By a few illustrations I will try to show how Dr. Cheyne's psychological reconstruction is essentially a duplication, in hypothetical terms, of the known factors employed by the French critics. On their view, we have to do with a conflict between Hebraism in the form of austere devotion to the Law and the seductive Hellenism of the Asiatic kingdoms, which by its relaxing influence on a portion of the nation had made the other portion more intensely conscious of the need for resistance. The fascination of Greek civilisation for the higher classes in Judæa we can easily understand. Now Dr. Cheyne, for his own system of explanation, has to attribute hypothetically to North Arabians, "Canaanites," Jerahmeelites, and so forth, exactly the features which we know would be antipathetic, in the Hellenisers of Judæa, to the party that stood by the Deuteronomic Code. The higher classes, he finds, were opportunists,[1] inclined to compromise with Jerahmeel, the symbol of a more sensuous worship than that of Jahveh.[2] It would appear, he observes, that Jerahmeelites "formed an influential part of the nominally Israelite population; that they became, in fact, to a large extent the 'princes' or high officers."[3] The prophets were hostile to the politicians and their diplomacy.[4] "What Canaanites would have

for the sake of literary consistency." Again (pp. 335–336): "The [N. Arabian] names appear in later times to have acquired a typical or symbolical value." Also it is incidentally conceded (pp. 370–371) that past events may be described under the form of prophecy.

[1] P. 408. [2] P. 298. [3] P. 252. [4] P. 244.

called progress, Jeremiah and his like-minded predecessors regarded as degeneration."[1] Does not this present to us exactly the aspect under which the flexible Hellenising politicians would have appeared to the stiff theocrats? To take in connexion with it a relatively small but significant point. Dr. Cheyne has to give from his ethnic point of view a highly elaborate and hypothetical explanation of Zephaniah's threat of punishment on "the princes, and the sons of the king, and all those who put on foreign clothing" (i. 8).[2] Here M. Dujardin's explanation is simple and sufficient. The passage is still intelligible to us as just the kind of attack that a nationalist prophet would make on those who wore Greek dress.[3] We know that old-fashioned Romans took the same sort of offence. Finally, I will quote Dr. Cheyne's comment on the prophecy against Jehoiakim in Jeremiah (xxii. 13–19), portions of which he does not think can be genuine in their extant form. "I cannot believe," he says, "that the prophet would have been so ironical about the elegance of a new palace and the royal builder's fine taste for cedar-wood."[4] But is not this quite consistent with the rest? And does it not complete the picture we formed? Under the figure of King Jehoiakim, upon whom at last ruin came, a puritan poet of the Greek

[1] P. 56. [2] Pp. 407–408.

[3] *Cf. Les Prédécesseurs de Daniel*, p. 53: "Qu'est-ce que peut bien être le 'vêtement étranger' dont se revêtent les mauvais Juifs, si ce n'est le vêtement à la grecque, cause de scandale pour les Juifs pieux de l'époque des Psaumes."

[4] P. 393.

period, imaginatively identifying himself with an idealised dervish-seer of the past, is attacking at once the relative civilisation and culture and the corruption and oppression of the aristocrats of his own day. The actual High-Priest (who was also the Prince) of the time was no doubt a kind of Leo X.,—"enlightened," diplomatic, sensuous, and complacently presiding over ceremonial religion while himself fundamentally irreligious. The prophetic party, consistently hostile, in the spirit of the extant sacred books, at once to the good and evil of the foreign influx, denounced toleration of Greek statuary[1] and indifference to the sufferings of the poor[2] in the same breath.

Between one position of Dr. Cheyne and one of M. Dujardin there is a coincidence too remarkable not to be noticed. Both alike find the precursor of the literary poet-prophet in the popular dervish-seer, known in Palestine and the surrounding countries both much earlier and much later than the period of the great prophetic literature. In the statement of the position there is only this difference. According to M. Dujardin, the mere

[1] I find confirmation of this in what Dr. Cheyne says at p. 34: "The same prophecy of Isaiah which mentions divination also refers to idols, or other symbols of deity, as everywhere to be seen, and as fabricated to meet a newly arisen demand, in contradistinction to those of olden time, which were few and rarely made." This seems a crucial point. It is intelligible that idolatry in this form should come from the Greeks or Hellenisers; but what reason is there to suppose that it could come to Israel from North Arabia, which probably had idols as rude as those of the old Palestinian kingdoms?

[2] The new luxury, of course, required use of the *corvée*, which, as Dr. Cheyne recognises in his revision of the passage (Jer. xxii. 13, "that maketh his neighbour to work for nought, and giveth him not his wage"), was especially denounced by the prophet.

existence of the dervish-seer gave a sufficient hint to the literary prophets and to their precursors, who wrote legends like those of Elijah, for the imagination of great figures modelled on the type. According to Dr. Cheyne, the literary prophet like Amos comes at the end of an actual series beginning with the dervish. There are transitional types represented by figures like Balaam, and afterwards Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha, perhaps very slightly historical in their present form, yet corresponding to some reality in the past. Here again, a minor as well as a major coincidence will be observed. For M. Dujardin also, as was just indicated in passing, the literary prophets have precursors; only these are not Samuel himself and the other prophetic men of action in the past, but the writers who imagined the legends afterwards introduced into the "historical" books of Samuel and Kings. Here, it must be confessed, we are in the region of conjecture. Dr. Cheyne himself recognises the difficulty of knowing with any approach to certainty what historical elements there may have been in the prophetic figures of legend. And probably M. Dujardin would admit that the literary prophet, in the excitement of composition, was conscious (as a Greek poet also could be) of something in him resembling the " madness "—the intoxication by the god—of the popular seer. On his view, too, therefore, the types need not be regarded as absolutely unmediated. There was a natural basis in the psychology of the prophet for the

literary artifice by which he placed himself in the position of a seer under the old kings of Ephraim or of Judah.

Another problem raised by Dr. Cheyne brings with it a difficulty that does not appear to him soluble, as he candidly confesses, on the line he has taken. Who, he asks, were the "men of thought" behind the prophetic movement?[1] For such must have existed as well as the men of action. "We know not," he replies; and he evidently thinks it hopeless to look for them in North Arabia. "N. Arabian priests," he remarks, "had not the speculative faculty of their fellows of Heliopolis and Babylon."[2] On the view set forth in the earlier chapters, the difficulty is solved. The speculative precursors at once of the priests and prophets of Jerusalem or Judæa[3] were those very priests of Heliopolis and Babylon themselves. We need look no further. And for what, we may ask, were the "men of thought" needed? Clearly, to formulate the universalistic monotheism of which the prophets in their highest moods became the poetic voices. And this, according to the position Dr. Cheyne now takes up with regard to the texts, was "post-exilic." The universalist passages we admire were not, he holds, in the genuine Amos or Hosea of the eighth century. Thus the explanation I have given seems in the last resort absolutely demanded

[1] P. 77. [2] P. 75.

[3] *Cf.* Cheyne, p. 38: For a provincial as for a city prophet "Judah *is* Jerusalem." This is an important point with Dujardin. The Bible was the literature of Jerusalem.

by the exclusions he is obliged to make. And, monotheism being thus traced back to its source, there is no longer any need to attempt a separation of pre-exilic and post-exilic passages. Law and Prophets alike belong to the Church-State formed after the exile.[1]

When we consider the whole development, a parallel suggests itself with the scheme of Plato, in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, for the instruction of the multitude in religion and morality. The comparison has been put trenchantly by Mr. J. M. Robertson[2]: "What the Hebrew Bible-makers actually did, Plato proposed to do." And Mr. Benn, in his *Revaluations* (1909), quotes from Nietzsche the saying that Plato had "the soul of a Semitic priest." Caird, in his *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, discusses Plato's proposals, but on the whole concludes that they were impracticable; and so no doubt they were if we imagine thinkers who had arrived at the stage of Greek philosophy in Plato's time deliberately setting themselves to invent appropriate poetic myths for literal acceptance in a Hellenic State. This, however, is not precisely the condition presented by Judæa in the time, from the fifth to the fourth century, contemporary with Socrates,

1 That any possible explanation will ever make the prophecies clear through and through I do not maintain. Dr. Cheyne's examination of the text is undoubtedly successful in showing how extremely obscure they often are as they stand. In detail it is merely a question of relative clearness and simplicity where we cannot hope to explain everything. Obscure language in compositions of the kind was doubtless to some extent intentional; though to suggest that it was so in a particular case is of course only a guess.

2 *A Short History of Freethought*, 2nd ed. (1906), vol. i. p. 170.

Plato, and Aristotle; during which we suppose the Church-State to have been organised, and its laws first put into writing. The priests were the only class with any literary training, the population as a whole having scarcely risen above semi-barbarism. Thus a conception like that of Plato could be realised, though doubtless not quite in the manner that he would have desired. As Caird says: "He regards it as the business of art and poetry to present the truths of ethics and religion in a form suitable to minds that are yet unripe and unfitted for the reflective processes of science. In particular, he thinks that it is the office of mythology to inculcate a simple faith in the omnipotence of goodness upon those who are not yet prepared to grapple with the problem of evil; and in this poetic teaching he would have all the perplexing difficulties of life evaded, and all inconvenient facts suppressed. . . . Poetry is to tell its 'noble untruth,' and no scepticism or criticism is to be allowed to breathe a breath of suspicion upon it."[1] This is in effect the authorised theodicy of the history of Israel and of the hortatory passages in the Law. If the people suffered, that was because it had sinned: repentance would bring reconciliation with God and a return of prosperity. So it continued to be with the Prophets, yet not without modifications which again prove their later date. In Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Isaiah (to take them in what the revised criticism finds

1 *Op. cit.*, vol. i. pp. 149–150.

to be their real chronological order) there is a progressive grappling with the problems raised by reflective thought. Jeremiah and Ezekiel deny that the children suffer for the sins of their fathers ;[1] the doer of the wrong has to suffer. More stress is laid on the inward disposition and less on the outward act, though it is an error to regard the Law itself as demanding only external morality ; inward love of God and the neighbour is required. As the prophetic view broadens, Israel is regarded as having a mission for which suffering is essential. This culminates in the second part of Isaiah. It is true that the ethical code is only for Jews and proselytes to Judaism. The ideal community is not that of humanity as such, or of the universe as a manifestation of reason, as it was for the Stoics ; but is essentially a divine monarchy which at present includes only a small part of the world. And no doubt at the basis of the most magnificent poetry there is the most unbending fanaticism for the Lord whose name was Jealous. Yet it is worth while to recall, on behalf of the ethics of this theocracy, that, as Havet says : "If the Jews believed firmly that their God loved only Jews, they believed also that he would one day make Jews of all men." [2]

And on one side of Hebrew thought national limitations were really transcended. What is called the "Wisdom-literature" reached a high

[1] Jer. xxxi. 29–30 ; Ezek. xviii. 2–4.
[2] *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, vol. iii. p. 443.

degree of gnomic reflectiveness analogous to the pre-philosophic thought of Greece. The Books of Job and Ecclesiastes go further, and may be compared with the sceptical opposition to Greek theism. The bare possibility of a theodicy was made subject to question. And what is questioned is the universal providential order, not merely whether Israel has rightly or wrongly suffered. There are doubtless in both books, as M. Vernes has noted, touches making us conscious of specifically Jewish religion in the background. Job is imagined as an Arabian practising the religious observances of a proselyte to Judaism. Thus his fortunes represent a possible case at the time when the book was written—that is, in the third century B.C. For all the local colour, however, it seems to me that neither the author of the Book of Job nor the author of Ecclesiastes can have been as a thinker bound within national limitations. The question is posited as clearly as it has ever been, whether the moral law is supreme in the universe. Job, in some ways the highest expression of the Hebrew poetic genius, leaves it insoluble; for we can hardly suppose that the vision of the uncontrollable and irresponsible might of God was meant to be taken for a solution. Ecclesiastes, a later work, seems in many passages to decide positively and finally for an absolute indifference of the nature of things as between good and evil. In both alike there is a total absence of metaphysics, by which no Jewish thinker was touched who had not studied in the

Greek schools; but silently the national religion has given place to pure ethics, for which Jewish law and custom, if they are part of the scenery, are as external as the religious customs of his city to a Greek philosopher.

It was not, however, by its sublimest or profoundest work that Hebraism set going the movement that conquered the Western world. Even the second part of Isaiah, with its vision of all peoples turning to Jerusalem, would have been no more than another piece of literature had it not been for the apocalypses. Immensely inferior as these were in distinctive genius, they brought with them the spark of a popular mythology that could set on fire everything else. In them appeared the figure of the Messiah, the *Christus* or Anointed King, a visible redeemer and bearer of sovereignty. Arising at first, as is thought, in Babylonia, the idea of the Lord's deputy traversed Judæa to pass over to a new empire and civilisation. The new empire, at the stage now reached, was spontaneously returning to the institutions of the East; and of the whole East Judæa, to the Western imagination, began to seem the heir and Jerusalem the most illustrious city.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHRISTIAN ERA

THE obscure early history of the Messianic idea has yet to be investigated in full; but we may take the meaning of it to be that a vicegerent of the supreme God is to bring the world under one rule, as the founders of empires had aspired to do. Thus it could easily coalesce with the idea of a mediator-god. Such a god was Mithra, the Persian Sun-god, who, from a subordinate deity in the old Aryan mythology, had become the centre of a new religious propaganda in which he was represented as passing through a phase of suffering before his triumph. Messianic Judaism connected itself apparently with a popular substratum resembling the Mithraic cult among the Persians. The Messiah or world-conqueror, analogous to the Persian Saoshyant, who may have sprung from the same Babylonian original, could by himself be imagined as realised in a king, a descendant or successor of David, doing God's will on earth. David, in the Latin Vulgate, gives to his predecessor Saul the title of the Lord's *christus*, or anointed, which he afterwards himself bears. But somehow this notion became joined with that of a figure himself supernatural, perhaps

an ancient Semitic deity. The quite unhistorical Book of Joshua, or Jesus as it is in the Greek, transformed one name which there are grounds for regarding as originally that of a supernatural being into the name of a national hero, the leader of the imaginary theocracy that represented the ideals of later Judaism, in a war of extermination against its enemies. So also, it is held by some, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were transformed gods analogous to the Greek heroes. These mythological elements, very imperfectly traceable beneath the official religion, had points of contact with similar popular substrata elsewhere. They were met by analogous worships from Egypt and the non-Jewish East, such as the cults of Isis and Osiris, Adonis or Tammuz, Cybele and Attis. These were associated with animistic ideas that had disappeared more completely in official Judaism than anywhere else. It has long been a commonplace of criticism that the survival of the individual soul plays no part at all in the religion of the Old Testament. The contrast has also become familiar between the Olympian and the Chthonian religions of Greece ; of which the latter was more archaic and popular, and had a far more strongly marked animism. Its animistic side was developed by the Orphic movement. The theory of this as of other new religions was that by mysterious rites, as well as by observing a distinctive code of moral conduct with more or less ascetic features, each soul was to attain a glorified life, as the god, whether called Dionysus

or Osiris, or by some other name, had attained it after his suffering and descent into the underworld. In what precise way all these ideas interacted and came together in the competing religions of the Roman Empire it may never be possible to determine except conjecturally; but we know of the existence of all the strands. We know also from the result that the finally triumphant religion succeeded in representing itself as continuous with the official Judaism which, in its priesthood and its central rites, perished at the capture of Jerusalem and the burning of the Temple by Titus in the year 70 of the Christian era.

The annexation of the Jewish sacred books, however effected, counted enormously towards the success of the new creed, thus linked on to a propaganda going back to the second century B.C. About that time, while Hebrew, the particular Semitic dialect in which the greater part of the Bible is written, was giving place to Aramaic as the spoken language of Judæa, the Bible itself was being translated for the use of the Jews, mostly Greek-speaking, now diffused throughout the Hellenic world. These, while rigorously practising their national rites and refusing to have any part in those of aliens, yet turned to those aliens with the aim of winning them over for their own God and Law. The God of the Jews, every one recognises for this period, was held to be the Maker of heaven and earth. All other dominions, it was now declared in accordance with the pro-

phetic and apocalyptic teaching, must give place to his. And a doctrine of "resurrection from the dead" gradually formed itself, perhaps out of the vestiges of primitive animism aided by Persian and Egyptian ideas, and became in the end so powerful that to the Romans an absolute confidence in the imperishableness of the individual soul appeared to characterise the Jews as it did the Druids of Gaul. Thus for the prophetic vision of triumphant nationality there could be substituted that of a universal community of believers in the religion. The "day of the Lord" of the old prophets was a great day of battle, in which, after the victory, judgment would be executed on the nations that had opposed his chosen people, and the people as then represented on earth would live in joy and dominion. This now became a "last day." All the righteous who had ever lived and accepted the law and its promises were to rise again—with their bodies, according to the materialistic imagination of the apocalyptists—to receive their reward in a new life; while the wicked, marked out by their exclusion from incorporation with the Lord's chosen, would be destroyed or reserved for punishment, either everlasting or for a term. All was set forth in tangible detail, though the details differed in different apocalypses. What was needed to enable the imagination to seize men's minds was a condition of the world that could furnish the contributory circumstances from without.

Before turning to these, it is desirable to sum up the general effect of that Judaism in which the next form of Western religion was to find its official antecedents. We may take the statement of it from the Apology of Josephus, written, some time after the destruction of Jerusalem, against the rhetorician Apion, one of the "anti-Semites" of antiquity.

The word invented by Josephus to describe the system to outsiders is theocracy.[1] This has since been extended to describe at once the more ancient systems of the East that had preceded Judaism and the system of mediæval Europe that took it for its model. A brief summary of the statements of Josephus will show how the Judaic form of it was, as compared with the relation between State and religion in classical antiquity, a reversion to an older type, while nevertheless Judaism itself bore the marks of what Comte has called the "revolutionary transition." Both characters were essential to the prestige it exercised. For the world was undergoing a cyclical change; and yet, as all now admit, no return of an old order can ever bring back that order precisely as it was.

With the art of the apologist, Josephus puts in the forefront the monotheistic idea which Judaism has in common with the religious philosophy of the Greeks; but, he says, the philosophers taught their higher view of God only to a few, whereas Moses aimed at making his doctrine

[1] *Contra Apionem*, ii. 16.

universal in the nation. And under this doctrine everything is systematised. For theocracy differs from other conceptions of the order of the State in bringing all the moral virtues under religion. These cannot be regarded independently of the fundamental dogma; nor can religious piety be treated as merely one virtue among others. In other legislative systems, thinking about the conduct of life and the practice of it as mere custom have been separated, some taking for their province one and some the other; but our legislator left not the smallest point to individual choice.[1] Other peoples do not even know their own laws in common, but have to consult experts; whereas any Jew, if one were to ask him, could more easily tell all the laws than his own name. Among the rest, all sorts of opinions may be heard, not only casually from any one you meet, but from philosophers; some of whom have endeavoured to get rid of the very being of God, while others deny his providence over men. Hence the accusation that the Jews have discovered nothing new. But this, Josephus maintains, is really a credit to them. "For the others think it a distinction to adhere to none of their paternal customs, and celebrate the wonderful cleverness of those who have had the daring to transgress them most. We, on the contrary, hold it for a principle that there is only one wisdom and one virtue; and that is, neither to

1 *Contra Apionem*, ii. 17: *οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν βραχυτάτων αὐτεξούσιον ἐπὶ ταῖς βουλήσεσι τῶν χρησομένων κατέλιπεν.*

do nor to think anything whatever opposed to the laws laid down from the beginning. . . . And what could be fairer or more just than to hold that God is the ruler of the whole of things, and to commit to the priests in common the regulation of the highest interests, entrusting the chief priest of all with the direction of the other priests ? " [1]

On one side this strikingly recalls the comments ascribed by Plato to the Egyptian priest whom Solon visited, upon the eternal childlike curiosity of the Greeks and the absence among them of anything venerable from antiquity ; but there is another side. The conservatism of sacerdotal government, which Josephus holds up as the ideal, was indeed fundamental to theocracy, as it might have been generalised from Egypt or Babylon. And the Jews were undoubtedly reviving that apparently outworn order in a militant form. Yet with its reawakening there has come something else. Knowledge in detail of the sacred law is now not simply for the priests, but for all the people. The priests are only administrators. The idea of the Pact between the people and its God has had its effect in producing something which, if it is not in the political sense democracy, is at any rate far removed from the conception of the priestly caste in the older civilisations. These could not by their religion survive the destruction of their outward institutions, as Judaism did not only in its successors but in itself.

[1] *Contra Apionem*, ii. 20.

I agree indeed with the view upheld by Mr. Benn in his *Revaluations*, that in the Hebrew literature, including the Prophets, there is nothing that can be rightly called either socialism or democracy. As articulate doctrines, both democracy and socialism are of Græco-Roman origin. It is true that in the Prophets and the Psalms there is a literature of the poor and oppressed; but, as Mr. Benn shows, no demand is made for equality of rights or for social reconstruction, but only for the carrying out of the law, which remained in its ideal, as in fact, a priestly code, by the rich and powerful. Yet even this, when the books became widely diffused, gave Hebraism a sort of revolutionary tinge. And if so far there was nothing but emotion, powerless without a body of ideas, the Jews had at any rate behind their insurgence against the order of decadent antiquity one distinctive principle held with a spirit not to be broken. Whatever they may have contributed afterwards, by the religion that claimed them as its ancestors, to rebuild the monarchico-theocratic order in Europe, their ideal of the direct government of the people by its God compelled them to oppose, with an obstinacy that nothing else could have given, the deification of kings, taken over from Asia and Egypt by the Macedonian monarchies, and afterwards by the Roman Empire. There are no passages in Ezekiel or Isaiah more impressive than the outbursts of exultation over the divine king of Egypt or of Babylon lying in the world of the dead surrounded

by slain men, though he thought that he was a god and not a man. Under the contemptuous tolerance of philosophy the system of apotheosis might have gone on for ever. It was one of those things that intolerant fanaticism is needed to destroy.

Thus it is not without reason that near the end of the historical literature the author of the Book of Ezra, in the form of a letter from adversaries, pays Jerusalem the compliment of treating it as notoriously, to the despots of Asia, "the rebellious and the bad city." "So shalt thou find in the book of the records," its enemies write to the Great King, "and know that this city is a rebellious city, and hurtful unto kings and provinces, and that they have moved sedition within the same of old time: for which cause was this city destroyed."[1] After the final destruction by Titus, however, it is interesting to observe that the heathen historian, Dio Cassius, did more justice to the heroic resistance of the Jews than Josephus, who, devoted as he remained to his ancestral religion, had in fact deserted the cause of his countrymen.[2]

But again there is another side to the case. The revival of a decaying order has inevitably something we can only call reactionary which that order had not in itself. The priesthoods of Egypt and Babylonia were in their time the repositories of knowledge. Thus their total system

[1] Ezra iv. 12–15.
[2] *Cf.* Th. Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains, etc.*, p. 195, *n.* 3.

included principles of intellectual direction for the administration of civilised life.[1] With the Jews, on the other hand, as soon as religion, transplanted from the old order, becomes a specialised thing, we can see in it the principle of what was long afterwards called the "Kingdom of Darkness." Made by priestly legislators the speciality of a nation relatively barbarous, it is as if purposely set against light and civilisation. There is evident a tendency to insist on the harsher and sterner side of "natural religion," such as we find in modern reactionaries who know in their hearts that reason and humanity are against them. Almost at the beginning of the Book of Genesis we perceive an unmistakable intention to maintain firmly the principle of blood-sacrifice as against the milder commutations which may already have been coming into use in civilisations so old as those of Egypt and Babylonia.

"Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering unto the Lord.

"And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering :

"But unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect."[2]

In view of this, it is noteworthy that Apion, among other things, made it a reproach to the Jews that they sacrificed animals. Coming from

1 In this it was an anticipation of Comte's ideal "Catholicism." The resemblance may enable us to understand his preference of the name to that of Christianity.

2 Gen. iv. 3–5.

a rhetorician, who of course only said what he thought would tell, the accusation indicates that in the first century of the Christian era the Neo-Pythagorean campaign against blood-offerings was making way, so that an attack on the sanguinary rites of the Temple would meet with popular sympathy.[1] We know how the story of Cain was treated later by Byron and the romantics in revolt, as distinguished from the romantic reactionaries. In their version, it was by an act of vengeance from the divine malevolence that the protester against the cruelties and tyrannies of the Lord God became the first manslayer.[2] When we turn to the Book of Genesis itself, we find that the arts of life are treated in a tone of religious contempt as the inventions of the descendants of Cain, the evil race; while of the good race, descended from Seth, we are told that in their days "began men to call upon the name of the Lord."[3]

Recognition, however, is due to the humanity of some precepts in the Mosaic law concerning animal life. And, if we look upon that law as a deliberately constructed code, not a mere growth, we shall be inclined to see in the precepts more than ancient "taboos." Doubtless they may

[1] Th. Reinach (*op. cit.*, p. 134) supposes that Apion was a Stoic, but this would not explain an objection taken against animal sacrifices.

[2] Compare the words of the resuscitated Cain to the shade of Abel in Leconte de Lisle's poem:

O victime, tu sais le sinistre dessein
D'Iahvèh m'aveuglant du feu de sa colère.
L'iniquité divine est ton seul assassin.

Poemes Barbares, "Qaïn."

[3] Gen. iv. 26.

have had their remote origin in taboo; but the legislators, in preserving one thing and rejecting another, showed humane intention. Porphyry, in his books against flesh-eating and animal sacrifices, gave the Jewish legislation credit for this. His citing the precepts for praise may be set against Schopenhauer's depreciation. It would have been well if on this point the Christian Church had followed its Jewish predecessors instead of the Stoics, who, on the ground that animals are not rational beings, denied that any regard is due to them.

So we might go on through a whole series of antitheses; but it is time now to return to the state of the Western world when the Jewish and afterwards the Christian propaganda began to spread over it. To understand its preparedness, we must run rapidly through the stages of its outward life from the end of the Persian War.

How clearly conscious of its progress the younger world could become for a moment may be seen in a passage of the *Eumenides* of Æschylus, where Apollo as the Hellenic god of light drives out the Furies from his temple, telling them to go where mutilations and sanguinary tortures and stonings to death are practised.[1] Curiously, Æschylus has been looked upon as a prejudiced conservative; just as we are now in many quarters expected to regard Tacitus in the same way because he did not welcome the divine advent

1 *Eum.* 186–190. The passage itself has unfortunately been mutilated.

of autocracy, with its accompaniment of millionaire-freedmen, court-eunuchs, and court-poisoners. Æschylus, however, recognises that the Furies cannot be utterly expelled, but are there to wait on failure in doing the right. Now the Greeks, and afterwards the Romans, did not in working out their institutions fulfil the first promises of a higher social type. Their problems being beyond their power, the immemorial past, with its chastisements, had to return for a season. And this, it must be added, is so far much more a warning than a ground of complacency to the later modern world that has emerged from the wreck.

The clue to the cyclical change, though there were many other conditions, is that the only alternative to perpetual wars was an empire; that an empire could only be held together by monarchy; and that a monarchy, for the bond of overawing belief that could subdue men's minds, needed a theocratic religion. There had been a time undoubtedly when the institution of directive kingship was an advance. At one stage it was the means of breaking down or preventing the formation of an unalterably fixed hierarchical system of caste. Yet the time soon came, in Asia as afterwards in Christian Europe, when the compromise thought normal in the eighteenth century, the union of priest and king, issued in the most deadly form of absolutism. And everywhere, when once the republican polity has been achieved, monarchy can only be

regarded, inevitable though it may be, as a political lapse. Now in antiquity some attempts were made at empire under a republic, but these failed. To the attempt of Athens justice has never quite been done historically on the imperial side. Its exclusiveness as compared with that of Rome is no doubt rightly blamed in view of the practical problem to be solved for the immediate future; but the refusal to lose, by incorporating subjects, the absolute power of self-direction in Athens itself, meant after all a resolution to preserve the higher type of political life. Though the comparison of England to Rome is more usual, and is justified in some respects, the Athenian had, in common with the British Empire, not only the external feature that it depended on sea-power, but also the persistent retention of a characteristic and individual life at the centre. Athens never became the mere centre of an empire-State, but remained a free State presiding over an empire.[1] And, as Sir Alfred Lyall has pointed out after the experience of a distinguished Indian administrator, the unified national State (of which the city-State may be regarded as one variety on a smaller and more finished scale) is a higher political organism than the sort of composite unity called imperial. To imperial I think we may add federal. A federal league delimiting powers between the imperial and the local legisla-

[1] Both Havet and Eduard Meyer, whom I have had so much occasion to refer to all along, and who as foreign observers may be considered impartial, find the nearest modern analogue of Pericles in the great English parliamentary statesmen.

tures could never have meant for the world what historic Athens did. Unfortunately, the Greek conception of the right of each city to a position of autonomous sovereignty made the mildest dominion of the presiding State technically a "tyranny." Thus the sense of injustice in the subject Hellenic cities helped the rivals of Athens to destroy her hegemony; but with its collapse the brightest episode in ancient history came to an end. After it followed "discord, Macedon, and Rome." The Macedonian Empire founded by Philip and Alexander was essentially monarchical, and broke up into a group of monarchies. Yet, easily as we may understand the Greek resistance to Philip which was urged by Demosthenes, the presidency initiated by him both left room for and actually promoted what was then the only practicable form of progress, namely, the diffusion of Hellenic culture. The Greek States had ceased to do anything but wear each other out in perpetual wars. In the new political order, both under the Macedonians and the Romans, philosophy was the antiseptic of the Greek world, and secured to it the intellectual direction of the West as long as the ancient civilisation lasted. The political decline, however, was irreversible. Rome, after taking up for a time the republican succession, organising its conquests under the aristocratic government of the Senate, which it tried to combine with an urban democracy, passed definitely under monarchy before the end of the first century B.C.,

and thus opened the last phase of the ancient world.

The Roman type, as compared with the Greek or Athenian, has been called "half-civilisation," and we may observe the contrast in one conspicuous case. The gladiatorial shows, it is now known, were not put an end to by Christianity. The Christian doctors followed those ancient moralists who condemned them; but, for all that, they were exhibited whenever they could be afforded till the Western Empire came to an end. Athens, on the other hand, even in the time of decadence, refused to receive them; though it is related that the intervention of a philosopher was sometimes necessary to prevent their gaining a footing. Now those exhibitions probably arose out of the funeral sacrifices of the pre-Aryan and theocratically minded Etruscans, from whom Rome derived its culture before it came in contact with Greece. The background of a gloomier religion seems, however, to have given the Roman governing and literary class a more strenuous antipathy to the superstition which it did not feel itself able to dispense with in public life; and, under the aristocratic rule of the republican period, private freethought was safer than it had been under the Athenian democracy. In the imperial monarchy, during its pre-Christian period, the same freedom was on the whole preserved; but from a very early time symptoms of the slow change that was to lead to the next phase are perceptible.

These symptoms may be noticed in passing from Lucretius to Virgil. It is a quite sustainable position, not only that, as Mr. Benn says,[1] "in positive knowledge, Virgil greatly excelled Lucretius," but also that Virgil's philosophy, as such, is superior. He does not, of course, show the power of argumentatively working out a single system as a whole and in detail, and he seems to fluctuate between different views. On the other hand, he never falls under the illusion of imagining that a physical hypothesis can furnish an ultimate explanation in philosophy. Each view that he suggests has a meaning in metaphysical terms, and even the differences seem to correspond to inevitable and perhaps permanent doubts about the ultimate constitution of reality. Is the inner principle of all things a kind of universal sentiency, or is it something analogous to intellectual direction? Does the individual mind emerge from the common ground of the animated universe to be reabsorbed into it, or are there separate souls that go through successive stages of life, preserving their identity? Passages might be found to illustrate any of these answers, but none to illustrate mechanicism pure and simple. Now I do not think this idealism is a sign or a source of reaction. John Scotus Erigena and Giordano Bruno, who were inspired by it, were as far as possible from being reactionaries. Bruno deliberately preferred the doctrine of "the Pythagorean poet" to that of Lucretius,

[1] *The Greek Philosophers* (1882), vol. ii. p. 205.

whom he admired and resembled in temper. And, if we estimate Virgil by tone of feeling generally, he illustrates perhaps better than any one the kind of progress that makes the latter part of the ancient world appear so modern in its refinements. Yet, as compared with Lucretius, he is undoubtedly in some ways reactionary; and this is a symptom of the change that partly produced and was partly produced by the new monarchy. While Lucretius rises to his greatest height of indignant eloquence in denouncing the sacrifice of Iphigenia, Virgil carefully introduces, as part of his imitative archæological detail, a sacrifice of captives by Æneas at the funeral of Pallas. Homer, in the time of rising humanism, had given to the traditional sacrifice of the Trojan prisoners by Achilles the least space possible. His successor, living in an age that inherited all the centuries of humanist civilisation, but in a time of royalist and sacerdotal revival, makes the pious Æneas a religious hero analogous to the pious Abraham, whose faith, however, was shown by his willingness to offer up a victim not in the end demanded by the God who had put him to the test.

If closely examined, the later books of the *Æneid* offer some analogy with the national epic of the Hebrew patriarchs and the return of the descendants of Jacob to Palestine. The legends embodied in both were taken up comparatively late with a "pragmatic" aim. As a natural consequence, they are much more remote from

fact than those that formed the traditional material of the far more brilliantly and spontaneously imaginative Greeks. Since recent discoveries, we know that there actually was a Siege of Troy; but it is as little likely that we shall ever discover traces of Israel in Egypt as that we shall be able to follow the stages by which a Trojan colony passed over to Latium. The brilliant historian Ferrero, who often combines common sense with paradox, has very plausibly conjectured that Iulus, as the name for the son of Æneas, may have been simply an invention of Julius Cæsar to glorify his ancestors. At first, as we know from the opening of the poem of Lucretius, it was not the Cæsars, but the Romans generally, who were called the "Æneadæ."

I have just referred to the author of *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, recently translated into English. By citation of one or two points in his work, it will be possible to give very briefly the indications necessary as to the character of the period we are reviewing. These indications will be the more effective because Ferrero seems to regard the early principate as a sincere attempt to revive the republic as far as that was practicable, and not merely to disguise the monarchy under republican forms. Now I accept the view that attaches great importance to the preservation of those forms. It meant that the literature and modes of feeling of the republican period were consecrated in the system of education for the rest of what we call pagan antiquity. Yet, if

Augustus and Tiberius fully understood the necessity for compromise, it does not follow at all that they were sincere republicans, but only that they were able and prudent men who had learnt the lesson of the Ides of March. Without the successful conspiracy against Julius Cæsar, I do not see how this necessity could have been made visible. Cæsar himself, unless the tradition is wrong, was in sentiment and principle a Cæsarean royalist. This was the justification of what Comte calls the act of "metaphysical fanaticism and aristocratic rage." The Roman aristocracy, in spite of its faults, was defending the freedom that remained in the world. And, after Philippi, the tyrannicides still alive were hunted down and put to death as slayers of a quasi-divine person, like the English regicides at the Restoration. Both modes of ideal feeling existed, the republican and the royalist; but in the age of Augustus the former belonged to the past and the latter to the future.[1] The party that Ferrero calls conservative was therefore at the time the party that was resisting a decadence.

Still, in so far as it desired to preserve ancient privilege, it was the natural support of an authoritative order. And therefore the very argument that Ferrero uses to show that Augustus could

[1] *Cf.* Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, vol. ii. (3rd ed., 1880), pp. 192–193: "En un mot ce que nous appelons volontiers l'esprit du moyen âge était déjà celui de cette brillante époque, prise dans son fond; ce fond est recouvert pour nous par l'éclat d'une élite qui fait l'histoire et qui la remplit, mais il s'étend profondément au-dessous d'elle, et elle-même n'en est pas absolument dégagée. C'est sur ce fond que le christianisme a poussé."

not be aiming at the foundation of a monarchy can be turned precisely to prove that he was. By his social legislation, the argument runs, he attempted to restore the vigour of the aristocracy.[1] But in what way? By restriction of the right of candidature for office to citizens with a property qualification of at least 400,000 sesterces. "Thus the political career which had been open to the poorer citizens for a century was now closed; the old timocratic and aristocratic constitution was restored; political posts which had formerly been open to such men as Ventidius, the muleteer, were now declared to be the privilege of the moneyed classes; government became the monopoly of an aristocracy which, though degenerate, idle, and disunited, was none the less legally defined. It was a decision which concluded a century of terrible struggle, and which might inaugurate a new order of things; none the less, it was received with such universal indifference that our knowledge of it depends upon a few lines written at a later date by a historian who attached no great importance to the event." In a note the author adds: "The only allusion, curiously enough, that I have found to this reform is in the *Amores* of Ovid: *Curia pauperibus clausa est. Dat census honores.*"[2] Then on the next page he proceeds: "Finally, the prætors were allowed to expend, when they wished, three times the amount allocated to them from the

[1] *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, vol. v. chap. iii.: "The Great Social Laws of the Year 18 B.C."

[2] *Op. cit.*, vol. v. p. 74.

treasury upon the public games. The sumptuary law forbade the rich to display their wealth in their own houses, but the public had every right to amusement in the streets and in the theatre. Here we see the new democratic spirit which became obvious at Rome after the restoration of the moneyed aristocracy, a spirit which Augustus was well able to satisfy." I hope the irony in the last sentence is intentional; but is not the whole method that which would be adopted by one who desired to found a stable monarchy where it did not already exist? We see that it was really the aristocracy during the conflicts of the republican period that had thrown the career open to talents. Under the peace of the monarchy, after the proscriptions, what remained of the former governing class was to be cherished as no longer dangerous, but capable of serving as a mediating element in the graded hierarchy of which kingship is the summit. Political apathy, and popular interest in ceremonial display, were circumstances favourable to this new order. These, with the plutocratical qualification for membership of the directing classes, are precisely what a modern reactionary would desire. For each order, republican or monarchical, has a certain organic character; and the modes of public sentiment on which it was based when new tend to preserve it when old. The historian in the end recognises quite clearly what the result was. In a chapter on "The Altar of Augustus and of Rome" he tells us how "Augustus became a god and a monarch

in Gaul as in the East. On August 1 of the year 10 B.C. were laid the foundations of that European monarchy which remains almost intact at the present day."[1] It might have been added that modern France, inheriting the character of pioneer, has been the first great European nation to cast the system definitely aside.

Often with modern historians the Cæsarean monarchy gets credit for the humaner legislation that followed the development of philosophical ethics. This humaner legislation did indeed go on, but rather through a kind of *vis inertiæ* of progress once started than through monarchical direction. If it was actively promoted from the centre, that was in the reformed empire, due to the senatorial revival of the second century with its return to republican ideals. How little the monarchical system as such told in favour of humanity may be seen in an incident related by Tacitus, which no one who has read it can forget. In A.D. 61, in the reign of Nero, an old law requiring the execution of the whole household of slaves when the master had been murdered by one of them was carried out in spite of popular risings by the personal intervention of the monarch and under the protection of the imperial guards.[2] It is true that he did not consent further to the banishing of all the freedmen who had been under the same roof, as was proposed by Cingonius

1 *Op. cit.*, vol. v. p. 212.

2 Tac., *Ann.* xiv. 45: "Tum Cæsar populo edicto increpuit atque omne iter quo damnati ad pœnam ducebantur militaribus præsidiis sæpsit."

Varro—himself afterwards put to death without trial by order of Galba ; but we learn that, while the custom of wholesale execution had existed in republican times, its severity had already been increased under the monarchy by successive decrees in A.D. 10 and 57.[1]

And yet the fact is indisputable that the imperial monarchy of Rome always retained the marks of popular origin. Its pedigree went back to the tribunes of the Roman *plebs*. Julius Cæsar, its founder both real and titular, while fundamentally a man of kingly and even papal authority, began as a revolutionary chief and became the leader of the democratic party. That the impress remained even in the Byzantine period, after all the consecrations taken over from old and new religions, has been shown by Professor Bury in his recent lecture on *The Constitution of the Later Roman Empire*.[2] The result he arrives at is that even in its last stage, in spite of the growing tendency to legitimism with its theory of divine right, "the Roman autocracy had definite restrictions which must be described as constitutional" ; just as, "in what is miscalled a limited monarchy, the king may have legal rights which it would be unconstitutional to exercise."

[1] See the notes to *Ann.* xiv. 42–45 (with a reference to xiii. 32) in Furneaux' edition (vol. ii., revised by Pelham and Fisher, 1907). In 9 B.C., Ferrero relates, giving a reference to Dion, lv. 5, Augustus approved the passing of a law which authorised the torture of slaves in lawsuits aimed at their masters ; adding that, according to Dion, many people objected to the law. (*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, vol. v. p. 219.) For illustration of the impression made by autocracy on enlightened men who actually administered the Empire, see Appendix, Note A.

[2] Published at Cambridge, 1910.

Thus when, three or four centuries later, the changes we associate with the Christian era were accomplished, it was not Oriental religion and monarchy in their older form that had triumphed over the higher order signified by philosophy and republic, but revolutionary monarchy and revolutionary religion.[1] For a century or so on either side of the arbitrary dividing line, the people chiefly known as propagandists were the Jews and their proselytes. And the name of Christianity came, though not from orthodox Judaism, yet from its offshoot Messianism, of which it is a rendering in Latinised Greek. In what precise manner the new religion assumed the form which we know with growing clearness from the second century onward can only be conjecturally determined. We are confronted with a sacred canon of which the data, be they historical or legendary or mythical, are absolutely unverifiable from external sources for the first century called Christian. And that century was a literary age. Over what period the composition of the canonical literature itself extends is disputed. Some com-

[1] The first to grasp the possibility of completing the monarchical by a corresponding religious revolution seems to have been the Syrian youth whose name, identified with that of his God, is known to history as Heliogabalus or, more correctly, Elagabalus. See the thought-provoking study by Mr. J. S. Hay (with an introduction by Professor Bury) entitled *The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus* (1911). The sole or supreme God was to have borne the name of a Semitic deity worshipped at Emesa, unrepresented by statues, but having for service a gorgeous ritual and the slaughter of innumerable victims. As the reign of Elagabal's High-Priest began in 218 and ended in 222, this attempt at monotheistic unification was nearly a hundred years earlier than the first edict of Constantine in favour of the Christians (313).

petent scholars may be found who place its earliest portions before the year 70, when Jerusalem was destroyed, while others do not allow that anything had received approximately its present form before 120. That nearly all the component parts of the New Testament as we have it now were in existence about 150 is generally allowed. The relations between the Christians and the Roman Empire are unknown till the second century, when a few passing references to them in classical writers, beginning with Tacitus, show that they are hostile.[1] This hostility continued with intermissions till Christianity was adopted as the State-religion in the reign of Constantine, early in the fourth century; but any persecution to which it was subject must have been on the whole very slight compared with the severe persecutions of mediæval and even modern times. As Havet puts it: "It would be absurd to imagine, under the Inquisition, synagogues or Protestant churches constituted as the Christian Church was constituted under the Cæsars: having publicly chiefs, an organisation, finances; brethren coming to aid their brethren in their dungeons; apologists writing and spreading abroad eloquent discourses to prove that their faith ought to be respected."[2]

[1] Who the supposed "Christians" put to death in the reign of Nero were has been found puzzling by ecclesiastics as well as others. Dean Merivale suggested that they were in part Messianic Jews of a fanatical type, who could plausibly be accused of incendiarism, and with whom the real Christians may have been mixed up. In *The Origins of Christianity* (p. 23) I have argued that they were entirely such, Christianity in our sense being not yet existent.

[2] *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, vol. iv. p. 483.

The apologists themselves recognised that without the Empire their propaganda would have been in vain. The Christians as a new race, they said, and the Empire had arisen about the same time. This was part of the providential order. And it was to the chiefs, to Cæsar himself, as they were accustomed to express it, that they appealed. For they too, popular and revolutionary as they might be in origin, were in essence men of authority. From the beginning of their literature they advised those who accepted their teachings to be "subject unto the higher powers." "For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God." So it was written in words that purported to have been addressed by their great Apostle to the Christians of Rome.

In relation to my present thesis, it is unnecessary to enter at large into the controversies about the beginnings of Christianity. I have written on the subject in a separate work, in which I have tried to combine the position of the late Professor van Manen, that the Pauline Epistles are pseudepigrapha, with Mr. J. M. Robertson's theory that the Gospel-story is in its basis mythical. To those views I adhere; but for the immediate purpose an attitude of sceptical reserve as to the personality of the founder and the authorship of the apostolic literature would suffice. This is on the whole the position of M. Salomon Reinach, who concludes that about the historical Jesus nothing can be affirmed[1]; but that Christianity,

[1] *Orpheus* (1909), 6th ed., p. 332: "Le Jésus historique est propre-

with its rival Mithraism, had its source, at least in part, in old Asiatic religions having for their essential characters the sacrifice of the god and the sacrament or communion.[1]

Here I am concerned mainly, not with the sacrificial and sacramental side of the religion, but with the side on which it connected itself with official Judaism, and claimed to appropriate the theistic philosophy and the philosophical ethics of the Græco-Roman world. For it is on this side that it takes rank as one of the higher religions. Now for the combination of these monotheistic and philosophical elements with the cult there was no need of a unique personality. In fact, it is historically certain that the structure was mostly built up by men of the type of theological doctors, from Paul and John (or the Pauline and Johannine writers) to the Fathers and the Schoolmen. What was primarily needed was no doubt a concrete story to serve as a centre and to impress the popular imagination. The important thing, however, was not that this should be true, but only that it should be placed

ment insaisissable, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il n'ait pas existé, mais simplement que nous ne pouvons rien affirmer à son sujet, faute de témoignages remontant sans conteste à ceux qui l'ont vu ou entendu." *Cf.* p. 577: "Le Christ tel qu'il a pu exister et enseigner nous est inaccessible; nous n'avons devant nous d'autre réalité concrète que le christianisme, qui s'est divisé en sectes hostiles." In an article included in *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, M. Reinach finds himself obliged to maintain that the Crucifixion is mythical. See vol. ii., 2nd ed. (1909), pp. 437–442 ("Le verset 17 du Paume xxii").

[1] *Orpheus*, p. 103: "La conclusion qui s'impose, c'est que le christianisme et le mithraïsme ont pour source commune, en partie du moins, une ou plusieurs de ces vieilles religions asiatiques dont nous ne connaissons que les formes relativement modernes et qui avaient pour caractères essentiels le sacrifice du dieu et la communion."

beyond the reach of tangible disproof. Whether the belief that the Jewish Messiah had come, and his identification with the sacrificed god who rose again from the dead, took form at first among Jews or in the Hellenistic fringes of the Jewish world, it is perhaps impossible to say. Many Jewish and other points of contact for it have been suggested by Mr. Robertson. Of these I am now inclined to think that the most plausible is the actual fate of the last legitimate King of the Jews—Antigonus, the representative of the Hasmonæan line of high-priests and kings, who was attached to a cross, scourged, and beheaded by order of Mark Antony in the interests of Herod in 37 B.C.[1] In whatever way the story may have originated,[2] it is doubtful whether there was ever any appreciable following of the new sect among the Jews themselves. There is nothing to show that any of the writers of the New Testament were Jews, though the author of the Apocalypse used fragments of Jewish writings. It is now known that the Greek in which the books are written was on the whole the vernacular Greek of the period, coloured by the use of the Septuagint, but not having in itself anything specially Jewish. This has been made out by

[1] See the passage from Dio Cassius cited by Th. Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains, etc.*, pp. 186–187. Antigonus, it is related, was the first king to be thus executed by the Romans: compare the passage from Strabo cited at p. 94.

[2] Havet, though not going the length of the mythical theory, would account very simply for the belief that the Messiah had appeared. See *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, vol. iv. p. 2: "A force de l'attendre, on finit par croire qu'il avait paru."

investigations of the papyri discovered in Egypt and containing specimens of the familiar interchange of daily life. To write Greek of the classical tradition at that time needed an education in the schools of rhetoric ; and if any of the New Testament writers had this, as they may have had, they for the most part disguised it. The Septuagint itself being predominantly in vernacular Greek, the style of composition of the new sacred literature was fixed by that of the old. Origen compares the procedure of the evangelists to what Plato's might have been had he tried to make himself like a Syrian or an Egyptian in order to win those of inferior culture for philosophic truth.

In tracing out the relation of Christianity to Greece and Judæa, we have always to remember, of course, that there is much in the Christian story not properly either Hellenic or Hebraic, but appealing primordially to the miscellaneous new populations incorporated in the Roman Empire. King-worship and existing Asiatic cults had their influence. The name itself of Jesus Christ, there is reason to suppose, was that of an ancient Semitic god, combined with the title of the Jewish Messiah translated into Greek.[1] By the drama of the Crucifixion,[2] the figure had been mysteriously yet effectively brought down to earth.

[1] Compare, on the positions of Professor W. B. Smith, Appendix, Note B.

[2] Incidentally, Havet narrowly missed the modern theory which makes the story a transcript of a Mystery Play. See *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, iv. p. 260. The narrator of the Passion, he says, " n'a pas pris plus de peine qu'on n'en prend dans une pièce de théâtre pour s'assujettir aux conditions extérieures de la vie."

We can infer from the literature, whichever of the alternative dates we adopt, that by the end of the first century the Christ was worshipped with the attributes of High-Priest, King, Son of God, Saviour, God Manifest, while none the less seeming to realise by his sufferings the symbolic imagination of the ideally just man persecuted, as set forth by Plato in the *Republic*. At the same time, it must be again repeated, there were doctors resolute to lose nothing formally of the Jewish monotheism, and to incorporate all the heathen wisdom of which they could not deny the value. As in the case of Judaism, we cannot succeed in getting back to a stage of inchoate belief before the construction of the elementary dogma. The dogmatic system, indeed, became far more elaborate as time went on; but there is a definite structure from the first. How this came to exist is matter of inference and conjecture, not of direct knowledge.

That is to say, we have no direct knowledge of the first coalescence of the group of practices and beliefs that formed the Christian ritual and dogma. On the other hand, much knowledge exists of the elements by means of which the formation becomes explicable, and that knowledge is increasing. There are, of course, the Jewish and Judæo-Christian apocalypses, which, under new points of view, will doubtless yield more light. And, most important of all as it now appears, there is the literature of the Hellenistic mysteries. Upon this in relation to Christianity,

the recent investigations of Dieterich[1] and of Reitzenstein[2] have taken, or are taking, classical rank. The total result is to give new precision to the view that the primeval element in Christianity was a cult, and that its ritual ideas belong to the part of it that has been described as neither Hellenic nor Hebraic, but Hellenistic. To call them Hellenistic in the specialised sense means that their substance is that of the non-Jewish propagandist religions of the East, bearing the stamp of a Greek terminology. This terminology is technical in its own manner, yet quite distinct from that of philosophy. So far as it could be investigated in Judæo-Christian literature, its distinctive characters had been pretty carefully made out from the philosophical side, and its interaction shown with the terminology of philosophy in the later patristic period.[3] What the new investigations have made manifest is that the usages of Jewish and Christian writers constitute only a particular case within a far wider realm of religious thought. Before Christian Gnosticism and the kindred Jewish developments, there was a generalised Oriental "gnosis." This might for special schools or thinkers go altogether beyond ritual, but it took its start from the ritual ideas involved in the cults of Isis, Attis, Dionysus, Adonis, and especially in that of Mithras, which

[1] A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie* (2nd ed., 1910).

[2] R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterien-religionen, ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen* (1910).

[3] In Siebeck's *Geschichte der Psychologie* (i. 2, 1884) the senses of πνεῦμα in Philo and in the Pauline writings are brought clearly into view.

first became prominent at the time when we know authentically that Christianity did, namely, in the second century of our era.[1] The ideas common to these rituals, of the death and resurrection of the god, the sacrament by which his resurrection (as first his death) was participated in, and the "rebirth" that was the process to immortality, were not Jewish at all.[2] And the "gnosis" by which the ritual ideas were to be grasped (or later transcended) never meant rational knowledge, as in philosophy, but always supernatural illumination. The knowledge sought is, in the full expression of which "gnosis" is the abbreviated form, knowledge of God (γνῶσις θεοῦ). Thus out of the popular religions there had sprung what we may call in general terms a search after "enlightenment"; but it was an enlightenment understood with a difference. It was, as we should put it, a theosophy rather than a philosophy. In reality, it was only for the few within the religious communities, and it was in intention guarded from the profane as philosophy never was.[3] Yet it can be correctly said that the central position acquired by the new elements absorbed into Christianity was the result of a "revolution from below."[4] Association between philosophical enlightenment and the politically organised civic

1 *Cf.* Dieterich, *op. cit.*, p. 46: "Nach 100 erst beginnt die stärkere und alsbald rapide Ausbreitung des Mithrasdienstes."

2 More guardedly, it ought perhaps to be said, not officially Jewish.

3 The authors I am referring to do not state this explicitly; but illustrations of the point of view are not infrequent in the New Testament.

4 Dieterich, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–108.

cults gave place to the beginnings of an alliance between the rising monarchies and the religious feeling of the masses.[1] The principal, though not the only, source for the Christian form of this gnosis, this "wisdom among the perfect,"[2] which rises above the popular religions, yet springs out of them by a series of stages, is the Pauline epistolary literature. Paul, as both Dieterich and Reitzenstein find, moves essentially in the circle of ideas which has been recovered for us in its "heathen" form in the Hermetic literature and in the "magical" papyri.[3] It is on this side that explanation is to be sought, the Christian ideas being, not original, but derivative. "For the chief propositions of Pauline as of Johannine theology, in any case the basis of Judaism is wanting."[4]

Although I had not thought of returning here to the question as to the authorship of the Pauline Epistles, I cannot help remarking how much these researches confirm retrospectively the position I have adopted from Van Manen. And the confirmation becomes all the stronger because the

1 Reitzenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

2 *Cf.* 1 Cor. ii. 6: *σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις.*

3 This literature, as a whole, is assigned to a period from about the opening of the Christian era to a time not later than 300.

4 Dieterich, *op. cit.*, p. 179; *cf.* Reitzenstein, pp. 57–58. Schopenhauer has drawn attention to the singularly un-Jewish character of an expression in the Epistle of James, "the wheel of birth" (*τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως*, iii. 6), to which he would ascribe an Indian origin. This, however, is also Orphic: compare Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*. The literature of Orphism might be described as an early phase of the gnosis. And the true account of the origin of Indian philosophy as an independent movement may be that it, too, began in a kind of gnosis, which got free instead of becoming subjected to Church and creed as in the West.

writers apparently do not know or have not been interested in the newer Dutch criticism, but take for granted that the author of the Epistles was the Jew of Tarsus. Yet a considerable part of Van Manen's case was the influence evident in them of what he also called the "non-Jewish Eastern gnosis." It might indeed be suggested as a possible answer that, since the sources of this gnosis are by the new researches traced further back, the historical Paul[1] of the first century may very well have been a recipient of the influence. To this the reply is that the Paul who wrote the doctrinal parts of the Epistles had not merely been influenced by the Hellenistic Oriental gnosis, but was absolutely steeped in it. He thinks in its terms, and—as experts in Rabbinic literature, as if to complete the case, have told us from the other side—not at all as an orthodox Jew of that or any time could ever have thought. This means that the framework of the Epistles is incompatible with their contents; for in them Paul is made to describe himself, just as in the Acts of the Apostles, as a Jew of the Jews. To expel all such passages would be to destroy the bond of personality, real or dramatised, by which the literature is in fact held together. Therefore, so far as anything of the kind can be demonstrated, it seems to me that that literature is demonstrably pseudepigraphic.

1 Van Manen also believes in a "historical Paul"—a missionary propagandist of the first century, one of whose travelling companions wrote the diary preserved, with editorial additions, in the journey-narrative taken up into the Acts of the Apostles.

For this view I find incidental support in Professor Schmiedel's extremely clear-sighted article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* on "Simon Magus." The Tübingen theory is well known, according to which the Simon Magus of the pseudo-Clementine *Homilies* and *Recognitions*—romances composed in the third or fourth century, but going back to older sources—was a caricature of the great Apostle by his Judaising enemies. Van Manen suggested that this theory, in its extreme developments, had become itself something of a romance; but these excesses Schmiedel has swept away. What he is able to show without any doubt is that among the sources of the Clementines were attacks on the Pauline theology and on the life-story of Paul as set forth by himself or his admirers. These attacks are as palpable as some that have survived in the New Testament.[1] And they are of a remarkably minute kind. Modern writers have been struck over and over again with the way in which Paul, as some have expressed it, celebrates his own apotheosis. This, again, was part of Van Manen's case. It had aroused the scepticism of Havet. And Reitzenstein, commenting on passages where the Apostle seems to glorify himself as the ideal "spiritual" man, beyond the judgment of friend and foe alike, observes that he "claims a position

[1] See the verses cited by Schmiedel (*Ency. Bib.*, vol. iv. col. 4545) from Rev. ii.; and compare Jude 19 (cited col. 4542, *n.*). In this verse οἱ ἀποδιορίζοντες [not ἑαυτούς] are "they who make a division" (between "psychics" and "pneumatics"), like Paul and the Gnostics.

which we can only with difficulty make comprehensible to ourselves."[1] It is in fact as if some actual Stoic had put himself forward as already the ideal sage.[2] Now Schmiedel brings out not only that these very passages are objects of attack in the Clementines,[3] but even that the style of Paul is imitated in a mocking way.[4] He has also made it very plausible that passages in the Epistles are replies to such attacks.[5] Yet since the historical Paul belongs to the first century, and only oral sources of the Clementines can be supposed before the second, the assumption is admittedly necessary that this anti-Pauline polemic went through a period of oral transmission before it was written down. Here I do not see how the case as it stands can be maintained. About the parody of the Pauline style there is no doubt; but this, in its minuteness, extending to particles, I find unimaginable except as a literary attack made in literary form from the first. All difficulty vanishes if we no longer regard the historical Paul, but only the Epistles attributed to him, as the object of attack, and if we place these in the early part of the second century. It was then, we must suppose, that the quarrels were going on between Paulinists and the Judaising parties. Fragments of the anti-Pauline polemic

1 *Op. cit.*, p. 169.

2 In describing himself in Stoic language as having been a "proficient" in Judaism (Gal. i. 14), Paul does not go beyond what might have been said; but here the passage is incongruous in another way, since he is also represented as a Jew by birth.

3 *Ency. Bib.*, vol. iv. col. 4541.

4 *Ibid.*, col. 4543.

5 *Ibid.*, cols. 4542, 4549.

were embedded in Judæo-Christian documents like the Apocalypse, the Epistle of Jude, and the second-century sources of the Clementines; all of which were little posterior to the "Epistles of Paul" themselves. Later in the second century, as Schmiedel convincingly shows, the attacks became impossible, because the Apostle had then been received within the Catholic system of compromise. All vestiges of the conflict, however, could not be destroyed.

As I have been led so far to restate and support one position not actually necessary for the present purpose, I will return also for a moment to the mythical theory of the Gospel-story. The result of reflection on this is that I do not see how Mr. Robertson's or Professor Arthur Drews' position[1] can be permanently sustained without the adoption of Van Manen's theory also. No doubt there is a certain plausibility, Paul being taken as hypothetically a writer of the first century, in arguing that a Christ imagined by him as so entirely phantasmal and supernatural a figure could not possibly have been a human contemporary of his. I, too, find the transformation of an actual person whom Paul, the rabbinically trained Jew, knew to have lived and died in Palestine, into the "Christ Jesus" of the Epistles unthinkable. I will go further and say that I never found the chapter on the Resurrection in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, rhetorically fine as it is in part, intelligible as even the most

[1] *Die Christusmythe*, 1910.

halting argument of any individual mind. As a cento, made up partly of the beginnings of "evidential" Christianity, partly of "eschatological hopes," but most of all and predominantly of Hellenistic spiritualism, it can on the whole be understood.[1] Thus, if I were to postulate a basis for the Epistles in writings of the actual Apostle, I should, with Mr. Robertson and others, regard that famous chapter as seriously interpolated. This, however, does not seem to me enough. The fact remains that the personal Paul who figures in the Epistles is a Jew brought up in Jewish learning and the contemporary of Jesus and of apostles who were before him. On the whole, this representation is too deep-going to be got rid of except by the most drastic expulsions. If even the "principal Epistles" are from a Paul who was a Christian teacher of the first century, there remains apparent testimony to the concrete reality of other apostles and of Jesus himself as having lived in that century.[2] If the Epistles go, the last apparent testimony

1 Compare Reitzenstein (*op. cit.*, p. 202), by whom the difficulty of reconciliation is very well put.

2 In *Pagan Christs*, 2nd ed. (1911), Mr. Robertson replies to this objection as put in the *Hibbert Journal* from the traditionalist side. Undoubtedly he succeeds in showing that this testimony, like the rest, is of a very shadowy kind; but not, I think, in making it positively intelligible as coming from a contemporary of rival "apostles" who also knew no concrete Jesus. The most natural explanation, for example, of 2 Cor. v. 16 (where Paul repudiates henceforth all knowledge of Christ κατὰ σάρκα) seems to be either (1) that it is a setting aside by the actual Paul of those who had known the living Jesus, or (2) that it is a championship, by Paulinists of the second century, of the apostle who confessedly had not "known Christ after the flesh" against the claims of others who, according to the legend, had been his disciples. Any other interpretation seems strained. For myself, I adhere to the second.

of the kind goes with them. And only then, I think, can the mass of positive evidence for mythical sources of the Gospels produce its full effect.[1]

But, to return to certainties from what will not yet by the majority of critics be accepted as such, there is one thing in the origins of Christianity of which we have direct knowledge. Whatever Hellenistic elements may have gone to constitute its ritual and myth, it succeeded in attaching itself formally to Judaism. The whole conception of a Church, as Reitzenstein notes,[2] is fundamentally not Hellenistic. The doctrine of the Christian Church may have been in substance non-Jewish ; but the theocratic idea of Christendom was taken over immediately from its Jewish predecessors. Without the destruction of Jerusalem, the claim of an intolerant cosmopolitan theocracy, directly founded on the legislation against unfaithful Jews in the Book of Deuteronomy, would have been barred out from the first. The legitimate priesthood of the Temple could without difficulty have thrust aside what it regarded as the upstart faith. In the actual circumstances, full practice of the Jewish Law as laid down in the Mosaic Code having been

[1] It may be well to add that I did not myself take up the position of Van Manen for the reason that it seemed to be required by the mythical theory, but had accepted it earlier. Van Manen himself had not arrived at that theory, though he assumed only the very slightest and most colourless outline of the Gospel-story, and this rather as not within the range of his special investigation than as having passed any test such as he applied to the Epistles.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

rendered impossible, those who claimed to be "the Israel of God" could introduce a discipline of their own, admitting the rest of the world on the sole terms of belief in a newly framed dogma. Thus the Jewish propaganda was for ever superseded. The remnant could only fall back on isolation to preserve its nationality. It even cast aside what perfectly orthodox Jews had written in Greek, and, abandoning this to the Christians, returned for itself to a scholastic form of the old sacred language. The Romans, however, did not forget whence the Christians had come, and among those who looked back to the ancient ideal of civic culture regret was finally bitter that Judæa had ever been conquered and Jerusalem destroyed.

Atque utinam nunquam Iudæa subacta fuisset
Pompeii bellis imperioque Titi!
Latius excisæ pestis contagia serpunt,
Victoresque suos natio victa premit.[1]

[1] Rutilius Namatianus, in a poem dated A.D. 416, cited by Th. Reinach, *Textes, etc.*, pp. 358–360.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRISTIANITY AND PHILOSOPHY

As I am not writing a history of religions, but only noting some applications of a point of view which I think has already been made clear, I will not dwell further at present on the development of the theocratic idea. The process by which Rome itself, instead of Jerusalem, became the centre of a new theocracy is written in general history, and for the most part does not need conjectural deduction.[1] What we have to bear in mind is this : that numerous as are the elements of Græco-Roman culture that entered into Christianity, theocracy came from Judæa. It may be said, and has been said, by way of apology

[1] So far as the Roman theocracy was founded on the supposed residence of the Apostle Peter at Rome, Professor Schmiedel has shown once for all that its basis was from the first simply fiction worked in the interests of the Church. See his articles on "Simon Peter" and "Simon Magus" (which should be read in this order) in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. The demonstration of its nullity is independent of the account which he conjecturally gives of the origin of the fiction ; as this again, with some modification, might be made independent of the question whether Simon Peter, the "rock" apostle, or his supposed antagonist, Simon, the magician of Samaria, ever existed in historical reality. It would be interesting to discuss these problems further ; but I limit myself here to citing Professor Schmiedel's comment on the whole development. This, he says (*Ency. Bib.*, vol. iv. col. 4621), "is seen to present a perversion of historical truth such as it would be almost impossible to surpass, and which throws a lurid light upon the hostility to history, as well as upon the power, of the idea of a Catholic Church."

for the intolerance of the Hebrew sacred books, that this belonged only to the dream of dominion in a people for most of its time suffering oppression; but the dream was realised to the full by the successors who adopted the books as their own, and the will to realise it was inspired from that source. Still, I quite recognise that only the smallest part of the responsibility falls on the Jews. Plato, in the *Laws* written in his declining years, had set forth a scheme of religious persecution; but this was simply ignored by his own followers to the end of classical antiquity. In the ancient world, it can be said, intolerance was never systematised, but remained only of the sporadic kind with which serious innovators must always expect to meet. If the Christian Church had so chosen, it could have set aside the persecuting elements in the Hebrew Scriptures as easily as the Platonists ignored or argumentatively opposed their master's legislation on religion or art.

In the ethical sense in which it is sometimes opposed to "paganism," Christianity was prepared in its detail far more by later Græco-Roman antiquity than by Judaism.[1] This does not apply, indeed, to the distinctive moral precepts

1 See Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, iii. p. 465: "Si nous ne sommes plus aujourd'hui ce que nous appelons païens, dans le mauvais sens du mot, nous le devons avant tout au travail de la sagesse hellénique." *Cf.* p. 492: "Le christianisme, quoique juif dans la forme, est hellénique dans son fond." Bruno Bauer (with whose work I am very slightly acquainted) has gone so far as to speak of Christianity, in this aspect, as "a Græco-Roman phenomenon in a Jewish mask." On another aspect, see Appendix, "Hellenistic Messianism."

of the Synoptic Gospels, which sprang out of a generalising direction within Judaism itself, and were in great part formulated in terms verbally identical with precepts in the Old Testament. Even in the Gospels, however, points of contact have been found with an external religious movement so remote in origin as Buddhism.[1] There are also curious resemblances to sayings of philosophers as recorded in Diogenes Laertius ; and of course the collection that goes by that name, though later in date, depends on sources much older than the Gospels. If there was borrowing, it was unquestionably on the Judæo-Christian side. Even the very slight sympathetic references in writers of the Græco-Roman tradition that have been generally assumed to show knowledge of Jewish literature do not indicate this with any certainty.[2] Whatever may be the case with one writer or another here and there, we must regard the classical tradition as practically im-

[1] See G. A. van den Bergh van Eysinga, *Indische Einflüsse auf Evangelische Erzählungen*, 2nd ed. (German translation of a Dutch work), 1909.

[2] Two of these I have myself taken for granted ; namely, the reference in the treatise *On the Sublime* to the impressiveness of the creation of light as described at the opening of the Book of Genesis, and the comparison of Plato to Moses by Numenius of Apamea. Regarding the first, Mr. Benn pointed out to me that Mommsen holds the writer of the treatise to have been, not a pagan, but a Hellenising Jew. M. Théodore Reinach does not mention this, but has the following note on the passage (*op. cit.*, pp. 114–115) : "Le commentateur Schurzfleisch (Wittenberg, 1711) a supposé ingénieusement que l'auteur n'a pas puisé directement dans les Septante, mais dans le traité du *Sublime* de son prédécesseur Cécilius, qu'il cite à diverses reprises. Ce Cécilius, de Calacté en Sicile, qui professa à Rome sous Auguste, passait pour Juif." At p. 175 he also expresses doubt as to the authenticity of the saying attributed to Numenius by Clement of Alexandria : "What is Plato but Moses writing Attic ? "

permeable on that side. Jewish and Christian doctors, on the other hand, were determined, in a phrase that exactly expresses their point of view, to " take their own where they found it."

The period in which the modernised ideal of conduct and feeling that has received the name of Christian grew up was the period in which the separate nationalities and city-States were reduced to constituent parts of a world-empire. It grew up largely, though not wholly, in the philosophic schools. In conflict accompanied by eclectic choice, the eccentricities and extravagances of individual teachers disappeared ; and by the end of the second century of the Christian era the passage to what we call the modern type was practically complete within the ancient system of culture. What marks the new ethical model is stress on the virtues of kindness, forbearance, abstinence in all its forms, humility, forgiveness. It has even been thought excessive in this direction, like Christianity itself, which arose in the new moral atmosphere. Ernest Havet, in the first two volumes of *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*,[1] has traced out its formation with the hand of a master. Here he was not, as in the latter part of his work, simply a pioneer, but was writing from fulness of knowledge and finished accomplishment. The literature from which the history has to be reconstructed, as he points out, consists of relatively small remains of a large mass of work. Nevertheless, from what has been

1 3rd ed., 1880.

preserved, it can be shown that Hellenism included in its development all that is customarily called in the best sense Christianity. And of Hellenism this is only a part. Taken as a whole, Hellenism is more and greater than Christianity. Havet's idea here suggests that which has been brought out recently with philosophic generality by Professor Carveth Read, who has noted, both in *The Metaphysics of Nature* and in *Natural and Social Morals*, how the ethics of the city-State, as formulated by Plato and Aristotle, had a real superiority over the later cosmopolitan philosophies in its stress on the full achievement of what can be accomplished by the best faculties cultivated to their highest point. Thus it allows room for differences of "moral races," in contrast with the effaced character of an ideal consisting in mere "innocence" or absence of fault.[1]

I return now to the more distinctively religious development; and here it can be shown without difficulty how at a stroke Greek philosophy in nearly its earliest phase transcended all that can

[1] See especially *The Metaphysics of Nature*, pp. 350–351. This is so important that I must quote the early part of the passage, though it is a little off the line of the present argument. "The attempt to set up the same ideal for all men is one of the greatest errors of philosophy. Social life is not to be understood except as constituted by different species of men,—not merely ethnological but moral species. The differentiation of the human stock into such species is due (apart from ethnological causes) in a superficial way to the division of labour, but more profoundly to congenital differences of capacity and disposition. This was recognised by Plato and Aristotle, but obscured by Stoicism and other forces; so that it may now seem pagan and invidious, whereas it is merely humanity and common sense" (p. 350). Nietzscheanism may perhaps be best understood as a violent and exaggerated protest on behalf of this truth against the equally exaggerated Neo-Christianity of Tolstoy. Catholic Christianity to some extent recognises it.

be claimed for Judaism and Christianity together. For how could the claim be most favourably put ? It might be said that a purely spiritual conception of Deity was fixed by the former, and that animal sacrifices were abolished by the latter. Rigorously the claim is unsustainable in either case. In Judaism the Deity was so nationalised that some of the Christian Gnostics regarded Jehovah as a usurping Demiurge, to be dethroned by Jesus Christ, who came for that end as an emanation from the highest God. And some forms of Oriental Christianity still retain animal sacrifices. In the West, Christianity was influenced by the Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic campaign against them ; and this, which furnished the Christians with weapons against the pagan rites as commonly practised, was more radical than any attack from their own resources could have been.[1] The philosophers not only denied in principle that blood-sacrifice has any value, but declared it actually evil. To them the faith of Abraham, as shown in the preparations for the sacrifice of Isaac, which is the subject of panegyric in the New Testament, would have meant only willingness to propitiate a demon in the hope of material advantage. And the whole movement had been anticipated by Heraclitus, who thus speaks against popular religion among his contemporaries five centuries before the Christian era : " They vainly

[1] *Cf.* Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, ii. p. 234 : "Car ce n'est pas le judaïsme apparemment qui a appris aux chrétiens à ne pas faire d'un temple une boucherie."

purify themselves by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to wash his feet in mud. Any man who marked him doing thus would deem him mad. And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are."[1] No depreciation of blood-sacrifice by any Hebrew prophet or psalmist goes as far as this; while Christian theology is itself founded on the belief, definitely formulated, that "without shedding of blood is no remission."[2]

Early opponents of Christianity were not slow to point to such anticipations of what Jews and Christians declared to be truths revealed to them, upon whom the ends of the world were come. By Celsus the saying of Heraclitus, along with the rejection of statues in the old Persian religion, was urged against the claim of Judaism to originality in its condemnation of idolatry. In practice, however, the actual cults had to be defended by official opponents of the new revelation which proposed to sweep them away. And, while it did this not ostensibly in deference to philosophical ideas, but in order to make room for its own system of rites, the practical issue was the same. More archaic though the Christian sacrament might be in its inner meaning than official Hellenism, "deicide and theophagy" were yet so reduced in it to symbolical form that, with the

[1] Given by Diels as Fragment 5. Burnet adopts Professor Bywater's arrangement, in which the sentences appear as Fragments 129, 130, 126; translating in the words given above.

[2] Heb. ix. 22 (*χωρὶς αἱματεκχυσίας οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις*).

aid of the philosophical ideas, it could expel actual bloodshed from what is still called the altar. Thus there is some ground, though not so much as is usually supposed, for treating the later paganism as reactionary. Neo-Platonism had absorbed the Pythagorean movement ; Porphyry, who wrote against Christianity, had also continued the attack upon animal sacrifices ; and doubtless if no rivals had appeared to the ancient gods, blood-sacrifice would have disappeared from their rites by commutations into innocent offerings such as flowers and fruits. Yet Julian, himself a Neo-Platonist, when he re-established the old religion against the new, had to revive the old ritual. And his friend Sallustius, in the treatise *De Diis et Mundo*, formally defends the sacrifice of animal victims. Had the attempt at revival succeeded, the result could only have been a more sacerdotal paganism ; though, in contrast with the system established by the Church, philosophical liberty would have been preserved.

In the reformed paganism, as it can be inferred from the writings of Julian and Sallustius, the apotheosis of the Emperors would have been disused for ever. The monarchy would have been that of the Antonines, worked in as republican a spirit as possible, and repudiating "Cæsarism." In the religion of the Empire the place of Christ as God and King would have been taken by the Sun (ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἥλιος), in whose worship the Emperor was to be the representative of the State ; but the national religions, including that of the

Jews,[1] would all have been encouraged within their own limits. Christianity was to be tolerated, but officially discouraged. Within the churches the "heretics" were to be protected from the persecutions of the "Catholics." The doctrine at the summit, alike for Celsus and for Julian, is pure theism, with "rewards and punishments in a future state." Cudworth, as a speculative theologian familiar with the writings of the school to which Julian belonged, understood his position better than Gibbon; proving at length that he was not in his serious doctrine a polytheist. The myths, according to the Stoic tradition continued by Neo-Platonism, were to be allegorised in an edifying and philosophical manner. Thus the gods would have become a hierarchy of spiritual existences distinguishable in name only from the angelic hierarchies of which the theory was formulated by the Platonising Christian who wrote under the name of "Dionysius the Areopagite." But—what Julian supremely cared for—the literature and thought of antiquity would have been preserved in the natural surroundings of the life out of which they had grown, and humanistic civilisation would have continued without break. To him monotheism, which he formally accepted as much as his opponents, was no revolution, but the ordinary doctrine of the philosophic tradition

[1] Doubts have been expressed regarding the genuineness of the letter included in the correspondence of Julian as Ep. 25: see Th. Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains, etc.*, p. 209, *n.* On the whole, however, the tone of favour to the Jewish community does not seem stronger than the Emperor would have adopted in a public letter.

he followed. To set polytheism as such against Judæo-Christian monotheism was no part of his interest or of the cause to which he gave himself.

What makes this more important and significant historically is that the pure theism of the pagan apologists is in no way esoteric. It has indeed a kind of official character; but behind this the reserve is not in favour of a belief, more or less serious, in the literal truth of the popular stories, but implies a philosophy scarcely amounting to theism in the ordinary sense. The official monotheism, that is to say, itself contains something of popular accommodation. Thus Julian, in his philosophic writings, holds strongly to the position that the world has neither beginning nor end. It is only in his books against the Christians that he appears to substitute the creative God of the *Timæus*, taken literally, for the creative God of Moses. And Celsus, while he, too, is a Platonist, combines with his spiritualist theism a tinge of naturalism suggesting that he has read Lucretius with admiration. The theism itself differs from that of the Christians only in being without reserve universalist. Julian, for example, although he advises participation in the mysteries as a pious custom, repudiates, as no orthodox Christian could even now officially, the notion that participation or non-participation makes any difference to the fate of the soul. That depends wholly upon conduct. But again there is something in this of State-dogma. Gibbon, accordingly, while taking too much as serious doctrine Julian's

æsthetic and political sympathies with Greek polytheism, doubts whether personal immortality was part of his philosophic creed. Origen, too, on the Christian side, has some reservations at which he barely hints. It is known from his work *On Principles* that he believed in a series of world-cycles, and that he regarded no state of reward or punishment or condition of any spirit in the universe as final. Yet from his books against Celsus, written no doubt with an eye on the simple-minded among the faithful, we might suppose that he believed even those heathens whom he was following in philosophy to be everlastingly damned. There was on both sides in religion something of the distinction between doctrines for the many and for the few.[1] All that I insist on is that ethical theism was now not a matter of dispute, but a sort of common dogma. Both sides alike were able to use it to discredit the elements of myth and ritual in the system of their antagonists.

The distinction between "kinds of truth" was to be revived later in an exaggerated form; but we come now to the time when no doctrine

[1] I allowed insufficiently for this in my account of the controversy between Celsus and Origen (*Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays*, 1906). Unfortunately Origen's treatise Περὶ ἀρχῶν, by which the correction should be made, exists, apart from Greek extracts with an edifying purpose, only in the manipulated translation of Rufinus; and when I wrote, there was no satisfactory critical edition. In 1913, however, the new edition by Koetschau appeared, from which Origen's own teaching for theologians, though not always the verbally exact statement of it, can be recovered. I have written an exposition of this which I hope to publish sometime along with other essays still in manuscript.

but that which was taught authoritatively to the many was allowed to find utterance at all. Origen himself is said to have been placed among the damned by a Church Council. In 529, the Church having triumphed over all opposition, the philosophic schools at Athens were closed by Justinian. The history is familiar, and I do not propose to rewrite it; but at this point there may be some interest in noting the formulated position of philosophy in defeat and old age.[1] It is stated by Damascius in his Life of Isidorus, of which excerpts are preserved by Photius:[2] "He showed plainly that he did not love the present order (*τὰ παρόντα*, *i.e.*, Christianity), nor yet was willing to worship statues; but that his endeavour was now towards the gods themselves concealed within, not in shrines, but in the ineffable itself, whatsoever it is, of entire incognisance."[3] Here, while Christianity is repudiated, there is an approximation to its more spiritual expressions. We are reminded of the "unknown God" of the Acts of the Apostles. And in some such formula no doubt terms of agreement were found with thinkers nominally Christian who were indifferent to the controversies of the period about the Trinity and the Incarnation.

On these it is a commonplace of historical criticism that Greek philosophy had a far-reaching influence. Indeed, it has been blamed for raising

1 Damascius, *Vita Isidori*, 227: *ἀλλὰ τοῦτο συμβέβηκε νῦν ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ἑστάναι οὐ τῆς ἀκμῆς, τοῦ δὲ ἐσχάτου γήρως ὡς ἀληθῶς.*

2 See the appendix to the Didot edition of Diogenes Laertius.

3 *Vita Isidori*, 38.

them; though clearly philosophy itself had nothing to do with the selection of the story on which it was employed as an instrument by Christian theologians. For what remained of the ancient schools, the whole development on the Judæo-Christian line, from Philo to Clement and Origen, and on to later Fathers, was non-existent. Plotinus, it is true, wrote a book against the Gnostics, but only on a philosophical position of theirs, that the Maker of this world is evil; and the Gnostics, with their avowed pessimism, were repudiated by the orthodox Christians. These indeed found some aid afterwards from the Neo-Platonic philosophy; but chiefly in giving more exactitude to the definition of the immaterial soul. The refutation of materialism was the legacy to them of the school. They did not derive their theology from it, the Neo-Platonic Trinity being an entirely different conception from theirs.

Of the origin of its monotheism in rational speculation and not in a popular story or a local cult, the modern Catholic Church has preserved some sense. Thus its most authorised exponents undertake to furnish demonstrative proof of theism, while recognising that when the distinctive doctrines of its theology are reached the appeal must be to faith. In a controversy of some years ago I met with an illustration which now, as it recurs, suggests that the theological experts distinguish in their own minds between what they take to be the real truth in a revealed religion

and the particular stories with which it has been combined. It was admitted by Father Clarke, S.J., in replying to the late St. George Mivart, that a rather eccentric but quite orthodox theologian might have given leave to some one who consulted him on the point, to worship God, if he preferred, under the form of the Greek Apollo rather than the Jewish Jehovah, provided only that he did not morally approve of the character of the god as represented in the mythological stories. And, at the very beginning of the controversy between Christians and pagans, there was one point in common that seems to go beyond even this. Celsus and Origen agree that the highest worship is only of the mind, and needs no rites and ceremonies; that the external form of a religion, in short, is only for those who cannot rise above imagery to philosophical contemplation.

CHAPTER IX

THE THEOLOGICAL SCHISMS

From the seeming close of ancient culture in the fixation of the theocratic Empire, the means by which the intellectual life of Europe renewed itself was a series of schisms. These were first political and then theological.

Within a century from Constantine, who had made of Byzantium the seat of sovereignty and called it after his name, the Roman Empire became divided into East and West, each ruled by its own autocrat. Of the Eastern Empire the new Rome, or Constantinople, was the capital; of the Western, the old Rome. The year 476 is taken by historians as marking the fall of the Western Empire under the barbarian irruptions which had continued since the second century; but the theory was that the Emperor of the East now resumed jurisdiction over the whole. In the meantime, while new kingdoms, theoretically subordinated to Constantinople, were being shaped out of the Teutonic conquests, the absence of a supreme political authority at Rome gave the ecclesiastical power its opportunity for establishing a centralised "spiritual" domination including under it in theory all "secular" States. At the

end of the eighth century the Papacy, in its own interests, set up a new rival Empire, which claimed to inherit the political authority of the ancient Roman State as a complete unity, and was called the Holy Roman Empire. The Emperors, however, soon showed themselves the rivals of the Popes; for there were now two powers in the same territory claiming, each in its own manner, universal authority. On the one side was the Vicar of Christ; on the other side a new Cæsar, himself the consecrated chief of sovereigns who all came to be regarded by their partisans as ruling by divine right. The victory in the conflict rested on the whole with the Popes; till the secular power, not of the Empire which was their creation, but of the new national monarchies, became strong enough to get the better of ecclesiastical dictation in detail. As landmarks for the further history we may just recall to mind that the Empire of the East, though its dominions had been gradually retrenched, did not come to an end till 1453, when Constantinople was taken by the Turks; and that the Holy Roman Empire, though long reduced to a shadow, was not formally abolished till 1806.

Of the theological schisms, the division between Greek or Eastern and Latin or Western Christianity became practically complete in the ninth century. Nominally the points in dispute were theological subtleties, but in reality the division marked a difference of political types. In the East an autocrat ruled as the chief of a theocratic State to whom the Patriarch of Constantinople was

subordinate. In the West the Pope claimed spiritual sovereignty over all Christendom, while the kings held the secular or temporal sovereignty in their own dominions. Meanwhile, through the rise of Mohammed in Arabia as the prophet of the new faith of Islam, North Africa, Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor, and even portions of Europe, were torn from their union with the rest of the Roman Empire, to which they had all once belonged, and became part of the dominions of the Caliphs, Eastern and Western. The year from which the religion of Mohammed dates its annals is 622 of the Christian era; and within a century of this most of the Arabian conquests were effected. In its utmost extent, if Islam has gone eastward somewhat beyond the bounds ever reached by Roman dominion, it has not gone much beyond the conquests of Alexander, and is quite rightly included by Comte in the spiritual unity of the West (in the larger sense), as we shall see. To anticipate again on later history, the schism in Western Christendom which has divided it into Catholic and Protestant nations may be dated from the revolt against the Papacy started by Luther in 1517. There were many rebellions premonitory of this from the twelfth century onward; but, for want of sufficiently favourable political circumstances, all had been crushed out.

The broadest and deepest of the divisions theologically is between Islam and Christendom; and yet clearly a certain unity remains. All the religions recognise ethical monotheism at the

summit. And this, as we have seen, had also become official in later pagan antiquity. The distinction of Islam is to be by far the largest creation of a great external order by an individual prophet as man of action. While the earlier prophets to whom such creations were ascribed are legendary or mythical, Mohammed stands out with perfect clearness in the light of history. And the process by which the religion was built up is relatively simple and intelligible. Arabia in the time of Mohammed retained the early Semitic polytheism, but had been permeated by some knowledge of Judaism and Christianity. The Prophet, through contact with the foreign doctrines, felt himself seized upon by the idea of divine unity ; and this in him led to a powerful reaction in favour of simplification as against what had become the practical polytheism of established Christianity, with its Trinitarian theology, its image-worship, and its new pantheon of saints. The result was a return towards the Judaic type, but without the complications of ritual that had stood in the way of its universality. Islam was thus in essence a sect within the Judæo-Christian group, with a much simplified cult and an immensely reduced mythology. As a popular religion, it could not, of course, be entirely without sacred stories and a ritual of its own. The sacred stories were adopted by the Prophet from the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. These he treated as revelations preparatory of his own. The ritual, in so far as it was of native Arabian origin,

seems to have been imposed by the conservatism of usage, which, in view of practical exigencies, he could not disregard. The ideal was a theocratic dominion under a conquering chief of the faithful; but the interpreters of the faith never came to constitute strictly a priesthood like that of the ancient East, of Judæa, or of the Catholic forms of Christianity. In Islam the clergy are analogous rather to the Jewish Rabbis or to a Protestant ministry. Jews and Christians, but not "idolators," were to be tolerated on certain terms. In mediæval theory this toleration became reciprocal among the religions that professed in common a formal monotheism and claimed to possess a written revelation. Within each system toleration was, of course, not extended to heretics or freethinkers; and neither Christianity nor Islam conceded to those who had once professed it the right to fall off to another faith.

If any one desired to illustrate at once the saying of Heraclitus that war is the father of all things and the Hegelian interpretation of "dying to live" as applied to the products of the human spirit, the fortunes of Greek philosophy in its transference from the Byzantine to the Islamic Empire, and thence to the Catholic West, would form an excellent subject. We have seen how the Neo-Platonic philosophy, before the exile of its last professors, had passed into a mystical agnosticism. The phase that followed was a return from metaphysical speculation to positive science as far as that existed in antiquity, and to

occupation with the works of Aristotle as the best scientific encyclopædia extant. It was in this last age of the commentators, as Renan showed in his *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, that the position was assigned to Aristotle of "the master of those who know."[1] When the Arabians had had time to organise their conquests, their curiosity was excited by the arts and knowledge accumulated by their predecessors. Greek science was sought out first in translations that had been made into Syriac; from these, translations into Arabic were procured. As one part of ancient culture, the men of learning and science among the Arabians met with philosophy, Aristotle being presented to them as the great authority here also, as in the special sciences. Thus a small group came to devote itself to philosophical inquiries pursued by means of the Arabic translations just referred to. The movement that sprang from this first faint revival lasted from the ninth to the twelfth century. It exceeded in originality, if we except the *De Divisione Naturæ* of John Scotus Erigena, anything that was done in Western Europe in the same period; and in his case, too, it was Greek thought that had been reawakened to life, though the process was somewhat different. The early Arabians began with science and, like their successors, used only translations. Their contemporary Erigena (born in Ireland, as the name indicates) was one of the last in Western

[1] *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, 3rd ed. (1867), p. 93: "Là est le moment décisif où l'autorité philosophique se constitue pour plus de dix siècles."

Europe, before the Humanist revival, to know Greek; but the writers he studied were not the heathen commentators occupied with science, but the later Christian theologians influenced by the mystical side of Neo-Platonism. Different as the starting-points were, he represented as essentially rationalising an effort as did any of the Arabians in the succession of four centuries. And from him as well as from them came afterwards the stimulus to the heterodox Scholastics of the twelfth century. His fate, early in the thirteenth century, was to be condemned by a Pope to an oblivion that lasted till late in the seventeenth, when a copy of his great work that had escaped destruction was recovered at Oxford. Theirs was to be silenced under the popular fanaticism which the Mohammedan clergy were able to stir up; but the impulse had been transmitted through the Crusades, and the thought of the West went on in spite of all.

The most singular product of their thought is the doctrine of the "double truth," afterwards taken over and handed down in Europe, as a convenient formula for freethinkers, till the seventeenth century. They derived it, no doubt, from germs in the authors they read; perhaps from the phrase in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* about the stories that have been added to the truth concerning God "for the persuasion of the multitude"; but they gave it a much more pointed and paradoxical form. Their difficulty in openly following their Greek master was that he denied the creation

of the world; for this had been received from Judaism by Mohammedan as by Christian theology. Also it was clear to them that no doctrine of personal immortality was to be found in Aristotle. On immortality they developed, partly by a modification of the Neo-Platonic pantheism, which they had met with in some of the treatises they read, an extremely interesting and original theory of their own. It is only the general human mind, they held, that endures. The individual manifestations of this in time and space disappear. The one "active intellect," as they called it, of man is eternal, being an emanation of Deity; and the total system of things within which it is manifested has neither beginning nor end. This is the doctrine that results from philosophical reason. But how were such positions to be reconciled with ostensible acceptance of theological faith? The philosophers replied by a distinction between what they called philosophical and theological truth. Theological truth, they made it clear, is in their real opinion only a kind of utility. The philosopher can live a life of disinterested virtue, but the mass of mankind cannot. The different theological "legislations," Jewish, Christian, or Mohammedan, as the case may be, were intended for those who need the motives of reward and punishment, each being good in the State where it is professed. The authorities are quite right in not permitting it to be publicly questioned; but the learned ought to be free to hold their own theories among themselves.

Averroes, or Ibn Roshd (1126–1198), who has given his name to the whole movement, was taken as its representative because he came last, not because he was its founder or its most original thinker. By him the position just stated was put in particularly strong terms; but it did not avail to save him from persecution. Renan, in discussing the question whether the Arabian doctors were sincere believers in the faith they professed theologically, assumes his ironic tone; but about the general freethinking tendency of Averroes, not limited to metaphysics, there can be no doubt. This can be best seen in the points which Renan gives from his paraphrase of the *Republic*, where a liberality of spirit extending to practical matters is most apparent. Defending the equality of position assigned to women, Averroes does not simply reproduce but develops Plato. Sometimes, he says, they surpass men, as in music; where the perfection of the art would be that the music should be composed by a man and executed by a woman. It is the servitude to which they are reduced by our social order (in Mohammedan Spain) that does not allow us to see what they are capable of. The worst of tyrannies, he goes on to say, is that of priests. Military fiefs, he had said already, are the scourge of States. The Omeyyad autocracy he holds to have been a corruption of the original republic of the Arabians, which, he adds more romantically than historically, exactly resembled the republic of Plato.

[1] *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, pp. 161–162.

Through contact with the Arabian schools, especially during the time of the Crusades from the eleventh century onward, Western Christendom first obtained a fuller knowledge of the sources of Greek philosophy. During the period now called distinctively the Dark Ages—that is, from the fifth to the eighth or tenth century—the knowledge even of Latin antiquity had been reduced to little more than the small selection of school-books necessary for the elements of a learned education. There was, indeed, just enough in the form of compilations on logic to set thought going when minds again awoke after the time of chaos; but, till the theological reaction had suppressed its native philosophers and their books, Islam remained in advance of Christendom. At length, in the twelfth century, Latin translations from the Arabian translations used by the Mohammedan learned class brought to the Christian Middle Ages a knowledge of the works of Aristotle dealing with the content, and not merely with the form, of thought. In the labour of translation the Jews took a considerable part, so that the process of transmission from idiom to idiom had sometimes to pass also through Hebrew. That the thinkers, whether using Arabic, Hebrew, or Latin, could make anything at all of versions thus produced, always on the mediæval system of word-for-word rendering, has been a matter of astonishment. All the time, the original Greek texts were preserved at Constantinople; and, when the movement of Christian Scholasticism

had effectively begun, new versions were made directly from these. For at this time it was exclusively on Latin translations that the thinkers of Europe proceeded: the study of Greek did not begin to be revived till the fourteenth century, and did not become effective till the fifteenth. The fate of the movement was quite unlike that of the Arabian philosophy. The study of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, at first thought dangerous by the Church and prohibited, was from the thirteenth century made obligatory in the recently founded universities. Orthodox theism was now elaborated on an Aristotelian basis. The theism of Aristotle, it might have been thought *a priori*, was better adapted to form a basis for the simplified theology of Islam; but the explanation of the difference depends on a larger view than that of the particular point of doctrine. To the Arabians the doctrines of Greek philosophy were wholly new, and thus no doubt were a stimulus especially to heterodoxy. Christianity, on the other hand, in its formative period, had already assimilated much of Greek thought; so that the Scholastics, from the point of view of tradition, could busy themselves innocuously with its further development. Philosophy, in the received formula, became the *ancilla theologiæ*. At this stage, indeed, it was the Arabian commentators, more than the heathen masters themselves, that gave the impulse to freethought. To the later Middle Ages Averroes became the typical "infidel."

The unbelief that found more or less disguised utterance in the ages of faith, whether under Islam or Christendom, ran to the most radical denial. There seems to be little record of pure theism as a form of heterodoxy. That was reserved for modern times, when its Græco-Roman expression could be set against the complication with cults and myths in the revealed religions. Yet the heterogeneity of a system made up of theism and spiritualism defended on rational grounds, combined with a particular sacred tradition received on faith, became plain enough in the result. The historians of Scholasticism have shown how no attempted eirenicon of philosophy and faith, however elaborately worked out, could carry with it the general conviction of thinkers. In every case the end was a collapse into scepticism, and the only refuge for the speculative believer was mysticism. Nevertheless it is an error to suppose that the Scholastic philosophy has disappeared. The great system of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) is now the basis of the "Neo-Scholastic" teaching in the Catholic universities; and independent thinkers are ready to allow that this position cannot have been maintained without the presence of something genuinely rational and comprehensive in the system. Scholasticism was, however, always Church-philosophy; and with the new reversal of the European type from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, by which it became again civic instead of theocratic, philosophy passed into a new phase. This sprang

out of a movement that found its inspiration at once in the new growth of physical science and in the direct return to Greek antiquity.

For modern Europe the Roman Empire of the East has been of inestimable value through its preservation of the Greek language and of the texts of the classical writers in their original form. Had these not been preserved, the substitution for it of the Turkish Empire at an earlier period would have been unimportant. Indeed, so far as independent work in philosophy and the sciences is concerned, Islam has contributed more to European progress than Eastern Christianity. Stagnant from the sixth century, this is simply "part of the darkness that brought forth the light." [1] If the ambitions of the "spiritual power" in the West could have been realised, doubtless the result would have been no better; but the division between spiritual and temporal did, in the actual circumstances, make Latin Catholicism relatively progressive. At the time with which we are now concerned, Popes and Cardinals themselves became for a moment the representatives of its progressive elements, showing especial eagerness in encouraging the Greek scholars dispersed over Europe before and after the fall of Constantinople, as they had been foremost in seeking to recover the Latin manuscripts buried in the monasteries of the West. Some think that at Constantinople all along there had been a secret tradition of

[1] Ein Theil der Finsterniss die sich das Licht gebar.