

bridge the gulf" between a material process and a thought. Rather than admit that their thought is a function of their cerebration, they will leave as an absolute and hopeless anomaly, an enigma *sui generis*, the admitted fact that thought is as obviously the sequence or concurrent of brain action as the light of a match is of friction and chemical action. The two processes in man, they say, are correspondences; they are not cause and effect.

In the defence of this position the first line is the familiar dictum, cited above as it is put by Professor Höffding, that "motion is known to us only as an object in consciousness"—the very consciousness which is to be explained as a result of a form of motion. To this venerable device we have only to oppose the simple reminder that in every other scientific inquiry we agree to treat the universe as prior to our consciousness, and that either the psychologist must put aside *all* doctrines of natural causation as visionary or he must agree to proceed here as he did in the other cases. The professional metaphysician takes it for granted that we who read him understand his words as he means them; in talk he takes it for granted that he hears what is said. Now, written argument is simply potential talk reduced to writing, and this thus takes for granted the external reality which it proceeds for a certain purpose to call in question. If I talk with a champion of the formula cited, my words may be for him "only objects in his consciousness." But he would answer them, I presume, all the same.

And let us here note once for all the bottomless fallacy of the word "only," as here used. What does it mean? If I say that "So-and-So has gone and left only his hat-box," I mean his hat-box as distinguished from his other belongings: these *alia* are connoted by the "only." So when I am told that things exist "only in our consciousness," the "only," to have any meaning, must imply that

they could conceivably exist otherwise; just as, if one says "zebras are found wild only in Africa," he means that they might plausibly be supposed to flourish in other countries. What then is the point of the "only" as regards "our consciousness"? *Could* things conceivably exist anywhere else? *Is* there anywhere else? Either there is or there is not. If there *is*, what conceivable meaning can lie in the proposition that things do not exist there, when the "elsewhere" is confessedly a thing? If there is not, what is the sense of saying "only"? When these challenges are met it will be time to deal further with this primeval trick of a primitive metaphysic, which prospers only because men will not metaphysically analyse it. For the present, let it suffice to say that all science necessarily assumes that "things exist," and that the sense of "exist" is already implicitly determined for scientific purposes the moment two men agree to argue. The added phrase "in our consciousness" is absolutely meaningless, since it stands for no judgment whatever. And in the further form, "things do not exist outside our consciousness," it is just as meaningless, since the verbal implication is that there *is* an "outside," whereas the proposition is meant to deny it. "Idealism" of this sort has never met the first requirements of rational statement.

The next parry to rational science in the debate over "mind and matter" is a little more plausible, provided that we clear out of the way the memory of the first. It is perfectly true that the *problem* of consciousness is *sui generis*. In every other investigation we are comparing two or more data external to ourselves; in this we are reflecting on our process of comparison, on our very reflection. And it lies on the face of the case that there is no "common measure" of the motion of tangible matter and the fact of consciousness. Therefore, the physical causation of thought can never be made a strict analogy to the physical causation of a physical result

external to thought. It is absolutely suicidal, be it observed, for the anti-materialist at this point to revert to his formula that "phenomena exist only in our consciousness," since the only impression attachable to that really meaningless phrase is the notion that our consciousness causes the universe; and on that view all phenomena must be on all fours with the fact of consciousness itself; that is to say, *there is no "gulf" to "bridge."* But even when the "gulf" argument is placed on its best basis, and the just contradiction ignored, it is logically beside the case, precisely because the problem is *sui generis*. The primary question is not *how* cerebration causes thought; and the refusal of Professor Höffding's school to admit that it *is* the cause of thought is really a lawless resort to an illicit doctrine of causation.

One illustration will suffice. By Professor Höffding's own acknowledgment (p. 56) his opponents make the answer that, "taken strictly, *every* transition, *every* conversion of forces, is inconceivable to us." Yet in his rejoinder he entirely omits to meet this challenge, apparently assuming that when he merely mentions the principle of the persistence of energy he has cleared his ground. That doctrine, he observes, is as it stands "a purely physical doctrine." So be it. But what then becomes of the scientific proposition that light consists in an undulation of ether? To use his own formula, "What denominator is common" to ether and to tangible matter? Clearly we cannot so "bridge the gulf" between chemical combustion and light. But to come to the central problem: Can we in thought truly bridge any of the gulfs in the whole train of physical causation? The answer is that we cannot; we have simply set up in our minds a process of habit in virtue of which ordinary physical causation is reckoned intelligible because we "see it done." What we do know is simply that action A gives rise to or involves action B. The sole bridge between the actions is the bridge of habitual mental association.

This, it need hardly be remarked, is the position of Hume, who, as Professor Höffding admits, first effectively criticized the common notion of causation.¹ But when the Professor proceeds to deal with Hume's argument he gives us a startling sample of what philosophical debate may become in academic hands. Removed by a hundred and fifty pages from his discussion of the "mind and matter" problem, his answer to Hume consists in throwing overboard the whole process of reasoning by which he justified the refusal (p. 55) to admit that we know "whether there is really a causal relation, or a relation of interaction between the brain and consciousness or not." Now (p. 210) he argues that—

Instead of saying with Hume that we cannot see in a thing or infer from our conception of it that it is the cause or the effect of another thing, we must on the contrary maintain that we *only* know a thing at all in so far as it is cause or effect. Things are always given to us as members of a system.

Solvuntur tabulæ. Now it follows that we "only" know brain and mind as cause or as effect, or as both. Then the refusal to recognize causation or interaction between mind and body is quashed. Yet that refusal stands as part of Professor Höffding's argument. So lawless a business can philosophy become, under the official conditions set up by popular religion. In the hands of Professor Höffding it is an enterprise in which he is free to reduce language to vacuity whenever he will. He is capable of writing such a sentence as this: "If *everything* were uniform and unchangeable, *we* should have nothing about whose cause we could inquire." Any one of Professor Höffding's pupils, one would suppose, could have pointed out that the "if" excludes the "we." Had Büchner and Moleschott ever written like this, the Professor's contempt for them might have been excused.

The candid inquirer, of course, will not dismiss his

¹ Though the negative position had been put before him.

opponent in that fashion. He will not even take advantage of the second "only," which is one more fallacy. We *do* "know" a thing "at all" before we know of what it is the effect or the cause. All knowledge is but greater or less degree of perception of relations, and the first step is notation of the bare relations of existence. To say that we know a new object at once as a cause or as an effect would be true only in the sense that we know it is a cause of our perception, which is the merest verbalism. And men knew something of brain and mind before they regarded them as cause and effect. The true statement of the case is that we know as much about them in that relation as we know of a thousand other cases in which we acknowledge such a relation. And the fundamental fallacy of the anti-materialist school is that charged on the old Greek physicists by Mill, and by a writer whom Mill quotes. The quoted writer, discussing the failure of those physicists, has well said that—

Their stumbling-block was one as to the nature of the evidence they had to expect for their conviction.....They had not seized the idea that they must not expect to understand the processes of outward causes, but only their results; and consequently the whole physical philosophy of the Greeks was *an attempt to identify mentally the effect with its cause*, to feel after some not only necessary but natural connection, where they meant by natural that which would *per se* carry some presumption to their own mind.....They wanted to see some *reason* why the physical antecedent should produce this particular consequent, and their only attempts were in directions where they could find such reasons.¹

On which Mill adds :—

In other words, they were not content merely to know that one phenomenon was always followed by another; they thought that they had not attained the true end of science unless they could perceive something in the nature of the one phenomenon from which it might have been

¹ "Prospective Review" for February, 1850, cited in Mill's "Logic," bk. iii, ch. v, sect. 11.

known or presumed *previous to trial* that it would be followed by the other.

Exactly so do the anti-materialists argue that we cannot predicate interaction between body and consciousness, because we have no "common measure" of their processes. I am aware that among those whom I have for convenience termed "the anti-materialists" are some commonly accused of "materialism"; for instance, the late Professor Tyndall, who capitulated to the "gulf" argument. All the while he was loyal in his own (scientific) work to scientific principle. None the less, however, I lay against him as a reasoner the charge formulated against the Greeks by Mill.

As for the negative argument founded on the principle of the persistence of energy, it is simply one more fallacy. That principle does not, and cannot, rest on any proof that all transformation of energy can be traced in all its forms; it is simply an inference from the invariable proof reached where the tangible forms of energy *are* traceable. The anti-materialist men of science themselves insist, for religious purposes, on the ostensible dissipation of the energy of the universe. "For every thought we think," two of them tell us, "is accompanied by a displacement and motion of the particles of the brain; and we may imagine that *somehow* these motions are propagated [i.e., by "unseen" processes] throughout the universe."¹ So be it. Equally then we may assume that somehow it is transformed into thought, and that thought is a state of an "unseen" form of matter—the "mentiferous ether" of Dr. Maudsley.² Here, if we will, we come back, albeit on a plane of higher conception, to the old "materialistic" notion of mind—that is, we make the surmise without making the assumption that the "substance" in question exists in the mode of immortal and individual personalities, unless indeed we

¹ "The Unseen Universe," before cited, ed. 1886, p. 198.

² See his "Body and Will," 1883.

choose to adopt the gratuitous and theologizing¹ hypothesis of Professors Tait and Balfour Stewart, whose theory involves *two* series of "unseen" results from cerebration.

Either way, no foothold is left for the mere "non possumus" formulated by Professor Höffding. If we reflect on the correlative phenomena of brain and mind as we do on those of any other series of phenomena, we must recognize that here is causation *as we know causation*. Instead of saying that the principle of persistence of energy vetoes the belief that body and consciousness interact, we are bound to say that only by accepting consciousness as a function of cerebration can we account for the proved dissipation of bodily life in the brain in terms of blood supply and nerve tissue. In other words, to correct the unguarded formula of Professor Höffding, we do not *scientifically* know the brain save as the organ of thought.

Here, however, arises a new qualification which cannot be better stated than in the clear language of the "Primer of Psychology" of Professor E. B. Titchener of Cornell, one of the most accomplished and most scientifically-minded of our younger psychologists. I give the Professor's italics:—

In every science we try to *explain* things. Facts cannot be methodically arranged and harmonized until they are explained. Now to explain a thing is simply to *state the circumstances under which it appears*. These circumstances are termed the *conditions* of the thing's appearance. Apply this to psychology. Certain disturbances in the body, beginning in a bodily organ and ending in the cortex, are the circumstances under which mental processes appear. Bodily processes, that is, are the conditions of mental processes; and the statement of them furnishes us with the scientific explanation of the

¹ My meaning is that those writers, had they been brought up as Rationalists, would never have thought of seeing in the facts of science, as they profess to do, an argument for Christianity. They are merely gratifying their acquired bias.

mental processes. We can deal with mental processes by themselves; but to make our psychology complete we should add to our account of mind an explanation of it—that is, an account of our bodily conditions.

That is why the psychologist ought to know physiology. Wherever a mental process occurs there must be a bodily process to serve as its condition. But this is not saying that the brain *produces* mental processes; it is merely saying that the mental *runs alongside* of the bodily—that, as a matter of fact, the bodily is the condition of the mental. To say more than this is to leave science for ungrounded speculation.¹

Now, there can be no objection to this qualification, provided only that it be recognized as applying to *all cases of causation alike*. Professor Titchener does not finally and explicitly say as much; and his conclusion is apt to suggest that the application is limited to the case of body and mind. But the opening sentences of the passage clearly imply that the proposition is general, inasmuch as they put the “explanation” of mind on all fours with every other scientific explanation, as consisting in the statement of conditions of occurrence. Let it be realized that all we know of causation in Nature consists, as Hume argued, in knowledge of conditions of occurrence, and there is no ground for dispute. If we do not know that brain “produces” mental processes, neither do we know that anything “produces” anything else; and as Professor Titchener implicitly attributes a real significance to the term “produce” it seems to me he is committed to going further and explaining what he means by it. The crux is not new; long ago Schopenhauer protested against the new habit of speaking of the “conditions” of a phenomenon instead of the “causes”; and it is rightly to be asked what is to be done with the word “cause” when another word is made to do all its work.

On the other hand, I readily admit that an important

¹ “Primer of Psychology,” p. 18.

truth turns on the *attempt* to distinguish between causes and conditions—the truth, namely, that in a large view the cause of any event is not the immediate antecedent or the coincident conditions but *the whole cosmos*. Living body is indeed only that cosmic condition under which mind appears to us; and it is important thus to realize that “cause” embraces the whole series of things. But to stress this circumstance as regards mind without noting it as regards, say, gravitation or chemical action is merely to reinstate the spiritistic fallacy on a new footing; and it is to be hoped that Professor Titchener, who rightly claims that mind is “explained” just as other things are, will not let the fallacy creep in by his particular door. As he says in his preface—in a passage where, however, he disparages certain alleged forms of “materialism” somewhat in Professor Höffding’s fashion, without specifying or analyzing them—“the chief danger which besets the psychologist, in particular, is that of falling not into a crass materialism but into an equally crude spiritualism.” The proposition is well illustrated by the recent procedure of Professor James Ward, who, after a laborious and acrimonious criticism of Naturalism, marked by the most unscientific animus towards persons, ends in a reaffirmation of spiritism as to which the only critical question is whether it is to be called unphilosophic or puerile.

IV

To what conclusions, then, do we finally come as regards the “meaning of materialism”? Let us try to put them formally and concisely:—

1. The attitude of mind and the scientific method commonly labelled “materialism” are simply the attitude and the method which alone have delivered science from superstition and made its continuous progress possible.

2. In rejecting the barbaric fantasies of spiritism—the necessary process of negation which gave rise to the word “materialism”—thinking men have never pretended to

reduce the universe to what the spiritist calls "matter"; rather they have sought to conceive of the entire universe as consisting in an infinite variety of modes of one existence, of which the only honest ideal abstraction they can make is the broad conception of infinite Continuity, Coherence, Law.

3. In putting forward that conception they do not profess to have "explained" a universe which they regard as infinite; rather they are rejecting as an imposture the conservation of the ancient pretence of explaining it by affirming the countersense of "Infinite Personality *plus* Infinite Matter." "Materialism" so-called is an honest avowal of the limits of knowledge. It is spiritism that arrogantly and ineptly undertakes to conceive of infinitude in terms of the relatively trivial measure of "mind."

If, then, the student is bent on acknowledging the truth wherever it may lead him, he will not go about to rehabilitate the credit of spiritism by methods which utterly disguise its history and its errors, but will recognize that "materialism" has performed an inestimable service by logically driving spiritism out of the field. That service once recognized, "materialism" *ceases to be a significant term*; only in relation to spiritism had it meaning; and when spiritistic delusions are abandoned we are left to speak, not of materialism, nor of Monism, which is merely another antithetic name, negating Dualism, nor even of Naturalism, which is in turn the negation of Supernaturalism, but simply of science and philosophy, or, let us say, science *or* philosophy, since true philosophy is but a higher generalization on scientific lines. *But so long as the delusions of Spiritism are thrust upon us, the name Materialism has substantially the same value and justification as Monism, or Naturalism.*

It is not (be it repeated) a pretence to "know" matter in any final sense, any more than the name Naturalism involves a pretence to know Nature in a final sense. And

if only the successors of the Spiritists would frankly face the implications of their own teaching they would make possible an end of the old debate by a withdrawal of all the general "isms" alike. For what is the conclusion come to by Professor Höffding himself, after all the negative polemic above glanced at? Let us take his own words (pp. 64-5), in his own italics:—

Both the *parallelism* and the *proportionality* between the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity point to an *identity* at bottom. The difference which remains in spite of the points of agreement compels us to suppose that one and the same principle has found its expression in double form. We have no right to take mind and body for two beings or substances in reciprocal interaction. We are, on the contrary, impelled to conceive *the material interaction* between the elements composing the brain and the nervous system *as an outer form of the inner ideal unity of consciousness*. What we in our inner experience become conscious of as thought, feeling, and resolution is thus represented in the material world by certain material processes of the brain, which as such are subject to the law of the persistence of energy, although this law cannot be applied to the relation between cerebral and conscious processes. It is as though the same thing were said in two languages.

Now, if we were to italicize some of the many laxities of language in this passage, or to ask what is meant by "an outer form" or an "ideal unity," or to demand what constitutes the alleged "identity" if it be not persistence of energy, we should once more convict Professor Höffding easily enough of committing every one of the illicit processes he charges on the materialists and the spiritists alike—for he professes to reject both monistic and dualistic spiritism, howbeit without the discourtesy he thinks fit to bestow on the materialists. But let us simply proceed, first, to note the possible ambiguity of his denial of "two beings or substances"; secondly, to note that his assertion of "identity at bottom" amounts to saying no more than that cerebration and thought are related as "heat" to "motion"; and

then to note the *essential* identity of his position with that of some so-called materialists.

What says, for instance, Professor Bain? This: "The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity; they are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking. The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—a *double-faced unity*—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case."¹

And what says Büchner? This: "The whole struggle still proceeding between Materialism and Spiritualism, still more that between Materialism and Idealism, must appear futile and groundless to him who has once attained to the knowledge of the untenability of the *dualistic* theory which always underlies it.....THERE IS NO MIND WITHOUT MATTER; BUT NEITHER IS THERE ANY MATTER WITHOUT MIND."² [Compare Clifford's proposition that every molecule "possesses a small piece of mind-stuff." Haeckel uses similar language.]

In view of such fundamental agreements, is it unwarrantable to say that Descartes, could he have foreseen the developments of the conception of Matter, would have posited not two substances but two *modes* of Matter? Taking his doctrine as it stands, it differs from Clifford's conception of "Mind Stuff" only in that it ostensibly excludes what Clifford apparently assumes—that all aspects of substance are but modes of one totality. Substitute for Descartes's "substances" the "modes" of monism, and we shall perhaps have even a better formula than "double-faced unity"; for are not the "faces" of the "unity" infinite in number?

Is not such a formula a partial return to the assumption that we can compass a knowledge of the constitution of an infinite universe?

¹ "Mind and Body," p. 196.

² "Force and Matter," 4th End. ed., pp. 71-2.

Some such reversion, I think, is made in the formula of Clifford; and again in the solution offered by Dr. Morton Prince in his able little treatise on "The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism."¹ I am in respectful accord with Dr. Prince's criticism of the "anti-materialists," in particular of their "gulf" argument; and I respectfully endorse his criticism of Professor Bain's position that, inasmuch as fragrance is not extended, perception of odour is subjective in a sense in which perception of any other phenomenon is not.² The usual position (equally untenable) is rather the contrary—that visual perception is subjective, and other impressions objective. I am glad to find myself anticipated by Dr. Prince in the proposition that all our sense impressions of matter are on all fours, and that our ideas of colour and fragrance are neither more nor less subjective than our ideas of form, temperature, and hardness. All alike are statements of a relation between us and objects. But when Dr. Prince goes on to say, *first*, that behind the attributes which make up our knowledge of any piece of matter there is some inferable but unknown Thing-in-Itself; and, *second*, that the solution of the old problem lies in saying, on the lines of Professor Clifford, that the "real substance" is mind—then I am moved to say that the problem thus "solved" really remains as it was.

"Instead of there being one substance with two properties or 'aspects'—mind and motion," says Dr. Prince, "*there is one substance, mind*; and the other apparent property, motion, is only the way in which this real substance, mind, is apprehended by a second organism, only the sensation of, or effect upon, the second organism, when acted upon (ideally) by the real substance, mind."³

And again:—

"A mental state and those physical changes which are known in the objective world as neural undulations are

¹ Philadelphia, 1885.

² "Mind and Body," p. 135.

³ "On the Nature of Mind," pp. 28-9.

one and the same thing, but the former is the actuality, the latter a mode by which it is presented to the consciousness of a second person—i.e., to the non-possessor of it.”¹

It is not difficult to show that this ingenious solution really evades the problem. As thus:—

1. Whether or not mind be the “actuality,” it is *not* presented to a second organism as neural undulation. Neural undulation is cognized simply as neural undulation. Mind in A is *inferred* by B from A’s words or acts, and the analogy of B’s own experience.

2. Nothing is gained by calling mind the “actuality.” There remains the insoluble dilemma that when the brain life ceases the alleged “actuality” has ostensibly ceased. Dr. Prince, being a “materialist,” negates personal “soul” as a permanent entity. What then is left?

3. If mind is “the” actuality, the phenomena of madness are an absolute enigma.

4. The “Thing-in-Itself,” abstracted from all its attributes, is simply “the unknowable”; knowledge is in terms of attributes. And if we could proceed logically to abstract the assumed *substantia*, in ALL cases, from ALL attributes, not only would there be theoretically no *thing* left; there would be no *we* left. Consciousness is made up of (a) cognitions of attributes; (b) desires for things or for knowledge of things in terms of attributes; (c) sense of pain or pleasure in terms of localized sensation or loss of former sensation or pleasure; and (d) recollections of all these.

Once more, then, honest “materialism” is driven back to its true position, the avowal of the limitation of our knowledge. In so far as it ever competes with spiritism in claiming an ultimate knowledge of actuality otherwise than in terms of an equation between consciousness and states of matter, directly perceived or consistently inferred, it is unwittingly following the old *à priori* road, from

¹ “On the Nature of Mind,” p. 55.

which it had seen the need to turn away. The motto of renascent science in the seventeenth century was "Facts, not words." To call an infinite universe either mind or matter is simply a verbal process. "We called the chess-board white; we call it black." The two names stand alike for perception of relations; and to say that the universe is conceivable in terms of mind—our poor faculty of perception and comprehension—is no juster than to say it is conceivable in terms of our passions, or of material attributes. To these relations we are tied; or rather, in these relations we exist. And if we are to end, as we very well may, by postulating the existence of "the unknowable," let us remember that that is to be presumed a totality of infinite aspects themselves unknown. To fall back on an alleged necessity for a "psychic factor" is only to assume once more that the infinite whole must be controlled in terms of our conception of control.

Such is the candid philosophic conclusion; the moral conclusion is like unto it. The reachings of men in the name of science after the incognizable need do no more harm than any other unsatisfiable yearning, provided only that the seekers learn the *sociological* lesson of religious and philosophic history, and separate themselves from the evil spirit of theological hate. But when professed men of science, skilled only in physics, presume to vilify and vituperate what they call "materialism" as leading to certain moral and social evils, they entitle us to tell them that they are playing the part of charlatans in the spirit of priests. The spiritism to which they are either directly or indirectly lending their countenance has been the greatest worker of bloodshed, the greatest generator of evil, in human history; and their sociological generalizations are as truly the formulas of pretentious ignorance as any ever framed by spiritism itself.

When, moreover, they appear before us as champions of Paleyism in the field of history, proffering to a partly

contemptuous and partly deferential public the arguments which clericalism itself has abandoned, they entitle us to say that their conserved prejudice has partly cast out of them the true spirit of science, and to suspect every formula in which they deal with even their own subject in terms of its relation to philosophy. When the same set of teachers tell us in one breath that we do not know what matter really is, and in the next that we know it to be *per se* "non-psychic," they have given evidence not of special skill but of special inconsistency.

The best security, perhaps, against carrying anew into philosophy, in this connection, the temper of bigotry which has polluted it in its theological past is to keep before one the simple conspectus presented by Professor Bain in his excellent work on "Mind and Body." Thus does he set forth the conflicting theories:—

I.—TWO SUBSTANCES.

1.—*Both Material.*

- a. The prevailing conception among the lower races.
- b. Most of the ancient Greek philosophers.
- c. The early Christian Fathers.

2.—*An Immaterial and a Material.*

- a. Commencement in Plato and Aristotle.
- b. The later Fathers from the age of Augustine.
- c. The Schoolmen.
- d. Descartes.
- e. The prevalent opinion.

II.—ONE SUBSTANCE.

1.—*Mind and Matter the Same.*

- a. The cruder forms and expressions of materialism.
- b. The Pantheistic Ideal of Fichte. [*Add Spinoza.*]

2.—*Contrast of Mind and Matter Saved.*

Guarded or qualified materialism—held by many Physiologists and Metaphysicians; the growing opinion.

Add that since that table was framed, about thirty years ago,¹ such "materialists" as Clifford and Dr. Prince have stood for the formula that "the universe consists entirely of mind-stuff" (which Clifford distinguishes from "mind or consciousness"), and it will be seen how nearly the debate between Materialism and Spiritualism, in its scientific as distinguished from its theological aspect, has become a mere dispute over terms, thanks mainly to the service done by "materialism" in delivering science in the past from the clutches of religion.

¹ Written in 1902.

PROFESSOR JAMES'S PLEA FOR THEISM¹

(1898)

I

To the student of culture-history who happens to be non-theistic there is something surprising in the tenacity of theistic or deistic opinions among many educated people. I use the terms "theistic" and "deistic" as of similar force, because, as can easily be shown, the "theism" of many instructed people in our own day is intellectually on all fours with the Deism of one or two hundred years ago, so often described by professed theists as inadequate and superseded. The author² of the treatise "Supernatural Religion," for instance, thus expresses himself at the close of his second volume :—

The necessity of Divine Revelation is a pure theological figment utterly opposed to Reason. Escaping from it, we exchange a Jewish anthropomorphic Divinity, made after our image, for an omnipresent God, under whose beneficent government we know that all that is consistent with wise and omnipotent Law is prospered, and brought to perfection, and all that is opposed to Divine order is mercifully frustrated, and brought to naught.....It is manifestly our first duty, as it should be our supremest pleasure, to apprehend as clearly as we may the laws by which the Supreme Being governs the Universe, and to bring ourselves and our actions into reverent harmony with them.....*Thus* making the Divine Will our will, we

¹ [It should be noted that the late Professor James, in one of his subsequent writings, declared himself to have been misunderstood by his critics as regards his "Will to Believe." As he offered no details, it is impossible to know what points he had in mind. I incline to regard the statement as a partial surrender of the position taken up.]

² It should here be noted that the author in question, the late Mr. W. R. Cassels, afterwards expressly surrendered the theistic positions taken up in his first edition. I leave my criticism as it stood, for historical reasons.

shall recognize in the highest sense that God is ever with us, that His good providence controls our slightest actions, that we.....are eternally cared for and governed by an omnipresent immutable power, for which nothing is too great, nothing too insignificant, and in whose Divine order a fitting place is found for the lowest as well as the highest in the palpitating life of the Universe.

No rationalist reader, I suppose, will question either the good faith or the general intelligence of this author. These qualities in him are as obvious as his learning and his industry. No more patient and candid inquirer has worked at the problem of the documentary basis of Christianity. And yet—I say it with all gravity and with all regret—the reasoning of the passage above cited is worse, the thought more superficial, than that of the worst argument brought against the author by either Bishop Lightfoot or Bishop Westcott.

Let us apply to the passage the simplest tests of consistency. It affirms an omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, beneficent Providence. Yet it distinguishes between what is “opposed to Divine order” and what is “consistent with wise and omnipotent Law.” How, in the name of consistent speech, *can* anything in a universe made and controlled by omnipotence be *inconsistent* with omnipotent Law? How can anything be “opposed to Divine order” in a universe which, in the terms of the definition, *is* absolutely Divine order, and nothing else? Our author speaks of “bringing ourselves and our actions into reverent harmony” with the “laws by which the Supreme Being governs the universe.” Does he mean to assert that we can conceivably be *out* of harmony with laws so defined? God, he says, controls our slightest actions when we make the Divine Will our will. Does he imagine that, in the terms of the case, our will can ever be anything else? *Can* we overrule, or evade, the Will of Omnipotence? Do not the tiger and the tornado alike act by Divine Will? Does the microbe or the murderer do otherwise? Is it suggested that an Atheist

is beyond the control of Omnipotence; or that Omniscience had not contemplated Atheism? Brought up thus against a blank wall of self-contradiction, we can only say that the author has never realized the nature of the problem on which he thus discourses; just as, when he declares Christianity to be "the most perfect development of human morality," we say he can have given no adequate thought to the question wherein good morality consists. An expert in one research, he is a tyro in others, no less important, concerning which he speaks with a most summary confidence. His theism is just the elementary, confused, self-contradictory deism of Cicero, of Plutarch, of Augustine, of Luther, of Matthew Tindal, of Pope, and of the young Voltaire. And yet, perplexing as is the discovery, we are obliged to admit that his doctrine is in a general way endorsed by writers who rank as honoured experts in matters alike of reasoning and of the exact analysis of emotional processes.

II

The perplexity thus induced is, at least in some respects, a good preparation for the study of the recent volume of Professor William James, which undertakes to vindicate Theism in a series of essays under the title "The Will to Believe." In this mood we can at least be circumspect, considerate, and self-possessed, as befits us in the presence of an accomplished and original thinker. This, the Professor's latest book, is marked by many of the merits of his greater treatise—freshness and felicity of method, a stimulating independence of attitude, and, above all, a style quite remarkable at once for vividness, purity, simplicity, and power—the best English style, perhaps, to be found in the whole literature of modern philosophy. Here we need never fear to be button-holed by superannuated platitudes, or to be burdened with the débris of exploded arguments. The reasoning, be it right or wrong, is sure to be as piquant

as the phrasing; and he who would refute it must look warily to his steps.

For some way, indeed, it is safe, nay salutary, to follow. Professor James describes himself as a "radical empiricist," a very good name, which will recommend itself to many when thus defined (p. 14):—

I am myself a complete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. I live, to be sure, by the practical faith that we must go on experiencing and thinking over our experience, for only thus can our opinions grow more true; but to hold any one of them—I absolutely do not care which—as if it never could be reinterpretable, or corrigible, I believe to be a tremendously mistaken attitude, and I think that the whole history of philosophy will bear me out.

We may take exception to the next sentence: "There is but one indefectibly certain truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhonistic scepticism itself leaves standing—the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists." As the Professor goes on to say: "That is the bare starting point of knowledge, the mere admission of a stuff to be philosophized about." Then it is hardly to be called a truth. And, further, there cannot well be an accepted phenomenon of consciousness without an acceptance of certain cognitions. Surely it is for us, in this matter, an indefectibly certain truth that we are discussing something. The pyrrhonist always assumes that we hear his words, and he ours; so that he is really not so unanswerable by logic, I think, as Professor James sometimes declares him to be. "Objective evidence and certitude," says the Professor, in his vivid and poetic way (p. 14), "are doubtless very fine ideals to play with; but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found?" Then is not that an assertion that the moonlight and the dreams are as such objective certitudes?¹ Just before, too, the Professor had said (p. 13):

¹ It is Professor James's fellow-theist, Professor Royce, who writes: "The conditions that determine the logical possibility of error must themselves be absolute truth" ("The Religious Aspect of Philosophy," 1885, p. 387).

“You believe in objective evidence, and I do. Of some things we feel that we are certain; we know, and we know that we know.” Letting that pass, however, we need only note further, for preliminary purposes, that Professor James greatly overstates his radicalism when he says he absolutely does not care which opinion is claimed to be past reconsidering—that he insists on holding all open to revision. At the outset he had squarely said that some hypotheses are, for him and us, dead. “If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi,” he remarks, “the notion makes no electric connection with your nature—it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead”—dead, that is, only for us, since to the Arab it is alive. And this is important for our discussion. The “Will to Believe,” for which Professor James is going to do battle, is to be restricted to the beliefs of the neighbours—yes, and of the bulk of the neighbours. If you have a will to believe that Colonel Ingersoll is a valuable educative force, the case will be different; and your will to believe that the average belief is absurd—why, that is the very thing that Professor James is bent on discrediting.

Let us then come to the issue. The essential first step in the first essay is this: That we must all hold some beliefs, on grounds short of absolute certainty, and that Clifford's exhortation to believe nothing rather than make a single error is fantastic. “Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things.” So far, so good, especially as it at the same time conceded (p. 20) that “the need of acting is seldom so urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief at all.” Again, with certain discount for vivacity of rhetoric, we can agree to this (p. 21): “If you want an absolute duffer in an investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has no interest in its results. He is the warranted incapable, the positive fool.” And there need be no dispute at all about this: “The most useful investigator, because the

most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived." But immediately after that we stumble on a proposition in which are packed at least two fallacies, with an air of ulterior purpose.

"Science," says the Professor, "has organized this nervousness into a regular *technique*, her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that one may even say she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. It is only truth as technically verified that interests her. The truth of truths might come in merely affirmative form, and she would decline to touch it."

I am always a little suspicious of statements which metaphorize science into an entity with certain habits: they are so much in favour with certain "absolute duffers." And here suspicion at once hatches into revolt. A distinction has been drawn between truth by itself and truth as technically verified; and science is accused of having "ceased" to care for the former. But when did "she," or any one else, consciously care for truth recognized as unverified? What does truth mean but just "the verified"? There are certainly many degrees in the "technicality" of the verification for the different believers; but for each there is assuredly *a* technicality. When the old-world believer was told that the angel of the Lord appeared unto Joseph in a dream *his* standard of technicality was satisfied. But some form of verification, avowedly or not, goes with all assent; and the theist surely claims to have *his* verification. "Truth by itself," truth cognized as unverified—this is merely a verbal chimera; it is as if you should say: "An unfelt hunger," "uncongealed ice." "Science"—that is, the logical man of science—would not say, as Professor James represents, that a truth believed without verification would be "stolen in defiance of her duty to mankind." She—or he—would say, if anything, that a proposition recognized

as unverified is not a truth for anybody, and that assent is withheld from it, not as an unverified truth, but as a statement not known to be true. Nor is Professor James's remark intelligible save as a precipitate revelation of what he would like to justify if he could. For not only does he proceed to insist that "science" takes certain moral propositions for granted, seeking no verification for them, but he has already told us (p. 10) that "a leading biologist, now dead," once said to him that, even if such a thing as telepathy were true, "scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed." Here then was "science" in a frame of mind in which, clearly, the proposition that all alleged telepathy is a fraud is acceptable without any properly technical verification, being regarded as a welcome truth. That is to say, "science" is not the rigid devotee of verification that she was said to be. She, too, has her "will to believe"; and what Professor James is really contending for is just such a licence for the theist.

III

Of course, the licence must now be made to seem respectable. The thesis professedly defended runs (p. 11) :—

Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision—just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.

Observe the stress of the claim. You are passional, whether you say yes or no, or neither; that is to say, "science" is passional when she puts aside the so-called "truth by itself," though her "ground" is as intellectual as you could well wish. Then in what case are we not passional? Since we are all fallible, we may be wrong when we think we are intellectually right; and as we

have then "lost the truth," it should seem that it is all one whether we are passionate or not. About what, then, are we fighting? Ultimately we find out: it is for the right to be wilfully, consciously, purposely passionate, on the plea that what we decide to believe may be true after all. Professor James never once, that I know of, endorses the Christian doctrine of objective salvation; but his language here seems to me finally meaningless unless that meaning be put in it. What is "losing the truth"? In what sense do I gain a truth if I decide to make-believe to believe a mere unverified assertion? If I am not rationally convinced, where is the truth for me? And if I cannot believe it, what have I lost? What is this willed and passionate species of belief that in this particular kind of case Professor James is contending for?

The first concrete indication we have is his assertion (p. 24) that, in the case of a man winning a woman's love by mere sanguine insistence that she *must* love him, "the desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth's existence; and so in innumerable cases of other sorts." Now, it must be at once obvious to everybody that this assertion is utterly untrue. To say nothing of the singular use of the phrase "special truth," it is plain that not the desire, but the showing and telling of the desire, brings about the desired fact. Nor has this kind of so-called special truth the slightest analogy with the kind of hypothesis that Professor James sets out and ends by indicating. So with his further illustration of the act of the careful of passengers who, each having faith in the co-operation of the rest, rise as one man, and overpower the highwaymen. It is after giving us these two illustrations that Professor James writes (p. 25):—

And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the "lowest kind of immorality" into which a thinking being can fall. Yet

such is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our lives.

I do not remember to have met with a more surprising paralogism in theological literature, ancient or modern. After confusing an objective event—a change in a woman's feeling—with an abstract and universal proposition, Professor James goes on to confound a code of scientific demonstration, a rule of evidence, with a code of conduct. What positivist or scientific absolutist ever declared that we ought never to *act* save on an absolute certainty? What rationalist ever refused assent to Butler's claim that simple probability is the normal guide in conduct? What man or woman ever said that you ought never to take a risk in love or war or business? Who pretends to believe that Clifford would have called the sanguine lover or the courageous passenger immoral?

It will not avail to argue here that Clifford's doctrine as to the intellectual life is logically extensible to the life of action, as Butler claimed that the rule of probability was extensible from action to creed. If that were the proposition intended it would have been so put, and then argued for; but it is not put, and it is never argued. Our dialectician had simply assumed that his cases from action were logically identical with cases of simple belief or disbelief in a general quasi-philosophic proposition. It is immediately after the passage last cited that he writes (p. 25): "It will be said, these are all childish human cases, and have nothing to do with great cosmical matters, like the question of religious faith. *Let us then pass on to that.*" That is, he admits he has made out nothing. Why then did he claim a moment ago that he had stultified his adversary? He seems now to see that he had stumbled into sheer irrelevance. Why then does he leave the irrelevance standing? And why is it freshly obtruded in the later essay, p. 97, on "The Sentiment of Rationality"?

IV

Let us "pass on" with him:—

What then [he asks] do we now mean by the religious hypothesis? Science says things are; morality says some things are better than other things; and religion says essentially two things. First, she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word. "Perfection is eternal"—this phrase of Charles Secrétan seems a good way of putting this first affirmation of religion, an affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all. The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true.

Is this then what we are debating about—this string of sparkling tropes, some of which would very well serve to mark the grounds of anti-theism? Of course not. Professor James is significantly strategic with his intangible "essentials." It is only after some further operations that we come to the partially plain statement:—

The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere *It* to us, but a *Thou*, if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible from person to person might be possible here.

In another essay the "essentials" are stated (p. 122) a little more sharply still:—

First, it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality.....God's personality is to be regarded, like any other personality, as something outside of my own, and other than me, and whose existence I simply come upon and find.

We are entitled to ask, then, that the question be argued on this formula. The question now is, says Professor James (p. 26), "what the *logical* elements of this situation are, in case the religious hypothesis in both branches be really true"—that is, in case the universe be really a knowable person, and in case it be really an

instant gain to us to believe so. And he straightway proceeds to a comment in which there is no statement of logical elements at all—as he well may, since the question about logical elements was, perforce, meaningless. Let us put it with another bearing: “In case it be really true that the other side of the moon is made of green cheese, what are the logical elements of the case?” What, indeed! As regards the religious point, what is offered, says Professor James, is a “momentous option.” Suppose we answer, in the manner of the criticism on the Holy Roman Empire, that it is neither momentous nor an option, how will Professor James prove his point? First, he says, the proposition assumes that you gain if you accept it; you lose if you do not. Quite so, but that is merely the point in dispute; the option then is only hypothetically momentous. The Mahdi offers you as much; and so does Warner’s Safe Cure. And whereas the Cure, if not the Mahdi, professes to be testable, and is partially so, while the Theistic proposition is not, we might not unwarrantably say that the latter gives us no option whatever in the logical sense, since there are no data for a choice. It is a mere process of tossing a coin and abiding by the result. That is not a philosophic option.

Professor James here assumes, however, that if we refuse to take the theistic Safe Cure on the bare word of the advertisement it is for sheer fear of error; and he attacks the unbeliever for his timidity. I beg leave to say that there is no timidity in the case—that any timidity in the matter, by the Professor’s own showing, is precisely on his own side; and that I, for my part, am at a loss to realize how the question of fear can philosophically suggest itself. “Dupery for dupery,” says Professor James (p. 27), “what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear?” But how can there be dupery in the mere *inability* to believe? There may, indeed, be dupery in

a positive explanation, which I frame for myself, of the process by which another man's error, as I regard it, has been reached. But if I simply cannot believe a given proposition, how can I be said to be duped? Hypothetically, in this case, by my fear of error, says our Theist. My case is not inability, he suggests; it is a passional indisposition—a quasi-intellectual fear. But I repeat that there was no fear in the case. In the terms of the issue the possible error, if error it be, is one I—the organized being I—can never find out. What have I to fear? Clifford might say he feared to demoralize his intelligence; but that consideration really does not arise for us, for Clifford simply could not believe on what he *held* to be insufficient evidence, and, if he *did* too lightly believe, it was mere miscarriage, not conscious demoralization.

On the other hand, Professor James says for himself (p. 27), in so many words: "If religion be true, and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your extinguisher upon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business in this matter), to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side." And this flagrant confession of *fear* we are asked to take as a justifying of credence by the plea of *hope*! The motive is patently fear, pure and simple. And what a fear! It is the fear of not being "on the winning side." That is to say, I suppose, the hypothetical Ineffable Infinite Person is likely to cry *Vae Victis*¹ at the Judgment Day—to treat as captives and victims those who had not the luck to toss the coin of chance-credence aright. Shall we not here say once more, with Mill, that we had much rather be damned by such a deity as that than share in his despicable triumph? Professor James would perhaps say that there is "too much of robustious pathos" in such a declaration, as he says of Professor Clifford's protest against levity of belief. He

¹ Cp. the theistic expression on p. 96: "I expect then to triumph with tenfold glory"—i.e., at "the judgment day."

seems to want all the robustious pathos for himself. With him, then, let it be, since, sooth to say, his position has need of it. For us be the bare logic of the argument, which now brings us to the noting that Professor James not only avows that he is proceeding on sheer fear, but quashes even his posited premiss that the act of belief is in itself a gain.

One [he writes, p. 28] who should shut himself up in snarling logicality (like a churlish person in a company), and try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off for ever from his only opportunity of making the gods' acquaintance. This feeling, *forced on us* we know not whence, that by *obstinately* believing that there are gods (although not to do so would be so *easy*, both for our logic and our life) we are doing the universe the deepest service we can, seems part of the living essence of the religious hypothesis.

Observe the chaos of the argument. A certain feeling is "forced" on us, and yet it is "easy," both for our logic and our life, to do without it. If then logic and life are not the whole factors in our thinking, what is it that is left to constitute the element of pressure about that feeling? And if we thus know that life is "easy" without theism, what plausibility attaches to the hypothesis that the acceptance of theism makes us at once "better off"?

Let us now see where we stand. Here is the Professor's condensation of his case:—

If the hypothesis *were* true in all its parts.....then pure intellectualism, with its veto on our making willing advances, would be an absurdity; and some participation of our sympathetic nature would be logically required..... A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there would be an irrational rule. That for me is the long and short of the formal logic of the situation, no matter what the kinds of truth might materially be. I confess I do not see how this logic can be escaped.

Alas for formal logic if this be an example of it. Let

us paraphrase these too vivid sentences into clearness, as thus: "*If* an unproved and unprovable statement, a statement which can never be shown or known to be true, *be* true without our knowing it, then the logic which vetoed our believing it would be absurd, and we should do well to want to believe it, though as aforesaid we should never know, while in this frame of mind, whether we *were* really doing well. For instance, *if* it be true that there is a great green dragon on the other side of the moon, *then* that rule of evidence is absurd which tells us not to believe the assertion without proof. And since in the terms of the case we cannot know whether the assertion is or is not true, we clearly cannot know whether the rule of evidence is absurd." *Quod NON erat demonstrandum.*

This is, in sober sadness, what the argument of Professor James so far logically comes to. He stakes his case on an *if* which can never be un-*if*'ed, so to speak. *If* theism be true, then it is absurd not to believe it without proof; but as we can never know whether it *is* true, we can never tell whether or not it is absurd not to believe. Professor James apparently implies at times that "I" = something which will be able to argue matters over again in another world; but as he never even attempts to establish this the issue is not even before us. In short, we have arrived at nothing whatever. We have realized what the Professor elsewhere (p. 219) terms "the enormous emptiness of what is called an abstract proposition." And here endeth the first lesson—the title-essay of Professor James's book. It is after that summing-up that the Professor genially tells us that if we do not agree with him he suspects it is because we have "got away from the abstract logical point of view altogether, and are thinking (perhaps without realizing it) of some particular religious hypothesis which for us is dead." I respectfully retort the soft impeachment, replying that for abstract logic no hypothesis whatever

is dead before dissection; that this one has been for us formally proved by fresh logical scrutiny to be unsupported, as of old; that beyond this we have as yet affirmed nothing; and that it is our Theist who, parading loyalty to abstract logic, was all the while clutching the hand of a fleshly presupposition. "This command that we shall put a stopper on our hearts, instincts, and courage, and *wait*"—such is the Professor's account of our attitude to his hypotheticism. Here is robustious pathos indeed. There are "we," and "we," and I might fitly reply to Professor James that he is asking "us" to put a stopper on *our* hearts, instincts, and self-respect, and consciously sneak into a Fools' Paradise. There is small courage needed for *that* enterprise. If there be no God, it is all one; but if there *be* a God—so says his worshipper—He will make it go hard with atheists. Such is the old, unseemly kernel we find in the new argument. The position looks just a little better in the robustiously pathetic passage which Professor James in conclusion cites from Sir James Stephen: "We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still, we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road, we shall be dashed to pieces." But is there any philosophic improvement? Is not all this just a sample of that vacuity of rhetoric which Stephen was so fond of impugning to those whose views he disliked? Who is getting frozen? Who has been dashed to pieces? What force constitutes the frost; and what is the nature of the precipice? Really, a declamatory judge cannot help out a strayed philosopher; we must get back to something like significant speech and serious argument. The first campaign for the Will to Believe in Gods has come to nothing; let us scrutinize the others.

V

It is in the later essays, rather than in the titular, that our philosopher's Will to Believe becomes clearly recognizable for what it is. He really has some arguments for Theism, and his Will to Believe turns out to be a Will to Believe that these arguments are valid. In so many words he now contends that Theism is the only *rational* attitude to the problem of the universe: "theism," he avers (p. 127), "always stands ready with the most practically rational solution it is possible to conceive"; all that we heard about the passional nature is for the time peacefully withdrawn; and theism figures as nearly pure reason—nay, pure understanding. Unhappily, the new Reason is but the old Passion writ small. I say writ small, because passion does not have full sway, and reason does have a hearing. Professor James rejects the argument from design, from Nature. We "know nature too impartially and too well," he says (p. 43), "to worship unreservedly any God of whose character she can be an adequate expression." He admits in so many words (p. 198) that "ethics have as genuine and real a foothold in a universe where the highest consciousness is human as in a universe where there is a God as well." He admits, too (p. 176), that "the world is enigmatical enough in all conscience, whatever theory we may take up towards it." But all of these statements he more or less clearly contradicts; and that as to ethics he contradicts in the most stupefying way. And on the other hand he makes this extraordinary avowal, which he did not make in the first essay, where it would have been sharply relevant, but which, in reading that essay, one really did not dream to be possible on his part.

I confess [he writes, p. 61] that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength, and increase of very being, from our

fidelity. For my own part, I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will.

That passage occurs in a lecture addressed to the Harvard Young Men's Christian Association, under the title "Is Life Worth Living?", and it will be observed that it implicitly says that life is not much worth living, save on a view of the universe which, according to one part of the Christian creed, is flat blasphemy. I make no doubt that some Christian readers have so described it; and that many other Christians and Theists have been speechlessly astounded by it. And yet, though it is surprising, even to one who holds all Theism to be fallacy, in its nude confession that the God cannot be conceived as Omnipotent, on the other hand Theism so perpetually falls back on a veiled confession to that effect that this doctrine cannot be pronounced inconsistent with the general run of theistic thought. For the constant residuum of all theistic discussion is this: God is *not* Almighty. In human affairs he never gets his own way. It is but a sequent step further to take up the hypothetic position (really very old) sketched by Mill—that of a limited-liability-God, who is not even physically in command of things, but is the victim of circumstances over which he has only an imperfect control. And even without a single further step it lands us at once in the old conception, which my dear and honoured friend, Dr. Moncure Conway, has floated, I do not know how far fancifully, as the fit euthanasia of theism—that is to say, the ancient Dualism, the conception of a cosmic Evil Power at war with the Good. So that our theistic philosophy, after long crying "Back to Kant," and finally finding no peace there, is in a fair way to be heard crying "Back to the Devil." Professor James has set the key.

Logically, this avowal complements the argument of

the first essay by saying that even as the lover creates love by demanding it, so the Theist adds to his God's stature by believing that there is a God—a God who is not infinite, not omnipotent, and not all-wise—a God who suffers from neglect, and may be conceived as wailing, "My Creature, my Creature, why hast thou forsaken me?" I have only to say that this egregious conception will soon be disposed of in terms of the test to which Professor James is so fond of appealing as against Agnosticism—that of popular success. It will satisfy neither the thinker nor the emotionalist, neither the wise man nor the multitude. The very craving on which the Professor relies for the outvoting of rationalism is confessedly a craving for a God-Almighty, even though the cravers in their ethics always stultify their demand. They harbour the contradiction in virtue of the bridgeless gaps in their thought; but they will never stand being told in God's name that their God is only a demigod. Even they can confusedly feel what the reasonable thinker will at once see, that such a God is as no God; that on theistic principles you must at once invent another God above him to account for him. It is as necessary to explain him theistically as to explain the universe. An infinite universe must have an infinite God, if Godism is to keep up the semblance of philosophy.

And in due course, after having quashed theistic philosophy as we have seen, Dr. James sets about vindicating it in his essay on "The Sentiment of Rationality." He premises (p. 63) that philosophers "desire to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the whole be more rational than the somewhat chaotic view which every one by nature carries about with him under his hat." And rationality, he admits, is certificated as such by certain subjective marks with which it affects him—primarily by "a strong feeling of ease, peace, rest." "The transition from a state of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of lively relief and

pleasure." So far the formula. But the argument turns out to be this, that a process—or a certain process—which yields lively relief and pleasure is thereby certificated to be one of rational comprehension. There is no other content in the exposition. After having, as we have seen, let in again the barbaric hypothesis of a Good Power, Professor James acknowledges that the philosopher's ideal involves the knowledge of causes as converging to a minimum number, producing the maximum number of effects (p. 65). But this tendency, he reminds us, is alien to the average man, who loves concrete variety, and yet somehow yearns for certainty about the future; so, after some gymnastic, we arrive at the desired conclusion that the average man is entitled to the philosophy that suits him. And, instead of showing that it is rational so to form one's creed, the Professor merely goes about to show that it is possible. He had previously given us his opinion on that point in the chapter on Belief in his "Principles of Psychology"; but the essay before us perhaps goes a little further, while not seeming at first sight to go quite so far (pp. 76-7):—

Philosophers long ago observed the remarkable fact that mere familiarity with things is able to produce a feeling of their rationality.....The daily contemplation of phenomena juxtaposed in a certain order begets an acceptance of their connection as absolute as the repose engendered by theoretic insight into their coherence. To explain a thing is to pass easily back to its antecedents; to know it is easily to foresee its consequents. Custom, which lets us do both, is thus the source of *whatever rationality the thing may gain in our minds.* (Italics mine.)

This is more than a mere endorsement of Hume on causation. After the sweeping final clause, which negates the preceding admission as to the function of theoretic insight, we have the qualified claim that custom must be "one of the factors" of rationality in the broad sense. But, whatever be the theorem intended, all that we arrive at is the teaching of the "Principles":—

*We need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real. It will become so knit with habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which characterize belief.*¹

Here again Professor James, in the name of the average man, takes up a position where neither the average man nor the average philosopher can live. It is the position of Pascal, hardily cited by the Professor in his opening essay: if you have doubts about rites and sacraments go and practise them, take the eucharist and hear mass: *cela vous fera croire et vous abêtira*—that will make you believe, and will STUPEFY you. In this connection the Professor circumspectly argues (p. 6) that, “unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option.....to us Protestants these means of salvation seem such foregone impossibilities that Pascal’s logic, invoked for them specifically, leaves us unmoved.” This is formally a denial of the affirmation just cited from the “Principles,” which admits no exception; and it is formally a negation, once more, of the author’s claim that he kept absolutely all of his convictions open to revision. But let us take the qualified statement: to what does it bring us? What is a pre-existing tendency? On the Professor’s own showing, it involves, of necessity, only the perception that it would be agreeable to believe certain things; and, though he does not say as much, he leaves us free to say that a man who sees possibilities of income in an ecclesiastical career has a quite sufficient pre-existing tendency to believe in ecclesiastical formulas. Given that, all the rest follows, by the Professor’s express and reiterated sanction.

¹ “Principles of Psychology,” vol. ii, p. 321.

VI

Professor James seems to think his permit, in the matter of volitional faith,¹ will never lead any Protestant to masses and holy water—for “us,” he observes, these hypotheses are “dead,” though he has in effect told us that such confidence of negation is a “tremendously mistaken attitude.” How then came these hypotheses to be dead? Through mere cessation, says his argument. How then did that cessation come about? His exposition plainly implies that it was at least in part by reason of its becoming agreeable or convenient not to believe the dogmas in question—that many Protestants at the parting of the ways became so because Protestantism was seen to be materially advantageous; and here I am in decided agreement, sociologically speaking. But surely Professor James will not maintain, what even I should consider an extravagance of iconoclasm, that there was *no* spontaneous and disinterested tendency to disbelieve in masses and holy water? There must have been *some* honest revolt on intellectual grounds. And what is true of Protestantism is clearly true in a higher degree of every surrender since made of popular prejudice and superstition. Here then we have a series of revolts *against* customary belief, detections of irrationality in the most familiar formulas, and this by the spontaneous or induced operation of the analytic or critical faculty.

On this, which had once passed for a truism, we are obliged to insist, by way of letting daylight into Professor James's dialectic. He will have it that Will and Belief are identical, and that, given only that the hypotheses be “live,” you can believe what you will. To all which the fatal answer is, that hypotheses “die” just because men

¹ It may save some trouble to point out that it would be irrelevant to meet the present argument by the plea that *all* belief has in it, psychologically speaking, a certain element of volition—in the way of attention, sympathy, persistence, etc. We are dealing with a quite special form of volition, prescribed as being exceptional.

cannot believe what they will, though they may make-believe to. In direct defiance of the expert's dictum I make bold to say that the doctrine which you merely act towards *as if* you believed it is *never* believed in—never so long as you are conscious of acting with that purpose, as you always must be while you are capable of using that argument. Did Pascal believe? At bottom, no; he impressed the believers about him as a self-tormentor; he had *not* stupefied himself; enfeebled as he was in body and brain, he was but striving to inflame or to drug himself into the beliefs of the stupid. And Professor James's average man, whom he makes umpire in these matters, will never consent to say with the satirist: "We believe in baptism *because* we have seen it done."

Belief is, as is admitted by our psychologist, just the conviction of reality. Now, the very prescription of the alterative course of make-believe in certain cases is an admission that in these there is *not* the sense of reality. From this no sophistry can get away. So long as there survives the knowledge that our quasi-belief, or make-believe, *is* such—that it is in process of would-be manufacture—so long the sense of reality is not there, and belief is not there. As the Professor has it: "Belief, the sense of reality, feels like itself."¹ It avails nothing to say that the proposition may all the while be true. That is not here the question; the point is that the operator is not a believer. And how he can ever forget the course he has taken in the matter is to me inconceivable. But even if he otherwise could, Professor James will not let him.

We come to this, then, that every superstition we have outgrown, every hypothesis that has "died," would have been kept in vogue if men had been able to act on Professor James's principle. And on that principle there

¹ "Principles," vol. ii, p. 286.

is no security against reversion to those superstitions save one—that there is no social or pecuniary inducement to revert to them. But even that security does not cover the ground. The assumption of “deadness” is obviously arbitrary. As a matter of fact, many Protestants, and one or two whilom atheists, do revert to Catholicism; they feel the charm of the ritual and the atmosphere; they are so framed that there is no discomfort for them in the attitude of subjection. Any man, then, may go the length of haunting the Catholic service; let him but feel attracted, and he may lift himself by his boot-straps into belief, on the subjectivist method. And we are not restricted to the case of Catholicism. Why not revert to witches and fairies and the evil eye? Any form of mystery-mongering, any species of fortune-telling or spiritualism, may be justified in the same way; in fact, most spiritualists do nakedly stand on Professor James's ground—that faith helps to create the desired phenomena, and that there can be no final disproof of the general assertion, however often frauds may be detected.

VII

We have thus come to the practical issue: what will be the effect of Professor James's counsel on action? If my argument be sound, rationalists need have no fear that it will multiply blind believers, save in so far as it will encourage make-believers to teach their children as unquestioned truth what they know to be widely questioned. It is by such early teaching, of course, that most believers are made; conversions from rationalism to faith are not one tithe as numerous as those from faith to rationalism. But one of the great economic facts of our civilization is the existence of the class of professional ministers of religion; and it is impossible not to ask how Professor James's doctrine relates to the future of that class. It seems compulsory to answer that, though he

will not turn dubious young readers into believers, he may very well make them content to act as if they were. That is to say, he encourages men who have no sincere vocation for religion, no justifying sense of its reality, to take it up as a means of income, preaching dogmas they do not credit.

It is possible that on this Professor James would say he was doing not harm but good—that men who take to the ministry on his principles are likely to be men of light and leading. And though many will need no other answer to that plea than the retort that it makes an end of all intellectual morality, it may be as well to follow it up on lines incidentally laid down by the Professor himself. In his ingenious but, I think, irrelevant essay on "The Dilemma of Determinism" he is fain to argue against subjectivism in morals (p. 171), after saying all that can be said for it as against formal pessimism and formal optimism.

In theology, subjectivism develops as its "left wing" antinomianism. In literature, its left wing is romanticism. And in practical life it is either a nerveless sentimentality or a sensualism without bounds. Everywhere it fosters the fatalistic mood of mind.....All through history we find how subjectivism, as soon as it has a free career, exhausts itself in every sort of spiritual, moral, and practical licence. Its optimism turns to an ethical indifference, which infallibly brings ethical dissolution in its train.....Already I have heard a graduate of this very school [Harvard] express in the pulpit his willingness to sin like David if only he might repent like David.

Now, on what ground does Professor James condemn that student? In his philosophy of belief the Professor is himself a subjectivist; he repeatedly accepts the name, asking in one passage (p. 97): "How trebly asinine would it be for me to deny myself the use of the subjective method, the method of belief based on desire!"—in the case, that is, where "the future fact is conditioned by my present faith in it." How then does he expect men to adopt subjectivism in matters of opinion and steer

clear of it in matters of conduct? What was his defence of it as regards opinion? Simply that we were entitled to frame a creed which gratified all our faculties or cravings. On what principle, then, does he veto the application of the same canon to practical action? Why should not that young Levite sin like David in order to repent like David? The Professor in another place (p. 87) is all for cultivating repentance.

Take repentance; the man who can do nothing rightly can at least repent of his failures. But for paganism this faculty of repentance was a pure supernumerary, a straggler too late for the fair. Christianity took it and made it *the one power within us which appealed straight to the heart of God.*

The passage is no oversight; it is duplicated in the "Principles of Psychology."¹ Professor James must pardon me for saying with emphasis that the remark as to pagan religion is utterly wrong;² but that is not the point here. It is this: if Christianity has made repentance "the *one* power within us which appeals straight to the heart of God," would not the Christian Levite be "trebly asinine" not to use it—not to take the path which, in David's case, notoriously led to such directness of communion with deity? Would not that be a case in which faith created the desired phenomenon? And when the Professor elsewhere³ pronounces that "one of the charms of drunkenness unquestionably lies in the deepening of

¹ Vol. ii, p. 314.

² Let me cite, in passing, a sufficiently impartial view of the facts, set forth not for a philosophical but for a historical purpose: "A relation between human action and the operation of a personal divine being or beings is a hypothesis common to all historically known religions; and the consciousness of sin and suffering is the inheritance of all mankind. The conflict being thus given between the passion which obstructs and the action which is the final cause of the result, it is only by a removal of the obstruction that the action can become complete. The process is therefore a purifying or expiatory one; and it is the divine person who brings to pass the expiation. No religion of which we can trace the fundamental conceptions fails to recognize in this purifying or expiatory process the solution of the problem of human life." Professor A. W. Ward's "History of English Dramatic Literature," vol. i, introd. pp. xvii, xviii.

³ "Principles," vol. ii, p. 284.

the sense of reality and truth which is gained therein," what ground has he left himself for vetoing intoxication or for differentiating the will to believe from the will to brandy? Really, the alleged dilemma of determinism is nothing to the dilemma of objectivist subjectivism. As a rationalist who takes risks in action, I do not admit myself to oscillate between objectivism and subjectivism—I am, of necessity, partly subjectivist and partly objectivist in both philosophy and conduct. But Professor James repudiates subjectivism in conduct after having made the hypothetical necessity of subjectivism in conduct a ground for voluntary subjectivism in creed.

In this movement, of course, the Professor is forced on by mere fear of bad consequences. And it may be said to be on similarly practical grounds that he finally vindicates a willed Theism. His expansion of his claim (p. 127), that Theism offers the most practically rational solution it is possible to conceive, runs thus:—

Not an energy of our active nature to which it does not authoritatively appeal, not an emotion of which it does not naturally and normally release the springs. At a single stroke it changes the dead blank *it* of the world into a living *thou*, with whom the whole man may have dealings.

And again:—

Infra-theistic theories must be always in unstable equilibrium; for department Number Three [that is, our emotional or active nature] ever lurks in ambush, ready to assert its rights; and on the slightest show of justification it makes its fatal spring, and converts them into the other form, in which alone mental peace and order can permanently reign.

Now, what can we say of all this but that it is practically false and logically unsupported—a mere fulmination, as the Professor would say of a similar bluff on any other man's part? If theism is so satisfactory as all this, how did men ever come to be troubled about it? What now becomes of his own avowal (p. 176) that "the world

is enigmatical enough in all conscience, whatever theory we may take up towards it"? What becomes of all the literature of theistic perplexity, the chronic confessions of mystery, the endless toil to reconcile divine dispositions with man's ethical propositions? Where are those theistic prodigies of peace and mental order of whom we hear? Has not the Professor been telling us of the way in which men of science wall out of their minds the conceptions which might disturb them? Can the theist do any better than that?

All this facile presupposition is of a piece with the simple device of calling rationalism *infra*-theistic. Theism, says our theist (p. 126), "by reason of its practical rationality, is certain to survive all *lower* creeds." Now, alike in history and in logic, the positive or agnostic or atheistic attitude is subsequent to and "above" the theistic. The order of progress is from polytheism to monotheism, and from monotheism to "agnostic" science or abstract monism. If it be in any sense true that monotheism satisfies instincts which monism balks, then polytheism satisfies still more. If, on the other hand, monotheism is an escape from the moral and conceptual perplexities of polytheism, simple monistic rationalism is an escape from those of monotheism. The argument under notice is thus a mere verbalism. But if a more sweeping condemnation of it be desired, what does the reader say to this?—

When from our present advanced standpoint we look back upon the past stages of human thought, whether it be scientific thought or theological thought, we are amazed that a universe which appears to us of so vast and mysterious a complication should ever have seemed to any one so little and plain a thing. Whether it be Descartes's world or Newton's, whether it be that of the materialists of last century or that of the Bridgewater treatises of our own, it always looks the same to us—*incredibly* perspectiveless and short. Even Lyell's, Faraday's, Mill's, and Darwin's consciousness of their respective subjects are already beginning to put on an

infantile and innocent look. Is it then likely that the science of our own day will escape the common doom; that the minds of its votaries will never look old-fashioned to the grandchildren of the latter? It would be folly to suppose so.

Such are the views of Professor James when he treats of *Psychical Research* (p. 326). If we put these passages together and seek to reconcile them, we come to some such proposition as this: That every attitude in philosophy and science passes away save the attitude of the Unitarian pulpit—that alone transcends error and defies transmutation! Elsewhere (p. 54) the Professor asks:—

Is it credible that such a mushroom knowledge, such a growth overnight as this, *can* represent more than the minutest glimpse of what the universe will really prove to be when adequately understood? No, our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea. Whatever else is certain, this at least is certain—that the world of our present natural knowledge *is* enveloped in a larger world of *some* sort, of whose residual properties we at present can frame no positive idea.

And yet all the while, forsooth, the old theism—the patched and tattered, puttied and battered theism of the Unitarian Ministers' Institute—"stands ready with the most practically rational solution it is possible to conceive." And, in the same address, the same ministers are told that—

How my mind and will, which are not God, can yet cognize and leap to him, how I ever came to be so separate from him, and how God himself came to be at all, are problems that for the theist can remain unsolved and insoluble for ever. *It is sufficient for him* to know that he himself simply is, and needs God; and that behind this universe God simply is, and will be forever, and will in some way hear his call.

He is so practically rational as all that! Thus are *all* his instincts and inner needs satisfied!

VIII

In another discourse the claim becomes a little less elusive. At the end of the paper on "The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life" (p. 213) we meet again the now familiar bluff:—

The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that, even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander's sake. Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous type of character will on the battle-field of human history always outwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall.

But this cocksure theorem is arrived at in an essay which begins with the assertion that "there is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance," and which explicitly makes the admission (p. 198) that "ethics have as genuine and real a foothold in a universe where the highest consciousness is human as in a universe where there is a God as well." Professor James can hardly suppose that by affirming a proposition and then negating it he makes it doubly valid, as biscuit is more durable than bread. What is the solution? When he spoke of the strenuous and religious type of character on the battle-field of life he was perhaps thinking of the Turks—certainly the devoutest theists of the present day. But then—to say nothing of the Trinitarian piety of the Greeks and the Russians, of whom the latter defeated the Turks—it is those same Turks who chronically make the will of the "infinite demander" a reason for not trying to put out a fire. "Kismet" is not

an atheistic but a theistic formula. And this brings us once for all to the flat and final negation of our theist's claims concerning the effect of belief on action and on well-being. Theoretically and practically they are alike fallacious.

Theoretically, the believer in an infinite Providence is precisely the one who has least stimulus to strenuous action. All things being in the hand of Omniscient Omnipotence, *his* act is a mere fulfilment of God's will, *whichever way it goes*. So felt Emerson in the slavery struggle, till other men's action fired him into speech. "Shall the clay say to the potter, What doest thou?" cries the Unitarian of antiquity. So clear is this dilemma that the theist, to evade it, is perpetually at work to un-God his God. We have seen Professor James at work to make *his* God finite and dependent, looking to us almost as does a general to his troops. In the essay on Determinism he argues (pp. 180-1) for a God who does *not* foresee and foreshadow all things; who "carries on his own thinking" in the categories of possibilities and actualities "just as we do ours"; to whom there may be "chances uncontrolled even by him"; to whom "the course of the universe may be really ambiguous"; and who is "subject to the law of time"—a God, in short, who is shorn of exactly the attributes on which the Theist at other times relies to meet the atheistic argument.¹ The Determinist is under no compulsion or temptation

¹ One day at Harvard I heard Professor Everett in his class state very fairly the conflict between the theistic plea that an orderly world without a ruling intelligence is inconceivable, and the atheistic rejoinder that infinite intelligence is unthinkable as being a contradiction in terms. He admitted that the inconceivable *qua* contradiction must override the alleged inconceivable *qua* impossibility. But he went on to cite from Jevons the theorem that "ideal" (that is, absolute) thought would be limitless alike in time and range; and to decide that this consideration quashed the atheistic objection. This of course was a mere verbalism—a mere repositing of the dismissed "infinite intelligence" in other words, and an *ignoratio elenchi* at that. But the point specially to be noted is that Professor James destroys in the name of theism the ground on which Professor Everett finally stood, and on which Professor Royce, if I do not misunderstand him, rests also.

to spin such sand-ropes of contradiction as these. Given his so-called dilemma, on which Professor James supererogatorily insists—that the causation in which he believes emerges in his own person as an act of intelligent choice and will—he is under no special practical perplexity whatever. The acts of choice and will constitute for him self-expression, and there an end. “God’s being,” says Professor James (p. 141), “is sacred from ours. To co-operate with his creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us.” That is, God does not really control things, and we may haply thwart him. John Knox, seeing the Abbey of Scone burning, was wroth with the fanatics who fired it, and sought to save the structure; but when he found that the fire could not be got under he began to feel that God evidently wanted the place burned down. Such is the typical and eternal theistic dilemma, which repeats itself in every strife in which the theistic losers see their enemies exulting in God’s help. It is only the determinist who has his withers unwrung. For him defeat is but defeat, and his by rights is the indomitable word:—

Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.

So much for theory. I do not for a moment pretend that every theist is forever haunted by misgiving, irrespective of his temperament. Those uncritical pretences of polemic may be left to the theist himself. We all know that his volition is more often a function of his psychosis and physique than of his philosophy or his Sunday-school formula. But if in practice *he* can escape the due logical paralysis of his creed, which we actually see overtaking so many of his tribe in history, it is a little too absurd to pretend that the rational Determinist on his part is always a prey to the corrosion of indifference because, forsooth, it is only “finite demanders” that call upon him—because he is beckoned-to *only* by his loves and hates, his desires, his sympathies, his aspirations—

because he fights only for hearth and home, for justice and happiness, or at worst for vengeance, for power, for the ginger that is hot i' the mouth.

Of whom is Professor James thinking when he alleges that men need to invent a God in order to get a pretext for playing the game of life to the utmost? Did Cæsar become Pontifex Maximus by way of cultivating the Will-to-Believe, and so gaining a zest for action which had failed him? Did Napoleon invent *his* God-in-the-machine as an excuse to himself for making war and coercing the Pope? Were D'Holbach and Diderot, in their atheistic stage, less zealous propagandists than Voltaire? Was Danton so much less strenuous than Robespierre? Did La Place grow languid in his thinking because the theistic hypothesis was to him needless? Did Shelley wax slack in his philanthropy when he wrote himself atheist? Were Shakespeare and Molière paralysed as artists by their unbelief? Was Bakounin dumb; was Feuerbach inert; was Gambetta a skulker? Was Comte a slack constructor? Was Clifford a quietist? Did Arnold grow less productive when he set aside all definite Theism? Did Darwin and Huxley and Spencer flag in *their* work by reason of their agnosticism? Has Ingersoll been an idler? Was it Bradlaugh or the God-fearing House of Commons that gave way in their six-year battle of one to six hundred? Radical empiricist as I am, I rub my eyes over this Jacobite theorem. I have known intimately a typical atheist and determinist, and I am free to say that he had more strenuousness in his little finger than any theist of my acquaintance ever stored in his spine.

IX

If such detail as this be demurred to in a philosophic discussion, the reproach, I submit, lies solely on Professor James. His argument, I repeat, is philosophically void—nay, self-stultifying; for when all is said it is a plea

for a kind of intellectual licence that he declares to be psychologically identical with one which directly counters it in result. We are to be theists on "passional" grounds, though it is declared to be just on passional grounds that the denounced scientist, so-called, rejects theism; and we have no better justification than our emotional or volitional need, which in the terms of the case is equally his justification. And Professor James has no resource but to reiterate that his emotion is the more reasonable of the two; that "our" emotional happiness all round is dependent on a belief which, as he knows, myriads of men serenely reject and cheerfully impugn.

How comes it that such an admirable philosophic instrument as the Professor's mind should yield us in this direction so nugatory a result? It would be impertinent on my part to offer any explanation save one that is suggested by his present argument. His attitude is avowedly shaped with regard to that of certain men of science who ground their anti-theism on certain negatives—on lack of evidence, on the tendency of theism to foster quackery, and so on; and who for their own part are often visibly prejudiced in their attitude to strange-looking doctrines concerning measurable and knowable phenomena—e.g., the long refusal to recognize the actuality of hypnotism. I will take leave on this to say that this academic atheism, especially that of biologists and physicists, does not represent the vital strength of the anti-theistic position. The practically argumentative literature of atheism is not to any great extent accessible in a collected form; and the argumentation of some eminent scientific agnostics is not always competent. Neither Clifford nor Huxley can rightly be said to represent either the trained or the popular atheism of recent years; nor did either of them show any special susceptibility to lines of argument which, in the opinion of some of us, constitute the strength of rational antitheism.

The roots of that, I am disposed to say, lie on the one hand in the established facts of hierology—the traced evolution of religious beliefs—the knowledge of how the God-idea was everywhere come-by; and on the other hand in the utter impossibility of so squaring theism with the moral sense as to make out a deity who is omnipotent, loving, punitive, provident, and righteous—the God either of the Trinitarian or the Unitarian, the Jew or the Gentile, the man of the world or the professor. It cannot be too emphatically said that considerate atheists are so because for them “the things in the universe that throw the last stone and say the final word,” as Professor James puts it, are precisely the immensities of contradiction between theistic pretences and the facts, the grotesque incommensurability of history and nature with the formulas of religion. To look into shoreless space, starred with unnumbered worlds, till the mind swoons with the sense of its unthinkableness, and then to turn to the histories of the religion and philosophy with which men seek to balance it, is to feel in the uttermost fibres of heart and brain that the God of Jerusalem or of Harvard, of Kant or of James, is as vain a chimera as Moloch or Cotytto, as flagrantly subjective, man-made, contradictory, preposterous, puerile. This is no recoil from the risk of believing too easily. There is no more intellectual lead to believe in the thesis, at the end of the argument, than to believe in witchcraft.

“Just so,” Professor James will here answer—“for you the hypothesis is dead.” Yes, again, when we have once again worked it out. It dies each time, like the repeatedly checked error in an equation. But it dies as a result of a loyal process of reasoning. We have patiently followed the Professor over the old battlefield. We had seen his thesis of old in Ambrose—*Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum*; in Berkeley, who would have us accept Christian mysteries on the score that mathematicians accepted mysteries in

fluxions; in Kant, with his juggle of the transcendental Reason; in Coleridge, who alternately denounced the obtrusion of the Will-to-Believe by others, and clamoured for it on his own behalf; in the neophytes of the "Via Media," who "never presumed to argue, save against the propriety of arguing at all"; in Renan, who affirmed the Will-to-Believe almost in Professor James's words; in Kaftan, who Christianizes Kant; in Mr. Balfour, who reduces the general procedure to the plane of the unstudious Churchman. And the one thing we have learned of all these, from Ambrose to Professor James, is just this, that men challenged to break with a cherished psychic habit are nearly as ready to defy reason in the interest of their own immediate comfort, or that of their order, as to resist an unexpected claim at law which will deprive them of part of their property. True, they are fatally driven to offer a semblance of reasoning in defence of their refusal to reason; thus giving us unwitting assurance of the ultimate security of the intellectual order which they repudiate; but resist it they do.

And Professor James's particularity lies apparently in this, that he seems to have been provoked into his repudiation by the air of *parti pris* among certain of those who tell him that the formulas in which he was most steeped in youth are mere prepossessions. It is thus against men who logically jar on him by their want of the judicial temper that he erects his claim to put the judicial temper out of court—thus confuting one half of his bias in seeking to fulfil the other. In one sense, his formula of the Will-to-Believe is the most gratuitous affirmation of the obvious. Assuredly most of us think as often by will as by proof. So far from denying the claim, one is disposed to ask: Was there any need to tell us this? Have we not all been vainly looking all our lives for the ideal teacher in any branch of moral science? We look for the man who shall be indeed impartial, who shall be to conflicting views and causes what we like

to suppose Shakespeare was to the imagined causes of conflicting men—considerate of all, intelligent of all. We want a thinker without prejudice or passion, whose very blame is calm as the physician's diagnosis, or, if warmer, genially so, without the malice of the zealot, without the bias of the partisan. And from the best, what do we have instead? This historian, with grave airs of scrupulous erudition, betrays incidentally his complicity in a commonplace moral code; that other, contemptuous of some old conventions, reveals himself as iniquitously and absurdly prejudiced, giving us as historical philosophy doctrines fit only for a village green; a third masks with prophetic mien the workings of what we find to be mere spontaneous temper; a fourth, professing to rise above all resentments, cannot quench the gleam of anger in his eye; a fifth reveals himself as the weathercock of a dozen moods. So, in ethics, men who claim to make right action their supreme concern are found outraging the first principles of intellectual justice; wantonly misrepresenting those who differ from them; refusing to modify a false judgment once uttered; playing in the field of criticism the part of the primeval pirate or the feudal chief. Who escapes the taint? Give us that thinker who is not *sometimes* passion's puppet, "and we will wear him in our heart's heart." "Something too much of *this*," indeed. Can it possibly be ever necessary, as our philosopher argues, to encourage men to follow their predilections in forming some of their opinions? If, as he avers, the professed men of science are doing it most of the time, is there really a risk that the men trained in religion, taught from the first to hold reason lower than faith, will retain too little of the primary bias to self-pleasing in the matter of their formula-making? Is there really such an ascetic passion of conscientiousness in the air in these days?

With all his zeal for subjectivism in creed, the Professor, as we have seen, at times gives himself pause. Towards

the end of his first essay, too, after a good many vehemences and vivacities, he writes: "No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words of abuse." Well, to tell people that with their beliefs their emotional natures must be stunted and partly paralysed—this seems to partake of the nature of issuing vetoes; and when the Professor allows himself¹ to speak of the arguments he opposes as "influences working in the direction of our mental barbarization," he is surely a little too epithetic to satisfy his own prescription. I have no wish to outdo him; but that last phrase irresistibly sets one asking the question: *What* is mental barbarization? What do we understand by barbarism? Is it not, in brief, just the play of lawless will? And is there any more facile road imaginable to mental barbarization than the aggressive assertion of the claims of the Will-to-Believe against the law of argument and probation, over and above all scientific statement of it as a persisting factor in thought?

We have found Professor James, I think, contradicting himself as sufficiently as we could wish at every stage of his thesis; but I am fain, in concluding, to answer my last question with one of his, which is a proposition in the query form:—

A Bonaparte and a Philip II are called monsters. But when an *intellect* is found insatiate enough to declare that all existence must bend the knee to its requirements, we do not call its owner a monster, but a philosophic prophet. May not all this be wrong?

This is asked² with regard to Hegel; and I think the answer may be Yes, not only as regards Hegel, but as regards anti-Hegelians. For "intellect" put "passional nature" or "Will-to-Believe," and the answer is for me the same. I think it is Professor Royce, whom Professor James so often applauds, who in one of his books declares "downright dishonest belief" to be "mere blasphemy."

¹ P. 132.

² P. 272.

Far be it from me to talk of blasphemy in philosophy's name. But I am once more driven to put a query: What *is* dishonest belief—where in thought or life is the thing to be found—if it be not present in those forms of consciously manufactured quasi-opinion which Professor James encourages his readers to evolve by their Will-to-Believe?

PROFESSOR JAMES ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

I

To have read any one of the books of Professor William James is to be willing to read another, were it only for the sake of the style. He is one of the rare instances of transmission of high literary gift from father to son; for in the writing of what is called "nervous" English no man of the last generation could be said to surpass Henry James, senior; and the Harvard Professor of Psychology writes perhaps the most perfectly accomplished English that is to be found in latter-day philosophical literature. His style is as incisive as Professor Bradley's, without the convulsive quality that tends to attach to the notable energy of the latter. Professor James's prose is graceful and limpid even when he is most splenetic in his intention.

It would be hoping too much to expect from a philosopher at once a perfect style and impeccable thinking: not that bad writing in philosophy—O shades of Kant and Hegel!—is a security for soundness of reasoning; but that felicity of form, as distinct from simple clearness, is an artistic rather than a scientific symptom, and tells of concern for other things than pure scientific truth. And in point of fact some of us who read Professor James with constant interest, and in a very friendly spirit, have never had the happiness of agreeing with him on the issues which he seems specially concerned to raise.

That familiar negative experience recurs in the reading of his extremely interesting volume of Gifford Lectures on "Varieties of Religious Experience." Of the book as a collection of records it may be said at once that, though it has nothing typically new for students of either ancient

or modern religious history (the religious experience of one generation being remarkably like that of another), it is most skilfully grouped; and that the running comment is invariably vivid. Those who have not previously given any critical heed to the mass of religious biography and autobiography cannot more pleasantly get a notion of its substance than under Professor James's guidance. But, as against this form of comfort, there arises for the non-theological student at the very threshold of the book a psychological drawback. Addressing a Scotch audience of presumptive piety, Professor James somewhat anxiously explains to them that if he ever seems to speak disrespectfully of their beliefs it is quite unintentionally, his disrespect being felt and meant strictly for those "who call themselves scientists and Positivists"; and he in effect invites them to join him in that respectable attitude. To start with, this seems somewhat gratuitous. An orthodox Scotch audience (if I know anything of my countrymen) has no need of such comfort to make it duly self-complacent; and to begin what after all claims to be a somewhat scientific study of religious experience with the virtual declaration, "See, I am impertinent to the medical materialists; let that reassure you," is to make academic science look a little undignified.

But this is not all the trouble. Such devices tell, to the instructed, of an uneasy consciousness that any dispassionate comparison of religious experiences is bound to be disconcerting to religionists, whose forte is an inaptitude for the comparative method; and uneasiness invites excuses for its tactics. Professor James, however, is not content till he has given his devouter hearers an almost papal dispensation from the consequences of criticism. The gist of it is in these sentences:—

What is nowadays called the higher criticism of the Bible is only a study of the Bible from the existential point of view, *neglected* too much by the earlier Church..... But.....the existential facts by themselves are insufficient for determining the value; and the best adepts of the

higher criticism accordingly never confound the existential with the spiritual problem.

The psychic purport of this allocution might not ill be translated thus: "You are aware that the Bible, which you were taught to regard as a body of supernaturally revealed truth, absolutely incomparable with any other religious literature, has been shown to be in large measure a compilation of simple Semitic myth and tradition, forged priestly codes, fabulous and falsified history, and books written by anybody rather than those whose names they bear; and you are aware further that its cosmology is in the terms of the case mere barbaric fantasy, and its ethic frequently odious. Whereas you thought it was wholly true, as men understand truth, you find that it is hardly at all true. And you will recollect that you and your fathers before you have hated and vilified all who led the way in challenging the untruth and getting at the facts. But let not the thought discompose you. Reflect that the composers and compilers of those frauds and myths were men of great spiritual originality; and that if what they wrote be untrue 'existentially'—that is, simply not true—it is 'true' in another way, since what they wrote has been spiritually influential with many spiritually-minded people. Be not then contrite for your past bigotry and malice, or humble-minded for your gross credulity. We all want to feel self-satisfied: then feel so. Assure yourselves that those who have exposed normal delusion where you saw supernatural truth are, after all, unspiritual minds, devoid of the spiritual authority of the Bible-makers. Continue then to feel yourselves superior to those poor creatures, the higher critics: yea, make unto yourselves a new dunghill and crow thereon. Spirituality consists in self-praise."

That, I fancy, is how the prescription works, as generally assimilated. And since Professor James does not mince matters in his account of the doctrines he opposes, I shall not let my regard for him cause me to mince matters in

my account of his. It is a debasing of the moral currency. He is giving a gratuitous stimulus to commonplace conceit where what is needed is a lead to intellectual humility. It will doubtless be said for Professor James that he revolts against the signs of conceit in the people on the other side—that he is holding the balances between “crude” iconoclasm and uncritical faith. But he is merely crude with a difference. The scientific man is plainly free—is, in some measure, bound by duty—not only to put the facts dispassionately, making no capital out of the exposure of orthodox error, but to warn the more eager iconoclasts that they, after all, are of the lineage of the idolaters; that we are all much at the mercy of contemporary culture; and that the right temper of retrospect is a quiet compassion for the endless errancy of man. This, however, is not Professor James’s way. Always his pat is for the pietist, and his slap for the thinker. To hold the balances evenly he may indeed contrive, when his eye is not irritated by the presence of the unbeliever at his inquest: then he is even capable of shocking his pietist; but that is only when he forgets his feud with the other. The truth is that for personal reasons he suffers in his affections from all discrediting of religion by unbelievers: he cannot without resentment hear them speak the truth that in calm moments he speaks himself; and his study as a whole is chronically vitiated by his inability to keep his knowledge and his bias in accord. And, brilliantly as he writes, we have to make an effort to arrange his argument for ourselves; his own exposition is so frequently out of gear.

II

Feeling our way, we contemplate dispassionately the types of “religious experience” with which he first presents us. The “medical materialists” of his aversion must be interested in some of them, as exhibitions of

“spiritual” consciousness. One of the first samples is the case of a gentleman who was conscious of the spiritual presence of a friend behind him (p. 16). Thus he tells it: “Moving my eyes round slightly.....the lower portion of one leg became visible, and I instantly recognized the grey-blue material of trousers he often wore; but the suit appeared semi-transparent.....” Then follows a fuller visual hallucination. Again, we have (p. 62) a *blind* man’s vision of a “grey-bearded man dressed in a pepper-and-salt suit.” It is impressive. “We are so spiritual,” those favoured ones in effect say—“so spiritual! and in proof behold our visions of spiritualized trousers and pepper-and-salt suits!”

Is *this*, then, we ask, the religious experience we are invited to study? Happily, we are not asked to remain long on the sartorial plane. At the outset, Mr. James had given us his definition (p. 31): “Religion.....as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.” Arbitrarily indeed is the definition framed, for “out of religion, in the sense in which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations *may grow*”; that is to say, the theologies are not religion, and the study is to be one of *abnormal* religious experience. And yet it turns out that nearly all the persons put under examination are members of religious organizations, with theologies given them in advance.

Easily—or uneasily—anticipating the first verdict of common-sense on his material, Mr. James pungently objects in advance to the “medical materialism” which would dispose of visions of blue trousers by imputing them to certain states of physical disturbance. Physical conditions in the producer, he insists, are admittedly no test of the merit of an æsthetic communication; neither, then, can they be of a religious one. If a poet produces a beautiful

poem, or an artist a beautiful picture, it is beside the case to inquire whether he suffered from neurosis; the question is whether his work be worth having. Here, happily, we can all agree; but what about the next step? Even æsthetic merit is fairly hard to settle, apart from all inquisition into the producer's mental condition: still we agree that on that side we are looking for beauty, charm, delightfulness; and to some extent we agree in our classifications in that respect. But what is to be the test of the merit of a religious communication? It cannot be merely æsthetic; if it were, there would be no specifically religious category at all. Granting that it may have an æsthetic medium, the religious communication, as such, must have a religious content. What, then, is the measure of the value of that?

Here again Mr. James duly proffers his set of tests; and by these his material is to be tried. They are:—

1. Immediate luminousness;
2. Philosophical reasonableness;
3. Moral helpfulness.

Obviously the first, standing by itself, is no test at all: "luminousness" is a quality that must itself be exactly defined if there is to be any exact argument; and at the very outset the procedure breaks down, because the only meaning that can be attached even by the religious mind to "immediate luminousness" is by Mr. James disallowed (p. 16) in advance. I cite the passage at length:—

Inner happiness and serviceableness do not always agree. What immediately feels "good" is not always most "true" when measured by the verdict of the rest of experience. The difference between Philip drunk and Philip sober is the classic instance in corroboration. If merely "feeling good" could decide, drunkenness would be the supremely valid human experience. But its revelations, however acutely satisfying at the moment, are inserted into an environment which refuses to bear them out for any length of time. The consequence of this discrepancy of the two criteria is the uncertainty which still prevails over so many of our spiritual judgments. There are moments of senti-

mental and mystical experience.....that carry an enormous sense of inner authority and illumination with them when they come. But they come seldom, and they do not come to every one; and the rest of life makes either no connection with them, or tends to contradict them more than it confirms them.....

Thus "immediate luminousness" simply goes by the board. It avails nothing to claim further that the confessed discordancy "can never be resolved by any merely medical test." On the face of the case the medical test does not claim to meet the *philosophical* challenge: it does but state a fact—a fact which Professor James does not dispute; and that fact is adduced by way of meeting a claim which Professor James at this point carefully keeps in the background—the claim, namely, to *supernatural origin*. It lies on the face of all religious history that the quality in religious experience which religious people understand by "immediate luminousness" is more or less habitually urged by them as the certificate of supernatural source, of "inspiration" in the old and intelligible sense of the term. Now, to *that* claim the reply of the medical materialist is adequate and unanswerable; and had Professor James been bent on a fair exposition he would have noted as much, instead of suggesting, what is not the fact, that the medical materialist is resorting to irrelevance by way of prejudging the *philosophic* problem. It is he who is confusing the issue. The philosophic answer falls to be made when the philosophic challenge is formulated as such.

III

Now what is that challenge? So ill-constructed is the Professor's total argument that, after all, his second test of "philosophic reasonableness" is really never disengaged from that of "immediate luminousness" which we have actually seen him disallow two pages before he formulates it. To that test, discredited by himself, he is always

returning. In arguing that the pathological test concludes nothing, he virtually contends that all psychic experiences are as such on a par, and that their validity is to be tried by moral and intellectual standards. Here, I repeat, most of us are willing to acquiesce. Some in the other camp have actually anticipated his argument, as he himself avows.

Dr. Maudsley [he writes, p. 19] is perhaps the cleverest of the rebutters of supernatural religion on grounds of origin. Yet he finds himself forced to write:—

“What right have we to believe Nature under any obligation to do her work by means of complete minds only? She may find an incomplete mind a more suitable instrument for a particular purpose. It is the work that is done, and the quality in the worker by which it was done, that is alone of moment; and it may be no great matter from a cosmical standpoint if in other qualities of character he was singularly defective—if, indeed, he were hypocrite, adulterer, eccentric, or lunatic.....Home we come again, then, to the old and last resort of certitude—namely, the common assent of mankind, or of the competent, by instruction and training, of mankind.”¹

In other words, not its origin, but *the way in which it works on the whole*, is Dr. Maudsley's final test of a belief. This is our own empiricist criterion; and this criterion the stoutest insisters on supernatural origin have also been forced to use in the end. Among the visions and messages some have always been too patently silly, among the trances and convulsive seizures some have been too fruitless for conduct and character, to pass themselves off as significant, still less as divine.....In the end it had to come to our empiricist criterion: By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots.

Observe here, first, the implications of the remark that Dr. Maudsley found himself “forced” to write as he did. The suggestion is that he came to that view unwillingly; in which case it would be all the more to his credit that he was so candid. But what now becomes of Professor James's immediately preceding complaint (p. 19), that “the medical materialists are only so many belated

¹ Maudsley, “Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings” (1886), pp. 256, 257.

dogmatists, neatly turning the tables on their predecessors by using the criterion of origin in a destructive instead of in an accredited way"? What is Dr. Maudsley, with whom he so closely coincides, but a medical materialist? I may say that, *moi qui parle*, I have been called a coarse materialist for arguing in very much this fashion (only without talking of "Nature's purposes") that Coleridge's finest poetry was a product of opium-taking, and none the less admirable for that; and when some of us have insisted that the genius of Poe or Heine or Dostoyevsky is none the less precious for being morbidly conditioned, we have been met with just such indignation from the professedly "spiritual" orders of mind as has greeted the theses of Lombroso and Nisbet, that all genius is pathological. It is interesting to the materialist to find himself countenanced, with whatever accompaniments of disparagement, by such a chosen champion of apriorism as the author of "The Will to Believe."

Unfortunately, Professor James, divided between his two purposes of reasoning and of discrediting rationalism, never lets himself reach the end of any one argument; and his book finally misses anything like philosophic coherence. On the one hand, finding the "medico-materialists" of his aversion explaining "religious experience" as a result of certain neuropathic states, he indignantly declares, with Professor Coe,¹ that the tracing of the physiological conditions of ideas has nothing to do with fixing their "spiritual authority," even as he declares that their truth as propositions is a separate and secondary issue. Granting him this, we ask him in turn on what principle he berates and belittles the medico-materialists for being satisfied to explain religious experience as they do. He assumes to discredit them by a logical process—by affirming that all judgments alike are conditioned by the state of the nervous machine, and that a judgment in terms of neurosis

¹ Pp. 14, 241.

may be as true, for all we know, as one in terms of normal nerve-action. Then, however, he goes on to urge that unreasoning intuition is *superior* to reasoned judgment:—

If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely *knows* that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. This inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just as manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when it argues against it. That vast literature of proofs of God's existence drawn from the order of nature, which a century ago seemed so overwhelmingly convincing, to-day does little more than gather dust in libraries, for the simple reason that our generation has ceased to believe in the kind of God it argued for. Whatever sort of a being God may be, we *know* to-day that he is nevermore that mere external inventor of "contrivances" intended to make manifest his "glory" in which our great-grandfathers took such satisfaction, though just how we know this we cannot possibly make clear by words either to others or to ourselves. I defy any of you here fully to account for your persuasion that if a God exist he must be a more cosmic and tragic personage than that Being.¹

To assimilate this passage is to realize the specialties of Professor James's mind as an intellectual instrument. First we have the simple and primitive propensity to "bluff," to outface the antagonist by vaunting, to set up a claim to "superiority" without a word of demonstration—nay, with the lofty protest that to seek to demonstrate would be to become inferior. Next we have the refusal to do what is the psychologist's first duty—to search for a possible solution of the alleged mystery. With all this we have a cavalier disregard of the very foremost facts of the case; an assumption of what is demonstrably not true—that "our generation has ceased to believe in

¹ Pp. 73-4.

the kind of God " of the eighteenth-century deists ; and a wholesale challenge which proceeds upon the further wild assumption that no theist nowadays either reasons his belief or is affected by the reasoning of other men.

As against this sequence of mistake, let us put the facts. (1) Multitudes of theists to-day still reason as did their predecessors ; and it would be strange indeed, on Professor James's own principles, if they did not. According to him, subjectivity in religion has the casting vote ; what, then, has happened to revolutionize average subjectivity ? (2) His absolute differentiation between the " rationalistic level " and the intuitional is simply false psychology ; one might prove as much from his own " Principles " ; and certainly it has been proved by others before him. Not only is the so-called intuition in this case for the most part merely a *bad* process of reasoning, but the very obstinacy of adhesion to its result, which the intuitionist so complacently and so absurdly parades as the proof of its rightness, is a perfectly normal phenomenon among the so-called " rationalists," whether they have happened to reason well or ill. To feel sure that you are right, even when the other side claims to be getting the best of the argument, is really not so exclusively tribal an experience as Professor James would seem to suppose ; and it is in his own favoured land, where confidence in one's own spontaneous philosophic rightness is at least as common as elsewhere, that there has been framed this catechism (for which I must decline to be responsible) :—

" What is an intuition ?

" It is what a woman has when she is wrong."

Applying the method of induction with the humble consciousness of doing so, we inferiors may further venture to explain to Professor James (3) that if he and some other theists have got rid of the eighteenth-century God-idea it is probably from having obliviously profited by some of the many arguments latterly directed against it ; and if the contemned rationalizing theists will not dare

to meet Professor James's challenge to them to "account fully" for their persuasion that the old idea of the "divine Architect" is inadequate to the problem to be solved, some of us pariahs outside would even undertake, at a pinch, to provide an explanation for them.

IV

And now we revert to the prior issue: What would it matter, on Professor James's own principles, if the medico-materialists *were* belated dogmatists, provided that they felt quite satisfied with their explanation? When Professor James alleges that the "inferiority of the rationalistic level.....is *manifest*" he is presumably aware that his proposition appeals only to those who already believe it. To the rest of us it is no more manifest than the contrary proposition is to him. And if now the materialists say that the ideas special to neuropathic states are *manifestly* inferior to those reached in normal states, what right of philosophic negation has he, of all men? If they *feel* quite sure, is not that enough, on his own showing? And if they refuse to accept his contention that they are scientifically inconsistent, have they not thereby (for him) proved themselves to be on the "superior" level of non-rationalism? Professor James may answer that all this is only loquacity and logic-chopping, whether or not "clever"—as to that, none of us can expect from him any such acknowledgment as we are all joyfully ready to make to himself. But if the materialists are simply inconsistent, and stop arguing when he corners them, have not *they* at least thereby repelled the charges of loquacity and cleverness? In fine, in the absence of any ostensible answer to such queries from the Professor's book, must we come to the conclusion that his one underlying principle in this brilliant performance is the principle that what is sauce for the goose shall never be sauce for the gander?

It often appears so, yet there are sections of the book which ostensibly revert to the very method of the psychologists, and, what is more, appear to take that as a sufficient solution of the case. It would seem as if Professor James's aversion were not, at bottom, to the scientific explanation, but to some of those who offer it. When he is thinking of them, he cannot control his dislike; he can hardly phrase without spleen; his tone grows acrid on the instant. But later, when he is investigating cases of "conversion," and a psycho-physiological explanation is suggested by some one who has not chanced to exasperate him by disparaging religion in general, the hint is taken by him with a perfectly good grace, and he puts forward just the sort of solution that he had earlier execrated. What he had called "belated dogmatism" he now complacently gives out as contemporary psychology, only bethinking himself to assure "the Methodists" that they need not be offended, and so interpolate a few words of inexpensive compliment to the explained convertites—to the effect that, though they do not amount to much, they might have amounted to still less had they not been converted.¹ The partizan principle of unity is thus, so far, preserved; there is no specific asperity to "religious" people; asperity is still reserved for those "who are fond of calling themselves 'scientists' and 'positivists.'"

But towards the close of the book we find Professor James reverting to what will certainly be taken by many of his readers as a final endorsement of the previously discarded criterion of "immediate luminousness." Thus he expresses himself (p. 498):—

In spite of the appeal which the impersonality of the scientific attitude makes to a certain magnanimity of temper, I believe it to be shallow, and I can now state my reason in comparatively few words. That reason is that, so long as we deal with the cosmic and the general,

¹ Compare pp. 237, 241.

we deal only with the symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.

It might suffice to meet this fulmination with the Professor's own epithet of "shallow"; he is certainly entitled to no more critical consideration than he gives; and the semblance of argument with which he backs up his dogma is the merest paraphrase of his proposition. Men of science, so-called, have plenty to answer for in the way of inadequate reasoning; but if they often reasoned like this they would be inadequate indeed. It may be well, however, to point out how completely Professor James is convicted, by his own previous utterance, of merely brazening out his bias at the end as he did at the beginning of his exposition. As we have seen, he found himself "forced" (to use his own term) at one stage of his investigation to admit that among the "visions and messages" of the religious "some have always been too patently silly to pass themselves off as significant, still less as divine." And now he includes those very imbecilities in his definition of "realities in the completest sense of the term." We are thus invited by his own procedure to meet him here with the intimation that before such a fulmination of pseudo-rationalism—for such his proposition is—our "intuition" of his error is prompt and permanent, and that we thereby put ourselves on a "higher" plane, relatively to his "loquacity" and "logic-chopping." But, leaving such devices to the cause of obscurantism, let us give the rationalistic, the philosophical answer.

Our sense of "reality," if it is to be philosophically formulated at all, is to be defined in terms of our whole experience; and that experience warrants this and only this account of it—that the measure of reality is degree of relatedness. Of "private and personal phenomena as such," the most typical of all is a dream, and to term that "reality in the completest sense of the term" is to set empty words against the whole testimony of all our lives.

"The inner state," our religionist avows, "may be the most fugitive and paltry activity of mind. Yet the cosmic objects, so far as our experience yields them, are but ideal pictures of something whose existence we do not inwardly possess but only point at outwardly, while the inner state is our very experience itself."¹ Here we have the most flagrant argument-in-a-circle that was ever seriously framed—an argument passed on from generation to generation of bewildered academics, hired to put a philosophic face on religious delusion. Our psychological expert can do no better than echo them. He postulates "ideal pictures" without a definition, when in the terms of the case there is no category to define ideal pictures against, save a "something" which is alleged not to be experienced. Yet in the very terms of the paralogism the "ideal picture" is an "inner state," and an inner state has just been defined to be "our very experience itself." In sum, the light we normally cognize, the sun and stars we see, are alleged to be non-realities, "only symbols of reality" (as if "symbol of reality" were a known category, needing no definition); while the sense of "seeing stars" that is set up by a blow on the eye is pure reality!

It well becomes the vendor of this venerable verbalism to speak of the "deep" intuitions in virtue of which we "know" that rationalism is only logic-chopping. To this complexion religious intuition always comes—the negation of universal intuition in the interests of animism.

V

So much for Professor James's application of the test of "philosophical reasonableness" to the subjective phenomena of religious experience: we are finally invited to see "complete reality" in (among others) thoughts confessedly "too silly for significance." There remains the test of "moral helpfulness"; and in the application of

¹ P. 499.

this we have the same vacillation, with hardly even the semblance of a final comparative estimate. Here and there we are shown that religious experience helps people to endure suffering; but it is also made clear that it is at least as often an actual form or source of suffering. Nowhere is there any suggestion of any but the merest individual test, save when the Professor is "forced" to comment in a sufficiently negative fashion on the phenomena of sainthood. Thus he declares that the intellect of young Saint Louis of Gonzaga was "originally no larger than a pin's head, and cherished ideas of God of corresponding smallness";¹ and he speaks as follows² of Saint Teresa:—

Take Saint Teresa, for example, one of the ablest women, in many respects, of whose life we have the record. She had a powerful intellect of the practical order. She wrote admirable descriptive psychology, possessed a will equal to any emergency, great talent for politics and business, a buoyant disposition, and a first-rate literary style. She was tenaciously aspiring, and put her whole life at the service of her religious ideals. Yet so paltry were these, according to our present way of thinking (although I know that others have been moved differently), I confess that my only feeling in reading has been pity that so much vitality of soul should have found such poor employment.

In spite of the sufferings which she endured, there is a curious flavour of speciality about her genius. A Birmingham anthropologist, Dr. Jordan, has divided the human race into two types, whom he calls "shrews" and "non-shrews" respectively. The shrew-type is defined as possessing an "active, unimpassioned temperament." In other words, shrews are the "motors" rather than the "sensories," and their expressions are as a rule more energetic than the feelings which appear to prompt them. Saint Teresa, paradoxical as such a judgment may sound, was a typical shrew, in this sense of the term. The bustle of her style, as well as her life, proves it. Not only must she receive unheard-of personal favours and spiritual graces from her Saviour, but she must immediately write about them and *exploiter* them professionally, and use her

¹ P. 354

² Pp. 346-8.

experiences to give instructions to those less privileged. Her voluble egotism; her sense, not of radically bad being, as the really contrite have it, but of her "faults" and "imperfections" in the plural; her stereotyped humility and return upon herself, as covered with "confusion" at each new manifestation of God's singular partiality for a person so unworthy, are typical of shrewdom; a paramountly feeling nature would be objectively lost in gratitude, and silent. She had some public instincts, it is true; she hated the Lutherans, and longed for the Church's triumph over them; but in the main her idea of religion seems to have been that of an endless amatory flirtation—if one may say so without irreverence—between the devotee and the deity; and, apart from helping younger nuns to go in this direction by the inspiration of her example and instruction, there is absolutely no human use in her, or sign of any general human interest. Yet the spirit of her age, far from rebuking her, exalted her as super-human.....

So much for mere devotion, divorced from the intellectual conceptions which might guide it towards bearing useful human fruit.

It is well that this was not said by a medical-materialist; had it been, we can imagine the outcry from "spiritual" persons. But even this fairly drastic treatment of a prominent case is no sufficient application of the test proposed. The "moral helpfulness" of subjective religious experience is to be gauged only by some *general* measurement of its total influence on social development and well-being; and this Professor James does not attempt, or even hint at as desirable—nay, he vetoes it. From the sociological scrutiny, which could alone yield a report worth considering, he excludes himself by his fatal presupposition that the individual experience as such is a worthier theme of scientific investigation than anything in which the normal scientific exclusion of the "personal equation" might be attempted. Thus he staves off the historic test:—

I beseech you never to confound the phenomena of mere tribal or corporate psychology.....with those manifestations of the *purely interior life* which are the exclusive

object of our study. The baiting of Jews, the hunting of Albigenses and the Waldenses, the stoning of Quakers and ducking of Methodists, the murdering of Mormons, and the massacring of Armenians, express much rather the original human neophobia, that pugnacity of which we all share the vestiges, and that *inborn* hatred of the alien and of eccentric and non-conforming men as aliens, than they express the positive piety of the various perpetrators. Piety is the mask; the inner force is *tribal instinct*. (P. 338.)

That is to say, wherever religion is plainly seen to have the most flagrantly demoralizing effect on human character in the mass, we are to allot the discredit not to the avowed religious impulsion but to "original sin." The sophism, as it happens, is part of the stock-in-trade of vulgar apologetics; and it is somewhat painful to find it assimilated by Professor James; but when so employed it must be met. We have to note, then, firstly, the instant surrender of the scientific case. If piety can habitually function as a mere "mask" for the lowest human passions, lending to them its own credit and speciosity, then not only is piety thus admittedly a most dangerous force, insidiously increasing pre-existent evil, but, *ex hypothesi*, in its very best aspects it may be a mere alien "mask" for that measure of natural human goodness which would subsist without it. So the whole argument falls once for all. Professor James's resort to the popular sophism has simply made an end, logically speaking, of his undertaking to give an ethical certificate. In terms of his own psychological thesis no scientific certificate is possible; and the current procedure is mere charlatanism.

VI

All the while, however, Professor James is divided against himself, even as is the average apologist. It is necessary to note here how the case is commonly conducted. The natural course of the man who has begun to doubt the truth of current religion is to state his

doubts. It is at this point an almost invariable experience, however, so far as my own knowledge goes, to be met on the side of faith by the reply that Christianity has regenerated the world. It is usually after receiving this reply that the doubter, extending his studies, discovers the profound falsity of the claim, and proceeds to impeach Christianity as a historic cause. But, even apart from such an experience, the Christian claim challenges the doubter on all sides. It has a whole literature of its own—in the main almost as unprofitable as that of dogmatics, by reason of its constant untrustworthiness on points of historic fact.

To this claim, then, Christian propaganda is broadly committed; and the spectacle, latterly so common, of the apologist protesting against the ascription to faith of the crimes wrought in faith's name is another unpleasant reminder that piety can either be the prompter or the "mask" of a baseness. It was the apologist himself, broadly speaking, who called for that test; and he employed it exactly on the lines on which it has been turned against him. Wherever he found his creed or Church associated with any apparent betterment of human life, he put this as the result of that. But the moment the creed or the Church is shown to have made men act cruelly, treacherously, irrationally, he exclaims that the case is being maliciously misrepresented. When men do wrong on strictly religious pretexts, albeit they are committing crimes of which they would not, and could not, have dreamt on any non-religious pretext, their acts are to be set down solely to their natural animalism. It is only when they happen to do good that religion is concerned. Heads, Christianity wins; tails, unbelief loses.

Those of us who cannot consent to be taken in by this infantine paralogism have sometimes striven to raise the discussion to a level nearer that of adult intelligence; and latterly some of the less primitive apologists, such

as Mr. G. K. Chesterton, have shown signs of following suit—in their own way. Mr. Chesterton, for instance, duly ignoring the primary Christian claim, meets Mr. Blatchford's sketch of Christian history by retorting: "Crimes were wrought at the French Revolution in the name of Liberty and Democracy; are these, then, forces of evil?" Strategically speaking, this is a distinct improvement on the old Christian Evidence method of asserting that the French Revolution was the work of Atheists, and that all its crimes lay at their door. That theorem too readily indicated its own rebuttal, by way of a simple reminder (1) that the makers of the Revolution were not Atheists but, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, theists; while (2) an infinity of savage social crime had been wrought in Christian history, on Christian pretexts, by avowedly Christian States, peoples, sects, and Churches, at times when Atheism had only a conjectural existence.

But Mr. Chesterton in his turn is only freshening the sophistry. He thinks to stagger his fellow democrats by the formula: "Crimes have been wrought in Liberty's name." Let the democrat simply retain his intellectual sincerity—the sure refuge against the sophist—and he can in a moment get inside Mr. Chesterton's guard. The claim under discussion was that Christianity is socially a great regenerative force—in other words, that its acceptance makes bad men better, and good men better still. The answer is that the acceptance has in countless large instances visibly given cruel and treacherous men a pretext and a sanction for their cruelty and treachery, and has made hateful persecutors of men who otherwise would have had no thought of persecuting. Further, it has beaten back knowledge and crucified truth through whole centuries, keeping the mind of Europe in a visible bondage to its own false traditions, which set its devotees upon vilifying every bringer of new light.

Is there, then, any analogy to the case of democracy? Not the slightest, unless where the democrat has been

talking as thoughtlessly as the Christian apologist. If any democrat ever proclaimed that the mere acceptance of democratic doctrines by men who had not been disciplined by the democratic life could suffice to transform them into good citizens, he blundered indeed. But when was the cause of democracy so preached? It may be that before the French Revolution its zealots declared, in the Christian fashion, that the mere creed could work social miracles. But ever since the great miscarriage, has not every rational and representative democrat, from Paine onwards, corrected the error? As a matter of fact, every democrat of "light and leading" has seen and taught that men who had never known political freedom are *not* regenerated by a mere belief in its efficacy; that democracy must be a discipline as well as a creed; that its justification lies not in any general casting out of human egoism or unwisdom, or elimination of anti-social types—all impossible ideals—but in the fact that it simply gives a far better chance to mankind in the mass than the contrary system; and that, given progress, it promises a steady reduction of the evils resulting from average egoism and from the darker spirit of incivism.

The ostensible rebuttal, in short, is a mere falsification of the issue, inasmuch as democrats do not make for democracy the claims which Christians habitually make for Christianity, and it was these latter claims that were being discussed. Mr. Chesterton is but playing the part of the quack-doctor who, on being told that his vaunted cure-all has done much harm and no good, answers with a: "Did you not confess yourself that you hadn't been able to cure your rheumatism by wearing flannels?" He makes a brilliant merryandrew; but he is surely qualified for better things. The plain course for the Christian who would be honest is simply to surrender the historic plea, as did Newman when he admitted that Christianity did *not* regenerate the earth. The old plea is false. Men in the mass were never made either wise

or truthful or humane by any supernaturalist creed, or even by the preaching of a good set of moral principles. It takes a very different machinery from that of myths and precepts to lift visibly in the scale of evolution a race that has only slowly grown out of the animal into the human form.

If the Christian desires to retain the character of an honest and intelligent disputant, let him leave the ill-chosen ground of experimental justification and return to that which he ought never to have left. His creed must in the end stand or fall, for competent minds, by its *credibility*—as a narrative of historic fact, as a solution of cosmic problems, as an ethical theory, and as a code for practice. The problem of its “moral usefulness” is clearly a secondary one, and falls to be solved after those others have been disposed of. And if the Christian fears that a hostile verdict on the secondary ground will infallibly follow on a decision that his creed is not true, he may be reminded that he will certainly not help matters by playing the sophist in the interim. Thereby he can but strengthen the suspicion that false belief prompts to bad action. On the other hand, it is precisely the most completely discredited creeds that receive the most dispassionate handling from historic science. For those whose sympathies have entwined round the history of “religious experience” dialectic honesty is really the best policy.

VII

Professor James, with his capricious lucidity, reverts to rectitude in this as in other issues. After stipulating that tribal crimes wrought in piety's name are never to be connected with piety, he disconcerts his devouter hearers by the avowal¹ that “when ‘Freethinkers’ tell us that religion and fanaticism are twins, we cannot make an unqualified denial of the charge.” That is pretty fair;

¹ P. 342.

but Professor James's admissions are apt to turn out broken reeds, and it is necessary once more to press home the psychological truth, as against his previous argument. It has already been remarked (1) that if "piety" is not to be blamed for the evil deeds done under its mask, neither can it be praised for the good ones; and (2) that the very fact of its adaptability to the purposes of the former is an admission of injurious potentiality. But further we have to note (3) that the *isolated* religion of fanatics is often even more directly associated than are "tribal" persecutions with religious motive—e.g., in the case of fanatical assassins; and, finally (4) that on Professor James's general principles there is no ground for disparaging the tribal instinct of neophobia or separateness as compared with "religious experience." The former is just as "interior" as the latter; and in terms of Professor James's ethic it *therefore* owes no rational account of itself. For its every impulse the tribal consciousness has just the sort of sanction that he (in certain moods) holds to be all-sufficient for religious conviction; it is self-sufficing. In applying to it the test of normal utility, therefore, he once more flouts his own transcendental doctrine.

Such a series of miscarriages on the part of so accomplished a thinker may surely serve to warn any vigilant reader against the vices of method, or the levities of self-will, which involve them. A species of logical licence which ends in mere self-contradiction on every final issue is surely sufficiently condemned by its results. After all the eloquent affirmations made by Professor James on behalf of religious experience, we end in this deadlock of countervailing propositions: "The mystic is invulnerable."¹ "Non-mystics are under no obligation to acknowledge in mystical states a superior authority conferred on them by their intrinsic nature."² That is to say, there is no rational case whatever; and the kind of assertion on which

¹ P. 424.² P. 427.

Professor James has been trading his to his own perception no validity for those who are not already in agreement. His philosophy, in short, is "tribal."

For such a mind, is such an occupation quite worthwhile? Considering the air of cosmic confidence about the main affirmations, the final aim seems oddly unambitious. Some of us who conceive ourselves to stand at but a moderate altitude relatively to the problem of the universe are yet fain to aspire to something larger in the way of propaganda than the mere ascertainment of one's concurrence with a select series of eccentrics who can persuade none and are not open to persuasion. The mere rationalist, for whom the measure of reality is "degree of relatedness," ventures to aspire to a wider concert, a less incommunicable form of illumination, a less lonely and less impotent subjectivity. For him there is the undelirious and yet not unsatisfying certainty that he can have reasoned agreement and intellectual community with multitudes of all races who can have access to the knowledge, the demonstrations on which he proceeds; he can have comrades in China and Japan; sympathizers, on appeal, in every land where men read and think; and this in virtue not of a chance complicity of bias, never to be reckoned on, but of a general human response to graded reasoning—a reciprocity as vital, as congruous with the whole order of things, as the law that kindness begets kindness, and courtesy courtesy.

And all that is at least as open to Professor James as to another, if he could only bring himself to care as much for universal critical righteousness as for his tribal proclivities, his hereditary and temperamental affections. It is not at all necessary that he should go about to flout the latter; but it is essential that he should not be forever wresting the forms of scientific philosophy and psychology to the illicit propitiation of orders of mind which have no part in scientific thought. After all, it is very doubtful whether he finally does propitiate them,

in view of the unmitigated kind of comment which he every now and then metes out to their idiosyncrasies. Here, for instance, is a deliverance, following on the before-quoted estimate of Saint Teresa, which will taste about as bitter as medical materialism to some of the Professor's religious readers:—

We have to pass a similar judgment on the whole notion of saintship based on merits. Any God who, on the one hand, can care to keep a pedantically minute account of individual shortcomings, and on the other can feel such partialities, and load particular creatures with such insipid marks of favour, is too small-minded a God for our credence. When Luther, in his immense manly way, swept off by a stroke of his hand the very notion of a debit and credit account kept with individuals by the Almighty, he stretched the soul's imagination, and saved theology from puerility.

The trouble about such writing is that while it shocks, perhaps usefully, the complacency of some dogmatists, it unprofitably flatters the ignorance of others, and it misses persuasiveness for the former by its very inconsistency. In the first place, it is not true that Luther struck out a new conception; in the second place, his doctrine was far from "morally useful" to many who accepted it; in the third, he did not set a worthy conception in place of an unworthy, for his own doctrine of unconditional salvation from all guilt by participation in a blood sacrifice—and of the cosmic need of such salvation—is just as grotesque, just as puerile, just as primitively unimaginative, as that which he discards. Once more we have had a blank fulmination: there has been no demonstration; there ensues no conviction.

If only Professor James could bring himself to imitate the medical materialists in one particular, he might be just as happy a man—"and oh! the difference to us." If he would but be content to be precise, coherent, and consistent under all weathers of temperament, he would still be an admirable writer, and so much more would be added unto him!

INDEX

- AMBROSE, cited, 207
 American Revolution and the French, 24, 27
 Antinomianism, 197
 Aranda, 24
 Argens, d', 9
 Argenson, d', 17 *sq.*
 Aristotle, 132, 152
 Arnold, M., 42, 139, 205
 Art, 92 *sq.*
 Ascham, 54, 59
 Assassinations, pious, 23
 Aulard, 13

 BACON, 62 *sq.*, 121
 Bain, 145, 168, 169, 172
 Bakounin, 205
 Bale, 56
 Balfour, A. J., 208
 Balzac, 111
 Barante, de, 20, 23
 Barbier, cited, 17
 Belief, 181 *sq.*, 194, 195 *sq.*, 211
 Bergier, Abbé, 15
 Berkeley, 3, 207
 Berners, Lord, 52, 61
 Bible, English translations of, 29 *sq.*;
 attitudes towards, 213
 Birrell, A., cited, 4
 Boer War, 82 *sq.*
 Bolingbroke, 24
 Bossuet, 14
 Boulainvilliers, 9
 Boulanger, 20
 Bradlaugh, 205
 Bradley, F. H., 142 *sq.*
 Brain and mind, 167
 Bruno, 146
 Büchner, 144, 168
 Buckle, cited, 19, 20
 Byzantium, 130

 CABANIS, 144, 146
 Cæsar, 205
 Calonne, 25
 Cassels, W. R., 174 *sq.*
 Cataneo, 22
 Catherine, Empress, 24
 Causation, 161, 163, 192

 Chamfort, 22
 Châtelet, Marquise du, 6
 Chesterton, G. K., 231 *sq.*
 China, 130, 131
 Christianity and conduct, 229,
 230 *sq.*
 Clifford, 168, 169, 173, 178, 182,
 205, 206
 Coger, 22
 Coleridge, 208, 220
 Collins, 9
 Comte, 69, 115, 121, 205
 Condorcet, 22
 Consciousness, 157 *sq.*
 Conway, Moncure, 190
 Cook, Prof. A. S., 30 *sq.*, 42 *sq.*
 Coverdale, 38, 56
 Creation, Hebrew idea of, 147
 Criminal treatment, 85 *sq.*
 Crousaz, 14
 Cudworth, 146 *n.*
 Culture-contacts, 130

 DAMIENS, 23
 Dante, 153
 Danton, 205
 Darwin, 119, 138, 200, 205
 David, 197 *sq.*
 Dee, John, 57
 Deism, 24, 174
 Democracy, 231
 Democritus, 156
 Descartes, 114, 115, 146, 168, 200
 Determinism, 203 *sq.*
 Diderot, 20, 22, 205
 Dore, cited, 39 *n.*
 Dostoievsky, 108, 109, 111, 220
 Downs, A., 46
 Drunkenness, 217
 Dualism, 190
 Dumont, 25 *n.*
 Duruy, cited, 19

 EDEN, Richard, 49
 Edgar, Dr., cited, 31, 39 *n.*
 Egypt, 130; religion of ancient,
 147 *n.*
 Emerson, quoted, 136; philosophy
 of, 203

- English influence on French Revolution, 24
 Epicurus, 146 *n.*
 Everett, Prof., 203
 Explanation, 163
- FAITH, 181 *sq.*
 Fanaticism, 229, 233
 Faraday, 200
 Fénelon, 9, 13
 Feuerbach, 205
 Fiction, canons of, 103 *sq.*
 Flaubert, 111
 Florio, 65
 Fontenelle, 8
 Fox, 24
 Foxe, 58
 Franklin, 24
 Frederick the Great, 24
 French evolution, 2 *sq.*
- GAMBETTA, 205
 Gauchat, Abbé, 8, 10, 14
 Geology, 119
 Gnosticism, 150
 God, Christian idea of, 150 *sq.*;
 Prof. James on, 183, 204, 221, 286;
 compared concepts of, 207, 286
 Greek physics, 161
 Green, T. H., 118
 Greene, 62
 Grégoire, Abbé, 24
 Grimm, 8
 Guevara, 52, 61
- HALL, 53
 Hallam, cited, 40
 Hamilton, 146
 Hartley, 146
 Hawthorne, 111
 Hegel, 119, 121, 210
 Heine, 220
 Hermogenes, 141, 150
 Hobbes, 121
 Höfding, Prof., 149 *sq.*, 157, 159 *sq.*,
 163, 167 *sq.*
 Holbach, d', 19 *sq.*, 144, 205
 Holland, Philemon, 65
 Homer, 100 *sq.*, 146
 Hooker, 56, 63 *sq.*
 Hudson, Prof. W. H., on Spencer,
 134, 137
 Huet, 9, 13
 Hume, 13, 119, 160, 164, 192
 Hutchinson, 55
 Huxley, 205, 206
- IBSEN, 111
- Immortality, doctrine of, 153
 Individualism, 135
 "Infâme," Voltaire and the, 13
 Ingersoll, 178
 Insurrections, pious, 23
- JAMES, Prof. W., on theism, 174-
 211; on varieties of religious ex-
 perience, 212-36
 Janet, Paul, cited, 10
 Jansenism, 19, 21
 Japan, 127 *sq.*
 Jesuitism, 21
 Jesus, teachings of, 75 *sq.*
 Jewel, Bishop, 55, 56
 Jordan, Dr., 227
 Joseph, story of, 105
- KAFTAN, 208
 Kant, 208
 Knox, 204
 Kruger, 82 *sq.*
- LAFAYETTE, 13
 Lang, A., cited, 47 *sq.*
 Lange, 141-2
 Laplace, 114, 155, 205
 Latimer, 57
 Lefevre, A., 142, 146
 Leibnitz, 146
 Leland, 15
 Life, definition of, 74
 Lilly, 48, 61, 62
 Locke, 156
 Lombroso, 220
 Lotze, 114, 145
 Louis XIV, 16, 18, 23
 — XV and XVI, 25
 Lucan, cited, 204
 Luther, 236
 Lycurgus, story of, 80
 Lyell, 200
- MABLY, 20, 23
 McAfee, Dr., cited, 46 *n.*
 Macaulay, on Tudor prose, 30 *n.*
 Macpherson, H., 121-2 *n.*
 Mahon, Lord, 25 *n.*, 27
 Maine, 26
 Maintenon, Mme. de, 18
 Mair, G. H., cited, 41
 Mallet du Pan, 22
 Mansel, 122
 Marivaux, 4
 Marmontel, 22
 Massingham, H. W., 85
 Materialism, 141
 Maude, Aylmer, 71, 93, 98

- Maudsley, 162, 219
 Meredith, 108, 111
 Mill, J. S., cited, 161, 185, 190, 200
 Mind, theories of, 167 *sq.*
 Mirabeau, the elder, 20
 Moleschott, 144
 Molière, 205
 Monism, 166
 Montesquieu, 10, 16, 17, 22, 27
 More, Sir T., 50, 53, 55
 Morley, Lord, cited, 13, 142
 Mosheim, 147 *n.*
 Murry, J. M., 68 *n.*
 Music, Spencer on evolution of, 133
 Mysticism, 234
- NAPOLEON, 205, 210
 Nashe, 66 *sq.*
 Nature and God, 189
 Necker, 24, 25
 Newman, 232
 Newton, 114, 138, 200
 Nisbet, 220
 Non-resistance, 80 *sq.*
 North, 62
- ORIGEN, 152
- PAINE, 24, 232
 Painter, 58
 Paley, 15
 Pascal, influence of, 5, 9, 14, 23 ;
 prescript of, for belief, 193
 Peasant art, 97 *sq.*
 Persecution, 13 *sq.*, 229, 233
 Piety, 229
 Pitts, the, 24
 Plato, 146 *n.*, 149 *sq.*, 152, 154, 156
 Pliny, 156
 Poe, 220
 Poole, R. L., 142 *n.*
 Pragmatism, 202
 Priestley, 146
 Prince, Dr. Morton, 169 *sq.*, 173
 Prophets, modern, 69, 89
 Pyrrhonism, 177
- QUILLER-COUCH, Sir A., on Elizabethan prose, 28 *sq.*; on the Authorized Version, 29 *sq.*
- RACE-MIXTURE, 128 *sq.*
 Raleigh, 50 *n.*, 66
 Rapin, 16 *n.*
 Rationalism, 235
 Raynal, 20
 Reality, measure of, 235
 Religion, 216 *sq.*
- Revolutions, causation of, 26-27
 Rivarol, 22
 "Robinson Crusoe," 104 *sq.*
 Robinson, Dean Armitage, 138
 Robinson, Ralph, 57
 Rocquain, 19
 Rogers, 48
 Rousseau, 2 *sq.*, 4 *sq.*, 22, 26
 Royce, Prof., cited, 177 *n.*, 203, 210
 Ruskin, on war, 87
 Russian fiction, 103 *sq.*
- SAINTSBURY, Prof., 29 *sq.*, 50 *n.*
 Salaville, 13
 Savoureux, Le, 147
 Science, progress of, 118 *sq.*, 120 ;
 method of, 179
 Secrétan, 183
 Selden, cited, 39 *sq.*, 205, 209
 Shakespeare and the Bible, 43
 Sidgwick, Prof., on French evolution, 1 *sq.*; on ethics, 118
 Sidney, Sir Philip, 60 *sq.*
 Sociology, 1, 123, 124 *sq.*
 Soury, 142
 Spencer, H., 112 *sq.*; range of, 113 *sq.*; on Japanese policy, 127 *sq.*; disillusionment of, 135 *sq.*; activity of, 205
 Spenser, 48
 Spinoza, 115, 146
 Spirit, the term, 146 *sq.*
 Spiritism, 149 *sq.*
 Stephen, Sir L., 15 *n.*
 — Sir J., cited, 188
 Style in philosophy, 176, 212
 Surrey, 48 *n.*
- TAINE, 3, 10, 13, 15 *sq.*
 Tait and Stewart, 155, 163
 Teresa, St., 227
 Tertullian, 141, 151 *n.*
 Thackeray, 111
 Theism, 174 *sq.*
 Tibet, 131
 Titchener, Prof. E. B., cited, 163 ;
 discussed, 164 *sq.*
 Tocqueville, de, 10, 11 *sq.*
 Tolstoy, the moralist, 69 *sq.*; interpretation of the Gospel by, 75 *sq.*; dialectical methods of, 78 ; on war, 79 *sq.*; on non-resistance, 80 *sq.*; on criminal treatment, 86 ; on sex questions, 87 *sq.*; contradictions of, 90 *sq.*; the critic, 92 *sq.*; on art, 92 *sq.*; the artist, 102 *sq.*

- Tourguénief, 108, 109, 111
 Toussaint, 17
 Trinitarianism, 203
 Truth, 179, 181
 Turgot, 19, 24, 25
 Turks, 202
 Tyndale, 31 *n.*, 48, 50 *sq.*, 162
- UNITARIANISM, 201
- VEDAS, the, 100
 Voltaire, 3 *sq.*, 205; intellectual
 evolution of, 5 *sq.*
- WALPOLE, 24
 Ward, Prof. A. W., cited, 198
 — Prof. J., 114, 165
 Washington, 24
 Watson, Bishop, 15
 Whitgift, 55
 Wiclif, 31
 Will to Believe, the, 178 *sq.*, 193 *sq.*
 208
 Wilson, Thomas, 41
- ZOLA, 108, 111

A STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ORIGINS

xviii + 382 pp.; cloth, 7s. 6d. net, by post 8s.

MYTH, MAGIC, & MORALS

By F. C. CONYBEARE, M.A.

(Fellow and Praelector of Univ. Coll., Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy;
Doctor of Theology, *honoris causa*, of Giessen; Officier d'Academie)

ON the distinctive theory of Christian origins put forward in this second impression of the second edition of this remarkable work there are differences of opinion; but there can be no doubt that Dr. Conybeare, with his wide-ranging scholarship, has persuasively argued, on the basis of a decidedly conservative view of the New Testament documents, the case for a completely non-supernatural account of the events and teaching that were the beginning of the Gospel. This account supposes that Jesus and Paul, as founders of Christianity, are persons whose lives and work, in spite of the accretions of thaumaturgy and myth that have gathered about their names, are approximately known to us from the literary sources. In the actual religion, myth, magic, and morals are all traceable as having contributed to the structure.

THE AUTHOR'S MASTERPIECE

New and Revised Edition; 261 pp.; cloth, 7s. 6d. net, by post 8s.

PRIESTS, PHILOSOPHERS, AND PROPHETS

By THOMAS WHITTAKER, B.A.

(Author of "The Neo-Platonists," etc.)

THE aim of this learned and interesting work is to arrive at an understanding of the three cosmopolitan religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—in their historical causes. These religions, in the author's view, are not to be wholly explained as growths out of pre-existing myth and ritual. They were also constructions by minds aware that they were bringing something new into the world. This is the meaning of "revealed religion." The three determining factors are indicated in the title—monotheistic dogma of ancient priesthoods; philosophic monotheism of Greek thinkers; lyric poetry of Hebrew prophets, followed by "Messianic hope" of apocalyptists. This last was the germ, but only the germ, of historical Christianity as wrought out by its series of fathers and doctors.

London: WATTS & Co., Johnson's Court, Fleet Street, E.C.4

WORKS BY
The Right Hon. J. M. ROBERTSON

A SHORT HISTORY OF MORALS. viii + 460 pp. demy 8vo ; cloth, 6s. net, by post 6s. 9d.

CHRISTIANITY AND MYTHOLOGY. New, revised and expanded, edition. xxiii + 472 pp.; cloth, 5s. net, by post 5s. 9d.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY. xx + 354 pp.; cloth, 3s. net, by post 3s. 9d.; paper cover, 2s. net, by post 2s. 6d.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FREETHOUGHT, ANCIENT AND MODERN. Third edition, much revised and considerably enlarged. Two vols., xxiv + 1,019 pp.; 7s. 6d. net the two vols., inland carriage 1s.

THE JESUS PROBLEM: A Re-Statement of the Myth Theory. 272 pp.; 3s. 6d. net, by post 4s.; paper cover, 2s. 6d. net, by post 3s.

THE HISTORICAL JESUS: A Survey of Positions. xxiv + 224 pp.; cloth, 3s. 6d. net, by post 4s.; paper cover, 2s. 6d. net, by post 3s.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH. ("Life Stories of Famous Men" Series.) 128 pp., with four Portraits; cloth, 3s. 6d. net, by post 3s. 10d.; paper cover, 2s. net, by post 2s. 3d.

VOLTAIRE. ("Life-Stories of Famous Men" Series.) 128 pp., with four Portraits; cloth, 3s. 6d. net, by post 3s. 10d.; paper cover, 2s. net, by post 2s. 3d.

ERNEST RENAN. ("Life Stories of Famous Men" Series.) 128 pp., with four Illustrations; cloth, 3s. 6d. net, by post 3s. 10d.; paper cover, 2s. net, by post 2s. 3d.

GIBBON. ("Life-Stories of Famous Men" Series.) 128 pp., with four Illustrations; cloth, 3s. 6d. net, by post 3s. 10d.; paper cover, 2s. net, by post 2s. 3d.

LONDON: WATTS & CO., JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.4