

mean one with reference to number, whereas *unum* can only imply unity of substance." With respect to the third text, *I in my Father, and my Father in me*, Tertullian's remark is that Christ had just before referred to the miracles which He had wrought. He meant, therefore, to affirm that He possessed the same power as the Father; that they were *one* as to the power of working miracles. Our author urges incidentally, as an argument against the doctrine of Praxeas, that the Jews in his day did not look for the coming of the Father, but of a distinct Person—the anointed of the Father.

Tertullian comes at last to those passages relating to the mission of the Paraclete,¹ which, as has been already remarked, he conceived to afford decisive proof of the distinction of Persons in the Trinity. In his comment upon them, he has been supposed to allude to the celebrated verse in the First Epistle of St. John, which contains the three heavenly witnesses. It is not my intention to engage in the general controversy respecting the genuineness of the verse; but it may be expected that I should state my opinion upon that part of the question in which Tertullian is immediately concerned. We have seen that, according to him, Praxeas confounded the Persons in the Trinity; though, if we may judge from his mode of conducting the controversy, it turned principally upon the Persons of the Father and the Son. Praxeas quoted in support of his opinion, *Ego et Pater unum sumus*.² Tertullian replied, "That verse is directly against you; for though it declares a unity of substance in the Father and Son, it also declares a duality, if we may coin a word, of Persons." Having established his point with respect to the first and second Persons in the Trinity, Tertullian proceeds to the third. "We have seen," he says, "that the Son promised that, when He had ascended to the Father, He would ask the Father to send another Comforter; and we have seen in what sense He was called *another* Comforter.³ Of this Comforter the Son says, *He shall take of mine*, as the Son Himself had taken of the Father's.⁴ Thus the connexion of the Father in the Son, and of the Son in the Paraclete, makes three coherent Persons, one in the other;

¹ C. 25. See p. 266, note 4.

² C. 22.

³ C. 9.

⁴ "Cæterum de meo sumet, inquit, sicut ipse de patris. Ita connexus Patris in Filio, et Filii in Paracleto, tres efficit cohærentes, alterum ex altero; qui tres unum sunt, non unus; quomodo dictum est, *Ego et Pater unum sumus*, ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem."

which three are one in substance, *unum*; not one in number, *unus*; in the same manner in which it was said, *I and my Father are one.*" Now in case Tertullian had been acquainted with 1 John v. 7, a verse which as clearly proved, according to his own mode of reasoning, the unity of substance and distinction of Persons in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as *Ego et Pater unum sumus* did in the Father and Son—I would ask whether it is not contrary to all reason to suppose that he would have neglected to quote it, and chosen rather to refer his readers to the latter text (John x. 30) and to John xvi. 14? An attempt has, I am aware, been made to evade the force of this argument, by saying that "Tertullian could not expressly quote 1 John v. 7, because it contains as just a description of the doctrine of Praxeas as that heretic could have given. The second Person in the Trinity is there designated as *the Word*; and Praxeas argued that the Word could not mean a distinct Person, but merely a voice—a sound proceeding from the mouth."¹ But if this reason was sufficient to prevent Tertullian from quoting the verse, it would also have prevented him from alluding to it. It is, however, quite incredible that any such reason should have occurred to him. A considerable portion of his tract is occupied in arguing that the Word (*Sermo*, not *Filius*) is a distinct Person from the Father;² and in proof of this position he quotes from Psalm xlv. (or xlv.), *Eructavit cor meum sermonem optimum.*³ Would a writer, who alleged such a passage in support of the distinct personality of the Word, be deterred from quoting 1 John v. 7, because the name of *Verbum* is there given to the second Person in the Trinity? In my opinion, the passage in Tertullian, far from containing an allusion to 1 John v. 7, furnishes most decisive proof that he knew nothing of the verse. It is not unworthy of remark that throughout this tract, when speaking of the Word, he uses *Sermo*,⁴ and not *Verbum*.

¹ C. 7.

² See cc. 5, 7.

³ C. 11. "Aut exhibe probationem, quam exoptulo, meæ similem; id est, sic Scripturas *eundem* Filium et Patrem ostendere, quemadmodum apud nos distincte Pater et Filius demonstrantur; distincte inquam, non divise. Sicut ego profero dictum a Deo, *Eructavit cor meum Sermonem optimum*; sic tu contra opponas alicubi dixisse Deum, *Eructavit me cor meum Sermonem optimum*; ut ipse sit et qui eructavit et quod eructavit; et ipse qui protulerit et qui prolatus sit, si ipse est et *Sermo* et *Deus*." This argument, in favour of the distinct personality of the Word, is lost in our version, *My heart is inditing of a good matter*. See Porson to *Travis*, p. 260.

⁴ A great outcry was raised against Erasmus for translating *λόγος*, *Sermo*, in his version of the New Testament. See his Apology de *In principio erat Sermo*. Opera, tom. ix. p. 111, ed. Lugd. Bat. 1706, and his note on John i. 1.

To return to Tertullian's argument against Praxeas :—after briefly referring to different passages in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke, which prove the existence of the Son as a distinct Person from the Father,¹ he proceeds to the two remaining questions which he proposed to discuss—Who the Son is, and how He exists. In order to get rid of our author's conclusion respecting the distinction of Persons,² Praxeas contended that, in the passages on which it was founded, the Son meant the flesh, that is man, that is Jesus ;³ the Father meant the Spirit, that is God, that is Christ. "Thus," observes Tertullian, "he contradicts himself; for if Jesus and Christ are different Persons, the Son and Father are different—since the Son is Jesus and the Father Christ. Nor is this all; for he also divides the Person of Christ." Here our author undertakes to explain in what manner the Word was made flesh.⁴ He was not transfigured into flesh, but put on flesh. Transfiguration implies the destruction of that which before existed. Neither must we suppose that the Word was so confounded with the flesh as to produce a third substance, in the same manner in which gold mixed with silver produces what is called electrum. Christ was both God and man :⁵—the Word and the flesh, that is, the divine and human natures were united in His Person, but were not confounded. Each displayed itself in its peculiar operations: in the former He worked miracles ;⁶ in the latter He hungered, thirsted, wept, was sorrowful even unto death, and died. "If," adds Tertullian, "we attend only to the meaning of the word Christus, we shall perceive the absurdity of supposing that the Father and Christ are one Person.⁷ Christus means one who is anointed—anointed consequently by another; but by whom could the Father be anointed?" Tertullian concludes the treatise with observing that the doctrine of the Trinity constituted the great difference between the faith of a Jew and a Christian.⁸ Praxeas, therefore, by confounding the Son and

¹ C. 26.

² C. 27.

³ From this statement Lardner argues that Praxeas was not a Patripassian, since he believed that the Son alone suffered. *History of Heretics*, c. 20, sect. 7, 8.

⁴ See the passage quoted in chap. vi. p. 225, note 2.

⁵ "Sed hæc vox carnis et animæ, id est hominis, non Sermonis nec Spiritûs, id est non Dei, propterea emissa est ut impassibilem Deum ostenderet, qui sic filium dereliquit, dum hominem ejus tradidit in mortem," c. 30. The meaning seems to be that, as man, Christ had a body and soul; as God, He had also the Spirit, which left Him on the cross, and by the loss of which He became subject to death. Compare *de Carne Christi*, cc. 5, 17.

⁶ Compare c. 16. *Apology*, c. 21. "Ostendens se esse λόγον Dei," etc.

⁷ C. 28.

⁸ C. 31.

the Holy Ghost with the Father, carried the believer back to Judaism.

After the detailed account which has been given of the tract *against Praxeas*, we need scarcely observe that Tertullian maintained a real Trinity; or, in the words of our first Article, that "in the unity of the Godhead there be three Persons of one substance, power, and eternity." Semler, in one of his notes, affirms that Tertullian was the earliest writer who used the words *Trinitas* and *Persona*, in speaking of the Persons in the Godhead.¹ He also asserts that Tertullian borrowed them from the Valentinians; but this assertion is unsupported by proof. There is undoubtedly a passage in the treatise *de Animâ*² in which he uses the word *Trinitas* to express the Valentinian distinction of men into three different species—spiritual, animal, and material; but it does not therefore follow that he borrowed the word from the Valentinians; for he has in the very same tract applied it to the Platonic division of the soul into λογικόν, θυμικόν, and ἐπιθυμητικόν.³ We find also in the tract *de Resurrectione Carnis*, the expression "Trina Virtus Dei;"⁴ but it is employed to denote the triple exercise of God's power, in rendering the devil subject to man, in raising the body of man from the grave, and in calling him to judgment hereafter.

Our analysis of the treatise *against Praxeas* further proves that the opinions of Tertullian respecting the Son and the Holy Ghost essentially coincided with the doctrines of our Church. According to him, "the Son, which is the Word of the Father,⁵ begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, of her substance;⁶ so that two whole and

¹ C. 8. The word *Trinitas* occurs also in cc. 2, 11.

² C. 21. "Ut adhuc *Trinitas* Valentiniana cædatur." See also *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 7. "Trinitas hominis apud Valentinum."

³ C. 16. "Ecce enim tota hæc *Trinitas* et in Domino: rationale—indignativum—et concupiscentivum." See chap. iii. p. 99.

⁴ C. 28. There is a singular representation of the Trinity in the tract *de Pudicitia*, c. 21, *sub fine*. "Nam et Ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est Spiritus, in quo est *Trinitas* unius divinitatis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Illam Ecclesiam congregat quam Dominus in tribus posuit." We have already on more than one occasion referred to the notion, adopted by Tertullian after he became a Montanist, that three persons constitute a Church.

⁵ *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 5.

⁶ *Apology*, c. 21. "Necesse est igitur pauca de Christo, ut Deo.—Hunc (τὸν λόγον) ex Deo prolatum dicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco Filium Dei et Deum dictum ex unitate substantiæ: nam et Deus Spiritus. Et quum radius ex

perfect natures, that is, the Godhead and manhood, were joined together in one Person,¹ never to be divided,² whereof is one Christ, very God and very man, who truly suffered, was dead and buried." According to him, "Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature, wherewith He ascended into heaven, and there sitteth until He return to judge all men at the last day."³ Lastly, according to him, "The Holy Ghost, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is of one substance, majesty, and glory with the Father, very and eternal God."⁴

But though we think that Tertullian's opinions on these points coincided in the main with the doctrines of our Church, we are far from meaning to assert that expressions may not occasionally be found which are capable of a different interpretation; and which were carefully avoided by the orthodox writers of later times, when the controversies respecting the Trinity had introduced greater precision of language. Pamelius has thought it necessary to put the reader on his guard against certain of these expressions; and Semler has noticed with a sort of ill-natured industry every passage in the tract *against Praxeas* in which there is any appearance of contradiction, or which will bear a

sole porrigitur, portio ex summâ, sed sol exit in radio, quia solis est radius: nec separatur substantia, sed extenditur. Ita de Spiritu Spiritus, et de Deo Deus, ut lumen de lumine accensum—Iste igitur Dei radius, ut retro semper prædicabatur, delapsus in Virginem quandam, et in utero ejus caro figuratus, nascitur homo Deo mistus. Caro Spiritu instructa nutritur, adolescit, affatur, docet, operatur, et Christus est." Tertullian then proceeds to describe Christ's crucifixion, His resurrection on the third day, and ascension. Compare *adv. Marcionem*, l. iii. c. 12; *de Spectaculis*, c. 25. We learn incidentally from the passage in the *Apology* that the Jews expected a mere man in the Messiah.

¹ "Aliter non diceretur homo Christus sine carne; nec hominis filius sine aliquo parente homine; sicut nec Deus sine Spiritu Dei, nec Dei filius sine Deo patre. Ita utriusque substantiæ census hominem et Deum exhibuit: hinc natum, inde non natum; hinc carneum, inde spiritalem; hinc infirmum, inde præfortem; hinc morientem, inde viventem." *De Carne Christi*, c. 5.

² I have observed nothing in Tertullian's writings which corresponds to the expression *never to be divided*.

³ *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 30; *de Carne Christi*, c. 24. "Sed bene quod idem veniet de cœlis, qui est passus: idem omnibus apparebit, qui est resuscitatus; et videbunt, et agnoscent, qui eum confixerunt; utique ipsam carnem in quam sævierunt; sine quâ nec ipse esse poterit, nec agnosci." See particularly *de Res. Carnis*, c. 51.

⁴ "Tertius enim est Spiritus a Deo et Filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus ex frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus ex flumine, et tertius a sole apex ex radio; nihil tamen a matrice alienatur, a quâ proprietates suas ducit." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 8. We have seen that in another place Tertullian speaks as if the Holy Ghost was from the Father through the Son. "Quia Spiritum non aliunde puto quam a Patre per Filium," c. 4.

construction favourable to the Arian tenets.¹ Bull, also, who conceives the language of Tertullian to be explicit and correct on the subject of the pre-existence and the consubstantiality, admits that he occasionally uses expressions at variance with the co-eternity of Christ. For instance, in the tract *against Hermogenes* we find the following passage:²—“Quia et Pater Deus est, et iudex Deus est; non tamen ideo Pater et iudex semper, quia Deus semper. Nam nec Pater potuit esse ante Filium, nec iudex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus quum et delictum et Filius non fuit, quod Iudicem et qui Patrem Deum faceret.” Here it is expressly asserted that there was a time when the Son was not. Perhaps, however, a reference to the peculiar tenets of Hermogenes will enable us to account for this assertion. That heretic affirmed, as we shall shortly have occasion to show more in detail, that matter was eternal, and argued thus: “God was always God and always Lord; but the word Lord implies the existence of something over which He was Lord; unless, therefore, we suppose the eternity of something distinct from God, it is not true that He was always Lord.” Tertullian boldly answered that God was not always Lord; and that in Scripture we do not find Him called Lord until the work of creation was completed. In like manner he contended that the titles of Judge and Father imply the existence of sin and of a Son. As, therefore, there was a time when neither sin nor the Son existed, the titles of Judge and Father were not at that time applicable to God. Tertullian could scarcely mean to affirm, in direct opposition to his own statements in the tract *against Praxeas*, that there was ever a time when the λόγος, or Ratio, or Sermo internus, did not exist.³ But with respect to Wisdom and the Son, Sophia and Filius, the case is different. Tertullian assigns to both a begin-

¹ We call it an ill-natured industry, because the true mode of ascertaining a writer's opinions is, not to fix upon particular expressions, but to take the general tenor of his language. If anything is expressly affirmed in the tract *against Praxeas*, it is that the Son is of the substance of the Father; yet Semler, finding in c. 27 this passage, “Quis Deus in eâ natus? Sermo, et Spiritus qui cum Ser-mone de Patris voluntate natus est,” makes the following remark: “Sic, *i.e.* de Patris voluntate, Ariani, non ἐξ οὐσίας.”

² C. 3. Compare c. 18. “Agnoscat, ergo, Hermogenes idcirco etiam Sophiam Dei natam et conditam prædicari, ne quid innatum et inconditum præter solum Deum crederemus. Si enim intra Dominum, quod ex ipso et in ipso fuit, sine initio non fuit—Sophia scilicet ipsius, exinde nata et condita, ex quo in sensu Dei ad opera mundi disponenda cœpit agitari; multo magis non capit sine initio quicquam fuisse, quod extra Dominum fuerit.”

³ With respect to the Sermo externus, Tertullian speaks of a time antecedent to his emission. “Nam etsi Deus nondum Sermonem suum miserat.” *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 5.

ning of existence. Sophia was created or formed in order to devise the plan of the universe; and the Son was begotten in order to carry that plan into effect.¹ Bull appears to have given an accurate representation of the matter when he says that, according to our author, the Reason and Spirit of God, being the substance of the Word and Son, were co-eternal with God; but that the titles of Word and Son were not strictly applicable until the former had been emitted to arrange, the latter begotten to execute, the work of creation.² Without, therefore, attempting to explain, much less to defend, all Tertullian's expressions and reasonings, we are disposed to acquiesce in the statement given by Bull of his opinions: "Ex quibus omnibus liquet, quam temerè ut solet, pronuntiaverit Petavius, *Quod ad æternitatem attinet Verbi, palam esse, Tertullianum minime illam agnovisse.*"³ Mihi sane, atque, ut arbitror, post tot apertissima testimonia a me adducta, lectori etiam meo prorsus contrarium constat; nisi verò, quod non credo, luserit Petavius in vocabulo *verbi*. Nam Filium Dei, docet quidem Tertullianus Verbum sive Sermonem factum ac denominatum fuisse ab aliquo initio: nempe tum, quando ex Deo Patre exivit cum voce, *Fiat Lux*, ad exornandum universa.⁴ Atqui ipsam illam hypostasim, quæ sermo sive verbum et Filius Dei dicitur, æternam credidisse Tertullianum, puto me abunde demonstrâsse."

In speaking also of the Holy Ghost, Tertullian occasionally uses terms of a very ambiguous and equivocal character. He says, for instance, that in Genesis i. 26 God addressed the Son,

¹ C. 7. "Hæc est nativitas perfecta Sermonis, dum ex Deo procedit: *conditus* ab eo primum ad *cogitatum* in nomine Sophiæ—dehinc *generatus* ad effectum."

² *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*, sect. iii. c. 10, p. 242. Bull refers to the following passages in support of his interpretation:—"Sermo autem Spiritu structus est, et, ut ita dixerim, Sermonis corpus est Spiritus. Sermo ergo et in Patre semper, sicut dicit, *Ego in Patre*; et apud Deum semper, sicut scriptum est, *Et Sermo erat apud Deum.*" *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 8. "Nos etiam Sermoni atque rationi, itemque virtuti, per quæ omnia molitum Deum ediximus, propriam *substantiam* Spiritum inscribimus." *Apology*, c. 21. "Quæcunque ergo substantia Sermonis fuit, illam dico Personam, et illi nomen Filii vindico." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 7. To these may be added, "Quia ipse quoque Sermo, ratione consistens, priorem eam ut substantiam suam ostendat." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 5. "Virtute et ratione comitatum, et Spiritu fultum." *Apology*, c. 21. "Hic Spiritus Dei idem erit Sermo; sicut enim, Ioanne dicente, *Sermo caro factus est*, Spiritum quoque intelligimus in nomine Sermonis; ita et hic Sermonem quoque agnoscimus in nomine Spiritus. Nam et Spiritus substantia est Sermonis, et Sermo operatio Spiritus: et duo unum sunt." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 26. See, however, *adv. Hermogenem*, c. 45. "Non apparentis solummodo, nec adpropinquantis, sed adhibentis tantos animi sui nisus, Sophiam, valentiam, sensum, sermonem, Spiritum, virtutem."

³ Sect. 3, c. 10, p. 246.

⁴ *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 7, *sub in.*

His Word, the second Person in the Trinity, and the third Person, the Spirit in the Word.¹ Here the distinct personality of the Spirit is expressly asserted, though it is difficult to reconcile the words *Spiritus in sermone* with the assertion. It is, however, certain, both from the general tenor of the tract *against Praxeas*, and from many passages in his other writings, that the distinct personality of the Holy Ghost formed an article of Tertullian's creed.² The occasional ambiguity of his language respecting the Holy Ghost is perhaps in part to be traced to the variety of senses in which the word *Spiritus* is used. It is applied generally to God, for God is a Spirit;³ and for the same reason to the Son, who is frequently called the Spirit of God,⁴ the Spirit of the Creator.⁵ Bull also, following Grotius, has shown that the word *Spiritus* is employed by the Fathers to express the divine nature in Christ.⁶

In our remarks upon the eighth Article of our Church, we stated that, in treating of the tract *against Praxeas*, an opportunity would present itself of ascertaining how far the opinions of Tertullian coincided with the language employed in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.⁷ That the general doctrine of those creeds is contained in Tertullian's writings cannot, we think, be doubted by any one who has carefully perused them. With respect to particular expressions, we find that he calls the Son—God of God and Light of Light.⁸ In referring to that verse in the fifteenth chapter of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians in which it is said that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, Tertullian observes that the apostle inserted the words *according to the Scriptures*, for the purpose of reconciling men, by the authority of Scripture, to the startling

¹ *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 12. "Imo, quia jam adhærebat illi filius, secunda Persona, Sermo ipsius; et tertia, Spiritus in Sermone."

² See for instance *ad Martyres*, c. 3. "Bonum agonem subituri estis, in quo agonothetes Deus vivus est; xystarches Spiritus Sanctus; corona æternitas; brabium Angelicæ substantiæ politia in cœlis, gloria in secula seculorum. Itaque epistates vester Christus Iesus."

³ *Adv. Marcionem*, l. ii. c. 9, *sub in.*

⁴ *De Oratione*, c. 1, *sub in.* "Dicimus enim et Filium suo nomine eatenus invisibilem; qua Sermo et Spiritus Dei." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 14. See also c. 26; *adv. Marcionem*, l. v. c. 8.

⁵ *Adv. Marcionem*, l. iii. c. 6. "Nam quoniam in Esaiâ jam tunc Christus, Sermo scilicet et Spiritus Creatoris, Ioannem prædicârat," l. iv. c. 33, *sub fine.*

⁶ *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*, sect. 1, c. 2, p. 18.

⁷ Chap. v. p. 160.

⁸ See the passage from the *Apology* quoted in note 6, p. 273 of this chapter, and *adv. Praxeam*, c. 15, "Nam etsi Deus Sermo, sed apud Deum, quia ex Deo Deus."

declaration that the Son of God had been made subject to death.¹ With respect to the expressions in the Athanasian Creed, we find Tertullian, while he asserts the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity, careful to maintain the unity of the substance; or, in the language of the creed, neither to confound the persons nor divide the substance.² We find also, in the tract *against Hermogenes*,³ an expression which, although there used without any reference to the Trinity, bears a strong resemblance to that clause in the Athanasian Creed which declares that "in the Trinity none is afore or after other; none is greater or less than another." The creed speaks of the Christian verity as compelling us to acknowledge that every Person in the Trinity by Himself is God and Lord, and of the Catholic religion as enforcing the unity of God. Tertullian speaks of the Christian verity as proclaiming the unity.⁴ On the subject of the Incarnation, the reader who compares the passages in the note with the corresponding clauses in the creed will be almost disposed to conclude that the framer of the creed had Tertullian's expressions immediately in his view.⁵

There is, however, a passage in the tract *de Carne Christi*, which appears at first sight to be at variance with the following clause of the creed, *One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh*.⁶ The heretics against whom Tertullian was contending argued that "God could not possibly be converted into man, so as to be born and to be embodied in the flesh; because that which is

¹ "Nam et Apostolus, non sine onere pronuntians *Christum mortuum*, adjicit *secundum Scripturas*, ut duritiam pronuntiationis Scripturarum auctoritate molliret, et scandalum auditori everteret." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 29.

² "Alium autem quomodo accipere debeas, jam professus sum; personæ, non substantiæ nomine; ad distinctionem, non ad divisionem." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 12.

³ Tertullian is arguing upon the consequences which he conceived to flow from the doctrines of Hermogenes respecting the eternity of matter. "That doctrine," he says, "places matter on a perfect equality with God." "Neutrum dicimus altero esse minorem, sive majorem; neutrum altero humiliorem, sive superiorem," c. 7.

⁴ "Sed veritas Christiana districtè pronuntiavit, Deus si non unus est, non est." *Adv. Marcionem*, l. i. c. 3.

⁵ "Sed enim invenimus illum directò, et Deum et hominem expositum—certe usquequaque Filium Dei et Filium hominis, quum Deum et hominem, sine dubio secundum utramque substantiam, in suâ proprietate distantem; quia neque Sermo aliud quam Deus, neque caro aliud quam homo—Videmus duplicem statum; non confusum, sed conjunctum in unâ Personâ, Deum et hominem Iesum." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 27. See also the passage from c. 30, quoted in note 5, p. 272, where it is said that Christ, as man, had a soul and flesh. For the inferiority of the Son in His human nature, see c. 16, referred to in note 6, p. 272.

⁶ C. 3. "'Sed ideo,' inquis, 'nego Deum in hominem verè conversum, ita ut nasceretur et carne corporaretur' (Rigault has *operaretur*); 'quia qui sine fine est,

eternal must necessarily be inconvertible. Conversion into a different state is the termination of the former state. If the Godhead was converted into manhood, it was entirely lost." To this argument Tertullian replied, that "although it might be right with respect to all other natures, it was not so with reference to the divine nature. We read in Scripture that at different times angels were converted into the human shape, and yet did not cease to be angels. Much more then might God assume the nature of man, and yet continue to be God." Here Tertullian appears to admit that in the mystery of the Incarnation there was a conversion of the Godhead into flesh, though he disallows the inference drawn by the heretics from it. If, however, we compare this passage with another in the tract *against Praxeas*, we shall find our author's opinion, when accurately stated, to have been, that God took upon Himself manhood.¹

The present appears to be the proper opportunity for observing that, among other appellations given by Tertullian to Christ, we find those of *Persona Dei* and *Spiritus Personæ Dei*; the former derived from Psalm iv. 6,² which stands thus in the Septuagint version, ἐσημειώθη ἐφ' ἡμᾶς τὸ φῶς τοῦ προσώπου σου, Κύριε; the latter from an erroneous reading of Lamentations iv. 20, πνεῦμα προσώπου ἡμῶν, Χριστὸς Κύριος, where αὐτοῦ appears to have been substituted for ἡμῶν.³

One of the questions on which theological ingenuity has

etiam inconvertibilis sit necesse est. Converti enim in aliud finis est pristini. Non competit ergo conversio cui non competit finis.' Plane natura convertibilium eâ lege est, ne permaneant in eo quod convertitur in iis; et (ut) ita non permanendo pereant; dum perdunt convertendo quod fuerunt. Sed nihil Deo par est; natura ejus ab omnium rerum conditione distat. Si ergo quæ a Deo distant, aut a quibus Deus distat, quum convertuntur, amittunt quod fuerunt; ubi erit diversitas divinitatis a cæteris rebus, nisi ut contrarium obtineat; id est, ut Deus et in omnia converti possit, et qualis est perseverare?"

¹ "Quod ergo Angelis inferioribus licuit, uti conversi in corpulentiam humanam Angeli nihilominus permanerent; hoc tu potentiori Deo auferas? quasi non valuerit Christus, *vere hominem indutus*, Deus perseverare?" Compare *adv. Praxeam*, c. 27, quoted also in chap. vi. note 2, p. 225. "Igitur Sermo in carne; dum et de hoc quærendum quomodo Sermo caro sit factus? utrumne quasi transfiguratus in carne, *an indutus carnem?* imo, *indutus.*"

² "Cui respondet Spiritus in Psalmo ex providentiâ futuri: *Significatum est*, inquit, *super nos lumen personæ tuæ, Domine.* Persona autem Dei, Christus Dominus." *Adv. Marcionem*, l. v. c. 11.

³ "Nam et Scriptura quid dicit? *Spiritus personæ ejus, Christus Dominus.* Ergo Christus personæ paternæ Spiritus est," etc. *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 14, *sub fine.* But in the third book *against Marcion*, c. 6, we find "*Personam Spiritus nostri, Christum Dominum.*" Rigault, however, in this passage, reads "*Spiritus personæ ejus, Christus Dominus.*" See Jerome's comment on the verse.

exercised itself is, whether the flesh of Christ was corruptible or incorruptible. We have seen that Valentinus asserted a difference between Christ's flesh and human flesh. In replying to this assertion, Tertullian observes, that Christ would not have been perfect man had not His flesh been human, and consequently corruptible.¹ Tertullian ascribes ubiquity to Christ as God, but not as the conductor of the gospel economy.² We find also in his writings a notion, derived from Isaiah liii. 3, which was very common among the early Fathers, that the personal appearance of Christ was mean and ignoble.³

The next heretic in Mosheim's catalogue is Hermogenes. He was a painter by profession, and contemporary with our author, from whose language it might be inferred that he actually apostatised from Christianity to paganism;⁴ but I believe Tertullian's meaning to be, that he adopted the notions of the pagan philosophers, the Stoics especially, respecting matter, which he conceived to be self-existent, and consequently eternal. From this matter, according to him, God made all things. His mode of arguing was, "Either God made all things from Himself, or from something, or from nothing."⁵ He could not make them from Himself, because they would then be parts of Himself; but this, the divine nature, which is indivisible and always the same, does not allow.⁶ He could not make them from nothing, because, being infinitely good, He would not in that case have allowed evil to exist: but evil does exist; it must consequently have existed independently of God, that is, in matter." Hermogenes urged another argument of a very subtle character, to which we have already had occasion to allude.⁷ "There never was a time when the title of Dominus or Lord was not applicable to God; but that title is relative—it implies the existence of something over which God was Lord: that something was

¹ *De Carne Christi*, c. 15.

² *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 23. "Habes Filium in terris, habes Patrem in cœlis. Non est separatio ista, sed dispositio divina. Cæterum scimus, Deum etiam intra abyssos esse, et ubique consistere, sed vi et potestate, Filium quoque, ut individuum cum ipso, ubique. Tamen in ipsâ οἰκονομίᾳ, Pater voluit Filium in terris haberi, se vero in cœlis." See Bull, *Defensio Fidei*, sect. 4, c. 3, p. 271.

³ *De Idololatriâ*, c. 18; *de Carne Christi*, cc. 9, 15; *adv. Marcionem*, l. iii. c. 7, *sub in.*, c. 17, *sub in.*; *adv. Judæos*, c. 14.

⁴ *Adv. Hermogenem*, c. 1. "Hermogenis autem doctrina tam novella est; denique ad hodiernum homo in seculo." Compare *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 30. "Cæterum et Nigidius nescio quis et Hermogenes, et multi alii qui adhuc ambulant, pervertentes vias Dei." See also *adv. Valentinianos*, c. 16; *de Monogamiâ*, c. 16.

⁵ C. 2.

⁶ Compare c. 39.

⁷ C. 3. See p. 275.

matter." To this argument Tertullian answers without hesitation that there was a time when the title was not applicable, that is, before the creation—as there was a time when God was neither Father nor Judge; which are also relative terms, implying the existence of a Son, and of sinners to be judged. "If we turn," he adds, "to Scripture, we shall find that, while the work of creation was carrying on, the language is always *God said, God saw*, not *the Lord said, the Lord saw*; but when it was completed, the title of Lord is introduced, *the Lord God took man whom He had made*."

Tertullian objects, in the first place, to the opinion of Hermogenes respecting the eternity of matter, that its effect is to introduce two Gods.¹ "You ascribe," he says, "eternity to matter, and thereby invest it with the attributes of the Deity. You join matter with God in the work of creation; for though you may pretend that eternity is the only attribute ascribed to matter, and that the supremacy is still reserved to God,—inasmuch as He is active and matter passive, and He it is who gives a form to matter—yet this is a mere evasion, since the very foundation of your doctrine is, that matter existed independently of God, and consequently out of the range of His power. Nay more, you make matter superior to God.² He who grants assistance is surely superior, in that respect at least, to him to whom it is granted. But God, according to your doctrine, could not have made the universe without the assistance of matter. Had God possessed any dominion over matter, He would, before He employed it in the work of creation, have purged it of the evil which He knew to exist in it. You are at least in this dilemma: you must either deny the Omnipotence of God, or admit that God was the Author of evil by voluntarily using matter in the creation of the world. Yet you adopted this notion respecting the eternity of matter, under the idea that you thereby removed from God the imputation of being the Author of evil. Like the other heretics, you were blind to the defects of your own reasoning, and did not perceive that it really furnished no solution of the difficulty."

Tertullian proceeds to inquire whether the reasons for which

¹ Cc. 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 42. Compare *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 33. It is evident that Tertullian here draws consequences from the opinions of Hermogenes, which that heretic himself disavowed. Compare c. 5 with *adv. Marcionem*, l. i. c. 3.

² Cc. 8, 9, 10.

Hermogenes imputed evil to matter, might not afford as good ground for imputing it to God Himself.¹ Among other arguments he urges the following:—"If matter is eternal, it is unchangeable in its nature; and that nature, according to Hermogenes, is evil.² How then could God create that which is good out of evil matter?³ Hermogenes ought rather to have said that matter was of a mixed character, both good and evil." "At least," Tertullian continues, "it is more honourable to God to make Him the free and voluntary Author of evil than to make Him as it were the slave of matter, and compelled to use it, although He knew it to be evil, in the work of creation."⁴ We find incidental mention of an opinion entertained by some, that the existence of evil was necessary in order to illustrate good by contrast; but Tertullian states that it was not entertained by Hermogenes.⁵ Tertullian further argued that by making matter self-existent and eternal, Hermogenes placed it above the Word or Wisdom, who, as begotten of God, had both an Author and beginning of His being.⁶ We have already seen in what sense Tertullian ascribed a commencement of existence to the Word or Wisdom.⁷

Hermogenes endeavoured to support his opinions by appealing to Scripture. He began with the very first words of the Book of Genesis, asserting that, by the expression, *In the beginning*, or as it is in the Latin, *In principio*, was meant some principle or substance out of which the heaven and earth were created: as it might be said that the clay is the principle of the vessel which is made from it.⁸ Tertullian replies that the words were only designed to mark the commencement of this visible frame of things. But not content with this sound explanation, he has recourse to others of a very different character: he supposes, for instance, that the word *principium* may refer to the Wisdom of God,⁹ of whom it is said in the Book of Proverbs, "Dominus condidit me *initium* viarum suarum in opera sua."¹⁰ If, however, this argument is weak, the praise of subtlety at least must be allowed to that which I am about to subjoin. "In every work, for example, in making a table, there must be a combination of

¹ C. 11.

² Cc. 12, 13. Hermogenes appears sometimes to have contended that matter was neither good nor evil, c. 37.

³ The reference is to Gen. i. 21.

⁴ C. 14.

⁵ C. 15.

⁶ Cc. 17, 18.

⁷ P. 275.

⁸ C. 19.

⁹ Cc. 20, 21, 22.

¹⁰ C. 8, ver. 22. The words of the English version are, *The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His way.*

three things—of him who makes—of that which is made—and of that out of which it is made.¹ But in the account of the creation only two of these are mentioned—God the Creator, and the heavens and earth the thing created; we are not told out of what they were created; therefore they were created out of nothing.” Is there not here some confusion between what Johnson has called the positive and negative meanings of nothing?

The next passage on which Hermogenes relied was also taken from the first chapter of Genesis: *the earth was without form and void.*² The earth here spoken of was, according to him, the matter out of which the present earth and all other things were made. But we will not weary the reader's patience by detailing Tertullian's observations upon this and upon other portions of Scripture alleged by his opponent. Both are justly liable to the charge of drawing inferences which were never intended by the sacred writer.

Having proved to his satisfaction that the universe was not created out of pre-existent matter, Tertullian proceeds to notice the inconsistencies of which Hermogenes was guilty with respect to his supposed matter;³ saying at one time that it was neither corporeal nor incorporeal—“as if,” observes Tertullian, “everything in the universe must not fall under one or other of the two descriptions;”⁴ saying at another that it was partly corporeal and partly incorporeal⁵—corporeal, because bodies are formed out of it; incorporeal, because it moves, and motion is incor-

¹ Tertullian urges an argument of a similar nature in c. 34. “It appears,” he says, “from the Scriptures, that in the final consummation of all things the universe will be reduced to nothing; we may therefore presume that it was created out of nothing.” Hermogenes appears to have interpreted the dissolution of the universe spiritually.

² C. 23. Tertullian's Latin is, “Terra autem erat invisibilis et incomposita.”

³ C. 35.

⁴ “Nisi fallor enim, omnis res aut corporalis aut incorporalis sit necesse est, ut concedam interim esse aliquid incorporale de substantiis duntaxat, quum ipsa substantia corpus sit rei cujusque.” This passage was quoted in note 3, p. 96 of chap. iii. Bull, *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*, sect. 3, c. 10, p. 236, observes, “Sed Tertulliano solenne est Deo corporales affectiones intrepide adscribere. Unde viri quidam docti existimârunt, revera sensisse Tertullianum, corporeæ esse naturæ Deum; a quibus tamen ego quidem dissentio.”

⁵ C. 36. The motion ascribed by Hermogenes to matter was of an irregular, turbulent kind, like the bubbling of boiling water in a pot. “Sic enim et ollæ undique ebullientis similitudinem opponis,” c. 41. “Materiam vero materiarum, non sibi subditam, non statu diversam, non motu inquietam, non habitu informem,” c. 18. See also cc. 28, 42.

poreal. "But in what sense," asks Tertullian, "can motion be made a part of matter? Man moves; but we do not say he is partly corporeal and partly incorporeal, because he has both body and motion. His actions, passions, duties, appetites are incorporeal; but we do not call them parts or portions of his substance. Motion is not a substance, but a particular state of a substance. With equal inconsistency and absurdity Hermogenes sometimes says that matter is neither good nor evil.¹ Moreover, he assigns it a place below God;² forgetting that, by assigning it a place, he assigns it limits, and thus admits that it is not infinite—an admission at variance with all his previous reasoning."

Tertullian next alludes to a notion of Hermogenes, that God did not use the whole, but only a portion of this pre-existent matter in the creation of the universe; and notices various absurd consequences which, in his opinion, proceed from the doctrine of Hermogenes: such as that good and evil are substances.³ He ridicules also the notion that God, in the work of creation, performed no other act than that of merely appearing and drawing near to matter; "as if," he observes, "there ever was a time when God did *not* appear or draw near to matter.⁴ On this supposition not only matter, but the universe also, is eternal." "Noli," continues Tertullian, "ita Deo adulari, ut velis illum solo visu et solo accessu tot ac tantas protulisse substantias et non propriis viribus instituisse"—a sentiment for which he is severely reprehended by Bull, who says that he seems to have cared little what he said, if he did but contradict his adversary.⁵

Such were the speculations of Hermogenes on the eternity of

¹ C. 37.

² Cc. 38, 39, 40. Hermogenes seems to have contended that matter was infinite only in duration; that is, eternal, not infinite in extent.

³ C. 41.

⁴ C. 44: Hermogenes illustrated his meaning by saying that God brought order out of confused and indigested matter by merely appearing or drawing near to it; as beauty affects the mind of the spectator by its mere appearance, and the magnet attracts iron by mere approximation. "At tu non inquis, pertransiens illam (materiam) facit (Deus) mundum, sed solummodo appropinquans ei, sicut facit quis decor solummodo apparens, et magnes lapis solummodo appropinquans. Quid simile Deus fabricans mundum, et decor vulnerans animum, aut magnes adtrahens ferrum?"

⁵ *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*, sect. 3, c. 10, p. 236. Tertullian afterwards says on the same subject, "Non apparentis (Dei) solummodo, nec adpropinquantis; sed adhibentis tantos animi sui nisus, Sophiam; valentiam, sensum, sermonem, Spiritum, virtutem," c. 45. Compare Warburton, Sermon 2, vol. ix. p. 39. *But what shall we say*, etc. He appears rather to lean to Tertullian's opinion.

matter, and such the arguments by which our author answered him. In one part of his reasoning he must be allowed to have been successful—in showing that the theory of his opponent removed none of the difficulties in which the question respecting the origin of evil is involved. He has also given no slight proof of discretion—a quality for which he is not generally remarkable—in not attempting himself to advance any counter-theory upon that inexplicable subject.

In conformity with the opinions already detailed, Hermogenes maintained that the human soul was made out of matter. This notion Tertullian confuted in an express treatise, entitled *de Censu Animâ, Concerning the Origin of the Soul*, which is not now extant.¹ In our account of Marcion we stated that Tertullian charged that heretic with denying the freedom of the will. We founded this statement on the following passage, in the tract *de Animâ*, in which the name of Hermogenes is coupled with that of Marcion.² “Inesse autem nobis τὸ ἀντεξούσιον naturaliter jam et Marcioni ostendimus et Hermogeni.” On this passage Lardner observes, “Tertullian asserted human liberty; and I think he does not deny it to have been held by Marcion and Hermogenes.”³ He appears to have forgotten that he had before referred to this very passage as furnishing proof that the Marcionites did not allow the freedom of human actions, but were believers in a kind of necessity.⁴ The zeal of Tertullian against Hermogenes was doubtless quickened by the boldness with which that heretic asserted the lawfulness of second marriages.⁵ In one place Hermogenes is connected with Nigidius, of whom nothing more is known.⁶

Besides the heretics enumerated by Mosheim in his history of the second century, Tertullian mentions some who belonged to the first. He speaks of Simon Magus;⁷ and repeats the story, which had been handed down by Justin Martyr and Irenæus, that a statue had been erected to Simon at Rome, bearing an inscription in which his divinity was recognised.⁸ In the tracts

¹ “De solo censu animæ congressus Hermogeni, quatenus et istum ex materiæ potius suggestu, quam ex Dei flatu constitisse præsumpsit.” *De Animâ*, c. 1. See also cc. 3, 11, and *de Monogamiâ*, c. 16.

² C. 21.

³ *History of Heretics*, c. 18, sect. 9.

⁴ *History of Heretics*, c. 10, sect. 15.

⁵ *Adv. Hermogenem*, c. 1; *de Monogamiâ*, c. 16:

⁶ *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 30.

⁷ *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, cc. 10, 33.

⁸ *Apology*, c. 13.

*de Idololatriâ*¹ and *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*,² allusions are found to his practice of magic. His disciples pretended that by their magical arts they could call up the souls of the deceased prophets.³ In the treatise *de Animâ*,⁴ it is said that Simon, indignant at the reproof which he received from St. Peter, determined in revenge to oppose the progress of the gospel, and associated with himself in the undertaking a Tyrian prostitute named Helena. He called himself the Supreme Father; Helena his first conception, through whom he formed the design of creating the angels and archangels. She, however, becoming acquainted with the design, went out from the Father into the lower parts of the universe; and there, anticipating his intention, created the angelic powers, who were ignorant of the Father, and were the artificers of this world.⁵ They detained her with them through envy; lest, if she went away, they should be deemed the offspring of another—that is, as I interpret the words, not self-existent. Not content with detaining her, they subjected her to every species of indignity, in order that the consciousness of her humiliation might extinguish even the wish to quit them. Thus she was compelled to take the human form; to be confined, as it were, in the bonds of the flesh, and to pass through different female bodies; among the rest through that of the Spartan Helen, until at length she appeared as the Helena of Simon. She was the lost sheep mentioned in the parable, whom Simon descended to recover and restore to heaven. Having effected his purpose, he determined in revenge to deliver mankind from the dominion of the angelic powers; and in order to elude their vigilance, he pretended to assume the human form, appearing as the Son in Judæa, as the Father in Samaria. On this strange account it will be sufficient to remark that it is taken almost *verbatim* from Irenæus.

Tertullian mentions Menander, the Samaritan, as the disciple of Simon Magus and the master of Saturninus.⁶ One of his assertions was that he was sent by the Supreme and Secret Power to make all who received his baptism, immortal and incorruptible; in other words, his baptism was itself the resurrection, and delivered all who partook of it from liability to death.⁷ Another of his

¹ C. 9.² C. 33.³ *De Animâ*, c. 57.⁴ C. 34.⁵ Instead of artificis, we must read artifices, as is evident from the corresponding passage in Irenæus, l. i. c. 20.⁶ *De Animâ*, c. 23.⁷ *De Animâ*, c. 50, from which passage we also learn that Menander dissuaded his followers from encountering martyrdom.

opinions was that the human body was created by angels.¹ Tertullian mentions the Nicolaitans ;² but says nothing respecting them which may not be immediately inferred from the Book of Revelation.³

There is a passage in the tract *de Resurrectione Carnis*, in which, if the reading is correct, Tertullian speaks of heretics who asserted the mortality of the soul.⁴

In the tract *de Jejuniis* our author mentions another heretic of his own day ("apud Jovem, hodiernum de Pythagorâ hæreticum"), who borrowed his tenets from the Pythagorean philosophy.⁵

To this account of the particular heresies mentioned by Tertullian, we will subjoin a few observations collected from his works, which apply generally to them all. We have seen that he traces their origin to the Grecian philosophy,⁶ and conceives that their existence was ordained or permitted by God in order to prove the faith of Christians.⁷ In the tract *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum* he draws a very unfavourable picture of the heretics in general, and of their modes of proceeding.⁸ He says that their practice, like their faith, was without gravity, authority, or discipline—that all was confusion amongst them—that they received indiscriminately every person who came to them, however different his opinions from their own ; the mere fact that he joined in opposing the truth being a sufficient recommendation to their favour—that they were puffed up with the conceit of their own knowledge, all being in their own estimation competent to instruct others, and even their women exercising the ministerial functions—that they conferred orders without previous inquiry into the qualifications of the candidates. Passing from their practice to their doctrine, he says that their object was to destroy, not to build up ; to unsettle, not to instruct ; to pervert the

¹ *De Res. Carnis*, c. 5.

² *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 33 ; *adv. Marcionem*, l. i. c. 29 ; *de Pudicitia*, c. 19.

³ C. 2, vv. 15, 20.

⁴ "Quamquam in hac materiâ admittamus interdum mortalitatem animæ assignari ab Hæreticis," c. 18.

⁵ C. 15.

⁶ P. 235. Tertullian supposed that the founders of the different heresies were led astray by the suggestion of the devil and his evil spirits. *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 40 ; *Apology*, c. 47.

⁷ Chap. v. p. 171 ; *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, cc. 2, 3, 5, 39.

⁸ Cc. 41, 42.

orthodox, not to convert the Gentiles:—that there was no agreement among them, each following his own fancies and despising his superiors—that many of them were even without assemblies for public worship. Another charge which he brings against them on the subject of doctrine is that, from consciousness of the weakness of their cause, they purposely argued in an inverted and perplexed manner.¹ With respect to their morals, he accuses them of holding intercourse with fortune-tellers and astrologers, and of acting as if they were released from all moral obligation.² He charges those heretics in particular, who denied the resurrection of the body, with leading sensual and vicious lives.³ That many of the accusations brought by him against the heretics were true, cannot, we think, be reasonably doubted; but there seems to be as little doubt that some rested on no solid foundation, and that others were grossly exaggerated. “We should not,” to borrow Jortin’s words,⁴ “trust too much to the representations which Christians after the apostolic age have given of the heretics of their times. Proper abatements must be made for credulity, zeal, resentment, mistake, and exaggeration.” It appears that the heretics were in the habit of appealing, in confirmation of the truth of their tenets, to the miraculous powers exerted by the founders of their respective sects.⁵

We shall conclude the present chapter by a remark which the subject naturally suggests. The Roman Catholics are in the habit of urging the division among Protestants as an argument against Protestantism; and their own pretended freedom from dissensions as a proof that they compose the true Church. If this is a valid argument against Protestantism, the long catalogue of heresies which have been just enumerated must furnish an equally valid argument against Christianity itself. But the divisions which arose, both among the early proselytes to the gospel and the early Reformers, were the natural consequences

¹ *De Res. Carnis*, c. 2; *adv. Praxeam*, c. 20; *de Pudicitia*, cc. 8, 16, *sub fine*. In the tract *against Hermogenes*, cc. 19, 27, Tertullian accuses the heretics of torturing the words of Scripture, and obscuring the plainest passages by their subtleties and refinements.

² *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 43.

³ *De Res. Carnis*, c. 11. In the tract *de Pœnitentiâ*, c. 5, Tertullian mentions certain persons (he does not call them heretics) who held that God was to be worshipped with the heart and mind, not by outward acts; and under this persuasion thought that they might sin with impunity.

⁴ *Discourses concerning the Truth of the Christian Religion*, p. 72, 3rd ed.

⁵ *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 44.

of the change effected in the condition of mankind by the new light which had burst upon their minds. Their former trains of thinking were interrupted—their former principles to a certain extent unsettled—they were to enter upon a new and enlarged field of speculation and of action. When, therefore, we consider how many sources of disagreement existed in their passions and prejudices—in the variety of their tempers and the opposition of their interests—it cannot be matter of surprise that all did not consent to walk in the same path, or that truth was occasionally sacrificed to the ambition of founding a sect.

It was originally the author's intention to add some observations upon the quotations and interpretations of Scripture in Tertullian's works; but the present volume has already exceeded the limits within which he purposed to confine it, and he must consequently defer those observations to a future opportunity.

ADDENDA, ETC.

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- 32, note 2. Dr. Neander observes that the tract *de Spe Fidelium* is mentioned by Jerome in *Ezechielem*, c. 36.
- 65, note 2, *add*, compare *de Cultu Fœminarum*, l. ii. c. 11: "Ac si necessitas amicitiarum officiorumque *gentilium* vos vocat," etc.; from which it appears that the Christians did not think themselves called upon to interrupt their former friendships, much less to break off all intercourse with the heathen.
- 66, third line, *for* charity *read* chastity.
- 117, line 13, *add*, in the tract *de Fejuniis*, c. 17, we find an allusion to the practice of allotting a double portion to the presidents in the feasts of charity, founded on a misapplication of 1 Tim. v. 17. "Ad elogium gulæ tuæ pertinet, quod duplex apud te Præsidentibus honor *binis partibus* deputatur; quum Apostolus duplicem honorem dederit, ut et fratribus et præpositis."
- 126, note 4, *add*, "Et tamen ejusmodi neque congregant neque participant nobiscum, facti per delicta denuo vestri: quando ne illis quidem misceamur, quos vestra vis atque sævitia ad negandum subegit." *Ad Nationes*, l. i. c. 5.
- 133, note 9. With respect to the reading of Rom. viii. 3, Dr. Neander has pointed out two passages, *de Res. Carnis*, c. 46, and *de Pudicitia*, c. 17, in which Tertullian has "*damnavit* or *damnaverit* delinquentiam in carne."
- 137, note 5, *add*, compare *de Monogamia*, c. 10, where Tertullian's reasoning proceeds on the supposition that we shall recognise our relations and friends in a future state.
- 160, Lord King, in his *Critical History of the Apostles' Creed*, infers from a passage in the tract *de Baptismo*, c. 6, that a recognition of the Holy Catholic Church formed a part of the profession of faith made by the candidates for baptism. "Quum autem sub tribus et testatio fidei et sponsio salutis pignerentur, necessario *adjicitur Ecclesiæ mentio*: quoniam ubi tres, id est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ibi Ecclesia quæ trium corpus est." The same noble writer considers *the Communion of Saints* as merely an appendix to the preceding clause, the *Holy Catholic Church*, and understands by the expression, the mutual

PAGE

society and fellowship which subsisted between particular Churches and between their members. To this fellowship, Tertullian's writings contain frequent allusions; and the external marks of this fellowship are expressed in the following passage from the tract *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 20:—"Communicatio pacis, et appellatio fraternitatis, et contesseratio hospitalitatis; quæ jura non alia ratio regit, quam ejusdem sacramenti una traditio;" where, in the expression *contesseratio hospitalitatis*, Tertullian refers to the commendatory letters, on the production of which members of one Christian community, when travelling abroad, were hospitably received, and allowed to communicate by the members of other communities.

- 167, note 4, *add*, "Ethnici, quos penes nulla est veritatis plenitudo, quia nec doctor veritatis Deus," etc. *De Spectaculis*, c. 21.
- 181, note 4. The reference to *de Res. Carnis*, c. 26 (not c. 62), is misplaced; it should have followed the word *copiâ* in the first line, p. 182.
- 204, note 2, *add*, In further proof that in Tertullian's time the Lord's Day was deemed a day of rejoicing, see the tract *de Coronâ*, c. 11. "Jam stationes aut ulli magis faciet quam Christo? aut et dominico die, quando nec Christo?"
205. I have said that Tertullian makes no allusion to the Paschal controversy. The passage in the work entitled *Prædestinatus* (c. 26) escaped me, in which the author quotes Tertullian as affirming, in his reply to Soter, Bishop of Rome, and to Apollonius, that the Montanists kept Easter according to the Roman custom. Dr. Neander refers, in confirmation of this statement, to the tract *adversus Judæos*, c. 8, *sub fine*, where Tertullian says that Christ was sacrificed on the first day of unleavened bread, on the evening of which the Jews killed the Paschal Lamb. Tertullian must therefore have supposed that the last meal which Christ ate with His disciples was not the Paschal Feast—a supposition at variance with the Asiatic mode of celebrating Easter.
- 223, note 8, *add*, *Apology*, c. 30; *ad Scapulam*, c. 2.
- 268, note 7, *add*, *Adv. Marcionem*, l. ii. c. 27.

