighth Italian	Five-ninths Protestant
Valais ... ..	(?) Half German, half French	Nearly all Catholic
Thurgau ... ..	Nearly all German	Two-sevenths Catholic
Basle ... ..	" " "	One-third Catholic

<sup>1</sup> Zschokke, as cited, p. 148; Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 153.



NAME.	LANGUAGE.	RELIGION.
Soleure ... ..	Nearly all German	Three-fourths Catholic
Geneva ... ..	Predominantly French	Half-and-half
Neuchâtel ... ..	" "	Seven-eighths Protestant
Schaffhausen ... ..	" German	" "
Appenzell (Rh. Ext.)	" "	Nine-tenths Protestant
" (Rh. Int.)	" "	Nearly all Catholic
Glarus ... ..	Nearly all German	One-fourth Catholic
Zug ... ..	" " "	Nearly all Catholic
Schwytz ... ..	" " "	" " "
Unterwalden ... ..	" " "	" " "
Uri ... ..	" " "	" " "

Here we have nearly every species of variation in terms of speech and creed. The one generalisation which appears to hold good to any extent in the matter is that Catholicism usually goes with an agricultural economy and Protestantism with manufactures ; but here, too, there are exceptions, as Vaud, which, though Protestant, is predominantly agricultural or vine-rearing; Glarus, which is mainly pastoral and Protestant; the Grisons, agricultural and more than half Protestant; and Geneva, where there is a large minority of Catholics in industrial conditions. On the whole, we are warranted in assuming that in Switzerland, as in most other countries, the town workers were the readiest to innovate in religion; while race, so far as inferrible from language, had nothing to do with the choice made. What differences of life accrue to the creeds, as we shall see, depend on their one important social divergence, that of bias for and against illiteracy.

### § 3. *The Modern Renaissance*

In the earlier part of the eighteenth century the Swiss Confederation figured as "a weather-beaten ruin, ready to fall."<sup>1</sup> It would be hard to point out, in the domestic conditions, any that made for beneficent change, and there were many that rigidly precluded it; but some elements of variability there were, and from other countries there came the principle of fertilisation. Theological hatreds and disputations had in a manner destroyed their own standing-ground by the very stress of their barren activity; and even while press laws were banning new works of thought and science, the better minds were secretly yearning towards them. In

<sup>1</sup> Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 193.

cities like Geneva and Basle (the latter then the seat of the only Swiss university), reason must to some extent have played beneath the surface while all its open manifestations were struck at. At Basle, in the old days, Erasmus spent the main part of his life; and he must have had some congenial intercourse. But it is on the side of the physical sciences that new intellectual life is first seen to germinate in post-Reformation Switzerland. There, as elsewhere, inquiring men felt that nature was kindlier to question than the self-appointed oracles of Deity, and that the unending search for real knowledge brought more peace than ever came of the insistence that the ultimate truth was known. Refugee immigrants, chiefly French, seem to have begun the ferment; and it is at the hands of their descendants that Swiss science has grown.<sup>1</sup> Having reason to avoid alike politics and theology in their new home, and living in many cases on incomes from investments, they turned to the sciences as occupation and solace.

With this inner movement concurred the new influences from French and English science and literature, and from the reviving culture of Germany.<sup>2</sup> With the rest of Europe, too, Switzerland turned in an increasing degree to industry, and in the latter half of the eighteenth century had developed many new trades, involving considerable use of machinery.<sup>3</sup> Agriculture, too, improved,<sup>4</sup> and mercenary soldiering began to fall into disrepute<sup>5</sup> under the influence of the new pacific thought. Still the rural economic conditions were bad, and the country seemed to grow poorer while the towns grew richer.<sup>6</sup> The population, in fact, constantly tended to exceed the not easily widened limits of rural subsistence; and in place of foreign soldiering, the old remedy, there began a peaceful industrial emigration into the neighbouring countries, Swiss beginning to figure there in increasing numbers as waiters and servants.<sup>7</sup> All the while the tyranny of the city aristocracies was unmitigated, and the subject lands were steadily ill-treated.<sup>8</sup> In Berne, in 1776, only eighteen families were represented in the Council of Two

<sup>1</sup> See the extremely interesting investigation of M. de Candolle in his *Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis deux siècles*, 1873, p. 131 ff. Cp. Ph. Godet, *Histoire littéraire de la Suisse française*, 1890, p. 170, as to the general influence.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Dändliker, *Geschichte*, iii, 43-103; *Short History*, pp. 194-99.

<sup>3</sup> *Id. Geschichte*, iii, 174-78.

<sup>4</sup> *Id. ib.* iii, 170-74. England is found learning from Switzerland on this side. In the volume of translations entitled *Foreign Essays on Agriculture and the Arts*, published in 1766, the majority of the papers are by Swiss writers. Hume ("Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," *Essays*, ed. 1825, i, 410) writes that in Switzerland in his day "we find at once the most skilful husbandmen and the most bungling tradesmen that are to be met with in Europe."

<sup>5</sup> Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 199. Under Louis XIV there had been 28,000 Swiss troops in the French service. In 1790 there were only 15,000. But there were six Swiss regiments in the Dutch army, four at Naples, and four in Spain (Vieusseux, p. 210).

<sup>6</sup> Dändliker, *Geschichte*, iii, 183, 184. <sup>7</sup> *Id. ib.* iii, 184. <sup>8</sup> *Id. Short History*, p. 203.

Hundred; and there and in Zurich and Lucerne the civic regulations were as flagrantly partial to the ruling class as in France itself.<sup>1</sup> The new industrial conditions, however, were gradually preparing a political change; and the intellectual climate steadily altered. Voltaire tells in many amusing letters of the spread of Socinian heresy in the city of Calvin. In Geneva arose the abnormal figure of Jean Jacques Rousseau, descendant of a French refugee immigrant of Calvin's day; and though his city in 1762 formally burned his epoch-marking book on the *Contrat Social*, a popular reaction followed six years later. Democratic disturbances had repeatedly occurred before; but this time there was a growing force at work. An insurrection in 1770 was suppressed; another, in 1782, though at first successful, ended in the overthrow of the popular party by means of troops from France, Berne, and Zurich; but in the fateful year of 1789 yet another broke out, and this time the tide turned.

With the interference of the French Republic in Switzerland in 1797 on behalf of the Pays de Vaud, then subject to Berne, began the long convulsion which broke up the old Confederation and framed a new. In 1798 began the wildly premature attempt of the more visionary republicans to create a unitary republic out of Cantons which had retrograded even from the measure of union attained before the Reformation. It could not succeed; and the rapine inseparable from the French revolutionary methods could not but arouse an intense resistance, paralysing the aims of the progressive party. Out of years of miserable ferocious warfare, ended by Napoleon's withdrawal of the French troops in 1801, came the new Confederation of 1803, which, however, it needed the friendly but authoritative mediation of the First Consul to get the conservative Cantons to accept. For once the despot had secured, in a really disinterested fashion,<sup>2</sup> what the Revolution ought to have brought about. The old aristocratic tyrannies were subverted; the subject lands were freed; to the thirteen Cantons of the old union were added Aargau, Thurgau, St. Gall, Vaud, and Ticino; through all was set up a representative system, modified in the towns by a measure of the old aristocratic element; and the whole possessed what Switzerland never had before, and could hardly otherwise have attained—a central parliamentary system. In 1814 Berne

<sup>1</sup> Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 204. In 1798 the French found in the Bernese treasury thirty millions of francs in gold and silver.

<sup>2</sup> Napoleon's sayings on Swiss politics, declaring in favour of cantonal home rule and federation, are among his most statesmanlike utterances; see them in Vieusseux, pp. 250-53. The originals are given in Thibaudeau's *Mémoires sur le Consulat*, 1827.

would fain have resumed its tyranny over the Vaud and Aargau, a step which would have initiated a general return to the old *régime*. The Allies, however, brought about the completion of the Confederation on the new principles; and by the addition to its roll of Geneva, Neuchâtel, and the Valais, and the cession to Berne of the Basle territory formerly annexed by France, created a compact and complete Switzerland, bounded in natural fashion by the Alps, the Jura, and the Rhine. And at this period, after so many vicissitudes, the culture life of Switzerland is found fully abreast of that of Europe in general. Sismondi, standing apart from France and Italy, and writing impartially the history of both, is the greatest historian of his day.

The later history of the Confederation, however, is one of the great illustrations of the perpetual possibility of strife and sunderance in communities. Sismondi lived to ban the democracy which would not be content to be ruled by the middle class. At 1820 the old spirit of class subsisted under the new institutions; the press was nearly everywhere under strict censorship; and the ideals which ruled elsewhere on the Continent seemed even more potent in Switzerland than elsewhere. There, as elsewhere, the system inevitably bred discontent; and in 1830, on the revolutionary initiative of Ticino, the most corruptly governed of all the Cantons, there ensued almost bloodless revolutions in the local governments, Radicals taking the place of Conservatives, and proceeding to reform alike administration and education. Then came the due reaction, the Catholic Cantons forming the League of Sarnen, while the extremists again pressed the ideal of a military State. Though morally strong enough to enforce peace in more than one embroilment of Cantons and parties, the Federal Diet was dangerously weak in the face of the new forces of religio-political reaction typified by the activity of the Jesuits, as well as the old trouble of cantonal selfishness, which affected even the tolls.<sup>1</sup> The resistance to Radicalism became a movement of clerical fanaticism, led by the cry of "religion in danger"; Catholics using it to foment local insurrections; Protestants, ecclesiastically led, using it to make a municipal revolution by violence at Zurich on the occasion of the proposal to give Strauss a university chair in 1839.<sup>2</sup> But the Jesuits—expelled from nearly every Catholic State in the eighteenth century, yet latterly cherished by the Swiss Catholics for their anti-Protestant services—were the chief mischief-makers; and at

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Grote's *Seven Letters*, 2nd ed. p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> See Grote's account, pp. 34, 35.

length the violences promoted from the headquarters at Lucerne led to Protestant reprisals which took the shape of a beginning of civil war. The collapse, however, of the Catholic "Sonderbund" or Secession-League in 1847, before the resolute military action of the Diet, marked the turning-point in modern Swiss politics. In 1848 was framed a new constitution, wholly Swiss-made, creating an effective Federal government, on a new basis of a Parliament of two Chambers. Now were definitely nationalised the systems of coinage, weights and measures, posts and telegraphs; and the Customs system was made one of complete internal free trade.

On this footing followed "long years of happiness, and a prosperity without precedent."<sup>1</sup> Yet even this constitution has had to be revised, to the end of guarding afresh against religious strifes and conflict of cantonal jurisdictions. In 1872 the centralising reformers carried in the Chambers a revision of the constitution; but under the referendum (a specialty of Swiss democracy, instituted in or after 1831 by the Catholic Conservative party in St. Gall, the Valais and Lucerne) it was rejected by a popular vote of 261,072 citizens to 255,609, and of thirteen cantons to nine. With a few modifications, however, it was carried in 1874 by a vote of 340,199 to 198,013, and of 14½ Cantons to 7½. The whole process is a great lesson as to the superiority of the methods of peace and persuasion to those of revolution and force. The referendum itself, first set up locally with the most reactionary intentions,<sup>2</sup> has come to be valued—whether wisely or unwisely—by Radicals and Conservatives alike; and while it seems to offer a possibility of appeals to demotic ignorance and passion<sup>3</sup> while these subsist, and to be unnecessary where they do not, it is at least a guarantee of the decisiveness of any great constitutional step taken under it. Historically speaking, the consummation thus far is a great democratic achievement, and the whole drift of Federal legislation is towards an increased stability of union. On the other hand, despite a characteristic menace from Bismarck,<sup>4</sup> the international position of Switzerland appears to be as safe as that of any other European State, great or small. Any

<sup>1</sup> Adams and Cunningham, *La Confédération Suisse*, éd. Loumyer, 1890, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Thus the Catholic clergy between 1840 and 1850 used it to reject measures of educational reform (Grote, p. 66; cp. p. 38). Adams and Cunningham do not appear to recognise this conservative origin, pointing rather (p. 87) to the fact that the Conservatives at first opposed the application of the referendum to Federal affairs, and attributing the first conception (p. 88) to the Radicals. There appears to be a conflict of evidence. In any case the system is now accepted all round.

<sup>3</sup> See the opinion of M. Droz concerning the drawbacks of the facultative referendum—that is, the permissible demand for it by 30,000 votes in cases where it is not obligatory as affecting the constitution—as cited by Adams and Cunningham, éd. Loumyer, p. 80.

<sup>4</sup> See M. Loumyer's note to his translation of Adams and Cunningham's work, p. 269.

attempt on its independence by any one Power would infallibly be resisted by others.

As regards the true political problems, those of domestic life, the Swiss case presents the usual elements. From dangerous religious strife (the Jesuits being excluded) it seems likely to be preserved in future by the rationalising force of the Socialist movement; but that movement in turn tells of the social problem. A country of not readily extensible resources, Switzerland exhibits nearly as clearly as does Holland the dangers of over-population. The old resource of foreign enlistment being done with,<sup>1</sup> surplus population forces a continual emigration, largely from the rural districts, where the lands are for the most part heavily mortgaged.<sup>2</sup> The active industrialism of the towns—with their large manufacture of clocks and watches, cottons and silks—involves a large importation of foreign food, with which native agriculture cannot advantageously compete. Thus, as in the eighteenth century, the pinch falls on the country, while the towns are in comparison thriving. The relatively high death-rate of recent years raises an old issue. Malthus has told<sup>3</sup> how in the eighteenth century a panic arose concerning the prudential habits of the population in the way of late marriages and small families, and how thereafter encouragements to early marriage had led to much worsening of the lot of many of the people. With a small birth-rate there had been a small death-rate; whereas the rising birth-rate went with rising misery.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps through the influence of his treatise, the movement of demand for increase of population seems to have died out, and the practice of prudence to have regained economic credit. It would appear, however, that within the past half-century the conditions as to population have again somewhat worsened. At 1850, when nearly half of all the men married per year in England were under twenty years of age, the normal marrying age in the Vaud was thirty or thirty-one; and there had existed in a number of the old Catholic Cantons laws inflicting heavy fines on young people who married without proving their ability to support a family.<sup>5</sup> The modern tendency is to abandon such paternal modes of interference; and it does not appear that personal prudence thus far replaces them, though on the other hand there was in the first half of last century a marked

<sup>1</sup> In 1830 there were still Swiss regiments in the French service, and a Swiss legion was enrolled by England for the Crimean War. This seems to be the last instance of the old practice.

<sup>2</sup> Adams and Cunningham, as cited, p. 303.

<sup>3</sup> *Essay*, bk. ii, ch. v.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* 7th ed. pp. 173-75.

<sup>5</sup> Kay, *The Social Condition and Education of the People in England and Europe*, 1850, i, 67, 68, 74, 76. Kay unfortunately does not go into history, and we are left to conjecture as to the course of opinion between the issue of Malthus's *Essay* and 1850.

recognition by Swiss publicists of the sociological law of the matter.

Thus M. Edward Mallet of Geneva pointed out before 1850 that the chances of life had steadily gone on increasing with the lessening of the birth-rate for centuries back.<sup>1</sup> His tables run:—

LIFE CHANCES.	YEARS.	MONTHS.	DAYS.
Towards end of 16th century ... ..	8	7	26
In 17th century ... ..	13	3	16
In the years 1701-1750 ... ..	27	9	13
"  "  1751-1800 ... ..	31	3	5
"  "  1801-1813 ... ..	40	8	0
"  "  1814-1833 ... ..	45	0	29

The statistician's summary of the case is worth citing:—

“As prosperity advanced, marriages became fewer and later; the proportion of births was reduced, but greater numbers of the infants born were preserved. In the early and barbarous periods the excessive mortality was accompanied by a prodigious fecundity. In the last few years of the seventeenth century a marriage still produced five children and more; the probable duration of life was not twenty years, and Geneva had scarcely 17,000 inhabitants. Towards the end of the eighteenth century there were scarcely three children to a marriage; and the probability of life exceeded thirty-two years. At the present time a marriage produces only two and three-quarter children; the probability of life is forty-five years; and Geneva, which exceeds 27,000 in population, has arrived at a high degree of civilisation and material prosperity. In 1836 the population appeared to have attained its summit: the births barely replaced the deaths.”

But in 1910 the population of Geneva (Canton) was 154,159;<sup>2</sup> and the figures of Swiss emigration—averaging about 5,000 per annum—tell their own tale. Increasing industrialism, as usual, has meant conjugal improvidence. Once more the trouble is not smallness of population, but undue increase.

As Protestantism appears to increase slightly more than Catholicism, no blame can in this case be laid on the Catholic Church. But in Switzerland, as elsewhere, Catholicism tends to illiteracy. In the Protestant cantons the proportion of school-attending children is as one to five; in the half-and-half Cantons

<sup>1</sup> See Kay, as cited. Compare the earlier calculations to similar effect cited by Malthus.

<sup>2</sup> An increase of nearly 63,000 in eleven years.

it is as one to seven; and in the Catholic it is as one to nine. This, and no tendency of race or *direct* tendency of creed, is the explanation of the relative superiority of Protestant to Catholic Cantons in point of comfort and freedom from mendicancy; for the Cantons remarked by travellers for their prosperity are indifferently French- and German-speaking, while the less prosperous are either German or mixed.<sup>1</sup> The fact that the three oldest Forest Cantons are among the more backward is a reminder that past-worship, there at its height, is always a snare to civilisation. Describing these cantons over half-a-century ago, Grote spoke severely of "their dull and stationary intelligence, their bigotry, and their pride in bygone power and exploits."<sup>2</sup> The reproach is in some measure applicable to other parts of Switzerland, as to other nations in general; and it must cease to be deserved before the Republic, cultured and well administered as it is, can realise republican ideals. But the existing Federation of the Helvetic Cantons, locally patriotic and self-seeking as they still are, is a hopeful spectacle—for this among other reasons, that it is a perpetual reminder of the possibility of federations of States, even at a stage of civilisation far short of any Utopia of altruism.

Note

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Kay, as cited, i, 9-11.

<sup>2</sup> *Seven Letters*, p. 31.



## CHAPTER VI

### PORTUGAL

#### § 1. *The Rise and Fall of Portuguese Empire*

FOR European history Portugal is signalised in two aspects: first, as a "made" kingdom, set up by the generating of local patriotism in a medieval population not hereditarily different from that of the rest of the Peninsula; secondly, as a small State which attained and for a time wielded "empire" on a great scale. The beginnings of the local patriotism are not confidently to be gathered from the old chronicles,<sup>1</sup> which reduce the process for the most part to the calculated action of the Queen Theresa (fl. 1114-28), certainly one of the most interesting female figures in history. But the main process of growth is simple enough. A series of warrior kings made good their position on the one hand against Spain, and on the other conquered what is now the southern part of Portugal (the ancient Lusitania) from the Moors. Only in a limited degree did their administration realise the gains conceivable from a differentiation and rivalry of cultures in the Peninsula; but in view of the special need for such variation in a territory open to few foreign culture-contacts, the Portuguese nationality has counted substantially for civilisation. It would have counted for much more if in the militant Catholic period the Portuguese crown had not followed the evil lead of Spain in the three main steps of setting up the Inquisition, expelling the Jews, and expelling the Moriscoes.

On the Portuguese as on the northern European coasts, sea-faring commerce arose on a basis of fishing;<sup>2</sup> agriculturally, save as to fruits and wines, Portugal was undeveloped; and the conquered Moorish territory, handed over by the king in vast estates to feudal lords, who gave no intelligent encouragement to cultivation, long remained sparsely populated.<sup>3</sup> The great commercial expansion began soon after King John II, egregiously known as "the Perfect," suddenly and violently broke the power of the feudal

<sup>1</sup> *The Story of Portugal*, by Mr. H. Morse Stephens, 1891, is the most trustworthy history of Portugal in English, giving as it does the main results of the work of the modern scientific school of Portuguese historians.

<sup>2</sup> Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, 1881, p. 283.

<sup>3</sup> H. Morse Stephens, *Portugal*, 1891, pp. 53, 87, 102, 236.

nobility (1483-84), a blow which made the king instantly a popular favourite, and which their feudal methods had left the nobles unable to return. In the previous generation Prince Henry the Navigator had set up a great movement of maritime discovery, directed to commercial ends; and from this beginning arose the remarkable but short-lived empire of Portugal in the Indies. That stands out from the later episodes of the Dutch and British empires in that, to begin with, the movement of discovery was systematically fostered and subsidised by the crown, Prince Henry giving the lead; and that in the sequel the whole commercial fruits of the process were the crown's monopoly—a state of things as unfavourable to permanence as could well be conceived. But even under more favourable conditions, though the Portuguese empire might have overborne the Dutch, it could hardly have maintained itself against the British. The economic and military bases, as in the case of Holland, were relatively too narrow for the superstructure.

What is most memorable in the Portuguese evolution is the simple process of discovery, which was scientifically and systematically conducted in the hope of sailing round Africa to India. The list of results is worth detailing. In 1419 Perestrello discovered the island of Porto Santa; in 1420 Zarco and Vaz found Madeira, not before charted; and in the next twenty years the Canary Islands, the Azores, Santa Maria, and St. Miguel swelled the list. In 1434 Cape Bojador was doubled by Gil Eannes, and the Rio d'Ouro was reached in 1436 by Baldaya; in 1441 Nuno Tristan attained Cape Blanco; in 1445 he found the river Senegal; D. Dias reaching Guinea in the same year, and Cape Verde in 1446. From Tristan's voyage of 1441 dates the slave trade, which now gave a sinister stimulus to the process of discovery; every cargo of negroes being eagerly bought for the cheap cultivation of the Moorish lands, still poorly populated under the feudal regimen.<sup>1</sup> The commercial and slave-trading purpose may in part account for the piecemeal nature of the advance;<sup>2</sup> for it was not till 1471 that the islands of Fernando Po were discovered and the Equator crossed; and not till 1484 that Cam reached the Congo.<sup>3</sup> But two years later Bartholomew Dias made the rest of the way to the Cape of Good Hope, a much greater advance than had before been made in thirty years; and after a pause in the chronicles of eleven years, Vasco da Gama sailed from

<sup>1</sup> Stephens, *Portugal*, pp. 148, 149, 182.

<sup>2</sup> Many of the dates are to some extent in dispute. Cp. Stephens, *Portugal*, pp. 144-56; and Mr. Major's *Life of Prince Henry of Portugal*, 1868, *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> There is a dubious-looking record that at this time a systematic attempt was made to Christianise the natives instead of enslaving them. See it in Dunham, *History of Spain and Portugal*, iii, 288-91.

Lisbon to Calcutta. Meantime the Perfect king, preoccupied with the African route, made in 1488 his great mistake of finally dismissing Columbus from his court as a visionary. Had Portugal added the new hemisphere to her list of discoveries, it would have been stupendous indeed. As it is, this "Celtic" people, sailing in poor little vessels obviously not far developed from the primary fishing-smack, had done more for the navigation and charting of the world than all the rest of Europe besides.

And still the expansion went rapidly on; the reign of Manuel, "the Fortunate," reaping even more glory than that of his predecessor, who in turn had rewards denied to the pioneer promoter, Prince Henry. In the year 1500 Brazil was reached by Cabral, and Labrador by Corte-Real; and in 1501 Castella discovered the islands of St. Helena and Ascension. Amerigo Vespucci, whose name came into the heritage of the discovery of Columbus, explored the Rio Plata and Paraguay in 1501-3; Coutinho did as much for Madagascar and the Mauritius in 1506; Almeida in 1507 found the Maldivé Islands; Malacca and Sumatra were attached by Sequiera in 1509; the Moluccas by Serrano in 1512; and the Ile de Bourbon in 1513 by Mascarenhas. In eastern Asia, again, Coelho in 1516 sailed up the coast of Cochin China and explored Siam; Andrade reached Canton in 1517 and Peking in 1521; and in 1520 the invincible Magellan, entering the service of Spain,<sup>1</sup> achieved his great passage to the Pacific.<sup>2</sup> No such century of navigation had yet been seen; and all this dazzling enlargement of life and knowledge was being accomplished by one of the smallest of the European kingdoms, while England was laggardly passing from the point of Agincourt, by the way of the Wars of the Roses, to that of the Field of the Cloth of Gold, producing at that stage, indeed, More's *Utopia*, but yielding no fruits meet therefor.

When, however, there followed on the process of discovery the process of commerce, the advantages accruing to the monarchic impulse and control were absent. Always as rigidly restrictive in its pursuit of discovery and commerce as the ancient Carthaginians had been,<sup>3</sup> the Portuguese crown was as much more restrictive than they in its practice as an absolute monarchy is more concentrated than an oligarchy. Whatever progress was achieved by the

<sup>1</sup> Thus the second great expansion of geographical knowledge, like the first, went to the credit of Spain through Portuguese mismanagement, Magellan being alienated by King Miguel's impolicy.

<sup>2</sup> I follow the dates fixed by Mr. Stephens, p. 175.

<sup>3</sup> See Dunham, iii, 286, as to the anger of John II at a pilot's remark that the voyage to Guinea was easily made. An attempted disclosure of the fact to Spain was ferociously punished.

Portuguese in India was in the way of vigorous conquest and administration by capable governors like Albuquerque (*d.* 1515) and Da Castro (*d.* 1548), of whom the first showed not only military but conciliatory capacity, and planned what might have been a triumphant policy of playing off Hindu princes against Mohammedan. But the restrictive home-policy was fatal to successful empire-building where the conditions called for the most constant output of energy. Though the Portuguese race has shown greater viability in India than either the Dutch or the English, it could not but suffer heavily from the climate in the first days of adaptation. The death-rate among the early governors is startling; and the rank and file cannot have fared much better.<sup>1</sup> All the while swarms of the more industrious Portuguese, including many Jews, were passing to Brazil and settling there.<sup>2</sup> To meet this drain there was needed the freest opening in India to private enterprise; whereas the Portuguese crown, keeping in its own hands the whole of the Indian products extorted by its governors, and forcing them to send cargoes of gratis goods for the Crown to sell, limited enterprise in an unparalleled fashion.<sup>3</sup> The original work of discovery and factory-planting, indeed, could not have been accomplished by Portuguese private enterprise as then developed; but the monarchic monopoly prevented its growth. The Jews had been expelled (1496), and with them most of the acquired commercial skill of the nation;<sup>4</sup> the nobles had become as subservient to and dependent on the throne as those of Spain were later to be; and already the curse of empire was impoverishing the land as it was to do in Spain. As was fully realised in the eighteenth century by the great Pombal,<sup>5</sup> the mere possession of gold mines destroyed prosperity, the imaginary wealth driving out the real; but before Portugal was ruined by her Brazilian mines she was enfeebled by the social diseases that afflicted ancient Rome. Slave labour in the Moorish provinces drove out free; the rural population elsewhere thinned rapidly under the increasing drain of the expeditions of discovery, colonisation, and conquest; and only in the rapidly increasing population of Lisbon, which trebled in eighty years, was there any ostensible advance in wealth to show for the era of empire. Even in Lisbon, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the negro slaves outnumbered the free citizens.<sup>6</sup> And over these conditions of economic and political decadence reigned the Inquisition.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Stephens, pp. 181, 218.

<sup>3</sup> Stephens, pp. 177, 181, 192.

<sup>5</sup> Conde da Carnota, *The Marquis of Pombal*, 2nd. ed. 1871, pp. 72-77.

<sup>6</sup> Stephens, p. 182.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* p. 228.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* pp. 171-73.