

and compassed the sovereignty of Milan. On the succession of Charles V to the throne of Spain and the Empire (1519), war between him and Francis set in systematically, and continued under Adrian and Clement VII as under Leo, both combatants feeding on and plundering Italy. The defeat of Francis at Pavia (1525) brought no cessation to the drain; a new league was formed between France, the Papacy, Venice, and Sforza; and soon, besides the regular armies, a guerilla horde of Germans on the imperial side, receiving no pay, was living by the plunder of Lombardy. At length, in 1527, came the sack of Rome by the imperial forces, Germans and Spanish combining for nine miserable months to outdo the brutalities and the horrors of all previous conquests, Christian or heathen. Two years' more fighting "only added to the desolation of Italy, and destroyed alike in all the Italian provinces the last remains of prosperity."<sup>1</sup> When a fresh German army entered Lombardy, in 1529, there was "nothing more to pillage."<sup>2</sup>

The curtain now falls rapidly on every form of "independence" in Italy. Pope Clement VII, freed of his barbarian conquerors, sent them against Florence, which fell in a fashion not unworthy of its great republican tradition, after tasting three final years of its ancient and thrice-forfeited "freedom." With the dying Machiavelli to frame the ordinances of her revived military system, and Michel Angelo to construct her last fortifications, she had in her final effort bound up with her name as a republic two of the greatest Italian names of the age of the Renaissance. Then came the vengeance of the Medicean Pope, Clement VII, the ducal tyranny, and the end of a great period.

The prolonged life of the maritime and commercial-aristocratic republics of Genoa and Venice, interesting as a proof of the defensive powers of communities so placed and so ordered, was no prolongation of Italian civilisation, save in so far as a brilliant art survived at Venice till the close of the sixteenth century. It is sufficient to note that what of artistic and intellectual life Venice and Genoa had was dependent first on Venetian contact with Byzantium, and later on the fecundity of freer Italy. The mere longer duration of Venice was due as much to her unique situation as to her system. On the other hand, it seems substantially true that the Venetian oligarchy did rule its subjects, both at home and on the mainland, with greater wisdom and fairness than was shown by any other Italian power. When

<sup>1</sup> Sismondi, *Républiques*, xvi, 71-76, 158, 159, 170, 217; *Short History*, p. 336.

<sup>2</sup> As to the misery of Florence after the siege, see Napier, *Florentine History*, iv, 533, 534.



Castruccio Castracani drove nine hundred families out of Lucca in 1310, thus destroying some of its chief manufactures, Venice gave the silk-weavers among them a politic encouragement, and so widened her commercial basis.<sup>1</sup> Her rulers, in short, had the common sense of men of business, who knew the value of good-will. There is thus an unwarrantable extravagance in the verdict of the young Macaulay, that in Venice "aristocracy had destroyed every seed of genius and virtue";<sup>2</sup> and in his outburst: "God forbid that there should ever again exist a powerful and civilised State which, after existing through thirteen hundred eventful years, shall not bequeath to mankind the memory of one great name or one generous action." Such actions are not rife in any history, and in mere civic selfishness of purpose the rulers of Venice were on a par with most others.<sup>3</sup> As citizens, or as a caste, they seem to have been not more but less self-seeking as against the rest of the community, despite their determined exclusiveness, than the same class in other States.<sup>4</sup> Their history does but prove that an astute oligarchy, protectively governing a commercial and industrial State, is not helpful to civilisation in the ratio of its power and stability, and that the higher political wisdom is not the appanage of any class.

When all is said, the whole Italian civilisation of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance represents a clear political gain over that of ancient Hellas in that it had transcended slavery, while failing to attain or to aim at the equality and fraternity which alone realise liberty. Despite, too, all the scandals of the Renaissance in general, and of papal Rome in particular, the life of such a city as Florence was morally quite on a par with that of any northern city.<sup>5</sup> But the later States and civilisations which, while so much more fortunate in their political conditions, are still so far from the moral liberation of their labouring masses—these are not entitled to plume themselves on their comparative success. "The petty done" is still dwarfed by "the undone vast."

What they and we may truly claim is that in the modern State, freed from the primal curse of fratricidal strife between cities and provinces, the totality of "good life," no less than of industrial and commercial life, is far greater than of old, even if signal genius be less common. To contrast the Genoa of to-day with the old City-State

<sup>1</sup> Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. iii, ch. iii, citing Sandi.

<sup>2</sup> Review of Mitford, *Miscellaneous Writings*, ed. 1868, p. 74.

<sup>3</sup> Macaulay doubtless proceeded on the history of Daru, now known to be seriously erroneous. Compare that of W. C. Hazlitt, above cited, pref.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. Brown, in *Cambridge Modern History*, 1902, vol. i, *The Renaissance*, p. 285.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. Armstrong, in *Cambridge History*, i, 150-51.



is to realise how peace can liberate human effort. The city of Petrarch, Columbus, and Mazzini has no recent citizen of European fame ; but since a wealthy son bequeathed to her his huge fortune (1875), she has become the chief port of Italy, passing some forty per cent. of the total trade of the country. The fact that half her imports, in weight, consist of coal, tells of the main economic disadvantage of modern Italy as compared with the chief northern countries ; but the modern development of industry is all the more notable. Under a system of general free trade, it might go much further.

The fact remains that modern Italy is no such intellectual beacon-light among the nations as she was in the " old, unhappy, far-off times " ; and upon this the historical sentimentalist is prone to moralise. But there is no perceptible reason why the new life, well managed, should not yield new intellectual glories ; and the latter-day intellectual Renaissance of Italy may one day take its place in the historic retrospect as no less notable than that of the days of strife.



PART V

THE FORTUNES OF THE LESSER  
EUROPEAN STATES

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CHAPTER I

THE IDEAS OF NATIONALITY AND NATIONAL  
GREATNESS

IT lies on the face of the foregoing surveys that the principle which gives mass-form to all politics—to wit, the principle of nationality—makes at once for peace and war, co-operation and enmity. As against the tendency to atomism, the tribal principle supplies cohesion; as against tribalism, the principle of the State plays the same part; and as against oppression the instinct of race or nationality inspires and sustains resistance. But in every aggregate, the force of attraction tends to generate a correlative repulsion to other aggregates, and—save for the counterplay of class repulsions—the fundamental instinct of egoism takes new extensions in pride of family, pride of clan, pride of nation, pride of race. Until the successive extensions have all been rectified by the spirit of reciprocity, politics remains so far unmoralised and unrationalised.

The nullity of the conception of “race genius” has been forced on us at every meeting with it. No less clear, on a critical analysis, is the irrationality of the instinct of racial pride which underlies that conception, and which is involved in perhaps half of the strifes of tribes, States, and nations. Yet perhaps most of the reflections made by historical writers in the way of generalisations of the history of States and peoples are in terms of the fallacy and the irrationality in question. And the instinctive persistence of both reveals itself when we come to reflect on the fortunes of what we usually call the little nations—employing a term which at once sets up a whole series of partial hallucinations.



The main distinction between civilised nations being difference of language, there has spontaneously arisen the habit of identifying language with "race," and regarding a dwindling tongue as implying a dwindling people. In the British Islands, for instance, the decline in the numbers of the people speaking Celtic dialects—the Erse, the Welsh, and the Gaelic—leads many persons, including some of the speakers of those tongues, to regard the "Celtic stock" as in course of diminution; and statesmen speak quasi-scientifically of "the Celtic fringe" as representing certain political tendencies in particular. Yet as soon as we substitute the comparatively real test of name-forms for the non-test of language, we find that the Welsh and Gaelic-speaking stocks have enormously extended within the English-speaking population, so that "Welsh blood" is very much commoner in Britain than "Saxon," relatively to the proportions between the areas and populations of Wales and England, while "Highland blood" is relatively predominant in "Saxon"-speaking Scotland; and "Irish blood" is almost similarly abundant even in England, to say nothing of its immense multiplication in the United States.

Enthusiasm for one's nation as such thus begins on scrutiny to resolve itself into enthusiasm for one's speech; and as our English speech is a near variant of certain others held alien, as Dutch and Scandinavian and German, with a decisive control from French, enthusiasm for the speech-tie begins, on reflection, to assimilate to the enthusiasm of the district, the glen, the parish. Millions of us are at a given moment rapturous about the deeds of our non-ancestors, on the supposition that they were our ancestors, and in terms of a correlative aversion to the deeds of certain other ancients loosely supposed to have been the ancestors of certain of our contemporaries. Thus the ostensible entity which plays so large a part in the common run of thought about history—the nation, considered as a continuous and personalised organism—is in large measure a metaphysical dream, and the emotion spent on it partakes much of the nature of superstition.

How hard it is for anyone trained in such emotion to transcend it is seen from the form taken by the sympathy which is bestowed by considerate members of a large community on members of a small one. "Gallant little Wales" is a phrase in English currency; and a contemporary poet, who had actually written pertinently and well in prose on the spurious conception of greatness attached to membership in a large population, has also written in verse a plea for "little peoples" in terms of the assumption of an entity conscious



of relative smallness. Some of these more sympathetic pictures of the lesser States obscurely recall the anecdote of the little girl who, contemplating a picture of martyrs thrown to the lions, sorrowed for the "poor lion who hadn't any Christian." The late Sir John Seeley, on the other hand, wrote in the more normal Anglo-Saxon manner that "some countries, such as Holland and Sweden, might pardonably (*sic*) regard their history as in a manner wound up; .....the only practical lesson of their history is a lesson of resignation."<sup>1</sup> The unit in a population of three millions is implicitly credited with the consciousness of a dwarf or a cripple facing a gigantic rival when he thinks of the existence of a community of thirty or sixty millions. Happily, the unit of the smaller community has no such consciousness;<sup>2</sup> and, inasmuch as his state is thus intellectually the more gracious, there appears to be some solid psychological basis for the paradox, lately broached by such a one, that "the future lies with the small nations." That is to say, it seems likely that a higher level of general rationality will be attained in the small than in the large populations, in virtue of their escaping one of the most childish and most fostered hallucinations current in the latter.

Certain patriots of the wilful sort are wont to flout reason in these matters, blustering of "false cosmopolitanism" and "salutary prejudice." To all such rhetoric the fitting answer is the characterisation of it as false passion. Those who indulge in it elect wilfully to enfranchise from the mass of detected and convicted animal passions one which specially chimes with their sentiment, as if every other might not be allowed loose with as good reason. Matters are truly bad enough without such perverse endorsement of vulgar ideals by those who can see their vulgarity. Ordinary observation makes us aware that the most commonplace and contracted minds are most prone to the passion of national and racial pride; whereas the men of antiquity who first seem to have transcended it are thereby marked out once for all as a higher breed. It is in fact the proof of incapacity for any large or deep view of human life to be habitually and zealously "patriotic" in the popular sense of the term. Yet, in the civilisations which to-day pass for being most advanced, the majority of the units habitually batten on that quality of feeling, millions of adults for ever living the political life of the schoolboy; and, as no polity can

<sup>1</sup> *The Expansion of England*, 1883, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> This though it be true, as remarked by Sismondi (*Histoire des républiques italiennes*, ed. 1826, i, 100, 101), that all nations spontaneously desire to be large and powerful, in disregard of all experience.



long transcend the ideals of the great mass, national fortunes and institutions thus far tend to be determined by the habit of the lower minds.

It is pure paralogism to point to the case of a large backward population without a national-flag idea—for instance, the Chinese<sup>1</sup>—as showing that want of patriotic passion goes with backwardness in culture. There is an infinity of the raw material of patriotism among precisely the most primitive of the Chinese population, whose hatred of “foreign devils” is the very warp of “imperialism.” The ideal of cosmopolitanism is at the other end of the psychological scale from that of the ignorance which has gone through no political evolution whatever; its very appearance implies past patriotism as a stepping-stone; and its ethic is to that of patriotism what civil law is to club law. If “salutary prejudice” is to be the shibboleth of future civilisation, the due upshot will be the attainment of it one day by the now semi-civilised races, and the drowning out of European patriotisms by Mongolian.

If a saner lesson is to be widely learned, one way to it, if not the best way, may be an effort on the part of the units of the “great nations” to realise the significance of the fortunes of the “little nations,” in terms, not of the imagined consciousness of metaphysical entities, but of actual human conditions—material, passional, and intellectual. We have seen how erudite specialists can express themselves in terms of the fallacy of racial genius. Specialists perhaps as erudite, and certainly multitudes of educated people, seem capable of thinking as positively in terms of the hallucinations of racial entity, national consciousness, political greatness, national revenue, and imperial success. Thus we have publicists speaking of Holland as an “effete nation,” of Belgium as “doomed to absorption,” of the Scandinavian peoples as “having failed in the race,” and of Switzerland as “impotent”; even as they call Spain “dying” and Turkey “decomposing.”

Nearly every one of those nations, strictly speaking, has a fairer chance of ultimate continuance without decline of wealth and power than England, whose units in general show as little eye for the laws of decline as Romans did in the days of Augustus. Spain has large potentialities of rich agricultural life; Turkey needs only new habits to develop her natural resources; the life of Belgium, indeed, is, like that of England, in part founded on exhaustible minerals; but Switzerland and Scandinavia, with their restrained populations, may

<sup>1</sup> This, it need hardly be repeated, was written before 1900.



continue to maintain, as they do, a rather higher *average* of decent life and popular culture than that of the British Islands,<sup>1</sup> though they, too, have at all times a social problem to deal with. British greatness, on dissection, consists in the aggregation of much greater masses of wealth and much greater masses of poverty, larger groups of idlers and larger swarms of degenerates, with much greater maritime power, than are to be seen in the little nations; certainly not in a higher average of manhood and intelligence and well-being. Sir John Seeley, in a moment of misgiving, avowed that "bigness is not necessarily greatness"; adding, "if by remaining in the second rank of magnitude we can hold the front rank morally and intellectually, let us sacrifice mere material magnitude."<sup>2</sup> But he had before used the term "greatness" without reserve as equivalent to "mere material magnitude"; and even in revising his doctrine, it seems, he must needs crave some sort of supremacy, some sense of the inferiority of the mass of mankind. Without any such constant reversion to the instinct of racial pride, let us say that "the things that are most excellent" have no dependence on mere material magnitude. Given a saner and juster distribution of wealth and culture-machinery, each one of the smaller States may be more civilised, more worth living in, than the larger, even as Athens was better worth living in than Rome, and Goethe's Weimar than the Berlin of 1800. It was a poet of one of the larger nations—though it had to be a poet—who saw not hardship but happiness in the thought of "leaving great verse unto a little clan." And it was a Christian bishop, looking on the break-up of a great empire, who asked, *An congruat bonis latius velle regnare?*—Doth it beseem the good to seek to widen their rule?—and gave the judgment that if human things had gone in the happier way of righteousness, all States had remained small, happy in peaceful neighbourhood.<sup>3</sup>

*Note*

As for the sentiment of a national greatness that is measured by acreage and census and quantity of war material, it is hard to distinguish ethically between it and that individual pride in lands and wealth which all men save those who cherish it are agreed to pronounce odious. Even the snobs of nationality have, as a rule, a saving sense which withholds them from flaunting their pride in the eyes of their "poorer" neighbours, the members of the less numerous

<sup>1</sup> Compare the remarks of Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, 2nd ed. p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Expansion of England*, p. 16. Compare the further vacillations in pp. 132-37, 301, 304, 306. In the concluding chapter (p. 294) comes the avowal that "we know no reason in the nature of things why a State should be any the better for being large."

<sup>3</sup> Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, iv, 15.



MB. communities. Yet the note which is thus tacitly admitted to be vulgarly jarring for alien ears is habitually struck for domestic satisfaction; few newspapers let many days pass without sounding it; and certain poets and writers of verse appear to find their chief joy in its vibrations. The men of some of the lesser States, then, stand a fair chance of becoming ethically and æsthetically, as well as intellectually, superior in the average to those of the larger aggregates, in that their moral codes are not vitiated nor their literary taste vulgarised by national purse-pride and the vertigo of the higher dunghill; though they, too, have their snares of "patriotism," with its false ideals and its vitiation of true fraternity.

To some degree, no doubt, the habit of mind of our megalophiles connects with the vague but common surmise that a small aggregate is more liable to unscrupulous aggression than a large one. If, however, there be any justice in that surmise, there is obviously implied a known disposition in the larger aggregates to commit such aggression; so that to act or rest upon it is simply to prefer being the wronger to being the wronged. Thus to glory in being rather on the side of the bully than on the side of the bullied is only to give one more proof of the unworthiness of the instinct at work. All the while, there is no real ground for the hope; and as regards the small nations themselves, the apprehension does not appear to prevail. There has indeed been a recrudescence of the barbaric ethic of the Napoleonic period in the Bismarckian period; but there is no present sign of a serious fear of national suppression on the part of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, and the Scandinavian States; while, apart from Bismarck's early aggression upon Denmark, and the ill-fortune of Greece in attacking Turkey, it is not small but large aggregates—to wit, Austria, France, Russia, Turkey, Spain—that have suffered any degree of military humiliation during the past half century; and it is precisely the large aggregates that avowedly live in the most constant apprehension either of being outnumbered in their armies and navies by single rivals or coalitions, or of losing their "prestige" by some failure to punish a supposed slight. It is a matter of historic fact that the "patriotic" consciousness in England had its withers wrung during a long series of years by the remembrance of such military disasters as the fall of Gordon at Khartoum, and the defeat of an incompetent general at Majuba Hill.<sup>1</sup> No "little nation" could exhibit a more wincing

<sup>1</sup> This was written before 1900. The disasters of the South African War confirmed the proposition.



sense of humiliation and disgrace than is thus visibly felt by multitudes of a great aggregate over military repulses at the hands of extremely small and primitive groups. Politically speaking, then, the future of the small nations seems rather brighter than that of the large; and thus in the last analysis the pride of the unit of the latter is found to be still a folly.



## CHAPTER II

### THE SCANDINAVIAN PEOPLES

#### § 1

WHEN the early history of Scandinavia is studied as a process of social evolution rather than as a chronicle of feuds and of the exploits of heroes of various grades,<sup>1</sup> it is found to constitute a miniature norm of a simple and instructive sort. Taken as it emerges from the stage of myth, about the time of Charlemagne, it presents a vivid phase of barbarism, acted on by powerful conditions of change. The three sections of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden stand in a certain natural gradation as regards their possibilities of political development. All alike were capable only of a secondary or tertiary civilisation, being at once geographically disrupted and incapable, on primitive methods, of feeding an abundant population. In their early piratical stage, the Scandinavians are not greatly different from the pre-Homeric Greeks as these were conceived by Thucydides; but whereas the Greeks came in contact with the relatively high civilisations which had preceded them, the Scandinavians of the Dark Ages had no contacts save with the primitive life of the pre-Christian Slavs, the premature and arrested cross-civilisations of Carolingian France and Anglo-Saxon England, and, in a fuller and more fruitful degree, with the similarly arrested semi-Christian civilisation of Celtic Ireland, which latter counted for so much in their literature.

<sup>1</sup> As in Carlyle's *Early Kings of Norway*, the *caput mortuum* of his historical method. Much more instructive works on Scandinavian history are available to the English reader. The two volumes on *Scandinavia* by Crichton and Wheaton (1837) are not yet superseded, though savouring strongly of the conservatism of their period. Dunham, who rapidly produced, for Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopædia series, histories of *Spain and Portugal* (5 vols.), *Europe during the Middle Ages* (4 vols.), and the *Germanic Empire* (3 vols.), compiled also one of *Denmark, Sweden, and Norway* (3 vols. 1839-40), of inferior quality. But Geijer's *History of Sweden*, one of the standard modern national histories of Europe, is translated into English as far as the period of Gustavus Vasa (3 vols. of orig. in one of trans. 1845); and the competent *History of Denmark* by C.-F. Allen is available in a French translation (Copenhagen, 2 tom. 1878). Otté's *Scandinavian History*, 1874, is an unpretending and unliterary but well-informed work, which may be used to check Crichton and Wheaton. The more recent work of Mr. R. Nisbet Bain, *Scandinavia: a Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden from 1513 to 1900* (Camb. Univ. Press, 1905), is useful for the period covered, but has little sociological value. For the history of ancient Scandinavian literature, the introduction to Vigfusson and Powell's *Corpus Poeticum Boreale* (1883), and Prof. Powell's article on Icelandic Literature in the 10th ed. of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, are preferable to Schweitzer's *Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur* (1886, 2 Bde.), which, however, is useful for the modern period.



But in barbarian conditions certain main laws of social evolution operate no less clearly than in later stages ; and we see sections of the Norsemen passing from tribal anarchy to primitive monarchy, and thence to military " empire," afterwards returning to their stable economic basis, as every military empire sooner or later must. Of the Scandinavian sections, Denmark and the southern parts of Sweden (round the Maelar) are the least disrupted and most fertile ; and these were respectively the most readily reducible to a single rule. In all, given to begin with the primordial bias to royalism in any of its forms,<sup>1</sup> the establishment of a supreme and hereditary military rule was only a question of time ; every successive attempt, however undone by the forces of barbaric independence, being a lead and stimulus to others. It is important to note how the process was promoted by, and in its turn promoted, the establishment of Christianity. The incomplex phenomena in Scandinavia throw a new light on the more complex evolution of other parts of Christendom. Primitive polytheism is obviously unpropitious to monarchic rule ; and in every ancient religion it can be seen to have undergone adaptations where such rule arose. In the widely varying systems of Homeric Greece, Babylonia, Egypt, and Rome, the same tendency is visibly at work in different degrees, the ascendent principle of earthly government being more or less directly duplicated in theological theory. Under the Roman Empire, all cults were in a measure bent to the imperial service, and it was only the primary exclusiveness of Christianity that put it in conflict with the State. Once the emperor accepted it, recognising its political use, and conceded its exclusive claims, it became a trebly effective political instrument,<sup>2</sup> centralising as it did the whole machinery of religion throughout the Empire, and co-ordinating all to the political system. To use a modern illustration, it " syndicated " the multifold irregular activities of worship, and was thus the ideal system for a centralised and imperial State.<sup>3</sup> This was as readily seen by Theodoric and Charlemagne as by the rulers at Constantinople ; and to such a perception, broadly speaking, is to be attributed the forcing of Christianity on the northern races by their kings.

Compare the explicit admissions of Mosheim, *Eccles. Hist.*

<sup>1</sup> See Geijer's *History of the Swedes*, Eng. tr. of pt. i, 1-vol. ed. p. 30, as to the special persistence in Scandinavia of the early religious conception of kingship. Cp. Crichton and Wheaton's *Scandinavia*, 1837, i, 157.

<sup>2</sup> Such New Testament passages as *Rom. xiii*, 1-7, and *Titus iii*, 1, seem to have been penned or interpolated expressly to propitiate the Roman government.

<sup>3</sup> It was by entirely overlooking this historic fact that M. Fustel de Coulanges, in the last chapter of his *Cité antique*, was able to propound a theory of historic Christianity as something extra-political. He there renounced the inductive method for a pure ecclesiastical apriorism, and the result is a very comprehensive sociological misconception.



8 cent., pt. ii, ch. ii, § 5 and note, following on the testimony of William of Malmesbury as to Charlemagne. Other ecclesiastical historians coincide. "Numbers of the earliest and most active converts, both in Germany and England, were connected with the royal households; and in this way it would naturally occur that measures which related to the organising of the Church would emanate directly from the King.....It is indeed remarkable that so long as kings were esteemed the real patrons of the Church, she felt no wish to define exactly her relations to the civil power; the two authorities.....laboured to enforce obedience to each other" (Hardwick, *Church History: Middle Age*, 1853, pp. 56-57). The same historian (p. 127) describes the Wends of the eleventh century as seeing in the missionary a means for their subjection to Germany, and as "constantly attempting to regain their independence and extinguish the few glimmerings of truth that had been forced into their minds."

Northern paganism, more than the semi-cosmopolitan polytheism of the south in the period of Augustus, was a local and domestic faith, lending itself to separateness and independence, as did the civic and family religions of early Greece and Rome. While there were communal assemblies with specially solemn sacrifices, the popular beliefs were such that every district could have its holy places, and every family or group its special rites;<sup>1</sup> and in primitive Scandinavia a priesthood could still less develop than even in primitive Germany, whose lack of any system corresponding to the Druidism of Gaul is still empirically ascribed to some anti-sacerdotal element in the "national character," whereas it is plainly a result of the nomadic life-conditions of the scattered people. In germ the Teutonic priesthood was extremely powerful, being the judiciary power from which there was no appeal.<sup>2</sup> But an organised priestly system can arise only on the basis of some measure of political levelling or centralisation, involving some peaceful inter-communication. Romanised Christianity, coming ready-made from its centre, permitted of no worship save that of the consecrated church, and no ministry save that of the ordained priest.<sup>3</sup> Only the most obstinately conservative kings or chieftains, therefore, could fail to see their immediate advantage in adopting it.<sup>4</sup>

Naturally the early Christian records gloss the facts. Thus

<sup>1</sup> Geijer, pp. 31, 33; Crichton and Wheaton, i, 102, 104, 183, 184.

<sup>2</sup> Tacitus, *Germania*, cc. 7, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, c. 7, as to the psychological effect of an organised worship in a great building on heathens without any such centre. And see the frank admission of J. R. Green, *Short History*, p. 54, that among the Anglo-Saxons "religion had told against political independence."

<sup>4</sup> Cp. C.-F. Allen, *History of Denmark*, French tr., Copenhagen, 1878, i, 55, 56.



it is told in the life of Anskar (Ancharius) that "the Swedes" sent messengers to the Emperor Ludovic the Pious (*circa* 825) telling that "many" of them "longed to embrace the Christian faith"—a story for which the only possible basis would be the longings and perhaps the propaganda of Christian captives of some western European nationality. (Cp. Hardwick, *Church History: Middle Age*, 1853, p. 110, *notes*, and p. 111.) Still it is admitted that the king was avowedly willing to listen; and the tale of the first acceptance of Christianity in Sweden, even if true in detail, would plainly point to a carefully rehearsed plan under the king's supervision. The admission that afterwards there was a return to heathenism for nearly a century consists entirely with the view that the first tentative was one of kingly policy. See Geijer, c. iii, pp. 34, 35. It was the people who drove out the missionaries; and Hardwick's statement that after seven years Anskar "was able to regain his hold on the affections of the Swedes" is confuted by his own narrative. All that Anskar obtained was a toleration of his mission; and this was given after a trial by lots, on heathen principles (Hardwick, pp. 112, 113; cp. p. 115). The account in Crichton and Wheaton's *Scandinavia*, 1837, i, 122, brings the king's initiative into prominence. (Cp. Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, p. 34.) They also note that Charlemagne, in treating with the Danes, "did not attempt to impose his religion" upon them; but they do not glimpse the true explanation, which is that he could gain nothing by helping to organise a hostile kingdom. In point of fact he refused to let Lindger pursue his purpose of converting the Northmen. (Hardwick, p. 108, *note* 2, citing *Vit. S. Lindger*.) He had not developed the devotion or the subservience to the Church which in later ages led emperors to force the acceptance of Christianity on a defeated State that remained otherwise independent.

When in a later age Christianity was definitely established in Sweden under Olaf the Lap (or Tribute) King (*circa* 1000), whose father Erik is said to have been murdered in a tumult for his destruction of a pagan temple, the process was again strictly monarchic, the Diet resisting; but Olaf's substantial success was such as to permit of his annexing Gothland, temporarily conquering Norway, and styling himself king of all Sweden; and his son, Anund Jakob, continuing the profitable policy, earned the title of Most Christian Majesty (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 111; Geijer, p. 39). Even after this the attempt of a bishop (1067) to destroy the old temple at Upsala, resisted by the Christian King Stenkil, but supported by his rasher son Inge, caused the expulsion of the latter by the pagan party under Svend. Only after Inge's restoration by Danish help (1075) was the heathen worship suppressed (Hardwick, p. 116).



As regards Denmark, the historians incidentally make it clear that Harald Klak, usurping king of Jutland (*circa* 820), wanted to Christianise his turbulent subjects in order to subordinate them, having learned the wisdom of the policy from Louis the Pious; and it is no less clear that the same motive swayed Erik I, who, after having in his days of piratical adventure, as usurper of the Jute crown, destroyed the Christian settlement of Charlemagne at Hamburg, entirely changed his attitude and favoured Christianity when, on the death of King Horda-Knut, he became king of all Denmark (Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 120–23).

So plain was the political tendency of the new creed that after the Christianisation of Denmark by Erik I the nobility forced Erik II to restore the pagan system; but the triumph of the Church, like that of monarchy, was only a question of time. Even kings who, being caught late in life, did not renounce their paganism, are found ready to favour the missionaries; and in Denmark such tolerance on the part of Gorm the Old (d. 941), successor of Erik II, is followed by the official Christianity of his son Harald Bluetooth. Danish "empire" duly follows; and in the next century we find Knut the Great (1014–1035) utterly reversing<sup>1</sup> the pagan policy of his father, Svend<sup>2</sup> (who had been enabled to dethrone *his* Christian father, Harald, by the pagan malcontents), and dying in the odour of sanctity, "lord" of six kingdoms—Denmark, Sweden, Norway, England, Scotland, and Wales.

The principle is established from another side in the case of Norway. There the first notable monarchic unification had been wrought by the pagan Harold Fairhair (875), without the aid of Christianity; and the pagan resistance was so irreducible that revolted sailed off in all directions, finding footing in Scotland and Ireland, and in particular in Northern France and Iceland.<sup>3</sup> In the next generation the monarchy relapsed to the old position; and Harold's Christian son Hakon (educated in England) had to cede to the determined demands of the pagan majority, who forced him to join in the old heathen rites, and murdered the leading Christians;<sup>4</sup> a course followed by the further weakening of the power of the crown. The Danish Harald Bluetooth, son of Gorm, who then conquered Norway, sought to re-establish the Church by the sword; but Hakon Jarl, who followed, gave up Christianity in order to reign

<sup>1</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, *Scandinavia*, i, 129–32; Hardwick, *Church History: Middle Age*, 1853, p. 115. Knut was a great supporter of missionaries. Hardwick attributes to Gorm a "bitter hatred" of the Church, and also "violence," but gives no details.

<sup>2</sup> Even Svend is said to have laboured for Christianity in his latter years—another suggestion that it was found to answer monarchic purposes. See Hardwick, p. 115, note 9.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Dasent, *Introd. to The Burnt Njal*, p. ix.

<sup>4</sup> Hardwick, as cited, p. 117.



and again put it down by violence.<sup>1</sup> The next king to restore it, Olaf Tryggvason, who had met with Christianity in his wanderings in Greece, Russia, England, and Germany,<sup>2</sup> established that creed by brute force when he attained the throne (977), and again the spirit of local independence, abnormally conserved in Norway by the special separateness set up by the geographical conditions, fiercely resisted the new system as it had done the rule of Harold Fairhair, many defeated pagans withdrawing to remote glens and fastnesses, where to this day their mythology thrives.<sup>3</sup> On Olaf's final defeat and death (1000), his immediate successors, jarls supported by Denmark and Sweden, were content to leave paganism alone, as representing a too dangerous spirit of independence; and when St. Olaf, in turn, again undertook to crush it, he found he had but beaten down and alienated the forces that would have enabled him to resist Knut.<sup>4</sup> Danish "imperialism" had been evolved while the Norwegian kings were striving towards it; and St. Olaf was exiled, defeated, and slain (1030). His subsequent popularity is a mere posthumous Church-made cult of the Christian period.

The spread of Christianity among the Franks; in England; in Saxony by Charlemagne; in North Germany later; and among the Wends, Poles, Hungarians, and Bohemians, constantly exhibits the same phenomena. Always it is the duke or king who is "converted"; whereupon the people are either baptised in mass or dragooned for generations. A powerful king like Clovis could secure obedience; others, as in Scandinavia, Bohemia, and Wendland, lost life and kingdom in the attempt to crush at once paganism and local independence. Prussia was almost depopulated by sixty years of war before the Order of Teutonic Knights, who undertook to convert it on being awarded the territory, could extinguish by savagery its staunch paganism. The Christianisation of almost the whole of Northern Europe was thus a purely political process, accomplished in great part by the sword. See Hardwick, *passim*, and cp. the author's *Short History of Christianity*, pp. 211-16.

## § 2

The ultimate arrest of all aggression by the Scandinavian peoples is to be explained as a simple redressing of the balance between them and the States they had formerly plundered. To begin with, all the

<sup>1</sup> Hardwick, as cited.

<sup>2</sup> A warlike priest of Bremen is said to have converted him in Germany; and he was baptised in the Scilly Islands, which he had visited on a piratical expedition. Finally he was confirmed in England, which he promised to treat in future as a friendly State. (*Id. ib.*)

<sup>3</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 151.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. Hardwick, p. 118, note 3.



Scandinavian groups alike practised piracy<sup>1</sup> as against the more civilised States of Northern Europe; and piracy showed them the way to conquest and colonisation. At home their means of subsistence were pasturage, fishing, the chase, and an agriculture which cannot have been easily extensible beyond the most fertile soils; hence a constant pressure of population, promoting piracy and aggressive emigration. How the pressure was purposively met is not clear; but as the Scandinavian father, like the Greek and Roman, was free either to expose or bring up a new-born child,<sup>2</sup> there is a presumption that at some periods exposure was not uncommon.<sup>3</sup> There is even testimony, going back to the eighth century and recurring frequently as late as the twelfth, to the effect that a certain number of men were periodically sent away by lot when the mouths had visibly multiplied beyond the meat.

See, for instance, the *Roman de Rou* (1160), ed. Andresen, 1877-79, i, 18, 19, verses 208-25 of prologue. Pluquet, in a note on the passage in his edition (1827, i, 10), remarking that the usage is often mentioned, not only by Norman but by English and French annalists of the Middle Ages, adds that the oldest mention of all, in the *Tractatus* of Abbot Odo (d. 942), must be rejected, the document being apocryphal. That, however, is not the oldest mention by a long way. Paulus Diaconus (740-99) gives the statement in a very circumstantial form (cited by Rydberg, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr. p. 68) in his history of the Longobardians, his own stock, who he says came from Scandinavia. He testifies that he had actually talked with persons who had been in Scandinavia—his descriptions pointing to Scania. M. Pluquet notes (so also Crichton and Wheaton, i, 166-67) that no northern saga mentions the usage in question. But it was likely to be commemorated only by the stocks forced in that fashion to emigrate. The saga-making Icelanders were not among these. The old statement, finally, is in some measure corroborated by the testimony of Geijer, p. 84, as to the long subsistence of the Swedish practice of sending forth sons to seek their fortune by sea.

But without any such organised exodus there were adventurers enough.<sup>4</sup> Hence colonisations and conquests in Scotland, the Hebrides, Ireland, Iceland, Russia, England, and remote plundering

<sup>1</sup> Though this was often of the most brutal description, there were some comparatively "mild-mannered" pirates, who rarely "cut a throat or scuttled ship." See C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, i, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Geijer, *History of Sweden*, Eng. tr. p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> It is actually on record that the practice long subsisted in Iceland, despite the efforts of St. Olaf to suppress it. Hardwick, *Church History: Middle Age*, p. 119, note, citing Torfaens, *Hist. Norveg.* ii, 2, and Neander. Among the Slavonic Pomeranians in the twelfth century it was still common to destroy female children at birth. *Id.* p. 224, note.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, Fr. tr. 1878, i, 20.



expeditions by land and river, some getting as far south as Italy; one conquering expedition passing from Gaul through Arab Spain (827) and along the Mediterranean coasts, north and south; another passing through Russia to Constantinople. Thus the Norwegian and Danish stocks must have rooted in nearly every part of the British Islands; and the settlement in Gaul of a colony of revolters from Norway, in the reign of Harold Fairhair, built up one of the great provinces of France. Only in Iceland did the colonists preserve their language; hence, in terms of the hallucination of race, the assumption that the others "failed," when in reality they helped to constitute new races; no more "failing" in these cases than did the British stock in its North American colonies. It may be said, indeed, that the Teutonic stocks which overran Italy, Spain, and North Africa did in large part physically disappear thence, their physiological type having failed to survive as against the southern types. Even on that view, however, the impermanent type must in some degree have affected that which survived. In any case, the amalgamated Norse stock in Normandy, grown French-speaking, in turn overran England and part of Italy and Sicily, and, in the Crusades, formed new kingdoms in the East; while in the case of England, turning English-speaking, they again modified the stock of the nation. As against the notion that in this case there was "failure" either for French or for Normans, we might almost adopt the *mot* of M. Clémenceau and call England "a French colony gone wrong."<sup>1</sup> In terms of realities there has been no racial decease; it is but names and languages that have changed with the generations.

But there was an arrest of military exodus from Scandinavia; and thenceforward the Norse-speaking stocks figure as more or less small and retiring communities. They gave up piracy and conquest only because they had to, Danish imperialism causing the arrest on a wide scale, as every monarchic unification had done on a small.<sup>2</sup> When Knut reigned over six kingdoms, piracy was necessarily checked as among these; and when Knut's empire broke up after his death through the repulsive powers of its component parts and the relative lack of resources in Denmark, the various States of north-western Europe, in the terms of the case, were more able than before to resist Norse attacks in general. In England, William the Conqueror was fain to keep them off by bribery and intrigue; but the States with the greater natural resources grew in strength, while

<sup>1</sup> "Qu'est-ce que c'est que l'Angleterre? Une colonie française mal tournée."

<sup>2</sup> Thus Rolf the Ganger fared forth to France because Harold Fairhair would not suffer piracy on any territory acquired by him.



those of Scandinavia could not. When the pirates began to get the worst of it, and when the Scandinavian kings had cause to dread reprisals from those of the west, piracy began to dwindle. The last regular practitioners were the pagan Wends, and the republican pagans of the city of Jomsborg, who plundered the Scandinavians as they had of yore plundered others; and after the Christianised Danish people had for a time defended themselves by voluntary associations, both sets of pirates were overthrown by an energetic Danish king. The suppression was under Christian auspices; but it is a conventional fallacy to attribute it to the influence of Christianity. It was simply an act of necessary progressive polity, like the suppression of the Cilician pirates by Pompeius.

Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton make the regulation statement that when Christianity was introduced into Scandinavia, "it corrected the abuses of an ill-regulated freedom; it banished vindictive quarrels and bloody dissensions; it put a restraint upon robberies and piracies; it humanised the public laws and softened the ferocity of public manners; it emancipated the peasantry from a miserable servitude, restored to them their natural rights, and created a relish for the blessings of peace and the comforts of life" (*Scandinavia*, i, 196). For the general and decisive disproof of these assertions it is necessary only to follow Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton's own narrative, pp. 201, 213, 216, 219, 230, 240, 244, 247, 275, 278, 280, 308, 312, 322, etc., and note their contrary generalisation at pp. 324, 325. It was his "Most Christian Majesty" Anund Jakob who got the nickname of Coal-burner for his law that the houses and effects of malefactors should be burned to the value of the harm they had done. The Swedes, polygamous before Christianity, continued to be so for generations as Christians (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 197, 198, citing Adam of Bremen. Cp. Grimm, *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*, i, 18, 188.) Civil wars and ferocious feuds greatly multiplied in the early Christian period, apart altogether from pagan insurrections. Geijer, while erroneously attributing to Christianity the lessening of war between Scandinavia and the rest of the world, admits that the passions of strife, "hitherto turned in an external direction, now spent themselves in a domestic field of action, generating civil discord and war. Christianity, besides, dissolved the effective bond of the old social institutions" (p. 40). In that case it clearly cannot have been religious feeling that checked external war. As to piracy, that was later practised by Elizabethan Protestants and by the Huguenots of La Rochelle, when the opportunities were tempting. As to popular misery, it is told in the life of Anskar that the poor in ancient Sweden were so few that the first Christians could find a use for their



alms only in foreign countries (Geijer, p. 33). That difficulty has not prevailed since. Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton later admit that the Danish peasantry, free as pagans, "gradually sunk under the increasing power and influence of the feudal chiefs and the Romish hierarchy" (p. 227), and that the Crusades did not forward the emancipation of the serfs in Denmark as elsewhere, the peasantry on the contrary sinking into "a state of hopeless bondage" (pp. 251, 252).

### § 3

From the period of arrest of aggression, the economic and political history of the Scandinavian States is that of slightly expansible communities with comparatively small resources; and their high status to-day is the illustration of what civilisation may come to under such conditions. In the feudal period they made small material or intellectual progress. It is not probable that the Norse population was ever greater than in the eighteenth century, though Malthus had a surmise that it might anciently have been so:<sup>1</sup> the old belief that Scandinavia was the great *officina gentium*, the nursery of the races which overran the Roman Empire, is a delusion; but it is certain that the increase since the twelfth century has been even slower than the European average. In the absence of emigration, this meant for past centuries constant restraint of marriage through lack of houses and livelihoods—the preventive check in its most stringent form. Emigration there must have been; but the check must also have been strong. Thus, while the lot of the common people, in so far as it remained free, was likely to be comparatively comfortable, the landowning classes, in the absence of industry and commerce, tended to become nearly all-powerful; and the Church, which inherits and does not squander, would engross most of the power if not specially checked. The conditions were thus as unfavourable to intellectual as to material progress.

Denmark was the first of the Scandinavian States to develop a considerable commerce, beginning as did Holland on the footing of the fishery;<sup>2</sup> and on that basis there was a certain renewal of Danish empire. But this again could not hold out against the neighbouring forces; and in the thirteenth century, the herring

<sup>1</sup> *Essay on the Principle of Population*, 7th ed. p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 254. Dr. Ph. Schweitzer (*Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur*, § 19), makes the surprising statement that the quantity of old coins found in Scandinavia (over 100,000 within the last century) proves that the ancient Scandinavian commerce was very great (*ein ganz grossartiger*). His own account of the occasional barter of the Vikings shows that there was nothing "grossartig" about it, and the coins prove nothing beyond piracy.



fishery in the Baltic failing, it had to yield its hold on the mainland cities of Hamburg and Lübeck, which began a new career of commercial power as the nucleus of the great trading federation of the Hansa cities, while Denmark itself was riven by the struggles of six claimants of the throne. The result was a "feudal and sacerdotal oligarchy,"<sup>1</sup> leading to an era of "the complete triumph of the Romish clergy over the temporal power in Denmark," in which the peasantry were reduced to absolute predial slavery.<sup>2</sup> Similar evolution took place in Norway,<sup>3</sup> though with less depression of the peasantry,<sup>4</sup> by reason of the small scope there for capitalistic agriculture; and there too the now nascent commerce was appropriated by the Hansa.<sup>5</sup> In Sweden, where industry remained so primitive that down till the sixteenth century there was hardly any attempt to work up the native iron,<sup>6</sup> Germans greatly predominated in the cities and controlled trade,<sup>7</sup> even before the accession of Albert of Mecklenburg (1363), who further depressed the native nobility in the German interest.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the clergy were less plenipotent than in the sister kingdoms, the people having retained more of their old power.

Cp. Schweitzer, *Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur*, i, 129. The Swedish peasantry, like the Norwegian, were less easy to enslave than the Danish by reason of the natural conditions; those of the remote mountain and mining districts in particular retaining their independence (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 375, 376; Geijer, pp. 50, 81, 89, 97, 103), so that they ultimately enabled Gustavus Vasa to throw off the Danish yoke. Yet they had at first refused to recognise him, being satisfied with their own liberties; and afterwards they gave him much serious trouble (Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, pp. 228, 235; Geijer, pp. 109, 112, 115, 116, 118, 120-24). Slavery, too, was definitely abolished in Sweden as early as 1335 (Geijer, pp. 57, 86; Crichton and Wheaton, i, 316, 333). As regards the regal power, the once dominant theory that the Swedish kings in the thirteenth century obtained a grant of all the mines, and of the province of the four great lakes (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 332), appears to be an entire delusion (Geijer, pp. 51, 52). Such claims were first enforced by Gustavus Vasa (*id.* p. 129). As regards the clergy, they appear from the first, *quâd* churchmen, to have been kept in check by the nobles, who kept the great Church offices largely in the hands of their

<sup>1</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 263, 287.    <sup>2</sup> *Id.* pp. 251, 252, 277, 377.    <sup>3</sup> *Id.* pp. 304, 305, 311.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* ii, 350. Cp. Laing, *Journal of a Residence in Norway* (1834-36), ed. 1851, p. 135. Bain, however, pronounces that in Norway in the latter part of the fifteenth century "the peasantry were mostly thralls" (*Scandinavia*, 1905, p. 10).

<sup>5</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 305, 310.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* p. 332; Geijer, p. 135.

<sup>7</sup> Geijer, pp. 88, 91; Crichton and Wheaton, i, 331.    <sup>8</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 324.



own order (Geijer, p. 109), though Magnus Ladulas strove to strengthen the Church in his own interest (*id.* pp. 52-53). Thus the nobles became specially powerful (*id.* pp. 50, 56, 108); and when in the fifteenth century Sweden was subject to Denmark, they specially resented the sacerdotal tyranny (Crichton and Wheaton, i, 356).

In Sweden, as in the other Scandinavian States, however, physical strife and mental stagnation were the ruling conditions. Down till the sixteenth century her history is pronounced "a wretched detail of civil wars, insurrections, and revolutions, arising principally from the jealousies subsisting between the kings and the people, the one striving to augment their power, the other to maintain their independence."<sup>1</sup> The same may be said of the sister kingdoms, all alike being torn and drained by innumerable strifes of faction and wars with each other. The occasional forcible and dynastic unions of crowns came to nothing; and the Union of Calmar (1397), an attempt to confederate the three kingdoms under one crown, repeatedly collapsed. The marvel is that in such an age even the attempt was made. The remarkable woman who planned and first effected it, Queen Margaret of Norway, appealed in the first instance with heavy bribes for the co-operation of the clergy,<sup>2</sup> who, especially in Sweden, where they preferred the Danish rule to the domination of the nobles,<sup>3</sup> were always in favour of it for ecclesiastical reasons.

Had such a union permanently succeeded, it would have eliminated a serious source of positive political evil; but to carry forward Scandinavian civilisation under the drawbacks of the medieval difficulty of inter-communication (involving lack of necessary culture-contacts), the natural poverty of the soil, and the restrictive pressure of the Catholic Church, would have been a task beyond the power of a monarchy comprising three mutually jealous sections. As it was, the old strifes recurred almost as frequently as before, and moral union was never developed. If historical evidence is to count for anything, the experience of the Scandinavian stocks should suffice to discredit once for all the persistent pretence that the "Teutonic races" have a faculty for union denied to the Celtic, inasmuch as they, apparently the most purely Teutonic of all, were even more irreconcilable, less fusible, than the Anglo-Saxons before the Norman Conquest and the Germans down till our own day, and much more mutually jealous than the quasi-Teutonic provinces of

<sup>1</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 331.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* p. 336.

<sup>3</sup> Geijer, pp. 100, 109; Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, p. 252.



the Netherlands, which, after the severance of Belgium, have latterly lost their extreme repulsions, while those of Scandinavia are not yet dead.<sup>1</sup> The explanation, of course, is not racial in any case; but it is for those who affirm that capacity for union is a Teutonic gift to find a racial excuse.

With the Reformation, though that was nowhere more clearly than in Scandinavia a revolution of plunder, there began a new progress, in respect not of any friendliness of the Lutheran system to thought and culture, but of the sheer break-up of the intellectual ice of the old regimen. In Denmark the process is curiously instructive. Christian II, personally a capable and reformatory but cruel tyrant, aimed throughout his life at reducing the power alike of the clergy and the nobles, and to that end sought on the one hand to abolish serfdom and educate the poor and the burghers,<sup>2</sup> and on the other to introduce Lutheranism (1520). From the latter attempt he was induced to desist, doubtless surmising that the remedy might for him be a new disease: but on his enforcing the reform of slavery he was rebelled against and forced to fly by the nobility, who thereupon oppressed the people more than ever.<sup>3</sup> His uncle and successor, Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein, accepted the mandate of the nobles to the extent of causing to be publicly burned in his presence all the laws of the last reign in favour of the peasants, closing the poor schools throughout the kingdom, burning the new books,<sup>4</sup> and pledging himself to expel Lutheranism. He seems, however, to have been secretly a Protestant, and to have evaded his pledge; and the rapid spread of the new heresy, especially in the cities, brought about a new birth of popular literature in the vernacular, despite the suppression of the schools.<sup>5</sup> In a few years' time, Frederick, recognising the obvious interest of the crown, and finding the greater nobles in alliance with the clergy, made common cause with the smaller nobility, and so was able (1527) to force on the prelates, who could hope for no better terms from the exiled king, the toleration of Protestantism, the permission of marriage to the clergy, and a surrender of a moiety of the tithes.<sup>6</sup> A few years later (1530) the monasteries were either stormed by the populace or abandoned by the monks, their houses and lands being divided

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, 4th ed. ii, 225, on Anglo-Saxon separatism. Since this was written there has taken place the decisive separation between Norway and Sweden.

<sup>2</sup> Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, pp. 214-18. Himself an excellent Latinist, he sought to raise the learned professions, and compelled the burghers to give their children schooling under penalty of heavy fines. He further caused new and better books to be prepared for the public schools, and stopped witch-burning. Cp. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, i, 281.

<sup>3</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 377-79, 383; Allen, as cited, i, 286, 310.

<sup>4</sup> Otté, p. 222; Allen, i, 287, 290.

<sup>5</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, i, 384-86; Allen, pp. 287-90.

<sup>6</sup> Allen, i, 299, 300.



among the municipalities, the king and his courtiers, and the secular clergy.<sup>1</sup> After a stormy interregnum, in which the Catholic party made a strenuous reaction, the next king, Christian III, taking the nobles and commons-deputies into partnership, made with their help an end of the Catholic system; the remaining lands, castles, and manors of the prelates going to the crown, and the tithes being parcelled among the landowners, the king, and the clergy. Naturally a large part of the lands, as before, was divided among the nobles,<sup>2</sup> who were in this way converted to Protestantism. Thus whereas heathen kings had originally embraced Christianity to enable them to consolidate their power, Christian kings embraced Protestantism to enable them to recover wealth and power from the Catholic Church. Creed all along followed interest;<sup>3</sup> and the people had small concern in the change.<sup>4</sup>

Norway, being under the same crown, followed the course of Denmark. In Sweden the powerful Gustavus Vasa saw himself forced at the outset of his reign to take power and wealth from the Church if he would have any of his own; and after the dramatic scene in the Diet of Westeras (1527), in which he broke out with a passionate vow to renounce the crown if he were not better supported,<sup>5</sup> he carried his point. The nobles, being "squared"<sup>6</sup> by permission to resume such of their ancestral lands as had been given to churches and convents since 1454, and by promise of further grants, forced the bishops to consent to surrender to the king their castles and strongholds, and to let him fix their revenues; all which was duly done. The monasteries were soon despoiled of nearly all their lands, many of which were seized by or granted in fief to the barons;<sup>7</sup> and the king became head of the Church in as full a degree as Henry VIII in England;<sup>8</sup> sagaciously, and in part unscrupulously, creating for the first time in Scandinavia a strong yet not wholly despotic monarchy, with such revenues from many sources<sup>9</sup> as made possible

<sup>1</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 386, 387. These writers suppress the details as to Frederick's anti-popular action; and Otté's history, giving these, omits all mention of his act of toleration. Allen's is the best account, i, 293, 299, 301, 305.

<sup>2</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 394-96; Otté, pp. 222-24. According to some accounts, the great bulk of the spoils went to the nobility. Villers, *Essay on the Reformation*, Eng. tr. 1836, p. 105.

<sup>3</sup> It is notable that even in the thirteenth century there was a Norwegian king (Erik) called the Priest-hater, because of his efforts to make the clergy pay taxes.

<sup>4</sup> "The bulk of the people, at least in the first instance, and especially in Sweden and Norway, were by no means disposed to look to Wittenberg rather than to Rome for spiritual guidance" (Bain, *Scandinavia*, p. 86; cp. pp. 60, 64).

<sup>5</sup> Geijer, p. 177; Otté, p. 234.

<sup>6</sup> As the king wrote later to an acquisitive noble: "To strip churches, convents, and prebends of estates, manors, and chattels, thereto are all full willing and ready; and after such a fashion is every man a Christian and evangelical"—i.e. Lutheran. Geijer, p. 126. Cp. p. 129 as to the practice of spoliation.

<sup>7</sup> Geijer, pp. 119, 129.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* p. 125; Otté, p. 236. The prelates were no longer admitted to any political offices, though the bishops and pastors sat together in the Diet.

<sup>9</sup> See Geijer, pp. 129-36.



the military power and activity of Gustavus Adolphus, and later the effort of Charles XII to create an "empire"—an effort which, necessarily failing, reduced Sweden permanently to her true economic basis.

Apart from those remarkable episodes, the development of the Scandinavian States since the sixteenth century has been, on their relatively small scale, that of the normal monarchic community with a variously vigorous democratic element; shaken frequently by civil strife; wasting much strength in insensate wars; losing much through bad kings and gaining somewhat from the good; passing painfully from bigotry to tolerance; getting rid of their old aristocracies and developing new; exhibiting in the mass the northern vice of alcoholism, yet maintaining racial vigour; disproportionately taxing their producers as compared with their non-producers; aiming, nevertheless, at industry and commerce, and suffering from the divisive social influences they entail; meddling in international strifes, till latterly the surrounding powers preponderated too heavily; disunited and normally jealous of each other, even when dynastically united, through stress of crude patriotic prejudice and lack of political science; frequently retrograding, yet in the end steadily progressing in such science as well as in general culture and well-being. Losses of territory—as Finland and Schleswig-Holstein—at the hands of stronger rivals, and the violent experiences and transitions of the Napoleonic period, have left them on a relatively stable and safe basis, albeit still mutually jealous and unable to pass beyond the normal monarchic stage. To-day their culture is that of all the higher civilisations, as are their social problems.

#### § 4

In the history of Scandinavian culture, however, lie some special illustrations of sociological law. The remarkable fact that the first great development of old Norse literature occurred in the poor and remote colonial settlement of Iceland is significant of much. To the retrospective yearning of an exiled people, the desire to preserve every memory of the old life in the fatherland, is to be attributed the grounding of the saga-cult in Iceland; and the natural conditions, enforcing long spells of winter leisure, greatly furthered the movement. But the finest growth of the new literature, it turns out, is due to culture-contacts—an unexpected confirmation, in a most unlikely quarter, of a general principle arrived at on other data. The vigilant study of our own day has detected, standing out from



the early Icelandic literature, "a group of poems which possess the very qualities of high imagination, deep pathos, fresh love of nature, passionate dramatic power, and noble simplicity of language, which [other] Icelandic poetry lacks. The solution is that these poems do not belong to Iceland at all. They are the poetry of the 'Western Islands' "<sup>1</sup>—that is, the poetry of the meeting and mixing of the "Celtic" and Scandinavian stocks in Ireland and the Hebrides—the former already much mixed, and proportionally rich in intellectual variations. It was in this area that "a magnificent school of poetry arose, to which we owe works that for power and beauty can be paralleled in no Teutonic language till centuries after their date..... This school, which is totally distinct from the Icelandic, ran its own course apart and perished before the thirteenth century." <sup>2</sup>

Compare Messrs. Vigfusson and Powell's *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, 1883, vol. i, Introd. pp. lxii, lxiii; and, as regards the old Irish civilisation, the author's *Saxon and Celt*, pp. 127, 128, 131-33.

The theory of Celtic influence, though established in its essentials, is not perfectly consistent as set forth in the *Britannica* article. Thus, while the Celticised literature is remarked for "noble simplicity of language," the true Icelandic, primarily like the Old English, is said to develop a "complexity of structure and ornament, an elaborate mythological and enigmatical phraseology, and a regularity of rhyme, assonance, luxuriance, quantity, and syllabification which it caught up from the Latin and Celtic poets." Further, while the Celticised school is described as "totally distinct from the Icelandic," Celtic influence is also specified as affecting Norse literature in general. The first generations of Icelandic poets were men of good birth, "nearly always, too, of Celtic blood on one side at least"; and they went to Norway or Denmark, where they lived as kings' or chiefs' henchmen. The immigration of Norse settlers from Ireland, too, affected the Iceland stock very early. "It is to the west that the best sagas belong: it is to the west that nearly every classic writer whose name we know belongs; and it is precisely in the west that the admixture of Irish blood is greatest" (*ib.*). The facts seem decisive, and the statements above cited appear the more clearly to need modification. It is to be noted that Schweitzer's *Geschichte der skandinavischen Literatur* gives no hint of the Celtic influence.

But the Icelandic civilisation as a whole could not indefinitely progress on its own basis any more than the Irish. Beyond a

<sup>1</sup> Prof. York Powell, article on Icelandic Literature, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 10th ed. xii, 621; 11th ed. xiv, 233.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* (11th ed. xiv, 234).



certain point both needed new light and leading; for the primeval spirit of strife never spontaneously weakened; the original Icelandic stock being, to begin with, a selection of revolvers from over-rule. So continual domestic feuds checked mental evolution in Iceland as in old Scandinavia; and the reduction of the island to Norwegian rule in the thirteenth century could not do more for it than monarchy was doing for Norway. Mere Christianity without progressive conditions of culture availed less for imaginative art than free paganism had done; and when higher culture-contacts became possible, the extreme poverty of Iceland tended more than ever to send the enterprising people where the culture and comfort were. It is in fact not a possible seat for a relatively flourishing civilisation in the period of peaceful development. The Reformation seems there to have availed for very little indeed. It was vehemently resisted,<sup>1</sup> but carried by the preponderant acquisitive forces: "nearly all who took part in it were men of low type, moved by personal motives rather than religious zeal."<sup>2</sup> "The glebes and hospital lands were a fresh power in the hands of the crown, and the subservient Lutheran clergy became the most powerful class in the island; while the bad system of underleasing at rack-rent and short lease with unsecured tenant-right extended in this way over at least a quarter of the better land, stopping any possible progress." For the rest, "the Reformation had produced a real poet [Hallgrim Petersen], but the material rise of Iceland"—that is, the recent improvements in the condition of the people—"has not yet done so,"<sup>3</sup> though poetry is still cultivated in Iceland very much as music is elsewhere.

Thus this one little community may be said to have reached the limits of its evolution, as compared with others, simply because of the strait natural conditions in which its lot was cast. But to think of it as a tragically moribund organism is merely to proceed upon the old hallucinations of race-consciousness. Men reared in Iceland have done their part in making European civilisation, entering the more southerly Scandinavian stocks as these entered the stocks of western Europe; and the present population, who are a remnant, have no more cause to hang their heads than any family that happens to have few members or to have missed wealth. Failure is relative only to pretension or purpose.

The modern revival of Scandinavian culture, as must needs be, is the outcome of all the European influences. At the close of the

<sup>1</sup> Bain, *Scandinavia*, pp. 100-1.

<sup>2</sup> Powell, article on Icelandic Literature, *Ency. Brit.* 10th ed. xii, 621. <sup>3</sup> *Id.* p. 623.



sixteenth century, in more or less friendly intercourse with the other Protestant countries of north Europe, Denmark began effectively to develop a literature such as theirs, imaginative and scientific, in the vernacular as well as in Latin; and so the development went on while Sweden was gaining military glory with little enlightenment. Then a rash attack upon Sweden ended in a loss of some of the richest Danish provinces (1658); whereafter a sudden parliamentary revolution, wrought by a league of king and people against the aristocracy, created not a constitutional but an absolute and hereditary monarchy (1660), enthroning divine right at the same instant in Denmark and Norway as in England. Thereafter, deprived of their old posts and subjected to ruinous taxes, the nobility fell rapidly into poverty;<sup>1</sup> and the merchant class, equally overtaxed, withdrew their capital; the peasantry all the while remaining in a state of serfdom.<sup>2</sup> Then came a new series of wars with Sweden, recurring through generations, arresting, it is said, literature, law, philosophy, and medicine,<sup>3</sup> but not the natural sciences, then so much in evidence elsewhere: Tycho Brahe being followed in astronomy by Horrebow, while chemistry, mathematics, and even anatomy made progress. But to this period belongs the brilliant dramatist and historian Holberg, the first great man of letters in modern Scandinavia (d. 1754); and in the latter half of the eighteenth century the two years of ascendancy of the free-thinking physician Struensee as queen's favourite (1770-72) served partially to emancipate the peasants, establish religious toleration, abolish torture, and reform the administration. Nor did his speedy overthrow and execution wholly undo his main work,<sup>4</sup> which outdid that of many generations of the old régime. Still, the history of his rise and fall, his vehement speed of reconstruction and the ruinous resistance it set up, is one of the most dramatic of the many warnings of history against thinking suddenly to elevate a nation by reforms imposed wholly from without.<sup>5</sup>

Thenceforward, with such fluctuations as mark all culture-history, the Scandinavian world has progressed mentally nearly

<sup>1</sup> Shaftesbury (*Characteristics*, ed. 1900, ii, 262) writes in 1713 of "that forlorn troop of begging gentry extant in Denmark or Sweden, since the time that those nations lost their liberties."

<sup>2</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 104.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.* ii, 321-22.

<sup>4</sup> Laing in 1839 (*Tour in Sweden*, p. 13) thought the Danes as backward as they had been in 1660, quoting the ambassador Molesworth as to the effect of Lutheran Protestantism in destroying Danish liberties (pp. 10, 11). But it is hard to see that there were any popular liberties to destroy, save in so far as the party which set up the Reformation undid the popular laws of Christian II. The greatest social reforms in Denmark are certainly the work of the last half-century.

<sup>5</sup> It will be remembered that the Marquis of Pombal, in Portugal, at the same period, was similarly overthrown after a much longer and non-scandalous reformatory rule, the queen being his enemy.



step for step with the rest of Europe, producing scholars, historians, men of science, artists, and imaginative writers in more than due proportion. Many names which stand for solid achievement in the little-read Scandinavian tongues are unknown save to specialists elsewhere; but those of Holberg, Linnæus, Malte-Brun, Rask, Niebuhr, Madvig, Œhlenschläger, Thorwaldsen, and Swedenborg tell of a comprehensive influence on the thought and culture of Europe during a hundred years in which Europe was being reborn; and in our own day some of the greatest imaginative literature of the modern world comes from Norway, long the most backward of the group. Ibsen, one of a notable company of masters, stood at the head of the drama of the nineteenth century; and the society which sustained him, however he may have satirised it, is certificated abreast of its age.

## § 5

In one aspect the Scandinavian polities have a special lesson for the larger nations. They have perforce been specially exercised latterly, as of old, by the problem of population; and in Norway there was formerly made one of the notable, if not one of the best, approaches to a practical solution of it. Malthus long ago<sup>1</sup> noted the Norwegian marriage-rate as the lowest in Europe save that of Switzerland; and he expressed the belief that in his day Norway was "almost the only country in Europe where a traveller will hear any apprehension expressed of a redundant population, and where the danger to the happiness of the lower classes of people is in some degree seen and understood."<sup>2</sup> This state of things having long subsisted, there is a presumption that it persists uninterruptedly from pagan times, when, as we have seen, there existed a deliberate population-policy; for Christian habits of mind can nowhere be seen to have set up such a tendency, and it would be hard to show in the history of Norway any great political change which might effect a rapid revolution in the domestic habits of the peasantry, such as occurred in France after the Revolution. Broadly speaking, the mass of the Norwegian people had till the last century continued to live under those external or domiciliary restraints on multiplication which were normal in rural Europe in the Middle Ages, and which elsewhere have been removed by industrialism; yet without suffering latterly from a continuance of the severer medieval destructive

<sup>1</sup> His particulars were gathered during a tour he made in 1799. Thus the Norse practice he notes had been independent of any effect produced by his own essay.

<sup>2</sup> *Essay on the Principle of Population*, 7th ed. pp. 126, 133.



checks. They must, therefore, have put a high degree of restraint on marriage, and probably observed parental prudence in addition.

When it is found that in Sweden, where the conditions and usages were once similar, there was latterly at once less prudential restraint on marriage and population, and a lower standard of material well-being, the two cases are seen to furnish a kind of *experimentum crucis*. The comparatively late maintenance of a powerful military system in Sweden having there prolonged the methods of aristocratic and bureaucratic control while they were being modified in Denmark-Norway, Swedish population in the eighteenth century was subject to artificial stimulus. From about the year 1748, the Government set itself, on the ordinary empirical principle of militarism, to encourage population.<sup>1</sup> Among its measures were the variously wise ones of establishing medical colleges and lying-in and foundling hospitals, the absolute freeing of the internal trade in grain, and the withdrawal in 1748 of an old law limiting the number of persons allowed to each farm. The purpose of that law had been to stimulate population by spreading tillage; but the spare soil being too unattractive, the young people emigrated. On the law being abolished, population did increase considerably, rising between 1751 and 1800 from 1,785,727 to 2,347,308,<sup>2</sup> though some severe famines had occurred within the period. But in the year 1799, when Malthus visited the country, the increased population suffered from famine very severely indeed, living mainly and miserably on bark bread.<sup>3</sup> It was one of Malthus's great object-lessons in his science. On one side a poor country was artificially over-populated; on the other, the people of Norway, an even poorer country, directly and indirectly<sup>4</sup> restrained their rate of increase, while the Government during a long period wrought to the same end by the adjustment of its military system and by making a certificate of earning power or income necessary for all marriages.<sup>5</sup> The result was that, save in the fishing districts, where speculative conditions encouraged early marriages and large families, the Norwegian population were better off than the Swedish.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This was doubtless owing to the loss of Finland (1742), a circumstance not considered by Malthus.

<sup>2</sup> Malthus (p. 141) gives higher and clearly erroneous figures for both periods, and contradicts them later (p. 143) with figures which he erroneously applies to Sweden and Finland. He seems to have introduced the latter words in the wrong passage.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.* p. 141.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 131 as to the restrictions on subdivision of farms by way of safeguarding the forests.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* p. 126. A priest would often refuse to marry a couple who had no good prospect of a livelihood: so far could rational custom affect even ecclesiastical practice.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 339-50; Laing, *Journal of a Residence in Norway* (1834-36), ed. 1851, pp. 22, 23, 34, 35, 191, 214.



Already in Malthus' youth the Norwegian-Danish policy had been altered, all legal and military restrictions on marriage having been withdrawn; and he notes that fears were expressed as to the probable results. It is one of his shortcomings to have entirely abstained from subsequent investigation of the subject; and in his late addendum as to the state of Sweden in 1826 he further fails to note that as a result of a creation there after 1803 of 6,000 new farms from land formerly waste, the country ceased to need to import corn and was able to export a surplus.<sup>1</sup> It still held good, however, that the Norwegian population, being from persistence of prudential habit<sup>2</sup> much the slower in its rate of increase, had the higher standard of comfort, despite much spread of education in Sweden.

Within the past half-century the general development of commerce and of industry has tended broadly to equalise the condition of the Scandinavian peoples. As late as 1835 a scarcity would suffice to drive the Norwegian peasantry to the old subsistence of bark bread, a ruinous resort, seeing that it destroyed multitudes of trees of which the value, could the timber have found a market, would have far exceeded that of a quantity of flour yielding much more and better food. At that period the British market was closed by duties imposed in the interest of the Canadian timber trade.<sup>3</sup> Since the establishment of British free trade, Norwegian timber has become a new source of wealth; and through this and other and earlier commercial developments prudential family habits were affected. Thus, whereas the population of Sweden had all but doubled between 1800 and 1880, the population of Norway had grown even faster.<sup>4</sup> And whereas in 1834 the proportion of illegitimate to legitimate births in Stockholm was 1 to 2.26<sup>5</sup> (one of the results of foundling hospitals, apparently), in 1890 the total Swedish rate was slightly below 1 to 10, while in Norway it was 1 to 14. The modern facilities for emigration have further affected conjugal habits. Latterly, however, there are evidences of a new growth of intelligent control.

In recent years the statistics of emigration and population tell a fairly plain story. In Norway and Sweden alike the excess of births over deaths reached nearly its highest in 1887, the figures

<sup>1</sup> Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 345. Laing (*Tour in Sweden*, pp. 277-82) thought the Swedish peasants better off than the Scotch, though morally inferior to the Norwegian.

<sup>2</sup> Laing, *Norway*, p. 213.

<sup>3</sup> Laing, as cited, p. 220; Crichton and Wheaton, ii, 368.

<sup>4</sup> Sweden in 1800 stood at 2,347,303; in 1880, at 4,565,668; in 1900, at 5,136,441. Estimate for 1910, 5,521,943. Norway in 1815 stood at 886,656; in 1910 at 2,391,782.

<sup>5</sup> Laing, as cited, p. 103, *note*.



being 63,942 for Sweden and 29,233 for Norway. In 1887, however, emigration was about its maximum in both countries, 50,786 leaving Sweden and 20,706 leaving Norway. Thereafter the birth-rate rapidly fell, and the emigration, though fluctuating, has never again risen in Sweden to the volume of 1887-88, though it has in Norway. But when, after falling to 43,728 in 1892, the excess of Swedish births over deaths rises to 60,231 in 1895, while the emigration falls from 45,000 in 1892 to 13,000 in 1894, it is clear that the lesson of regulation is still very imperfectly learned. Norway shows the same fluctuations, the excess of births rising from 23,600 in 1892 to nearly 32,000 in 1896, and again from 27,685 in 1908 to 29,804 in 1909, doubtless because of ups and downs in the harvests, as shown in the increase of marriages from 12,742 in 1892 to 13,962 in 1896.

In Denmark the progression has been similar. There the excess of births over deaths was so far at its maximum in 1886, the figures being 29,986 in a population of a little over 2,000,000; whereafter they slowly decreased, till in 1893 the excess was only 26,235. All the while emigration was active, gradually rising from 4,346 in 1885 to 10,382 in 1891; then again falling to 2,876 in 1896, when the surplus of births over deaths was 34,181—a development sure to force more emigration. In 1911 the population was 2,775,076—a rapid rise; and in 1910 the surplus of births over deaths was 40,110. The Scandinavians are thus still in the unstable progressive stage of popular well-being, though probably suffering less from it than either Germany or England.

Here, then, is a group of kindred peoples apparently at least as capable of reaching a solution of the social problem as any other, and visibly prospering materially and morally in proportion as they bring reason to bear on the vital lines of conduct, though still in the stage of curing over-population by emigration. Given continued peaceful political evolution in the direction first of democratic federation, and further of socialisation of wealth, they may reach and keep the front rank in civilisation, while the more unmanageably large communities face risks of dire vicissitude.



### CHAPTER III

## THE HANSA

SYSTEMATIC commerce in the north of Europe, broadly speaking, begins with the traffic of the Hansa towns, whose rise may be traced to the sudden development of civic life forced on Germany in the tenth century by the emperor Henry I, as a means of withstanding the otherwise irresistible raids of the Hungarians.<sup>1</sup> Once founded, such cities for their own existence' sake gave freedom to all fugitive serfs who joined them, defending such against former masters, and giving them the chance of earning a living.<sup>2</sup> That is by common consent the outstanding origin of German civic industry, and the original conditions were such that the cities, once formed, were gradually forced<sup>3</sup> to special self-reliance. *Faustrecht*, or private war, was universal, even under emperors who suppressed feudal brigandage; and the cities had to fight their own battle, like those of Italy, from the beginning. As compared with the robber baronage and separate princes, they stood for intelligence and co-operation, and supplied a basis for organisation without which the long German chaos of the Middle Ages would have been immeasurably worse. Taking their commercial cue from the cities of Italy, they reached, as against feudal enemies, a measure of peaceful union which the less differentiated Italian cities could not attain save momentarily. The decisive conditions were that whereas in Italy the enemies were manifold—sometimes feudal nobles, sometimes the Emperor, sometimes the Pope—the German cities had substantially one objective, the protection of trade from the robber-knights. Thus, as early as the year 1284, seventy cities of South Germany formed the Rhenish League, on which followed that of the Swabian towns. The league of the Hansa cities, like the other early "Hansa of London," which united cities of Flanders and France with mercantile London, was a

<sup>1</sup> Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, bk. ix, cap. 147; Kohlrausch, *History of Germany*, Eng. tr., pp. 157, 162, 257; Dunham, *History of the Germanic Empire*, 1835, i, 108; Sharon Turner, *History of Europe during the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. i, 13. The main authority is the old annalist Wittikind.

<sup>2</sup> Heeren, *Essai sur l'influence des Croisades*, 1808, pp. 269-72; Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. iii, ch. 3.

<sup>3</sup> As to the process of evolution, see a good summary in Robertson's *View of the Progress of Society in Europe* (prefixed to his *Charles V*), Note xvii to Sect. I.



growth on all fours with these.<sup>1</sup> Starting, however, in maritime towns which grew to commerce from beginnings in fishing, as the earlier Scandinavians had grown to piracy, the northern League gave its main strength to trade by sea.

Its special interest for us to-day lies in the fact that it was ultra-racial, beginning in 1241 in a pact between the free cities of Lübeck and Hamburg,<sup>2</sup> and finally including Wendish, German, Dutch, French, and even Spanish cities, in fluctuating numbers. The motive to union, as it had need be, was one of mercantile gain. Beginning, apparently, by having each its separate authorised *hansa* or trading-group in foreign cities, the earlier trading-towns of the group, perhaps from the measure of co-operation and fraternity thus forced on them abroad,<sup>3</sup> saw their advantage in a special league for the common good as a monopoly maintained against outsiders; and this being extended, the whole League came to bear the generic name.

See Kohlrausch for the theory that contact in foreign cities is the probable cause of the policy of union (*History of Germany*, Eng. tr., p. 260; cp. Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, i, 104, 110). As to the origin of the word, see Stubbs, i, 447, note. The *hans* or *hansa* first appears historically in England as a name apparently identical with *gild*; and, starting with a *hansa* or hanse-house of their own, English cities in some cases are found trading through subordinate *hansas* in other cities, not only of Normandy but of England itself. Thus arose the Flemish Hansa or "Hansa of London," ignored in so many notices of the better-known Hanseatic League. Early in the thirteenth century it included a number of the towns of Flanders engaged in the English wool-trade; and later it numbered at one time seventeen towns, including Chalons, Rheims, St. Quentin, Cambray, and Amiens (Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, i, 109; cp. Prof. Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, 1889, i, 6, citing Varenbergh, *Hist. des relations diplomatiques entre le comte de Flandre et l'Angleterre au moyen âge*, Bruxelles, 1874, p. 146 sq.). There is some obscurity as to when the foreign Hansards were first permitted to have warehouses and residences of their own in London. Cp. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, vol. i, § 68; and

<sup>1</sup> The Spanish *Hermidad* was originally an organisation of cities set up in similar fashion. E. Armstrong, *Introduction to Major Martin Hume's Spain*, 1898, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Lübeck was founded in 1140 by a count of Holstein, and won its freedom in the common medieval fashion by purchase. Hamburg bought its freedom of its bishop in 1225. Hallam, *Middle Ages*, 11th ed. iii, 324. Many Dutch, supposed to have been driven from their own land by an inundation, settled on the Baltic coast between Bremen and Dantzic in the twelfth century. Heeren, *Essai sur les Croisades*, 1808, pp. 266-69, citing Leibnitz and Hoche. Cp. G. H. Schmidt, *Zur Agrargeschichte Lübecks*, 1887, p. 30 sq.

<sup>3</sup> "The league.....would scarcely have held long together or displayed any real federal unity but for the pressure of external dangers" (Art. "Hanseatic League" in *Ency. Brit.*, 10th ed. xi, 450).



Ashley, i, 105, following Schanz, who dates this privilege in the reign of Henry III, though the merchants of Cologne (*id.* p. 110) had a *hansa* or gildhall in London in the reign of Richard I. Under whatever conditions, it is clear that London was one of the first foreign cities in which the German Hansard traders came in friendly contact.

A reciprocal and normal egoism furthered as well as thwarted the Hansard enterprise. Trade in the feudal period being a ground of privilege like any other, the monopolied merchants of every city strove to force foreign traders to deal with them only. On the other hand, the English nobility sought to deal rather with the foreigner directly than with the English middlemen; and thus in each feudal country, but notably in England,<sup>1</sup> the interest of the landed class tended to throw foreign trade substantially in foreign hands, which did their best to hold it. In the reigns of the Edwards privileges of free trade with natives were gradually conferred on the foreign traders<sup>2</sup> in the interests of the landed class—the only “general consumers” who could then make their claims felt—in despite of the angry resistance of the native merchant class. For the rest, in a period when some maritime English cities, like those of France and Germany, could still carry on private wars with each other as well as with foreign cities,<sup>3</sup> a trader of one English town was in any other English town on all fours with a foreigner.<sup>4</sup> When, therefore, the foreigners combined, their advantage over the native trade was twofold.

Naturally the cities least liable to regal interference carried on a cosmopolitan co-operation to the best advantage. The Hansa of London, being made up of Flemish and French cities, was hampered by the divided allegiance of its members and by their national jealousies;<sup>5</sup> while the German cities, sharing in the free German scramble under a nominal emperor much occupied in Italy, could combine with ease. Cologne, having early Hansa rights in London, sought to exclude the other cities, but had to yield and join their union;<sup>6</sup> and the Hansa of London dwindled and broke up before their competition. As the number of leagued cities increased, it might be thought, something in the nature of an ideal of free trade

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Ashley, as cited, i, 104–112; Schanz, as cited, i, 331.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. W. von Ochenkowski, *Englands wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Ausgange des Mittelalters*, 1879, pp. 177–82, 221–31. Cp. the author's *Trade and Tariffs*, pt. ii, ch. ii, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii, 335. On private war in general see Robertson's *View*, note 21 to § i.

<sup>4</sup> Ashley, i, 108, 109.

<sup>5</sup> Whereas in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries England and Flanders had freely exchanged trading privileges, in the fifteenth century they begin to withdraw them, treating each other as trading rivals (Schanz, i, 7, 8).

<sup>6</sup> Ashley, i, 110.



must have partly arisen, for the number of "privileged" towns was thus apparently greater than that of the outside towns traded with. To the last, however, the faith seems to have been that without monopoly the league must perish; and in the closing Protestant period the command of the Baltic, as against the Dutch and the Scandinavians, was desperately and vainly battled for. But just as the cities could not escape the play of the other political forces of the time, and were severally clutched by this or that potentate, or biassed to their own stock, so they could not hinder that the principle of self-seeking on which they founded should divide themselves. As soon as the Dutch affiliated cities saw their opening for trade in the Baltic on their own account, they broke away.

While the league lasted, it was as remarkable a polity as any in history. With its four great foreign factories of Bruges, London, Bergen, and Novgorod, and its many minor stations, all conducted by celibate servitors living together like so many bodies of friars;<sup>1</sup> with its four great circles of affiliated towns, and its triennial and other congresses, the most cosmopolitan of European parliaments; with its military and naval system, by which, turning its trading into fighting fleets, it made war on Scandinavian kings and put down piracy on every hand—it was in its self-seeking and often brutal way one of the popular civilising influences of northern Europe for some two hundred and fifty years; and the very forces of separate national commerce, which finally undermined it, were set up or stimulated by its own example. With less rapacity, indeed, it might have conciliated populations that it alienated. A lack of any higher ideals than those of zealous commerce marks its entire career; it is associated with no such growth of learning and the fine arts as took place in commercial Holland; and its members seem to have been among the most unrefined of the northern city populations.<sup>2</sup> But it made for progress on the ordinary levels. In a world wholly bent on privilege in all directions, it at least

<sup>1</sup> This principle may have been copied from the practice of the Lombard *Umiliati*. The common account of that order is that when in 1014 the Emperor banished a number of Lombards, chiefly Milanese, into Germany, they formed themselves into a religious society, called "The Humbled," and in that corporate capacity devoted themselves to various trades, in particular to wool-working. Returning to Milan in 1019, they developed their organisation there. Down to 1140 all the members were laymen; but thereafter priests were placed in control. For long the organisation was in high repute both for commercial skill and for culture. Ultimately, like all other corporate orders, they grew corrupt; and in 1571 they were suppressed by Pius V. (Pignotti, *Hist. of Tuscany*, Eng. trans. 1823, pp. 266-67, note, following Tiraboschi.)

<sup>2</sup> In such accounts as M'Culloch's (*Treatises and Essays*) and those of the German patriotic historians the Hansa is seen in a rather delusive abstract. The useful monograph of Miss Zimmern (*The Hansa Towns: Story of the Nations Series*) gives a good idea of the reality. See in particular pp. 82-147. It should be noted, however, that Lübeck is credited with being the first northern town to adopt the Oriental usage of water-pipes (Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, 1802, i, 381).



tempered its own spirit of monopoly in some measure by its principle of inclusion ; and it passed away as a great power before it could dream of renewing the ideal of monopoly in the more sinister form of Oriental empire taken up by the Dutch. And, while its historians have not been careful to make a comparative study of the internal civic life which flourished under the commercial union, it does not at all appear that the divisions of classes were more steep, or the lot of the lower worse, than in any northern European State of the period.

The "downfall" of such a polity, then, is conceptual only. All the realities of life evolved by the league were passed on to its constituent elements throughout northern Europe ; and there survived from it what the separate States had not yet been able to offer—the adumbration, however dim, of a union reaching beyond the bounds of nationality and the jealousies of race. In an age of private war, without transcending the normal ethic, it practically limited private war as regarded its German members ; and while joining battle at need with half-barbarian northern kings, or grudging foreigners, it of necessity made peace its ideal. Its dissolution, therefore, marked at once the advance of national organisation up to its level, and the persistence of the more primitive over the more rational instincts of coalition.



## CHAPTER IV

### HOLLAND

#### NOTE ON LITERATURE

The special interest of Dutch history for English and other readers led in past generations to a more general sociological study of it than was given to almost any other. L. Guicciardini's *Description of the Low Countries* (*Descrizione.....di tutti Paesi Bassi*, etc., Anversa, folio, 1567, 1581, etc.; trans. in French, 1568, etc.; in English, 1593; in Dutch, 1582; in Latin, 1613, etc.) is one of the fullest surveys of the kind made till recent times. Sir William Temple's *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands* (1672) laid for English readers further foundations of an intelligent knowledge of the vital conditions of the State which had been in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the great commercial rival of England; and in the eighteenth century many English writers discussed the fortunes of Dutch commerce. An English translation was made of the remarkably sagacious work variously known as the *Memoirs of John de Witt*, the *True Interest of Holland*, and *Political Maxims of the State of Holland* (really written by De Witt's friend, Pierre Delacourt; De Witt, however, contributing two chapters), and much attention was given to it here and on the Continent. In addition to the many and copious histories written in the eighteenth century in Dutch, three or four voluminous and competent histories of the Low Countries were written in French—e.g., those of Dujardin (1757, etc., 8 vols. 4to), Cerisier (1777, etc., 10 vols. 12mo), Le Clerc (1723–28, 3 vols. folio), Wicquefort (1719, folio, proceeding from Peace of Münster). Of late years, though the lesson is as important as ever, it appears to be less generally attended to. In our own country, however, have appeared Davies' *History of Holland* (1841, 3 vols.), a careful but not often an illuminating work, which oddly begins with the statement that "there is scarcely any nation whose history has been so little understood or so generally neglected as that of Holland"; T. Colley Grattan's earlier and shorter book (*The Netherlands*, 1830), which is still worth reading for a general view based on adequate learning; and the much better known works of Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic* (1856) and the *History of the United Netherlands*



(1861-68), which deal minutely with only a period of fifty-five years of Dutch history, and of which, as of the work of Davies, the sociological value is much below the annalistic. All three are impaired as literature by their stale rhetoric. The same malady infects the second volume of the *Industrial History of the Free Nations* (1846), by W. Torrens M'Cullagh (afterwards M'Cullagh Torrens); but this, which deals with Holland, is the better section of that treatise, and it gives distinct help to a scientific conception of the process of Dutch history, as does J. R. M'Culloch's *Essay on the Rise, Progress, and Decline of Commerce in Holland*, which is one of the best of his *Essays and Treatises* (2nd ed. 1859). The *Holland* of the late Professor Thorold Rogers has merit as a vivacious conspectus, but hardly rises to the opportunity.

Of the many French, Belgian, and German works on special periods of the history of the Low Countries, some have a special and general scientific interest. Among these is the research of M. Alphonse Wauters on *Les libertés communales* (Bruxelles, 1878). Barante's *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne* (4th ed. 1838-40) contains much interesting matter on the Burgundian period. The assiduous research of M. Lefèvre Pontalis, *Jean de Witt, Grand Pensionnaire de Hollande* (2 tom. 1884; Eng. trans. 2 vols.), throws a full light on one of the most critical periods of Dutch history.

Dutch works on the history of the Low Countries in general, and the United Provinces in particular, are many and voluminous; indeed, no history has been more amply written. The good general history of the Netherlands by N. G. van Kampen, which appeared in German in the series of Heeren and Uckert (1831-33), is only partially superseded by the *Geschichte der Niederlande* of Wenzelburger (Bd. i, 1879; ii, 1886), which is not completed. But the most readable general history of the Netherlands yet produced is that of P. J. Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk* (1892, etc.), of which there is a competent but unfortunately abridged English translation (Putnams, vol. i, 1898). Standard modern Dutch works are those of J. A. Vijnne, *Geschiedenis van het Vaderland*, and J. van Lennep, *De Geschiedenis van Nederland*. For Belgian history in particular the authorities are similarly numerous. The *Manuel de l'histoire de Belgique*, by J. David (Louvain, 1847), will be found a good handbook of authorities, episodes, and chronology, though without any sociological element. The *Histoire de Belgique* of Th. Juste (Bruxelles, 1895, 3 tom. 4to) is comprehensive, but disfigured by insupportable illustrations.



§ 1. *The Rise of the Netherlands*

THE case of Holland is one of those which at first sight seem to flout the sociological maxim that civilisations flourish in virtue partly of natural advantages and partly of psychological pressures. On the face of things, it would seem that the original negation of natural advantage could hardly be carried farther than here. A land pieced together out of drained marshes certainly tells more of man's effort than of Nature's bounty. Yet even here the process of natural law is perfectly sequent and intelligible.

One of the least-noted influences of the sea on civilisation is the economic basis it yields in the way of food-supply. Already in Cæsar's time the Batavians were partly fishermen; and it may be taken as certain that through all the troubled ages down to the period of industry and commerce it was the resource of fishing that mainly maintained and retained population in the sea-board swamps of the Low Countries. Here was a harvest that enemies could not destroy, that demanded no ploughing and sowing, and that could not well be reaped by the labour of slaves. When war and devastation could absolutely depopulate the cultivated land, forcing all men to flee from famine, the sea for ever yielded some return to him who could but get afloat with net or line; and he who could sail the sea had a double chance of life and freedom as against land enemies. Thus a sea marsh could be humanly advantaged as against a fruitful plain, and could be a surer dwelling-place. The tables were first effectually turned when the Norse pirates attacked from the sea—an irresistible inroad which seems to have driven the sea-board Frisians (as it did the coast inhabitants of France) in crowds into slavery for protection, thus laying a broad foundation of popular serfdom.<sup>1</sup> When, however, the Norse empire began to fail, the sea as a source of sustenance again counted for civilisation; and when to this natural basis of population and subsistence there was added the peculiar stimulus set up by a religious inculcation or encouragement of a fish diet, the fishing-grounds of the continent became relatively richer estates than mines and vineyards. Venice and Holland alike owed much to the superstition which made Christians akreophagous on Fridays and fast-days and all through the forty days of Lent.

<sup>1</sup> Motley, *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, 1-vol. ed. 1863, p. 18. For details of the different invasions see David, *Manuel de l'histoire de Belgique*, 1847, pp. 37, 39, 41, 49. Cp. van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, Ger. ed. i, 82-89. Wenzelburger notes that the "Norsemen" included not only Norwegians and Danes, but Saxons and even Frisians (*Geschichte der Niederlande*, 1879, i, 61).



When the plan of salting herrings was hit upon,<sup>1</sup> all Christian Europe helped to make the fortunes of the fisheries.

Net-making may have led to weaving; in any case weaving is the first important industry developed in the Low Countries. It depended mainly on the wool of England; and on the basis of the ancient seafaring there thus arose a sea-going commerce.<sup>2</sup> Further, the position of Flanders,<sup>3</sup> as a trade-centre for northern and southern Europe, served to make it a market for all manner of produce; and round such a market population and manufactures grew together. It belonged to the conditions that, though the territory came under feudal rule like every other in the medieval military period, the cities were relatively energetic all along,<sup>4</sup> theirs being (after the Dark Ages, when the work was largely done by the Church) the task of maintaining the sea-dykes<sup>5</sup> and water-ways, and theirs the wealth on which alone the feudal over-lords could hope to flourish in an unfruitful land. The over-lords, on their part, saw the expediency of encouraging foreigners to settle and add to their taxable population,<sup>6</sup> thus establishing the tradition of political tolerance long before the Protestant period. Hence arose in the Netherlands, after the Renaissance, the phenomenon of a dense industrial population flourishing on a soil which finally could not be made to feed them,<sup>7</sup> and carrying on a vast shipping trade without owning a single good harbour and without possessing home-grown timber wherewith to build their ships, or home-products to freight them.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dutch writers claim the invention for one of their nation in the fourteenth century (cp. M'Culloch, *Treatises*, p. 342; Rogers, *Holland*, pp. 26, 27). There is clear evidence, however, that fish-salting was carried on at Yarmouth as early as 1210, one Peter Chivalier being the patentee (see Torrens M'Cullagh's *Industrial History of the Free Nations*, 1846, ii, 29; Madox, *History of the Exchequer*, ch. xiii, § 4, p. 326, cited by him; and Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, 1802, i, 384, 385). The practice was very common in antiquity; see Schürer, *Jewish People in the Time of Christ*, Eng. tr. Div. ii, vol. i, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> It is noteworthy that an English navy practically begins with King John, in whose reign it was that fishing began to flourish at Yarmouth. See Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, i, 374, 378, 384, 532.

<sup>3</sup> Originally the name Flanders covered only the territory of the city of Bruges. It was extended with the extension of the domain of the Counts of Flanders (David, *Manuel*, pp. 48, 49).

<sup>4</sup> Motley, p. 20; Grattan, pp. 38-40, 43, 56. At 1286 the Flemish cities were represented side by side with the nobles in the assembly of the provincial states. The same rights were acquired by the Dutch cities in the next century.

<sup>5</sup> Dykes existed as early as the Roman period (Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk*, Groningen, 1892, i, 315; Eng. tr. i, 211; Wenzelburger, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, 1878, i, 52). In the Middle Ages co-operative bodies took the work out of the Church's hands (Blok, pp. 315-17; tr. p. 212).

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Torrens M'Cullagh, *Industrial History*, ii, 22, 33; Motley, p. 18. The Counts of Holland seem to have led the way in encouraging towns and population. But Baldwin III of Flanders (circa 960) seems to have established yearly fairs free of tolls (De Witt, *Mémoires*, French tr., ed. 1709, part i, ch. viii, p. 34).

<sup>7</sup> Compare the so-called *Memoirs of John de Witt*, French ed. (3e) 1709, ch. iii, p. 18; Petty, *Essays in Political Arithmetic*, ed. 1699, p. 178; Torrens M'Cullagh, as cited, ii, 26, 113-15, 270-71; M'Culloch, *Treatises*, p. 350. English corn was frequently exported to the Low Countries, as against imported textiles, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and early in the fifteenth (Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, i, 561, 644).

<sup>8</sup> Keymor, *Observations on the Dutch Fishing about the year 1601*, reprinted in *The Phoenix*, 1707, i, 223, 225; Temple, *Observations upon the United Provinces*, cc. iii, vi (1814 ed. of *Works*, i, 127, 163).



One of the determinants of this growth on a partially democratic footing was clearly the primary and peculiar necessity for combination by the inhabitants to maintain the great sea-dykes, the canals, and the embankments of the low-lying river-lands in the interior.<sup>1</sup> It was a public bond in peace, over and above the normal tie of common enmities. The result was a development of civic life still more rapid and more marked in inland Flanders,<sup>2</sup> where the territorial feudal power was naturally greater than in the maritime Dutch provinces. Self-ruling cities, such as Ghent and Antwerp, at their meridian, were too powerful to be effectively menaced by their immediate feudal lords. But on the side of their relations with neighbouring cities or States they all exhibited the normal foible; and it was owing only to the murderous compulsion put upon them by Spain in the sixteenth century that any of the provinces of the Netherlands became a federal republic. For five centuries after Charlemagne, who subdued them to his system, the Low Countries had undergone the ordinary slow evolution from pure feudalism to the polity of municipalities. In the richer inland districts the feudal system, lay and clerical, was at its height, the baronial castles being "here more numerous than in any other part of Christendom";<sup>3</sup> and when the growing cities began to feel their power to buy charters, the feudal formula was unchallenged,<sup>4</sup> while the mass of the outside population were in the usual "Teutonic" state of partial or complete serfdom. It was only by burning their suburbs and taking to the walled fortress that the people of Utrecht escaped the yoke of the Norsemen.<sup>5</sup>

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Mr. Torrens M'Cullagh is responsible for the statement that "it seems doubtful whether any portion of the inhabitants of Holland were ever in a state of actual servitude or bondage," and that the northern provinces were more generally free from slavery than the others (*Industrial History of the Free Nations*, 1846, ii, 39). Motley (*Rise of the Dutch Republic*, as cited, pp. 17, 18) pronounces, on the contrary, that "in the northern Netherlands the degraded condition of the mass continued longest," and that "the number of slaves throughout the Netherlands was very large; the number belonging to the bishopric of Utrecht enormous." This is substantially borne out by Grattan, *Netherlands*, pp. 18, 34; Blok, *Geschiedenis van*

<sup>1</sup> Cp. De Witt, pp. 15, 16; Torrens M'Cullagh, *Industrial History*, ii, 36, 37, 46, 59; Grattan, *Netherlands*, p. 18; Blok, as above cited.

<sup>2</sup> As to the earlier development of the Flemish cities, cp. Blok, *Geschiedenis*, as cited, ii, 3; Eng. tr. i, 252; A. Wauters, *Les libertés communales*, Bruxelles, 1878, p. 746 and *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> Motley, *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, i, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> See the charter of Middelburg in 1217, quoted by Motley, p. 19, and by Davies, i, 65.

<sup>5</sup> Davies, *History of Holland*, i, 26.



*het Nederlandsche Volk*, i, 159, 160, 305-11, Eng. tr. i, 203-8; Wauters, *Les libertés communales*, 1878, pp. 222-30. As is noted by Blok, the status of the peasantry fluctuated, the thirteenth century being one of partial retrogression. Cp. pp. 318, 319, as to the general depression of the peasant class. The great impulse to slavery, as above noted, seems to have been given by the Norse pirates in general and the later Norman invaders, who, under Godfrey, forced every "free" Frisian to wear a halter. The comparative protection accruing to slaves of the Church was embraced by multitudes. In the time of the Crusades, again, many serfs were sold or mortgaged to the Church by the nobles in order to obtain funds for their expedition.

The cities were thus the liberating and civilising forces;<sup>1</sup> and the application of townsmen's capital to the land was an early influence in improving rural conditions.<sup>2</sup> But there was no escape from the fatality of strife in the Teutonic any more than in the ancient Greek or in the contemporary Italian world. Flanders, having the large markets of France at hand, developed its cloth-making and other industries more rapidly than the Frisian districts, where weaving was probably earlier carried on;<sup>3</sup> and here serfdom disappeared comparatively early,<sup>4</sup> the nobility dwindling through their wars; but the new industrial strifes of classes, which grew up everywhere in the familiar fashion, naturally matured the sooner in the more advanced civilisation; and already at the beginning of the fourteenth century we find a resulting disintegration. The monopoly methods of the trade guilds drove much of the weaving industry into the villages; then the Franco-Flemish wars, wherein the townspeople, by expelling the French in despite of the nobility, greatly strengthened their position,<sup>5</sup> nevertheless tended, as did the subsequent civil wars, to drive trade into South Brabant.

In Flemish Ghent and Bruges the clashing interests of weavers and woollen-traders, complicated by the strife of the French (aristocratic) and anti-French (popular) factions, led to riots in which citizens and magistrates were killed (1301). At times these enmities reached the magnitude of civil war. At Ypres (1303) a combination of workmen demanded the suppression of rival

<sup>1</sup> Cp. David, *Manuel*, p. 217; Wauters, *Les libertés communales*, pp. 36, 287; Van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i, 141, 142.

<sup>2</sup> M'Cullagh, ii, 42.

<sup>3</sup> De Witt (*i.e.* Delacourt), however, gives the priority to Flanders (*Mémoires*, as cited, pt. i, ch. viii, p. 34).

<sup>4</sup> The majority of the serfs seem to have been freed about 1230; and by 1300 the chiefs of the guilds were "more powerful than the nobles" (Grattan, p. 35; cp. p. 38, and Blok, as before cited).

<sup>5</sup> Cp. David, *Manuel*, pp. 78-88.



industries in neighbouring villages, and in an ensuing riot the mayor and all the magistrates were slain; at Bruges (1302) a trade riot led to the loss of fifteen hundred lives.<sup>1</sup> When later the weaving trade had flourished in Brabant, the same fatality came about: plebeians rebelled against patrician magistrates—themselves traders or employers of labour—in the principal cities; and Brussels (1312) was for a time given up to pillage and massacre, put down only by the troops of the reigning duke. A great legislative effort was made in the “Laws of Cortenberg,” framed by an assembly of nobles and city deputies, to regulate fiscal and industrial affairs in a stable fashion;<sup>2</sup> but after fifty years the trouble broke out afresh, and was ill-healed.<sup>3</sup> At length, in a riot in the rich city of Louvain (1379), sixteen of its patrician magistrates were slain, whereupon many took flight to England, but many more to Haarlem, Amsterdam, Leyden, and other Dutch cities.<sup>4</sup> Louvain never again recovered its trade<sup>5</sup> and wealth;<sup>6</sup> and since the renewed Franco-Flemish wars of this period had nearly destroyed the commerce of Flanders,<sup>6</sup> there was a general gravitation of both merchandise and manufacture to Holland.<sup>7</sup> Thus arose Dutch manufactures in an organic connection with maritime commerce, the Dutch municipal organisation securing a balance of trade interests where that of the Flemish industrial cities had partially failed.

The commercial lead given by the Hanseatic League was followed in the Netherlands with a peculiar energy, and till the Spanish period the main part of Dutch maritime commerce was with northern Europe and the Hansa cities. So far as the language test goes, the original Hansards and the Dutch were of the same “Low Dutch” stock, which was also that of the Anglo-Saxons.<sup>8</sup> Thus there was seen the phenomenon of a vigorous maritime and commercial development among the continental branches of the race; while the English, having lost its early seafaring habits on its new settlement, lagged far behind in both developments. Kinship, of course, counted for nothing towards goodwill between the nations when it could not keep peace within or between the towns; and in the fifteenth century the Dutch cities are found at war with the Hansa, as they had been in the thirteenth with England, and were to be again. But the spirit of strife did its worst work at home. On the one hand, a physical schism had been set up in Friesland

<sup>1</sup> De Witt, as cited, pp. 34, 35; M'Cullagh, p. 66; Grattan, p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> David, *Manuel*, pp. 142, 143; Grattan, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> David, pp. 154-57.

<sup>5</sup> David, *Manuel*, p. 158.

<sup>7</sup> Grattan, p. 43.

<sup>4</sup> De Witt, p. 35; M'Cullagh, p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* p. 107.

<sup>8</sup> Earle, *Philology of the English Tongue*, 3rd ed. pp. 8, 9.



in the thirteenth century by the immense disaster of the inundation which enlarged the Zuyder Zee.<sup>1</sup> Of that tremendous catastrophe there are singularly few historic traces; but it had the effect of making two small countries where there had been one large one, what was left of West Friesland being absorbed in the specific province of Holland, while East Friesland, across the Zuyder Zee, remained a separate confederation of maritime districts.<sup>2</sup> To the south-west, again, the great Flemish cities were incurably jealous of each other's prosperity, as well as inwardly distracted by their class disputes; and within the cities of Holland, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, while intelligible lines of cleavage between trades or classes are hard to find, the factions of Hoek and Kabbeljauw, the "Hooks" and the "Codfish," appear to have carried on a chronic strife, as irrational as any to be noted in the cities of Italy. Thus in the north as in the south, among Teutons as among "Latins" and among ancient Greeks, the primary instincts of separation checked democratic growth and coalition; though after the period of local feudal sovereignties the powerful monarchic and feudal forces in the Netherlands withheld the cities from internecine wars.

The most sympathetic historians are forced from the first to note the stress of mutual jealousy among the cities and districts of the Netherlands. "The engrained habit of municipal isolation," says one, "was the cause why the general liberties of the Netherlands were imperilled, why the larger part of the country was ultimately ruined, and why the war of independence was conducted with so much risk and difficulty, even in the face of the most serious perils" (Thorold Rogers, *Holland*, p. 26. Cp. pp. 35, 43; Motley, pp. 29, 30, 43; Grattan, pp. 39, 50, 51). Van Kampen avows (*Geschiede der Nederlande*, i, 131) that throughout the Middle Ages Friesland was unprogressive owing to constant feuds. Even as late as 1670 Leyden refused to let the Harle Maer be drained, because it would advantage other cities; and Amsterdam in turn opposed the reopening of the old Rhine channel because it would make Leyden maritime (Temple, *Observations*, i, 130, ch. iii).

As regards the early factions of the "Hooks" and the "Codfish" in the Dutch towns, the historic obscurity is so great that historians are found ascribing the names in contrary ways. Grattan (p. 49) represents the Hooks as the town party, and the Codfish as the party of the nobles; Motley (p. 21) reverses the explanation, noting, however, that there

<sup>1</sup> On this and previous floods see Blok, *Geschiedenis*, i, 313, 314; tr. i, 209, 210; Davies, vol. i, note C.

<sup>2</sup> Motley, p. 20.



was no consistent cleavage of class or of principle (cp. M'Cullagh, pp. 99, 100). This account is supported by Van Kampen, i, 170, 171. The fullest survey of the Hook and Cod feud is given by Wenzelburger, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i, 210-42. As to feuds of other parties in some of the cities see Van Kampen, i, 172. They included, for example, a class feud between the rich *Vetkooper* (fat-dealers) and the poor *Schieringer* (eel-fishers). See Davies, i, 180.

Thus dissident, and with feudal wars breaking out in every generation, the cities and provinces could win concessions from their feudal chiefs when the latter were in straits, as in the famous case of the "Great Privilege" extorted from the Duchess Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, after her father's overthrow by the Swiss; again in the case of her husband Maximilian after her death; and previously in the reaffirmation of the ill-observed Laws of Cortenberg, secured from the Duke of Brabant by the Louvainiers in 1372; but they could never deliver themselves from the feudal superstition, never evolve the republican ideal. When the rich citizens exploited the poor, it was the local sovereign's cue, as of old, to win the populace; whereupon the patricians leant to the over-lord, were he even the King of France; or it might be that the local lord himself sought the intervention of his suzerain, who again was at times the first to meddle, and against whom, as against rival potentates, the cities would at times fight desperately for their recognised head, when he was not overtaxing or thwarting them, or endangering their commerce.<sup>1</sup> It was a medley of clashing interests, always in unstable equilibrium. And so when sovereign powers on a great scale, as the Dukes of Burgundy, followed by the Archduke Maximilian, and later by the Emperor Charles, came into the inheritance of feudal prestige, the Dutch and Flemish cities became by degrees nearly as subordinate as those of France and Germany, losing one by one their municipal privileges.<sup>2</sup> The monarchic superstition overbore the passions of independence and primary interest; and a strong feudal ruler could count on a more general and durable loyalty than was ever given to any citizen-statesman. James van Arteveldt, who guided Ghent in the fourteenth century, and whose policy was one of alliance with the English king against the French, the feudal over-lord, was "the greatest personality Flanders ever produced."<sup>3</sup> But though Arteveldt's policy was maintained even by

<sup>1</sup> Cp. David, pp. 77, 78, 85, 92, 99, 101, 105, 108, 149; Motley, pp. 24, 28, 29; Grattan, pp. 42, 44, 46, 50, 54, 64.

<sup>2</sup> The town of Hoorn seems to have been virtually ruined by the punitive exactions of Charles the Bold (Davies, i, 269, 312).

<sup>3</sup> David, p. 94.



his murderers, murdered he was by his fellow-citizens, as the great De Witt was to be murdered in Holland three hundred years later. The monarchised Netherlanders were republicans only in the last resort, as against insupportable tyranny. Philip of Burgundy, who heavily oppressed them, they called "The Good." At the end of the fifteenth century Maximilian was able, even before he became Emperor, not only to crush the "bread-and-cheese" rebellion of the exasperated peasantry in Friesland and Guelderland,<sup>1</sup> but to put down all the oligarchs who had rebelled against him, and finally to behead them by the dozen,<sup>2</sup> leaving the land to his son as a virtually subject State.

In the sixteenth century, under Charles V, the men of Ghent, grown once again a great commercial community,<sup>3</sup> exhibited again the fatal instability of the undeveloped democracy of all ages. Called upon to pay their third of a huge subsidy of 1,200,000 *caroli* voted by the Flemish States to the Emperor, they rang their bell of revolt and defied him, offering their allegiance to the King of France. That monarch, by way of a bargain, promptly betrayed the intrigue to his "brother," who thereupon marched in force through France to the rebel city, now paralysed by terror; and without meeting a shadow of resistance, penalised it to the uttermost, beheading a score of leading citizens, banishing many more, annulling its remaining municipal rights, and exacting an increased tribute.<sup>4</sup> It needed an extremity of grievance to drive such communities to an enduring rebellion. When Charles V abdicated at Brussels in favour of his son Philip in 1555, he had already caused to be put to death Netherlanders to the number at least of thousands for religious heresy;<sup>5</sup> and still the provinces were absolutely submissive, and the people capable of weeping collectively out of sympathy with the despot's infirmities.<sup>6</sup> He, on his part, born and educated among them, and knowing them well, was wont to say of them that there was not a nation under the sun which more detested the *name* of slavery, or that bore the reality more patiently when managed with discretion.<sup>7</sup> He spoke whereof he knew.

<sup>1</sup> Davies, i, 314.

<sup>2</sup> Motley, pp. 28-30.

<sup>3</sup> Largely through the union between Spain and England under the Tudor kings (Grattan, p. 66).

<sup>4</sup> Robertson, *Charles V.*, b. vi; Motley, *Rise, Histor.* Introd. § 11.

<sup>5</sup> Motley, p. 60, notes that the numbers have been put often at fifty thousand, and sometimes even at a hundred thousand; but this, as he admits, is incredible.

<sup>6</sup> And still the rhetorical historian, sworn to maintain the Teutonic character for "liberty," declaims in his elementary manner that that has been seen to be the "master passion" of the race from Cæsar's time to Charles's (Motley, p. 49; compare pp. 25-29).

<sup>7</sup> Cited by Puffendorf, *Introduction to the History of Europe*, Eng. tr. 7th ed. 1711, i, 240.

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§ 2. *The Revolt against Spain*

That the people who endured so much at the hands of a despot should have revolted unsubduably against his son is to be explained in terms of certain circumstances little stressed in popular historiography. In the narratives of the rhetorical historians, no real explanation arises. The revolt figures as a stand for personal and religious freedom. But when Charles abdicated, after slaying his thousands, the Reformation had been in full tide for over thirty years; Calvin had built up Protestant Geneva to the point of burning Servetus; England had been for twenty years depapalised; France, with many scholars and nobles converted to Calvinism, was on the verge of a civil war of Huguenots and Catholics; the Netherlands themselves had been drenched in the blood of heretics; and still no leading man had thought of repudiating either Spain or Rome. Yet within thirteen years they were in full revolt, led by William of Orange, now turned Protestant. Seeing that mere popular Protestantism had spread far and gone fast, religious opinion was clearly not the determining force.

In reality, the *conditio sine qua non* was the psychological reversal effected by Philip when he elected to rule as a Spaniard, where his father had in effect ruled as a Fleming. Charles had always figured as a native of the Netherlands, at home among his people, friendly to their great men, ready to employ them in his affairs, even to the extent of partly ruling Spain through them. After his punishment of Ghent they were his boon subjects; and in his youth it was the Spaniards who were jealous of the Flemish and Dutch. This state of things had begun under his Flemish-German father, Philip I, who became King of Spain by marriage, and under whom the Netherland nobles showed in Spain a rapacity that infuriated the Spaniards against them. It was a question simply of racial predominance; and had the dynasty chosen to fix its capital in the north rather than in the south, it would have been the lot of the Netherlands to exploit Spain—a task for which they were perfectly ready.

The gross rapacity of the Flemings in Spain under Philip I is admitted by Motley (*Rise*, as cited, pp. 31, 75); but on the same score feeling was passionately strong in Spain in the earlier years of the reign of Charles. Cp. Robertson, *Charles V*, bk. i (Works, ed. 1821, iv, 37, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 53, 55, 77, 78); and van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i, 277, 278. It took more than ten years to bring Charles in good relations



with the Spaniards. See Mr. E. Armstrong's *Introduction* to Major Martin Hume's *Spain*, 1898, pp. 31-37, 57, 76. Even in his latter years they are found protesting against his customary absence from Spain, and his perpetual wars. Robertson, bk. vi, p. 494. Cp. bk. xii, vol. v, p. 417, as to the disregard shown him after his abdication.

While it lasted, the Flemish exploitation of Spain was as shameless as the Spanish exploitation of Italy. The Italian Peter Martyr Angleria, residing at the court of Spain, reckoned that in ten months the Flemings there remitted home over a million ducats (Robertson, bk. i, p. 53). A lad, nephew of Charles's Flemish minister Chievres, was appointed to the archbishopric of Toledo, in defiance of general indignation. The result was a clerico-popular insurrection. Everything goes to show that but for the Emperor's prudence his Flemings would have ruined him in Spain, by getting him to tyrannise for their gain, as Philip II later did for the Church's sake in the Netherlands.

It is not unwarrantable to say that had not Charles had the sagacity to adapt himself to the Spanish situation, learning to speak the language and even to tolerate the pride of the nobles<sup>1</sup> to a degree to which he never yielded before the claims of the burghers of the Netherlands, and had he not in the end identified himself chiefly with his Spanish interests, the history of Spain and the Netherlands might have been entirely reversed. Had he, that is, kept his seat of rule in the Netherlands, drawing thither the unearned revenues of the Americas, and still contrived to keep Spain subject to his rule, the latter country would have been thrown back on her great natural resources, her industry, and her commerce, which, as it was, developed markedly during his reign,<sup>2</sup> despite the heavy burdens of his wars. And in that case Spain might conceivably have become the Protestant and rebellious territory, and the Netherlands on the contrary have remained Catholic and grown commercially decrepit, having in reality the weaker potential economic basis.

Ex.

The theorem that the two races were vitally opposed in "religious sentiment," and that "it was as certain that the Netherlands would be fierce reformers as that the Spaniards would be uncompromising persecutors" (Motley, p. 31), is part of the common pre-scientific conception of national development, and proceeds upon flat disregard of the historical evidence. It is well established that there was as much heresy of the more rational Protestant and Unitarian sort in Spain, to begin with, as in Holland. Under Ferdinand and Isabella the Inquisition

<sup>1</sup> Robertson, *Charles V*, bk. vi, ed. cited, p. 495; Armstrong, as cited, pp. 78-82.

<sup>2</sup> Armstrong, as cited, pp. 83, 84.



seems to have struck mainly at Judaic and Moorish monotheistic heresy, which was not uncommon among the upper classes, while the lower were for the most part orthodox (Armstrong, *Introd. to Major Hume's Spain*, pp. 14, 18). Thus there is good ground for the surmise that Ferdinand's object was primarily the confiscation of the wealth of Jews and other rich heretics. (See U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, 1895, ii, 101; Hume's ed. 1900, ii, 74.) In Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia there was general resistance to the Inquisition; in Cordova there was a riot against it; in Saragossa the Inquisitor was murdered before the altar (Armstrong, p. 18; Llorente, *Hist. crit. de l'Inquisition d'Espagne*, éd. 1818, i, 185-213; M'Crie, *Reformation in Spain*, ed. 1856, pp. 52-53. Cp. U. R. Burke, as cited, ii, 97, 98, 101, 103, 111; Hume's ed. ii, 66, 70-71, 74-77, 82; as to the general and prolonged resistance of the people). During that reign Torquemada is credited with burning ten thousand persons in eighteen years (Prescott, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella*, Kirk's ed. 1889, p. 178, citing Llorente. But see p. 746, *note*, as to possible exaggeration. Cp. Burke, ii, 113; Hume's ed. ii, 84). In the early Lutheran period the spread of scholarly Protestantism in Spain was extremely rapid (La Rigaudière, *Histoire des persécutions religieuses en Espagne*, 1860, p. 245 *sq.*), and in the early years of Philip II it needed furious persecution to crush it, thousands leaving the kingdom (Prescott, *Philip II*, bk. ii, ch. iii; M'Crie, *Reformation in Spain*, ch. viii; De Castro, *History of the Spanish Protestants*, Eng. tr. 1851, *passim*). At the outset, 800 persons were arrested in Seville alone in one day; and the Venetian ambassador in 1562 testifies to the large number of Huguenots in Spain (Ranke, *Hist. of the Popes*, bk. v, Eng. tr. 1-vol. ed. p. 136).

NOTE

Had Philip II had Flemish sympathies and chosen to make Brussels his capital, the stress of the Inquisition could have fallen on the Netherlands as successfully as it actually did on Spain. His father's reign had proved as much. According to Motley, not only multitudes of Anabaptists but "thousands and tens of thousands of virtuous and well-disposed men and women" had then been "butchered in cold blood" (*Rise*, p. 43), without any sign of rebellion on the part of the provinces, whose leading men remained Catholic. In 1600 most of the inhabitants of Groningen were Catholics (Davies, ii, 347). A Protestant historian (Grattan, p. 93) admits that the Protestants "never, and least of all in these days, formed the mass." Another has admitted, as regards those of Germany, that "nothing had contributed more to the undisturbed progress of their opinions than the interregnum after Maximilian's death, the long absence of Charles, and the slackness of the reins of government which these occasioned" (Robertson, *Charles V*,



bk. v, ed. cited of *Works*, vol. iv, p. 387). "It was only tanners, dyers, and apostate priests who were Protestants at that day in the Netherlands" (Motley, p. 124). The same conditions would have had similar results in Spain, where many Catholics thought Philip much too religious for his age and station (Motley, p. 76).

It seems necessary to insist on the elementary fact that it was Netherlanders who put Protestants to death in the Netherlands; and that it was Spaniards who were burnt in Spain. In the Middle Ages "nowhere was the persecution of heretics more relentless than in the Netherlands" (Motley, p. 36; cp. p. 132). Grenville, most zealous of heresy-hunters, was a Burgundian; Viglius, an even bitterer persecutor, was a Frisian. The statement of Prescott (*Philip II*, Kirk's ed. 1894, p. 149) that the Netherlanders "claimed freedom of thought as their birthright" is a gratuitous absurdity. As regards, further, the old hallucination of "race types," it has to be noted that Charles, a devout Catholic and persecutor, was emphatically *Teutonic*, according to the established canons. His stock was Burgundo-Austrian on the father's side; his Spanish mother was of Teutonic descent; he had the fair hair, blue eyes, and hanging jaw and lip of the Teutonic Hapsburgs (see Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, cap. 341), and so had his descendants after him. On the other hand, William the Silent was markedly "Spanish" in his physiognomy (Motley, p. 56), and his reticence would in all ages pass for a Spanish rather than a "Teutonic" characteristic. Motley is reduced to such shifts of rhetoric concerning Philip II as the proposition (p. 75) that "the Burgundian and Austrian elements of his blood seemed to have evaporated." But his descendant, Philip IV, as seen in the great portraits of Velasquez, is, like him, a "typical" Teuton; and the stock preserved the Teutonic physiological tendency to gluttony, a most "un-Spanish" characteristic.

It is true that, as Buckle argues, the many earthquakes in Spain tended to promote superstitious fear; but then on his principles the Dutch seafaring habits, and the constant risks and frequent disasters of inundation, had the same primary tendency. For the rest, the one serious oversight in Buckle's theory of Spanish civilisation is his assumption (cp. 3-vol. ed. ii, 455-61; 1-vol. ed. p. 550) that Spanish "loyalty" was abnormal and continuous from the period of the first struggles with the Moors. As to this see the present writer's notes in the 1-vol. ed. of Buckle, as cited. Even Ferdinand, as an Aragonese, was disrespectfully treated by the Castilians (cp. Armstrong as cited, pp. 5, 31, etc.; De Castro, *History of Religious Intolerance in Spain*, Eng. tr. 1853, pp. 40, 41); and Philip I and Charles V set up a new resistance. An alien dynasty could set up disaffection in Spain as elsewhere.

It should be noted, finally, that the stiff ceremonialism which



is held to be the special characteristic of Spanish royalty was a Burgundo-Teutonic innovation, dating from Philip I, and that even in the early days of Philip the Cortes petitioned "that the household of the Prince Don Carlos should be arranged on the old Spanish lines, and not in the pompous new-fangled way of the House of Burgundy" (Major Hume's *Spain*, p. 127). Prescott (*Philip II*, ed. cited, pp. 655, 659) makes the petition refer to the king's own household, and shows it to have condemned the king's excessive expenditure in very strong terms, saying the expense of his household was "as great as would be required for the conquest of a kingdom." At the same time the Cortes petitioned against bull-fights, which appear to have originated with the Moors, were strongly opposed by Isabella the Catholic, and were much encouraged by the Teutonic Charles V (U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, 1895, ii, 2-4; Hume's ed. i, 328 sq.). In fine, the conventional Spain is a manufactured system, developed under a Teutonic dynasty. "To a German race of sovereigns Spain finally owed the subversion of her national system and ancient freedom" (Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* 4th ed. i, 5).

No doubt the Dutch disaffection to Philip, which began to reveal itself immediately after his accession, may be conceived as having economic grounds. Indeed, his creation of fresh bishoprics, and his manipulation of the abbey revenues, created instant and general resentment among churchmen and nobles,<sup>1</sup> as compared with his mere continuation of religious persecution; and despite his pledges to the contrary, certain posts in the Low Countries were conferred on Spaniards.<sup>2</sup> But had he shown his father's adaptability, all this could have been adjusted. Had he either lived at Brussels or made the Flemings feel that he held them an integral part of his empire, he would have had the zealous support of the upper classes in suppressing the popular heresy, which repelled them. Heresy in the Netherlands, indeed, seems thus far to have been on the whole rather licentious and anarchic than austere or "spiritual." The pre-Protestant movements of the Béguines, Beghards, and Lollards, beginning well, had turned out worse than the orders of friars in the south; and the decorous "Brethren of the Common Lot" were in the main "good churchmen," only a minority accepting Protestantism.<sup>3</sup> In face of the established formulas concerning the innate spirituality of the Teuton, and of the play of his "conscience" in his course at the Reformation, there stand the historic facts that in the Teutonic world alone was the Reformation accompanied by

<sup>1</sup> Motley, *Rise*, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* pp. 138, 139; Grattan, p. 87.

<sup>3</sup> Ullmann, *Reformers before the Reformation*, Eng. tr. 1855, ii, 14-17, 172-77.



widespread antinomianism, debauchery, and destructive violence. In France, Spain, and Italy there were no such movements as the Anabaptist, which so far as it could go was almost a dissolution of sane society.<sup>1</sup> From Holland that movement drew much of its strength and leadership, even as, in a previous age, the antinomian movement of Tanquelin had there had its main success.<sup>2</sup> Such was the standing of Dutch Protestantism in 1555; and no edict against heresy could be more searching and merciless than that drawn up by Charles in 1550<sup>3</sup> without losing any upper-class loyalty. Philip did but strive to carry it out.<sup>4</sup>

Had Philip, further, maintained a prospect of chronic war for the nobility of the Netherlands, the accruing chances of wealth<sup>5</sup> would in all likelihood have sufficed to keep them loyal. In the early wars of his reign with France immense gains had been made by them in the way of ransoms and booty. When these ceased, luxury continuing, embarrassment became general.<sup>6</sup> But when Philip's energies were seen to be mainly bent on killing out heresy, the discontented nobles began to lean to the side of the persecuted commonalty. At the first formation of the Confederacy of the "Beggars" in 1566, almost the only zealous Protestant among the leaders was William's impetuous brother Louis of Nassau, a Calvinist by training, who had for comrade the bibulous Brederode. The name of "Gueux," given to the malcontents in contempt by the councillor Berlaimont, had direct application to the known poverty or embarrassment of the great majority.<sup>7</sup> There was thus undisguisedly at work in the Netherlands the great economic force which had brought about "the Reformation" in all the Teutonic countries; and the needy nobles insensibly grew Protestant as it became more and more clear that only the lands of the Church could restore their fortunes.<sup>8</sup> This holds despite the fact that the more intelligent Protestantism which latterly spread among the people was the comparatively democratic form set up by Calvin, which reached the Low Countries through France, finding the readier reception among the serious because of the prestige accruing to its austerity as against the moral disrepute which now covered the German forms.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Pref. ch. viii, § 12.

<sup>2</sup> Motley, *Rise*, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> See it analysed in Motley, pp. 134, 135.

<sup>4</sup> Asked by his vicegerent Margaret of Parma to introduce the Spanish Inquisition, he pointed out that already "the Inquisition of the Netherlands is much more pitiless than that of Spain" (Motley, p. 174; cp. p. 81).

<sup>5</sup> It was an old source of income (Davies, i, 617; cp. Motley, p. 78).

<sup>6</sup> "The aristocracy of the Netherlands was excessively extravagant, dissipated, and already considerably embarrassed in circumstances" (Motley, p. 129; cp. pp. 125, 130, 131).

<sup>7</sup> Cp. Grattan, p. 106; Motley, as last cited.

<sup>8</sup> See the admissions of Motley, p. 131.