

incontestable evidence of our Lord's nativity. He states, however, that this census was taken by Sentius Saturninus, and consequently appears to contradict the account given by St. Luke, who ascribes it to Cyrenius. In this, as in the former case, I shall not attempt to examine the solutions of the difficulty which have been proposed by different learned men, but shall refer the reader to Lardner.¹ One circumstance, however, seems worthy of observation. Tertullian² uniformly appeals to the census as establishing the descent of Christ from David through Mary, whose genealogy he also supposes to be given in St. Matthew's Gospel.³ In the *Apology*,⁴ Tertullian states that the miraculous darkness at our Lord's crucifixion was denied by those who did not know that it had been predicted, and therefore could not account for it; "yet," he adds, "it is mentioned in your, *i.e.* the Roman archives." Gibbon⁵ thinks that, instead of *archivis vestris*, we should adopt the reading of the *Codex Fuldensis*, *arcanis vestris*, and understand the reference to be to the Sibylline verses, which relate the prodigy exactly in the words of the gospel. It is certain that Tertullian⁶ speaks of the sibyl as a true prophetess, but we have just seen that he occasionally appeals to documents in the Roman archives in confirmation of his statements, and I observe that Semler retains the reading *archivis*.⁷

I will conclude my remarks on the external history of the Church, as illustrated by the writings of Tertullian, with briefly adverting to the few notices which can be collected from them respecting the condition of the Jews in his time. He describes⁸

¹ *Credibility of the Gospel History*. Objections against Luke ii. 1, 2, considered.

² "Ex stirpe autem Jesse deputatum, per Mariam scilicet inde censendum. Fuit enim de patriâ Bethlehem, et de domo David, sicut apud Romanos in censu descripta est Maria, ex quâ nascitur Christus." *Adv. Judæos*, c. 9. Compare *adv. Marc.* l. iii. cc. 17, 20. l. iv. cc. 1, 36. "Qui vult videre Iesum, David filium credat per virginis censum." See also l. v. c. 1, and c. 8, where there is a very fanciful application of Isaiah xi. 1. Compare *de Carne Christi*, c. 21.

³ *De Carne Christi*, c. 22.

⁴ "Eodem momento dies, medium orbem signante sole, subducta est. Deliquium utique putaverunt, qui id quoque super Christo prædictum non scierunt; ratione non deprehensâ, negaverunt. Et tamen eum mundi casum relatam in archivis vestris," c. 21.

⁵ Chap. xv. note 194.

⁶ *Ad Nationes*, l. ii. c. 12, *sub fine*. The verses there quoted may be found in the *Apology* of Athenagoras, c. 26, *De Pallio*, c. 2. See *Salmasius in loco*.

⁷ See note 5, p. 79.

⁸ "Dispersi, palabundi, et cœli et soli sui extorres vagantur per orbem, sine homine, sine Deo rege, quibus nec advenarum jure terram patriam saltem vestigio

them as dispersed throughout the world, having neither God nor a fellow-mortal for their king; not allowed to set foot upon their native land; reduced, in a word, to a state of the lowest degradation.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II.

By the kindness of the Rev. Samuel Hey, Rector of Steeple Ashton, and of Dr. Richard Hey, of Hertingfordbury, I have been put in possession of twelve lectures on ecclesiastical history, read by their brother—the Rev. Dr. John Hey, late Norrisian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge—in the chapel of Sidney College, in the years 1768 and 1769. Two of them relate to the miracles of the primitive Church; and I willingly take this opportunity of confirming my own opinion on this interesting subject, by that of one of the most acute, most impartial, and most judicious divines of modern times. The reader, in perusing the following extracts, should bear in mind that at the time when Dr. Hey wrote, the controversy excited by Dr. Middleton's Essay was still fresh in the recollections of men.

After some preliminary remarks, Dr. Hey observes:—"The authors on both sides of this question, concerning the reality of the miraculous powers in the primitive Church, seemed to have looked too far *before* them; and to have argued the point with too much regard to the *consequences* which were likely to follow from its being determined in this manner or in that. Those who defend the pretensions of the Fathers do it through fear, lest, if they should appear indefensible, the cause of Christianity should suffer by the condemnation of its early propagators. Those who accuse the Fathers of superstition, weakness, or falsehood, consider what indelible disgrace they shall bring upon popery by showing the impurity of the sources from which all its distinguishing doctrines have taken their rise. But why, in searching after the *truth*, should we give the least attention to any consequences *whatsoever*? We know with certainty beforehand that error of

salutare conceditur." *Apology*, c. 21. Compare *adv. Judæos*, c. 3. "Unde Israel in novissimo tempore dignosci habebat, quando secundum sua merita in sanctam civitatem ingredi prohiberetur." See also c. 13, and *de Pudicitia*, c. 8. Ecclesiastical writers sometimes speak as if Adrian's prohibition applied only to the precincts of Jerusalem or Ælia; at others, as if it extended to the whole territory of Judæa. See Gibbon, c. xv. note 19, and the note of Valesius *ad Eusebii Eccl. Hist.* l. iv. c. 6; Justin Martyr, *Apology*, i. p. 84 B.

every kind, if it is not an evil in itself, is always productive of evil in some degree or other; and that to distinguish truth from falsehood is the likeliest method we can take to make our conduct acceptable to God and beneficial to man. Nothing can be more groundless than the fears which some men indulge lest the credit of Christianity should suffer along with the reputation of several of its professors, or more weak than considering *that* a sufficient reason for defending the veracity of the Fathers at all events. There are some miracles recorded in ecclesiastical history which are too childish and ridiculous for *any one* to believe; and there are *some indisputable* records of the vices of the Christians, and more particularly of the clergy: so that, if Christianity can suffer by *such* objections (for which there is no kind of foundation in reason), it has *already* suffered, even in the estimation of those who think the objections of weight. All agree (at least all Protestants) that there have been pious frauds and forged miracles, as well as that the sacred order have been in some ages extremely vicious. The only difference then is in the *degree* of this charge, or rather about the century with regard to which it ought to take place; but what difference can such a circumstance as that make in respect of the divine origin of Christianity? We may therefore, without fear or scruple, enter upon the discussion which I have been proposing, and probe every apparent wound with resolution and accuracy.

“But as all reasoning on subjects of this nature must have its foundation in *facts* (for we can no more argue upon points of history without ascertaining *facts*, than upon points of philosophy without experiments), the first part of our business is to collect from ecclesiastical writers *narratives* of *those* miracles wrought, or pretended to be wrought, in the Christian Church which seem to be most worthy of our attention, and most likely to afford our judgment ground for a determination.

“Previous, however, to such enumeration, it will be proper to mention a circumstance of importance, viz. that for fifty years after the ascension of Christ none of the Fathers made any pretensions to the possession of miraculous powers. We have already spoken in a former lecture of those Fathers who are called the Apostolic, of Ignatius, Polycarp, Barnabas, Hermas;¹ now it is an historical truth not to be omitted that not one of those pious men, though they were the principal governors of the

¹ Hermas had visions. *Note of Dr. Hey.*

Church, and the immediate successors of the apostles in that government (as well as their companions and friends), ever speaks of himself as capable of counteracting the ordinary powers of nature: they all endeavour to inculcate the morality and religion of the gospel, but that merely as *men*, possessed indeed of the sense and meaning of the sacred writers, but entirely void of their extraordinary power. This fact, though not wholly uncontroverted, is very nearly so; some ambiguous expressions concerning the graces and gifts of the Holy Spirit have been, not without great violence, extended to signify an extraordinary communication with the Deity—but no one has so much as *pretended* that such communication was ever meant to answer any further end than that of strengthening the weakness of human nature against the terrors of persecution. I only affirm, however, that none of the apostolic Fathers speaks of *himself* as endued with a power of working miracles. We must not absolutely say that no miracles have ever been said to be wrought about the time they lived, because there is a very celebrated letter extant from the Church of Smyrna, giving an account of the martyrdom of Polycarp, which is said to have been attended with circumstances sufficiently miraculous. This account I shall beg leave to repeat from an eminent writer.”

Having given an extract from this letter, as well as from the account of the martyrdom of Ignatius, Dr. Hey proceeds:—“These miracles are mentioned because they are said to have been performed concerning those two apostolic Fathers, who never ventured to assume the power of performing any themselves.” After briefly noticing the miracle of the thundering legion, of which he observes that “there seems sufficient reason for being cautious about ranking it amongst the genuine miracles performed in favour of the Christian religion,” he adds the following remarks:—“Though the apostolic Fathers stand clear of all imputations of vanity or falsehood on the score of claiming miraculous powers, yet those whom we mentioned next in order, when we considered the subject of studying the writings of the Fathers, declare openly that such were in their time indisputably exercised in the Church. I mean Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Theophilus Bishop of Antioch, and Tertullian. We might add Origen, and indeed every other writer after them till the Reformation; and there is no effort of the divine power so great which they do not boast of having exerted. Of all sorts of miracles ever performed, one would expect men to be the most cautious

of assuming *the power of raising the dead*; and yet Irenæus says that this was frequently done on necessary occasions, and that men so raised had lived amongst them many years. Irenæus only affirms this *in general*, without mentioning any *particular instance*, and it is somewhat strange that no instance was ever produced in the three first centuries, insomuch that the heathens gave no credit to the affirmations of the Fathers upon this head. 'Tantum enim,'¹ says Irenæus, 'absunt ab eo ut mortuum ipsi excitent, ut ne quidem credant hoc in totum posse fieri.' There is not, however, the same want of instances with regard to the other branches of miracles said to have been performed in the Church, namely, seeing visions, prophesying, healing diseases, curing demoniacs, and some others."

Dr. Hey passes in the second of the two lectures to what he terms the later miracles of the Church; those which are said to have been wrought in the interval between the establishment of Christianity by the civil power, and the time at which he wrote; and having remarked that many of them were proved to be impostures, he supposes with respect to others the question to be asked—"whether those should not be credited which have been strongly attested, and their falsity never proved?"

"In answer to this," he proceeds, "we may observe, in the first place, that to any one who has been conversant in history, and has seen the credulity of some, and the pious frauds of others, the want of regard to conscience in promoting the views of a party, whether civil or religious, with the many actual violations of truth which have been fully exposed, it is absolutely *impossible* to believe the common run of miraculous stories; no evidence can equal the prior probability which we have of their falsehood. Then there are many relations of preternatural events which no one believes (or perhaps a very trifling party), though they have been attested with all possible formality and exactness. The Abbé Paris is mentioned by every one on this subject: he only died in 1735. The variety of miracles which

¹ The whole passage is as follows:—"Tantum autem absunt ab eo ut mortuum excitent, quemadmodum Dominus excitavit, et Apostoli per orationem, et in fraternitate sæpissime propter aliquid necessarium, eâ quæ est in quoque loco Ecclesiâ universâ postulante per jejunium et supplicationem multam, reversus est Spiritus mortui et donatus est homo orationibus sanctorum, ut ne quidem credant hoc in totum posse fieri," l. ii. c. 56. Again, c. 57: "Jam etiam, quemadmodum diximus, et mortui resurrexerunt, et perseveraverunt nobiscum annis multis." Instead of the *heathens*, Dr. Hey should have said the *heretics*, for of them Irenæus is speaking.

were said to have been performed at his tomb is truly surprising in an improved age ; but not less so the strength, the precision, the regularity of the attestations of them, taken before magistrates of the greatest gravity and authority. Mons. de Montgeron, a person of eminent rank in Paris, published a select number of them in a pompous volume in quarto, which he dedicated to the king, and presented to him in person, being induced to the publication of them, as he declares, by the incontestable evidence of the facts, by which he himself, from a libertine and professed deist, became a sincere convert to the Christian faith. And yet no one *now believes* these facts ; the Jesuit party *never* owned their belief of them, for the Abbé was a Jansenist, and the miracles were to support the interests of the Jansenists ; though the Jesuits profess to believe the miracles of the Fathers which we have been relating, and which are not near so well attested as those of the Abbé Paris.


“If, then, some of the ecclesiastical miracles are to be *disbelieved*, and the later, which we are to disbelieve, are better attested than the early, in what century shall we draw the line between the credible and the incredible ? It is a difficult matter, and the difficulty cannot but affect the general credit of Church miracles, if joined to other collateral proofs of the fallibility of their evidence.

“There is another remarkable instance, in which the greatest number of witnesses, and the firmest *temporary* opinion concerning the truth of the facts, have not been able to perpetuate an error—and that is the affair of *witchcraft*. No miraculous fact in the Church has ever been better proved, if so well, as the supernatural operations of witches. All the nations of Christendom have so far taken their powers for granted as to provide legal remedies against them,—nay, even capital punishments for their supposed crimes. At this time there subsist in this university one, if not several foundations for annual sermons, to be preached against them. It is shocking to think of the number of poor wretches who have suffered cruel deaths on account of this superstition ; and yet there does not now seem to remain the least trace of it amongst liberal people, or indeed in any rank whatsoever.¹ If we consider how an incredulous person, during its existence, would be blamed for opposing the united sense of

¹ We are afraid that Dr. Hey here overrates the intelligence of the people of this country.

all Christian nations—the testimony of numbers of impartial people—the purport of the wisest laws, we shall at least contract a candid indulgence towards those who are unable to believe the relations of St. Jerome. In short, as Dr. Middleton says, ‘the incredibility of the thing prevailed, and was found at last too strong for human testimony.’¹

“Far different from those we have been speaking of, are the miracles of the gospel—rational, benevolent, seasonable, of *extensive* use, disinterested, free from superstition and moroseness, promoting good morals, called out by the greatness of the occasion in a series, coincident with the purposes of God manifested in prior revelations of His will. Nor would even these have justly gained the assent of mankind had the *internal* evidence of the gospel plainly contradicted the *external*,—had the precepts which it promulgated been evidently unworthy of the Deity, and productive of the misery of human nature, instead of meriting the angelic eulogium which they received when the heavenly choir sang, ‘Glory to God, peace on earth, and goodwill towards men.’”²



CHAPTER III.

ON THE STATE OF LETTERS AND PHILOSOPHY.

MOSHEIM commences his internal history of the Church in each century with an account of the state of letters and philosophy. In the second century his observations principally relate to the new system of philosophy, or, to speak more accurately, to that mixture of Platonism and Christianity which was introduced by Ammonius Saccas at Alexandria. On this subject the writings of Tertullian afford no information. Not

¹ Dr. Middleton does not seem to fall far short of Mr. Hume *On Miracles*. *Note of Dr. Hey.*

² A miracle to *me* can only be what *I judge is done* with, and *could not be done* without, divine power: I am liable to be deceived both as to what *is done*, and what *can be done*: every miracle therefore must be scrutinized by every man, and the nature and tendency of it called in to assist the judgment as to the *fact*, and the *powers of man*, etc., under the *laws of nature*. *Note by Dr. Hey, written in 1783.*

that he was unacquainted with the tenets of the different sects—his works, on the contrary, show that he had studied them with diligence and success; or that he entertained that mortal enmity to philosophy and letters which Mosheim imputes to the Montanists in general, for he appears even to have thought that the philosophers, who opposed the polytheism of their countrymen, were in some measure inspired by the spirit of truth;¹ but he clearly saw, and has, in his controversial writings against the heretics, pointed out the pernicious consequences to the interests of Christianity, which had resulted from the attempt to explain its doctrines by a reference to the tenets of the philosophers.² “They indeed by a lucky chance might sometimes stumble upon the truth, as men groping in the dark may accidentally hit upon the right path; but the Christian, who enjoys the benefit of a revelation from heaven, is inexcusable if he commits himself to such blind and treacherous guidance.”³

Although, however, the writings of Tertullian afford us no assistance in filling up the outline sketched by Mosheim of the state of learning and philosophy in the second century, an examination of his own philosophical or metaphysical notions will, we trust, supply some curious and not uninteresting information. We will begin, therefore, with the treatise *de Testimonio Animæ*, the object of which is to prove that the soul of man bears a natural testimony to the truth of the representation, given in Scripture, of the divine nature and attributes. In a short exordium,⁴ Tertullian points out the inconsistency and perverseness of the heathen, who usually paid a blind deference to the decisions of the philosophers, but renounced their authority at the very time when they approached most nearly to the truth—when their doctrines most closely resembled those of Christianity.

¹ “Idem (Socrates) et quum aliquid de Veritate sapiebat, Deos negans,” etc. *Apology*, c. 46. “Taceo de Philosophis, quos, superbiâ severitatis et duritiâ disciplinæ ab omni timore securos, nonnullus etiam afflatus Veritatis adversus Deos erigit.” *Ad Nationes*, l. i. c. 10.

² “Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? quid Academiæ et Ecclesiæ? quid Hæreticis et Christianis? Nostra institutio de porticu Solomonis est, qui et ipse tradiderat Dominum in simplicitate cordis esse quærendum. Viderint qui Stoicum, et Platicum, et Dialecticum Christianismum protulerunt. Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Iesum, nec inquisitione post Evangelium.” *De Præscriptione Hæreticæ*, c. 7. He traces the origin of all the heresies by which the peace of the Church was disturbed to the heathen philosophy: “Ipsæ denique hæreses a Philosophiâ subornantur.” *Ibid.* “Cum Philosophis—Patriarchis, ut ita dixerim, Hæreticorum.” *De Anima*, c. 3. See also c. 18, and the *Apology*, c. 47.

³ *De Anima*, c. 2. “Nonnunquam et in tenebris aditus quidam et exitus deprehenduntur cæcâ felicitate.”

⁴ Compare the *Apology*, c. 46.

He then proceeds to address the soul, enumerating at the same time the opinions entertained by the philosophers respecting its origin. "Stand forth," he says, "O soul, whether, as the majority of philosophers affirm, thou art divine and immortal, and therefore incapable of falsehood; or whether, according to the solitary opinion of Epicurus, thou art not divine, because mortal, and therefore under a stricter obligation to speak the truth; whether thou art brought down from heaven, or taken up from the earth; whether thou art formed from numbers or from atoms; whether thine existence commenced with that of the body, or thou wast subsequently introduced into the body: whatever thine origin, and in whatever manner thou makest man a rational animal, capable of sense and knowledge—stand forth."¹ "I do not, however," he adds, "address myself to the soul in an artificial state, such as it becomes after it has been tutored in the schools of philosophy, but to the soul in its natural state, possessing only that knowledge which it has either within itself or learns immediately from its Creator."

The testimony which, according to Tertullian, the soul bears to the unity of God, consists in exclamations like the following, which burst forth involuntarily from the mouths even of pagans, in common conversation:—"God grant that it may be so"—"If God will."² "How happens it," asks our author, still addressing the soul, "that instead of naming any one of the numerous deities who are the objects of heathen worship, you use the word *Deus*, and thus unconsciously bear testimony to the existence of one supreme God?" In like manner the soul evinces its knowledge of the attributes of God, of His power and goodness, by exclaiming, "God bless you; God is good; I commend you to God; God sees all things; God will repay:" as it evinces its knowledge of the author of evil, by the execrations which it pronounces against demons.³ By the fear also of death, by its innate desire of fame, and by involuntary expressions of feeling respecting the dead, it declares its consciousness that

¹ "Consiste in medio, Anima, seu divina et æterna res es, secundum plures philosophos, eo magis non mentiens; seu minimè divina, quoniam quidem mortalis, ut Epicuro soli videtur, eo magis mentiri non debens; seu de cœlo exciperis seu de terrâ conciperis; seu numeris, seu atomis concinnaris; seu cum corpore incipis, seu post corpus induceris; unde unde et quoquo modo hominem facis animal rationale, sensûs et scientiæ capacissimum," c. 1. In c. 4 are briefly enumerated the opinions of the different philosophers respecting the state of the soul after death.

² C. 2.

³ C. 3.

it shall exist in another state, and its anticipation of a future judgment.¹

“Such is the testimony which the soul bears to the unity and attributes of God, and to the reality of a future state of retribution. Such the language which it speaks, not in Greece only, or at Rome, but in every age and in every clime. Common to all nations, this language must have been derived from a common source, must have been dictated by nature, or rather by the God of nature, by Him who created the soul. But you will say, perhaps, that these exclamations, which burst as it were involuntarily from the lips, are not the result of a consciousness in the soul of its Divine Author, impressed upon it by Himself, but are merely habitual modes of speech used in common conversation, almost without meaning, and transmitted either by written or oral tradition. Be it so. Whence then were they derived by the man who first used them? The notion must have been conceived in the soul before it was delivered to the tongue, or committed to writing. To account for the general use of these expressions by saying that they have been handed down by written tradition, is in fact to trace them to God Himself; for the earliest writings in the world are the Jewish Scriptures, of which the authors were *divinely* inspired. It matters little whether we say that this consciousness was impressed immediately by God upon the soul, or that the soul acquired it through the medium of His revealed Word.”²

The confirmation which the natural testimony of the soul affords to the truth of Christianity was evidently a favourite topic with Tertullian.³ He urges the same argument in the *Apology*,⁴

¹ C. 4.

² Cc. 5, 6.

³ Compare *de Animâ*, c. 41; *de Carne Christi*, c. 12; *de Resurrectione Carnis*, c. 3; *adv. Marcionem*, l. i. c. 10.

⁴ C. 17. I insert the whole chapter as highly deserving the reader's attention. “Quod colimus Deus unus est, qui totam molem istam cum omni instrumento elementorum, corporum, spirituum, verbo quo jussit, ratione quâ disposuit, virtute quâ potuit, de nihilo expressit in ornamentum majestatis suæ, unde et Græci nomen mundo *κόσμος* accommodaverunt. Invisibilis est, etsi videatur; incomprehensibilis, etsi per gratiam repræsentetur; inæstimabilis, etsi humanis sensibus æstimetur; ideo verus et tantus est. Cæterum quod videri communiter, quod comprehendi, quod æstimari potest, minus est et oculis quibus occupatur, et manibus quibus contaminatur, et sensibus quibus invenitur. Quod vero immensum est, soli sibi notum est; hoc est quod Deum æstimari facit, dum æstimari non capit. Ita eum vis magnitudinis et notum hominibus objicit et ignotum. Et hæc est summa delicti nolentium recognoscere quem ignorare non possunt. Vultis ex operibus ipsius tot ac talibus quibus continemur, quibus sustinemur, quibus oblectamur, etiam quibus exterremur—vultis ex animæ ipsius testimonio com-

and Milner in his *History of the Church*, though little disposed to think highly of our author, admits that he “scarce remembers a finer observation made by any author in favour both of the natural voice of conscience, and of the patriarchal tradition of true religion ; for both may fairly be supposed concerned.”

In the short preface to the tract of which we have been speaking, Tertullian assigns the cause of his frequent recurrence to this mode of reasoning. To press the enemies of the gospel with arguments drawn from profane literature was, he says, useless ; though they allowed the premises, they were always ready with some pretext for evading the legitimate conclusion. To bring forward arguments founded on Scripture was still more unavailing ; they did not admit its authority. How then were they to be convinced, or at least silenced ? By an appeal to the testimony borne to the existence of one supreme God, by the natural voice of conscience, and by the works of creation.¹ To this testimony, therefore, Tertullian appeals ; and in thus appealing, far from thinking that he could be accused of pursuing a course derogatory to the honour or injurious to the interests of the gospel, he conceived that he was offering the strongest evidence in confirmation of its truth, by showing that the revelation which God has been pleased to make of Himself, in His

probemus? quæ licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus pravis circumscripta, licet libidinibus et concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis Diis exancillata, quum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapulâ, ut ex somno, ut ex aliquâ valetudine, et sanitatem suam potitur, Deum nominat, hoc solo nomine quia proprio Dei veri. *Deus magnus, Deus bonus, et quod Deus dederit*, omnium vox est. *Judicem quoque contestatur illum. Deus videt, et Deo commendo, et Deus mihi reddet.* O testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ ! Denique pronuntians hæc, non ad Capitolium, sed ad cœlum respicit. Novit enim sedem Dei vivi ; ab illo et inde descendit.”

¹ The following are selected from numerous passages in which Tertullian appeals to this testimony :—“Tractandum et hic de revelationis qualitate, an dignè cognitus sit (Deus), ut constet an verè ; et ita credatur esse, quem dignè constiterit revelatum. Digna enim Deo probabunt Deum. Nos definimus Deum primo naturâ cognoscendum, dehinc doctrinâ recognoscendum. Naturâ, ex operibus ; doctrinâ, ex prædicationibus.” *Adv. Marc.* l. i. c. 18. Compare l. ii. c. 3 ; *adv. Valentinianos*, c. 20. “Denique ante legem Moysi scriptam in lapideis tabulis, legem fuisse contendo non scriptam, quæ naturaliter intelligebatur et a Patribus custodiebatur. Nam unde Noe justus inventus, si non illum naturalis legis justitia præcedebat ?” *Adv. Judæos*, c. 2 ; *de Virginibus vel.* cc. 1, 16. “Nos unum Deum colimus, quem omnes naturaliter nostris ; ad cujus fulgura et tonitrua contremiscitis : ad cujus beneficia gaudetis.” *Ad Scapulam*, c. 2. “Si enim anima, aut divina aut a Deo data est, sine dubio datorem suum novit.” *De Testim. Animæ*, c. 2. “Quum etiam ignorantes Dominum nulla exceptio tueatur a pœnâ, quia Deum in aperto constitutum, et vel ex ipsis cœlestibus bonis comprehensibilem ignorari non licet, quanto cognitum despici periculosum est !” *De Pœnitentiâ*, c. 5 ; *de Spectaculis*, c. 2 ; *de Coronâ Militis*, c. 6 ; *ad Nationes*, l. ii. c. 5.

visible works and in the soul of man, is in perfect harmony with that contained in His written Word.

But though approved, as we have seen, by Milner, Tertullian's reasoning will be far, we suspect, from commanding universal assent in the present day. Since the publication of Dr. Ellis's work, entitled *The Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation*, it has become the fashion with many to treat, not merely as vain and idle, but even as presumptuous and almost impious, every attempt to prove the existence and attributes of God from the visible works of creation, or from the internal constitution of man. "Unless," we are told, "the idea of a God had in the first instance been communicated to the mind; unless God had Himself taught it to our first parents, and it had thus been transmitted through succeeding generations; no contemplation of the works of creation—no induction from the phenomena of the natural and moral world, could ever have enabled mankind to discover even His existence. But as soon as we are taught that there is a Creator necessarily existent and of infinite perfections, our understandings readily admit the idea of such a Being; and we find in the natural world innumerable testimonies to the truth of the doctrine."

Now we are ready to grant that man never *did* by reasoning *à posteriori* discover the existence of God; or in Warburton's words, that "all religious knowledge of the Deity and of man's relation to Him was revealed, and had descended traditionally down (though broken and disjointed in so long a passage) from the first man."¹ Still this concession does not, in our estimation, affect the only important part of the question; which is not, whether man ever did, *without previous intimation of a Supreme Being*, reason from the works of creation to the existence of a Creator; but whether, if he had so reasoned, he would have reasoned correctly.

When, however, it is affirmed that man not only never *did*, but never *could* so have reasoned, we must be permitted to examine the arguments by which the assertion is supported. Why then could not man discover the existence of God from the contemplation of the works of creation, etc.? "Because, it is said, between matter and spirit, things visible and invisible, time

¹ *Doctrine of Grace*, Book III. c. 2. Warburton is speaking in the person of an opponent of Natural Religion.

and eternity, beings finite and beings infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, the connexion is not perceptible to human observation." And we are therefore to conclude that, unless we had been taught that there *is* a spiritual, invisible, eternal, infinite Being, we never could have arrived at the knowledge of that Being. Yet the same writers contend that the fact is no sooner proposed than it commands the assent of the understanding. What then are the grounds on which that assent is given? The mere statement cannot alone be sufficient to produce conviction. The truth is that the understanding assents, because the fact proposed agrees with our previous observations—with the previous deductions of reason. Reason tells us that there are in the nature of man faculties for the existence of which we cannot account by any modification of matter known to us—thought, memory, invention, judgment. Reason tells us that no bounds can be set to time or space; hence we are led to admit the existence of a spiritual, eternal, infinite Being. The reasoning is equally valid, whether we apply it in confirmation of a fact which has been revealed to us, or without any previous revelation infer that fact from it. The latter is doubtless by far the more difficult operation; but we are now speaking only of its possibility or impossibility. The same series of proofs by which we establish a known truth might surely have conducted us to the knowledge of that truth.¹

Let us suppose a sceptic to ask why we believe the existence of God: what must be our reply? According to the writers whose opinions we are now considering, "this truth was originally made known by revelation." But if the sceptic proceeded to deny, as he probably would, the authority of the revelation, by what arguments must we endeavour to convince him? The answer is, "We must necessarily refer him to those testimonies, which the natural and moral phenomena of the world abundantly supply, of a Creator all-wise, powerful, good." It is admitted, then, by the very answer that those testimonies are sufficient to prove to the sceptic the existence of God; and is not this, in fact, to give up the point in dispute?

Perhaps, however, there may be some who will foresee this

¹ To borrow an illustration from science. For how long a period were the ablest mathematicians employed in endeavouring to effect the passage from finite to infinite, or from discrete to continuous, in geometry? The discovery was at length made, and therefore was at all times possible.

inevitable consequence of referring the sceptic to testimonies drawn from the natural and moral world, and will answer, "We can prove the authority of the revelation by historical investigation. We possess certain records, the genuineness of which we have ascertained. These declare that at a certain time a revelation was made from Heaven, and that the person who was sent to make it, attested the truth of His mission by miracles." Perhaps the sceptic will reply that no human testimony can establish the credit of a miracle. How is this objection to be answered but by a reference to the natural world? by showing that what we call the course of nature, from which a miracle is said to be a deviation, is in fact only a system appointed by the God of nature, and consequently liable to be suspended or altered according to His pleasure? Or perhaps the sceptic may say that pretensions to miraculous powers have abounded in all ages; and that, as such pretensions have in the majority of instances been shown to be false, we may reasonably conclude that they were so in all. To meet this objection, we must refer to the criteria of miracles, which are all deductions of human reason, and show that the purposes for which the miraculous powers are said to have been exerted were consonant to just conceptions of the divine nature and attributes; and those conceptions derived from sources extraneous and independent of the revelation itself. For we must not, in the first instance, say that we obtain the knowledge of the nature and attributes of God from a revelation, and then prove the truth of that revelation by a reference to the knowledge so obtained.

But is not this, it will be asked, to constitute human reason the judge of the divine dispensations? Is it not to say that man, blind and ignorant man, can certainly determine what ought and what ought not to proceed from God? By no means. It is only to compare one set of facts with another; to compare the conceptions of the divine nature, which we derive from the perusal of the Bible, with those which we derive from the contemplation of the phenomena of the natural and moral world. If the written word and the visible world both proceed from the same author, they cannot but agree in the testimony which they bear to His character and attributes.

Men, it is true, have not unfrequently been induced by the love of paradox, by the desire of obtaining a reputation for superior talent and acuteness, or by other motives of a similar

description, to assert the all-sufficiency of human reason, and to deny the necessity of a revelation. Hence many good and pious Christians have run into the opposite extreme, and been disposed to regard all who have recourse to reason and the light of nature in the investigation of religious truth as little better than infidels, puffed up with a presumptuous conceit of their own knowledge, and sitting in judgment on the fitness of the divine procedure. Yet what just ground is there for these heavy accusations? Is not reason the gift of God? Does not the light of nature emanate from the author of nature? from Him who is the fountain of light? In what then consists the presumption of endeavouring to trace the divine character and operations by means of that light which God has Himself supplied? The knowledge of divine things which we acquire by the proper exercise of our various faculties on the phenomena of the visible world, is as strictly the gift of God as that which we derive from the perusal of His revealed Word.

Warburton, in the second and third chapters of the third book of the *Doctrine of Grace*, has pointed out with his usual acuteness the causes in which the existing disposition to undervalue and condemn the argument *à posteriori* originated. In their endeavours to defend our holy religion, divines, instead of taking their stand upon the firm basis of truth, have been too apt to shift their ground, and think opinions right in proportion as they were further removed from those of the adversary with whom they were immediately contending. Hence they have continually run into extremes; sometimes exalting human reason above all due bounds, at other times as unjustly depreciating it. In the seventeenth century fanaticism was the error against which the clergy had principally to contend; and in order to place themselves at the greatest possible distance from it, they took every opportunity of launching forth into the praises of human reason, and asserting its sufficiency to the discovery of divine truth, till the gospel at length came to be spoken of as a mere republication of the religion of nature. The infidel was not slow in availing himself of the advantage which such unguarded expressions afforded him, and began to deny the necessity of revelation, under the pretence that natural religion was sufficient for every purpose. Our divines again took the alarm, and, instead of endeavouring to mark out the precise bounds of reason and revelation, saw no better mode of extricating themselves from the difficulty than by running into the opposite extreme, and decrying

natural religion with as much vehemence as their predecessors had extolled it.—To return to Tertullian.

We have seen his opinion respecting the testimony borne by the soul of man to the unity and attributes of God, and to a future state. Let us now examine his sentiments respecting the soul itself, which are detailed in the treatise *de Animâ*.¹ After the body of flesh of Adam² had been formed out of the dust of the earth,³ God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life,⁴ and man became a living soul. Man, therefore, is composed of two parts, σὰρξ and ψυχὴ, Caro and Anima,⁵ flesh and soul; and the term soul, according to Tertullian, includes both the vital and intellectual principles, the latter of which was afterwards distinguished by the name νοῦς, Animus or Mens. He describes νοῦς,⁶ or Animus, as coexistent and consubstantial with the soul,

¹ We have seen that our author wrote a distinct treatise on the origin of the soul, *de Censu Animæ*, against Hermogenes, who contended that it was formed out of matter. Chap. i. p. 32.

² C. 3. See, concerning the creation of man, *de Resurrectione Carnis*, cc. 5, 7.

³ Tertullian supposes the earth, out of which man was made, to have been in a humid state, having been lately covered with water. *De Baptismo*, c. 3; *adv. Valentinianos*, c. 24; *adv. Hermogenem*, c. 29. "Qui tunc de limo formari habebat." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 12. "De limo caro in Adam." *De Animâ*, c. 27. For a definition of the body see *de Resurrectione Carnis*, c. 35.

⁴ This breath Tertullian sometimes calls the substance of God. "A rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus (homo), sed etiam ex substantiâ ipsius animatus." *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 5. Compare *adv. Marc.* l. ii. cc. 5, 6. "Quoquo tamen, inquis, modo substantia Creatoris delicti capax invenitur, quum afflatus Dei, id est, anima, in homine deliquit," c. 9. The objection here stated was urged not only by the Marcionites, but also by Hermogenes. See *de Animâ*, c. 11.

⁵ Tertullian sometimes uses the word Spiritus to designate the soul. See *de Baptismo*, cc. 4, 5; *de Pœnitentiâ*, c. 3. "Siquidem et caro et Spiritus Dei res; alia manu ejus expressa; alia afflatu ejus consummata." *De Spectaculis*, c. 2. "Et tamen et corpore et spiritu desciiit a suo institutore." In another passage in the same tract, c. 13, Spiritus and Anima are joined together, and appear to be synonymous, unless the former means the breath. "Quæ non intestinis transiguntur, sed in ipso Spiritu et Animâ digeruntur." See also c. 17, *sub fine*, and *de Animâ*, cc. 10, 11. But generally Tertullian uses the word Spiritus to designate the Holy Spirit, the communication of whose influence constitutes the spiritual man, πνευματικός, in contradistinction to the animal man, ψυχικός. "Qui non tantum animæ erant, verum et spiritûs," c. 26. In c. 41 we find the spirit clearly distinguished from the soul. "Sequitur animam nubentem Spiritui caro, ut dotale mancipium, et jam non animæ famula, sed Spiritûs." Using the word Spiritus in this sense, he calls the soul suffectura Spiritûs ("Quia suffectura est quodammodo Spiritûs Anima," *adv. Marc.* l. i. c. 28), the substance on which the Spirit acts, or its instrument; and in the tract *de Resurrectione Carnis*, c. 40, he says that the inward man is renewed per suggestum Spiritûs. See also *de Monogamiâ*, c. 1.

⁶ "Proinde et animum, sive mens est, νοῦς apud Græcos, non aliud quid intelligimus, quam suggestum animæ ingenitum et insitum et nativitas proprium, quo agit, quo sapit, quem secum habens ex semetipsâ se commoveat in semetipsâ," c. 12. Again, in the same chapter, near the end: "Nos autem animum

yet distinct from it, as a minister or deputy is from his principal; being the instrument by which the soul acts, apprehends, moves. For that the pre-eminence, principalitas, is in the soul, Anima, not in the mind, Animus, is evident from the language of common life. We say that a rich man feeds so many souls, not so many minds; that a dying man breathes out his soul, not his mind; that Christ came to save the souls, not the minds of men.¹

“The Scriptures then,” Tertullian proceeds, “prove, in opposition to Plato, that the soul has a beginning. They prove also, in opposition to the same philosopher, that the soul is corporeal.”² On this last point great difference of opinion existed; some philosophers maintaining, with Cleanthes, that as there could be no mutual action of things corporeal and things incorporeal upon each other, and as the soul and body certainly do act upon each other, the soul must be corporeal.³ Plato, on the contrary, contended that every body must be either animale, animated by a soul, in which case it will be set in motion by some internal action; or inanimale, not animated by a soul, in which case it will be set in motion by some external action; but the soul falls under neither of these classes, being that which sets the body in motion.⁴ To this Tertullian replies that undoubtedly the soul can neither be called animale nor inanimale; still it is a body, though sui generis. It is itself set in motion by external action, when, for instance, it is under the influence of prophetic inspiration; and it sets bodies in motion, which it could not do if it were not a body. Plato further argued that the modes in which we arrive at the knowledge of the qualities of things corporeal

ita dicimus animæ concretum, non ut substantiâ alium, sed ut substantiæ officium.” Again, in c. 18: “Putabis quidem abesse animum ab animâ, siquando animo ita afficimur, ut nesciamus nos vidisse quid vel audisse, quia alibi fuerit animus: adeo contendam, immo ipsam animam nec vidisse, nec audisse, quia alibi fuerit cum suâ vi, id est, animo.” *De Resurrectione Carnis*, c. 40. “Porro Apostolus interiorem hominem non tam animam, quam mentem atque animum intelligi mavult, id est, non substantiam ipsam, sed substantiæ saporem.”

¹ C. 13.

² C. 4.

³ C. 5. Tertullian also ascribes a body to the Spirit. “Licet enim et animæ corpus sit aliquod, suæ qualitatis, sicut et spiritûs. *Adv. Marc.* l. v. c. 15. See also c. 10. “Et si habet aliquod proprium corpus anima vel spiritus, ut possit videri corpus animale animam significare, et corpus spiritale spiritum;” and *adv. Praxeam*, c. 7. “Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in suâ effigie.” He remarks in general, “Omne, quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est.” *De Carne Christi*, c. 11. “Nisi fallor enim, omnis res aut corporalis aut incorporalis sit necesse est; ut concedam interim esse aliquid incorporale de substantiis duntaxat, quum ipsa substantia corpus sit rei cujusque.” *Adv. Hermogenem*, c. 35.

⁴ C. 6.

and things incorporeal, are perfectly distinct. The knowledge of the former is obtained through the bodily senses—sight, touch, etc.; of the latter, of benevolence for instance, or malevolence, through the intellectual senses: the soul therefore is incorporeal. Tertullian denies the correctness of this distinction, and contends, on the contrary, that as the soul is advertised of the existence of things incorporeal, of sounds, colours, smells, through the medium of the corporeal senses, the fair inference rather is that the soul is corporeal. “Still, it must be allowed that the soul and body have each its peculiar sustenance; the latter is supported by meat and drink; the former by wisdom and learning.” Here Tertullian appeals to medical authority,¹ and contends that corporeal aliment is necessary also to the well-being of the soul, which would sink without it. Study does not feed, it only adorns the soul; not to mention, he adds, that the Stoics affirmed the arts and sciences to be corporeal. His last argument is drawn from the Scriptures, which speak of the torments endured by the soul of the rich man when in a state of separation from the body—in that intermediate state in which the soul remains until the general resurrection.² But if the soul can suffer, it must be corporeal; were it not corporeal, it would not have that whereby it could suffer. Nor let it be argued that the soul is incorporeal because it is invisible; all bodies have not the same properties; that of invisibility is peculiar to the soul.³ But though invisible to the eye of sense, it is visible to the eye of the spirit; for St. John, when in the Spirit, beheld the souls of the martyrs.⁴ The specimens already produced will give the reader a sufficiently accurate idea of the arguments by which the parties in this dispute supported their respective opinions; we will therefore proceed at once to state Tertullian’s conclusion. He ascribes to the soul⁵ a peculiar character or constitution, boundary, length, breadth, height, and figure.⁶ This conclusion he confirms by the testimony of a Christian female who was favoured with a vision, in which the soul was exhibited to her in a corporeal shape and appeared a spirit; not, however, an empty illusion, but capable of being grasped by the hand, soft and transparent, and of an

¹ Soranus, the physician whom Tertullian quotes by name, appears to have been a materialist, and to have maintained the mortality of the soul.

² C. 7. Compare *de Resurrectione Carnis*, c. 17. There is, however, some variation in Tertullian’s language on this subject. In the *Apology*, c. 48, he speaks as if the soul could not suffer when separated from the body: “Ideoque representabuntur et corpora, quia neque pati quicquam potest anima sola sine stabili materiâ, id est, carne.” See also *de Testimonio Animæ*, c. 4.

³ C. 8.

⁴ Apoc. vi. 9.

⁵ C. 9.

⁶ The Latin word is “habitum.”

ethereal colour, and in form agreeing exactly with the human form. For when God breathed into Adam the breath of life, that breath, being diffused through every part and member of his body, produced an interior man corresponding in all respects to the exterior.

Having shown that the soul is corporeal, our author proceeds to maintain that it is simple and uncompounded; in opposition to certain philosophers who distinguished between the soul and the spirit, *anima* and *spiritus*, and made the latter a different substance from the former; the soul being, according to them, the vital principle, the principle by which men live—the spirit that by which they breathe.¹ Anatomists, they said, inform us that moths, and ants, and gnats have no organs of respiration; they have the vital without the breathing principle; those principles are consequently distinct. But Tertullian will not allow that we can thus reason from an insect to a human being.² In the nature of man, life and breath are inseparable. The distinction, therefore, between *anima* and *spiritus* is only a distinction of words, similar to that between *lux* and *dies*, the light and the day. The spirit or breath is an act or operation of the soul: the soul breathes. We must not, however, be led astray by the mere sound of words, and confound the spirit, which from the very birth of man is inseparably united to his soul, with the Spirit of God and the spirit of the devil, which, though they act upon the soul, are extraneous to it.³

The simplicity of the soul necessarily implies that it is indivisible.⁴ When, therefore, the philosophers talk of the parts of the soul, they speak inaccurately: they should say powers, or faculties, or operations, as of moving, acting, thinking, seeing, hearing, etc. Because different parts of the body are, as it

¹ Cc. 10, 11.

² In c. 19, Tertullian distinguishes between the vital principle in man and in all other created things. “Denique arbores vivere, nec tamen sapere, secundum Aristotelem, et si quis alius substantiam animale in universa communicat, quæ apud nos in homine privata res est, non modo ut Dei opus quod et cætera, sed ut Dei flatus quod hæc sola, quam dicimus cum omni instructu suo nasci.”

³ “Erunt enim et aliæ Spiritus species, ut ex Deo, ut ex diabolo,” c. 10. Compare c. 18. “Ob hæc ergo præstruximus neque animum aliud quid esse, quam animæ suggestum et structum: neque spiritum extraneum quid quam quod et ipsa per flatum. Cæterum accessioni deputandum, quod aut Deus postea, aut Diabolus adspiraret.”

⁴ C. 14.

that the case is the same with the soul: on the contrary, the soul pervades the whole frame; as in the hydraulic organ of Archimedes one breath pervades the whole machine, and produces a variety of sounds. With respect to the seat of the soul, the part of the body in which the principle of vitality and sensation peculiarly resides, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, *principale*, Tertullian places it in the heart; grounding his opinion upon those passages of Scripture in which man is said to think, to believe, to sin, etc. with the heart.¹

While, however, Tertullian denies that the soul is divisible into parts, he admits Plato's distinction respecting its rational and irrational qualities, though he explains the distinction in a different manner.² The soul of Adam, as created by God and in its original and natural state, was rational. The irrational qualities were infused by the devil, when he seduced our first parents into transgression. Plato applied the terms θυμικὸν and ἐπιθυμητικὸν to the irrational qualities of the soul; but, says Tertullian, there is a rational as well as irrational indignation and desire; indignation at sin, and desire of good.

The credit due to the testimony of the senses³ was a question on which great diversity of opinion existed among the philosophers.⁴ The Platonists contended that no credit can be given to them, because in many instances their testimony is at variance with fact. Thus a straight oar immersed in the water appears bent—a parallel row of trees appears to converge to a point—the sky in the horizon appears to be united to the sea. The state of natural philosophy in Tertullian's days did not enable him to give a correct explanation of these appearances, yet he seems to reason correctly when he says that, as causes can be assigned why the appearances should be such as they are, they constitute no ground for rejecting the testimony of the senses. To persons suffering from a redundancy of gall, all things taste bitter; but the true conclusion is that the body is diseased, not that the sense of taste is fallacious. Tertullian,

¹ Compare *de Res. Carnis*, c. 15. The ancient anatomists appear to have instituted experiments for the purpose of ascertaining the seat of the soul, by removing those parts of the body in which it has been usually supposed to reside. Their conclusion was that nothing certain could be pronounced upon the subject; since, choose what part you will as the seat of the soul, animals or insects may be found in which the vital principle remains after that part is removed.

² C. 16.

³ C. 17.

⁴ In the tract *de Coronâ*, c. 5, Tertullian calls the senses the instruments of the soul, by which it sees, hears, etc. Compare the first *Tusculan*, c. 20, or 46.

however, does not rely solely upon reasoning: he points out the fatal consequences to the gospel which will follow from admitting the notion of the Platonists. If we cannot trust to the testimony of the senses, what grounds have we for believing that Christ either lived, or wrought miracles, or died, or rose again?

Closely connected with this notion respecting the fallacy of the senses¹ was the notion that the soul, so long as it is united to the body, cannot attain to the *knowledge* of the truth;² but must be involved in the maze of *opinion* and error. The business, therefore, of the wise man is to abstract the mind from the senses, and to raise it to the contemplation of those invisible, incorporeal, divine, eternal ideas which are the patterns of the visible objects around us. Doubtless, answers Tertullian, the distinction between things corporeal and things spiritual, things visible and things invisible, is just; and the soul arrives at the knowledge of them through different channels, being conversant with the one by means of the senses, with the other by means of the mind or intellect. But the knowledge obtained through the latter source is not more certain than that obtained through the former.

In opposition³ to those who affirmed that the soul of the infant was destitute of intellect,⁴ which they supposed to be subsequently introduced, Tertullian contends that all the faculties of the soul are co-existent with it, though they are afterwards more or less perfectly developed in different individuals, according to the different circumstances of birth, health, education, condition of life.⁵ But observing the great variety of intellectual and moral characters in the world, we are apt to conclude that it arises from some difference in the original constitution of the soul; whereas that is always the same, though it is afterwards modified by external circumstances. This remark is particularly directed against the Valentinian notion that different seeds—material, animal, or spiritual—are introduced into the souls of men after their birth;⁶ whence arise the diversities of cha-

¹ C. 18.

² The distinction between *scientia* and *opinio* must be familiar to all who are acquainted with Cicero's philosophical writings.

³ Cc. 19, 20, 21.

⁴ In other words, that the infant possesses the vital, but not the intellectual principle.

⁵ Compare cc. 24 and 38.

⁶ Compare c. 11.

racter discernible among them. One necessary inference from this notion is that the character of the individual is immutably determined by the nature of the seed infused into his soul; whether good or bad, it must always remain so. Our author, on the contrary, argues that the character of God alone is immutable, because He alone is self-existent: the character of a created being must be liable to change, and will depend upon the use which he makes of the freedom of his will—a freedom which he derives from nature. Tertullian, however, was far from intending to assert the sufficiency of man to form within himself by the mere exercise of his free-will a holy temper and disposition; he expressly states that the freedom of the will is subject to the influence of divine grace.¹ The following may be taken as a correct representation of his meaning. The character of man is not irrevocably fixed, as the Valentinians affirm, by any qualities infused into his soul subsequently to his birth. The diversities of character observable in different individuals, and in the same individual at different times, must be referred to the operation of external circumstances, and to the different degrees in which divine grace influences the determinations of the will.

Tertullian now recapitulates all that he has said on the subject of the soul;² and affirms that it derives its origin from the breath of God—that it is immortal;³ corporeal; that it has a figure; is simple in substance; possessing within itself the principle of intelligence; operating in different ways (or through different channels); endued with free-will; affected by external circumstances, and thus producing that infinite variety of talent and disposition observable among mankind; rational; designed to rule the whole man; possessing an insight into futurity.⁴ Moreover, the souls of all the inhabitants of the earth are derived from one common source, the soul of Adam.

¹ "Hæc erit vis divinæ gratiæ, potentior utique naturâ, habens in nobis subjacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, quod ἀντεξούσιον dicitur, quæ quum sit et ipsa naturalis atque mutabilis, quoquo vertitur, naturâ convertitur. Inesse autem nobis τὸ ἀντεξούσιον naturaliter, jam Marcioni ostendimus et Hermogeni," c. 21.

² C. 22. "Definimus Animam, Dei flatu natam, immortalem, corporalem, effigiatam, substantiâ simplicem, de suo sapientem, variè procedentem, liberam arbitrii, accidentiis obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem, rationalem, dominatricem, divinatricem, ex unâ redundantem."

³ Immortal in its own nature. Compare *de Res. Carnis*, cc. 18, 34, 35.

⁴ Tertullian here speaks of a natural insight into futurity; not of the spirit of prophecy, which is derived from the grace of God. See cc. 24, 41.

This last point he proceeds to establish by first refuting Plato's notions respecting the origin and pre-existence of the soul.¹ According to him, Plato said that the souls of men are continually passing to and fro between heaven and earth; that they originally existed in heaven with God, and were there conversant with those eternal ideas of which the visible things below are only the images. Hence during their residence on earth they do not acquire any new knowledge, but merely recall to their recollection what they knew in heaven, and forgot in their passage from heaven to earth. Plato further argued that the heavenly powers, the progeny of God,² who were entrusted by Him with the creation of man, and received for that purpose an immortal soul, froze around it a mortal body.³ In refuting these notions, Tertullian argues principally upon the inconsistency of Plato, who, at the same time that he makes the soul self-existent, and places it almost on an equality with the Deity, yet supposes it capable of forgetting what passed in a previous state.⁴ He alludes also to another philosophical notion that the soul is introduced into the foetus after its birth, being inhaled as it were when the infant first draws breath, and exhaled when man dies.⁵ This notion he conceives to be sufficiently refuted by the experience of every pregnant woman.⁶ His own opinion is, that the soul and body are conceived together; the womb of the mother being impregnated at the same time by the respective seeds, which, though different in kind, are from the first inseparably united. I must omit the arguments by which he supports this opinion. They are of such a nature that he feels himself obliged to apologise for them by saying that, as the business of a controversialist is to establish his point, he is sometimes under the necessity of sacrificing modesty to truth. The conclusion is, that when God formed Adam out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, the seeds of the body and soul were inseparably united together in him, and have been derived, in the same state of union, from him to his posterity. Thus Tertullian establishes his position that the souls of all

¹ C. 23.

² "Genimina Dei."

³ "Mortale ei circumgelaverint corpus."

⁴ C. 24.

⁵ C. 25. "Perinde animam, extraneam alias et extorrem uteri, primâ aspiratione nascentis infantis adduci, sicut expiratione novissimâ educi."

⁶ "Respondete matres, vosque prægnantes, vosque puerperæ; steriles et masculi taceant; vestræ naturæ veritas quæritur, vestræ passionis fides convenitur, an aliquam in foetu sentiatis vivacitatem alienam de vestro? de quo palpitent ilia, micent latera, tota ventris ambitio pulsetur, ubique ponderis regio mutetur?" etc.

mankind are derived from one common source, the soul of Adam.

Quitting Plato,¹ Tertullian now passes to the Pythagorean doctrine of the metempsychosis. I will mention one of his arguments against this doctrine, on account of the information which it supplies respecting the height to which cultivation and civilization were then carried. "If the doctrine of the metempsychosis," he says, "is true, the numbers of mankind must always remain the same; there can be no increase of population; whereas we know the fact to be otherwise. So great is the increase that, although we are continually sending out colonies, and penetrating into new regions, we cannot dispose of the excess. Every country is now accessible to the traveller and the merchant. Pleasant farms now smile where formerly were dreary and dangerous wastes — cultivated fields now occupy the place of forests — flocks and herds have expelled the wild beasts — sands are sown — rocks are planted — marshes are drained — and where once was a single cottage is now a populous city. We no longer speak with horror of the savage interior of the islands, or of the dangers of their rocky coasts; everywhere are houses, and inhabitants, and government, and civilized life. Still our population continually increases, and occasions fresh grounds of complaint; our numbers are burthensome to the world, which cannot furnish us with the means of subsistence. Such is our state that we no longer look upon pestilence, and famine, and wars, and earthquakes as positive evils, but as remedies provided by Providence against a greater calamity — as the only means of pruning the redundant luxuriance of the human race."² Professor Malthus himself could not have lamented more feelingly the miseries resulting from an excess of population, or have pointed out with greater acuteness the natural checks to that excess.

I shall omit Tertullian's³ other arguments against the doctrine of the metempsychosis, as well as his observations respecting the difference of the sexes in the human species;⁴ the state of the fœtus in the womb;⁵ the growth of the soul to maturity;⁶ and the corruption of human nature.⁷ To his remarks, however, on

¹ C. 28.

² C. 30.

³ He occupies eight chapters, from c. 28 to c. 36, in the discussion of this doctrine, and in proving that Simon Magus and Carpocrates founded some of their heretical notions upon it.

⁴ C. 36.

⁵ C. 37.

⁶ C. 38.

⁷ Cc. 39, 40, 41.

the last of these topics I shall hereafter have occasion to refer. The next subject of which he treats is sleep.¹ Having stated the opinions of the different philosophers, he prefers that of the Stoics, who defined sleep—a temporary suspension of the activity of the senses.² Sleep he conceives to be necessary only to the body; the soul, being immortal, neither requires nor even admits a state of rest.³ In sleep, therefore, when the body is at rest, the soul, which never rests, being unable to use the members of the body, uses its own, and the dreamer seems to go through all the operations necessary to the performance of certain acts, though nothing is performed.⁴ Tertullian⁵ admits that there are well-authenticated accounts of persons who never dreamed in the course of their lives. Suetonius⁶ says that this was the case with Nero; and Theopompus,⁷ with Thrasymedes. Our author mentions also the story of Hermotimus;⁸ of whom it was recorded that, when he slept, his soul entirely abandoned and wandered away from his body. In this state (his wife having revealed the secret) his body was seized by his enemies, who burned it, and his soul, returning too late, found itself deprived of its habitation. Tertullian does not attempt to reconcile these phenomena with his theory of the perpetual activity of the soul, but says that we must receive any solution of them rather than admit that the soul can be separated from the body except by death; or that the soul can sink into a state of absolute rest, which would imply its mortality.⁹ We have seen that Tertullian applies the word ecstasies—which he interprets “*Excessus sensûs amentiaë instar*”¹⁰—to the state of the prophet’s mind when under the influence of inspiration. He applies the same term to the state of the soul when dreaming, and evidently supposes that the knowledge of future events was frequently communicated to it in dreams.¹¹ Some dreams,¹² he adds, proceed from God;

¹ Cc. 42, 43.

² “*Resolutionem sensualis vigoris.*”

³ Compare *de Res. Carnis*, c. 18. “*Arctius dicam, ne in somnum quidem cadit Anima cum corpore, ne tum quidem sternitur cum carne. Etenim agitur in somnis et jactatur; quiesceret autem si jacaret.*”

⁴ C. 45. We have seen in what sense Tertullian ascribes members to the soul.

⁵ C. 44.

⁶ In *Nerone*, c. 46.

⁷ See Plutarch, *de defectu Oraculorum*, c. 50.

⁸ See Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* l. vii. c. 52. Plutarch, *de Dæmonio Socratis*, c. 22, calls him Hermodorus.

⁹ He says that the effect of fasting upon himself was, not to make him sleep without dreaming (such an admission would have been fatal to his theory), but to make him so dream that he was not conscious of having dreamed. “*Jejuniis autem nescio an ego solus plurimum ita somniem, ut me somniâsse non sentiam,*” c. 48—a subtle distinction.

¹⁰ C. 45.

¹¹ C. 46.

¹² C. 47.

others from demons ; others are suggested by intense application of the mind to a particular subject ; others again are so utterly wild and extravagant that they can scarcely be related, much less accounted for or interpreted. These last are to be ascribed peculiarly to the ecstatic influence.

From sleep, the image of death, Tertullian passes to death itself, which he defines the separation of the soul from the body.¹ "When we say," he continues, "that death is natural to man, we speak with reference not to his original nature as given him by his Maker, but to his actual nature as polluted by sin. Had Adam continued in his state of innocence, this separation of the soul from the body would never have taken place. Sin introduced death, which even in its mildest form is a violence done to our nature ; for how can the intimate union between the body and soul be dissolved without violence ?"² After this separation from the body, the souls of the mass of mankind descend to the parts below the earth, there to remain until the day of judgment.³ The souls of the martyrs alone pass not through this middle state, but are transferred immediately to heaven.

Tertullian proceeds to inquire whether the soul, after it has once passed into the lower parts of the earth, can leave them and revisit these upper regions.⁴ This question he determines in the negative, arguing principally from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. But the demons who are continually labouring to seduce us into error, though they cannot call up the soul after death, yet can practise illusions upon the senses ; and by presenting themselves under human forms, persuade men that they are the ghosts of persons deceased. Thus Saul was persuaded that he saw and conversed with Samuel. In like manner, Tertullian refers to the agency of demons the deceptions practised by the dealers in magic who generally affected to call up the spirits of such persons as had come to an untimely end ; taking advantage of the popular superstition that the souls of men, cut off by a violent death, hover about the earth until the period has elapsed to which, had they not been so cut off, their lives would have been extended.

But in what state, it may be asked, does the soul remain during its abode in the lower parts of the earth ?⁵ Does it sleep ?

¹ Cc. 50, 51.

² C. 52.

³ C. 55.

⁴ Cc. 56, 57.

⁵ C. 58. Compare *de Res. Carnis*, c. 17, and the 40th of King Edward's

“We have seen,” answers Tertullian, “that sleep is an affection of the body, not of the soul. When united to the body, the soul does not sleep; much less when separate from the body. No: the righteous judgments of God begin to take effect in this intermediate state. The souls of the good receive a foretaste of the happiness, and the souls of the wicked of the misery, which will be assigned them as their everlasting portion at the day of final retribution.”

Such are Tertullian’s speculations upon the origin, nature, and destiny of the soul. Should the examination of them have appeared somewhat minute and tedious, it must be remembered that the only mode of putting the reader in possession of the state of philosophy in any age is to exhibit to him the questions which formed the subjects of discussion, and the manner in which they were discussed. The result of the examination must, we think, be deemed favourable to our author’s character for talent and ingenuity. Many of the questions proposed may appear trifling—many of his arguments weak and inconclusive; the questions, however, are not more trifling, or the arguments more inconclusive, than those which occur in the writings of the most celebrated philosophers of antiquity. It would be the extreme of absurdity to compare the writings of Plato and Tertullian as compositions; but if they are considered as specimens of philosophical investigation, of reasoning and argument, he who professes to admire Plato will hardly escape the charge of inconsistency if he thinks meanly or speaks contemptuously of Tertullian.

In further illustration of our author’s philosophical opinions, we shall proceed briefly to state his notions respecting the nature of angels and demons. He asserts, in the first place, that there are spiritual substances, or material spirits—this is not denied even by the philosophers.¹ These spiritual or angelic substances

Articles.” “Qui animas defunctorum prædicant usque ad diem judicii absque omni sensu dormire, aut illas asserunt unâ cum corporibus mori, et extremo die cum illis excitandas, ab Orthodoxâ Fide, quæ nobis in Sacris Literis traditur, prorsus dissentiunt.”

¹ *Apology*, c. 22. “Atque adeo dicimus esse *substantias* quasdam *Spiritales*; nec nomen novum est. Sciunt dæmones Philosophi, Socrate ipso ad dæmonii arbitrium expectante. . . dæmones sciunt Poetæ; et jam vulgus indoctum in usum maledicti frequentat. . . Angelos quoque etiam Plato non negavit.” See also *adv. Marcionem*, l. ii. c. 8. “Sed adflatus Dei generosior *Spiritu Materiali*, quo Angeli constiterunt.” *Apology*, c. 46. “Quum secundum Deos Philosophi Dæmones deputent.” *De Animâ*, c. 1.

were originally created to be the ministers of the Divine will, but some were betrayed into transgression.¹ Smitten with the beauty of the daughters of men, they descended from heaven,² and imparted many branches of knowledge, revealed to themselves, but hitherto hidden from mankind—the properties of metals, the virtues of herbs, the powers of enchantment, and the arts of divination and astrology.³ Out of complaisance also to their earthly brides, they communicated the arts which administer to female vanity—of polishing and setting precious stones, of dyeing wool, of preparing cosmetics.

From these corrupt angels sprang demons, a still more corrupt race of spirits, whose actuating principle is hostility against man, and whose sole object is to accomplish his destruction.⁴ This they attempt in various ways, but as they are invisible to the eye, their mischievous activity is known only by its effects. They nip the fruit in the bud; they blight the corn; and, as through the tenuity and subtlety of their substance, they can operate on the soul as well as the body; while they inflict diseases on the one, they agitate the other with furious passions and ungovernable lust. By the same property of their substance they cause men to dream.⁵ But their favourite employment is to draw men off from the worship of the true God to idolatry.⁶ For this purpose they lurk within the statues of deceased mortals;⁷ practising illusions upon weak minds, and seducing them into a belief in the divinity of an idol.⁸ In their attempts to deceive mankind, they derive great assistance from the rapidity with which they transport themselves from one part of the globe to another.⁹ They are thus enabled to know and to declare

¹ "Nos officia divina Angelos credimus." *De Animâ*, c. 37; *Apology*, c. 22; *de Idololatriâ*, c. 4.

² In proof of the alleged intercourse between the angels and the daughters of men, Tertullian appeals to Genesis vi. 2, *de Virgin. vel.* c. 7, and to the apocryphal book of Enoch. *De Cultu Fæminarum*, l. i. c. 3.

³ *De Cultu Fæminarum*, l. i. c. 2; l. ii. cc. 4, 10. *De Idololatriâ*, c. 9. *Apology*, c. 35.

⁴ *Apology*, c. 22. Compare *de Spectaculis*, c. 2.

⁵ *De Animâ*, cc. 47, 49. *Apology*, c. 23.

⁶ *Apology*, cc. 23, 27. Compare *de Idololatriâ*, cc. 3, 4, 15.

⁷ *De Spectaculis*, cc. 10, 12, 13, 23, where Tertullian ascribes the invention of the games and scenic exhibitions to the demons.

⁸ The illusions practised by the professors of magic were, according to our author, peculiarly the work of demons; when, for instance, the object of the incantation was to raise a dead man from the grave, a demon presented himself under the figure of the deceased. *De Animâ*, c. 57, where the miracles performed by Pharaoh's magicians are mentioned. See p. 51.

⁹ *Apology*, c. 22.

what is passing in the most distant countries, so that they gain the credit of being the authors of events of which they are only the reporters. It was this peculiarity in the nature of demons which enabled them to communicate to the Pythian priestess what Crœsus was at that very moment doing in Lydia. In like manner, as they are continually passing to and fro through the region of the air, they can foretell the changes of the weather, and thus procure for the idol the reputation of possessing an insight into futurity. When by their delusions they have induced men to offer sacrifice, they hover about the victim, snuffing up with delight the savoury steam, which is their proper food.¹ The demons employed other artifices in order to effect the destruction of man. As during their abode in heaven they were enabled to obtain some insight into the nature of the divine dispensations, they endeavoured to preoccupy the minds of men, and to prevent them from embracing Christianity, by inventing fables bearing some resemblance to the truths which were to become the objects of faith under the gospel.² Thus they invented the tales of the tribunal of Minos and Rhadamanthus in the infernal regions; of the river Pyriphlegethon, and the Elysian Fields, in order that when the doctrines of a future judgment, and of the eternal happiness and misery prepared for the good and wicked in another life, should be revealed, the common people might think the former equally credible, the philosopher equally incredible with the latter.

As the purpose for which the angels were created was to execute the commands of God,³ they who retain their original purity still occupy themselves in observing the course of human affairs, and fulfilling the duties allotted them;⁴—thus, one angel

¹ "Hæc enim dæmoniorum pabula sunt." *Ad Scapulam*, c. 2.

² *Apology*, c. 22. "Dispositiones etiam Dei, et tunc Prophetis concionantibus exceperunt et nunc lectionibus resonantibus carpunt." C. 21. "Sciebant qui penes vos fabulas ad destructionem veritatis istius æmulas præministraverunt." C. 47. "Omnia adversus veritatem de ipsâ veritate constructa sunt, operantibus æmulationem istam Spiritibus erroris. Ab his adulteria hujusmodi salutaris disciplinæ subornata; ab his quædam etiam fabulæ immissæ, quæ de similitudine fidem infirmarent veritatis, vel eam sibi potius evincerent: ut quis ideo non putet Christianis credendum, quia nec Poetis nec Philosophis: vel ideo magis Poetis et Philosophis existimet credendum, quia non Christianis," etc. See also *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 40, and some very fanciful instances in the tract *de Spectaculis*, c. 23.

³ See note 1, p. 107. The word angel, as Tertullian remarks, is descriptive, not of a nature, but an office. "Angelus, id est, nuntius; officii, non naturæ vocabulo." *De Carne Christi*, c. 14.

⁴ *De Spectaculis*, c. 27. "Dubitas enim illo momento, quo in Diaboli Ecclesiâ fueris, omnes Angelos prospicere de cœlo, et singulos denotare, etc.?"

is especially appointed to preside over prayer;¹ another over baptism;² another to watch over men in their dying moments, and as it were to call away their souls;³ another to execute the righteous judgments of God upon wicked men.⁴ Tertullian states also, on the authority of Scripture, that it is a part of their office to appear occasionally to men; in which case, according to him, they assume not only the human form but the human body itself, by a peculiar privilege of their nature, which enables them to create it out of nothing.⁵ It is worthy of observation that Tertullian, while he assigns to each angel a particular office or department—as prayer, baptism—uses a different language with respect to demons, assigning to each individual his attendant demon;⁶ thus he accounts for the story of the Dæmon of Socrates.⁷

I will conclude this chapter by a few remarks on Gibbon's representation of the opinions entertained by the primitive Christians respecting demons. "It was," he says, "the universal sentiment both of the Church and of heretics, that the demons were the authors, the patrons, and the objects of idolatry."⁸ That Tertullian ascribed to them the two former characters is manifest from the foregoing statement of his opinions. They were the authors of idolatry, because every evil deed, every evil thought of man is the result of their corrupt suggestions; and it was consequently by their instigation that he was first drawn aside from his allegiance to the one true God, and induced to offer his adorations to the creature instead of the Creator. They were the patrons, because they promoted its cause by practising illusions upon the senses of mankind, and thus confirming their belief in the divinity of the idol. But they were not, at least in Tertullian's estimation, the objects. He

¹ "Angelo adhuc Orationis astante." *De Oratione*, c. 12.

² "Angelus Baptismi Arbiter." *De Baptismo*, c. 6.

³ "De ipsius statim Angeli facie, Evocatoris animarum, Mercurii Poetarum." *De Animâ*, c. 53, *sub fine*.

⁴ "Et judex te tradat Angelo Executionis, et ille te in carcerem mandet infernum." *De Animâ*, c. 35.


⁵ *Adv. Marcionem*, l. iii. c. 9. *De Carne Christi*, cc. 3, 6. "Igitur quum relatum non sit unde sumpserint carnem, relinquatur intellectui nostro non dubitare, hoc esse proprium Angelicæ potestatis ex nullâ materiâ corpus sibi sumere."

⁶ "Nam et suggestimus nullum pene hominem carere dæmonio." *De Animâ*, c. 57.

⁷ *Apology*, c. 46. "Sane Socrates facilius diverso Spiritu agebatur; si quidem aiunt dæmonium illi a puero adhæsisse, pessimum revera pædagogum." *De Animâ*, c. 1. See also cc. 25, 39.

⁸ Chap. xv. p. 463, ed. 4to.

expressly says that the objects of idolatry were dead men, who were conceived to be gods, on account of some useful invention by which they had contributed to the comfort and well-being of man in his present life.¹ The demons were content to lead man into error, and to feed upon the savoury steam arising from the sacrifices, without attempting to propose themselves as the immediate objects of worship.²



CHAPTER IV.

ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH.

FOLLOWING Mosheim's arrangement, we now proceed to inquire what information can be derived from the writings of Tertullian respecting the government and discipline of the Church in his day. The edict of Trajan,³ already alluded to, proves the extreme jealousy with which all associations were regarded by the Roman Emperors. We cannot, therefore, be surprised that the intimate union which subsisted between the professors of Christianity rendered them objects of suspicion and distrust. One point at which Tertullian aims in his *Apology* is to convince the governors whom he is addressing of the injustice of their suspicions, by explaining the nature and purposes of the Christian assemblies. "We form,"⁴ he says, "a body, being joined together by a community of religion, of discipline, and of hope. In our assemblies we meet to offer up our united supplications to God, to read the Scriptures, to deliver exhortations, to pronounce censures, cutting off from communion in prayer and in every holy exercise those who have been guilty of any flagrant

¹ "Quando etiam error orbis propterea Deos præsumperit, quos homines interdum confitetur, quoniam aliquid ab unoquoque prospectum videtur utilitatibus et commodis vitæ." *Adv. Marcionem*, l. i. c. 11. See also the *Apology*, cc. 10, 11; *de Idololatriâ*, c. 15.

² See *de Coronâ*, c. 10, where Tertullian is exposing the absurdity of placing crowns on the heads of idols. "Sed vacat totum, et est ipsum quoque opus mortuum, quantum in idolis; vivum plane quantum in dæmoniis, ad quæ pertinet superstitio." To crown an idol, the ostensible object of worship, is useless, since it can have no enjoyment of the fragrance or beauty of the flowers. The demons alone (who lurk within the idols) profit by these superstitious practices.

³ See chap. ii. p. 58, note 4.

⁴ C. 39.

offence. The older members, men of tried piety and prudence, preside; having obtained the dignity, not by purchase, but by acknowledged merit. If any collection is made at our meetings, it is perfectly voluntary: each contributes according to his ability, either monthly or as often as he pleases. These contributions we regard as a sacred deposit; not to be spent in feasting and gluttony, but in maintaining or burying the poor, and relieving the distresses of the orphan, the aged, or the shipwrecked mariner. A portion is also appropriated to the use of those who are suffering in the cause of religion; who are condemned to the mines, or banished to the islands, or confined in prison."

In this brief account of the Christian assemblies, Tertullian appears to speak of the Presidentship as conferred solely in consideration of superior age and piety.¹ It has therefore been inferred either that the distinction between the clergy and the laity was not then generally acknowledged in the Church, or at least that its validity was not recognised by our author. Attempts have been made to support the latter inference by an appeal to other passages of his works, the full force of which can only be perceived by viewing them in connexion with the subjects of which he is treating.

We have already noticed,² and shall again have occasion to notice, Tertullian's sentiments respecting a second marriage. They who maintained its lawfulness alleged the passages³ in the

¹ Tertullian's words are: "Præsident *probat* quique *Seniores*, honorem istum non pretio, sed testimonio adepti"—which Bingham translates, *The bishops and presbyters*, who preside over us, are advanced to that honour only by public testimony, l. iv. c. 3, sect. iv. He assigns no reason for thus translating the words *probat* quique *Seniores*. I am far from intending to say that the presidents were not bishops and presbyters; on the contrary, the following passage in the first tract *ad Uxorem*, c. 7, when compared with 1 Tim. iii. 2 and Titus i. 6, appears to limit the presidency to them:—"Quantum detrahant fidei, quantum obstrepant sanctitati nuptiæ secundæ, disciplina Ecclesiæ et præscriptio Apostoli declarat, quum digamos non sinit præsidere." Compare also *de Idololatriâ*, c. 7, with *de Coronâ*, c. 3; *de Jejuniis*, c. 17, with 1 Tim. v. 17. But Bingham ought surely to have explained why he affixed a sense to the words so foreign from their literal meaning; especially as in another place, l. ii. c. 19, sect. xix., he speaks of certain *seniores ecclesiæ* who were not of the clergy, yet had some concern in the care of the Church.

² Chap. i. p. 9.

³ 1 Tim. iii. 2, 12; Titus i. 6. Bishops and priests who contracted a second marriage were sometimes degraded. "Usque adeo quosdam memini digamos loco dejectos." *De Exhort. Castit.* c. 7. Compare *de Monogamiâ*, c. 11. Our author, however, complains that there was great laxity of discipline on this point. "Quot enim et digami præsent apud vos, insultantes utique Apostolo?" *De Monogamiâ*, c. 12.

Epistles to Timothy and Titus, in which St. Paul enjoins that bishops, priests, and deacons shall be *μῆς γυναικὸς ἄνδρες*—that is, according to the interpretation generally received in Tertullian's time, men who had been only once married. They contended, therefore, that as this restriction applied only to the clergy, laymen were at liberty to contract a second marriage. To evade this inference, Tertullian has recourse to the following argument: ¹—“Do not,” he says, “suppose that what is forbidden to the clergy is allowed to the laity. All Christians are priests, agreeably to the words of St. John in the Book of Revelation—‘Christ has made us a kingdom and a priesthood to God and His Father.’ The authority of the Church and its honour, which derives sanctity from the assembled clergy, has established the distinction between the clergy and laity. In places where there are no clergy, any single Christian may exercise the functions of the priesthood, may celebrate ² the eucharist, and baptize. But where three, though laymen, are gathered together, there is a Church. Every one *lives by his own faith, nor is there respect of persons with God; since not the hearers, but the doers, of the law are justified by God*, according to the apostle. If, therefore, you possess within yourself the right of the priesthood to be exercised in cases of necessity, you ought also to conform

¹ *De Exhort. Cast.* c. 7, referred to in chap. i. p. 4, note 1. I now give the whole passage. “Vani erimus, si putaverimus, quod Sacerdotibus non liceat, Laicis licere. Nonne et Laici Sacerdotes sumus? Scriptum est, *Regnum quoque nos et Sacerdotes Deo et Patri suo fecit*. Differentiam inter Ordinem et Plebem constituit Ecclesiæ autoritas, et honor per Ordinas consessum sanctificatus.” (There is an ambiguity in the latter clause of this sentence, which must be differently translated, according as *honor* is referred to *Ecclesiæ* or to *Differentia inter Ordinem et Plebem*. I have adopted the former sense, though by no means certain of its correctness. I conceive the allusion to be to the higher seats occupied by the clergy, apart from the laity, in the places of religious assembly. In the tract *de Fugâ in Persecutione*, c. 11, Tertullian makes a distinction between Christians *majoris et minoris loci*; apparently meaning the clergy by the former, and the laity by the latter. So in the tract *de Baptismo*, c. 17. “Sed quanto magis Laicis disciplina verecundiæ et modestiæ incumbit, quum ea *majoribus* competant.”) “Adeo ubi Ecclesiastici Ordinis non est consessus, et offers, et tinguis, et sacerdos es tibi solus. Sed ubi tres, ecclesia est, licet laici; unusquisque enim *suâ fide* vivit, nec est personarum acceptio apud Deum. Quoniam non *auditores legis* justificabuntur a Deo, sed *factores*, secundum quod et Apostolus dicit. Igitur si habes jus sacerdotis in temetipso, ubi necesse est, habeas oportet etiam disciplinam sacerdotis, ubi necesse sit habere jus sacerdotis. Digamus tinguis? digamus offers? quanto magis Laico digamo capitale est agere pro sacerdote, quum ipsi sacerdoti digamo facto auferatur agere sacerdotem? Sed necessitati, inquis, indulgetur. Nulla necessitas excusatur, quæ potest non esse. Noli denique digamus deprehendi, et non committis in necessitatem administrandi quod non licet digamo. Omnes nos Deus ita vult dispositos esse, ut ubique Sacramentis ejus obeundis apti simus.” Bennet, in his *Rights of the Clergy*, etc., has bestowed a whole chapter on this passage.

² So the word *offers* must, I think, be translated in this passage.

yourself to the rule of life prescribed to those who engage in the priesthood, the rights of which you may be called to exercise. Do you, after contracting a second marriage, venture to baptize or to celebrate the eucharist? How much more heinous is it in a layman who has contracted a second marriage to exercise the functions of the priesthood, when a second marriage is deemed a sufficient ground for degrading a priest from his order? But you will plead the necessity of the case as an apology for the act. The plea is invalid, because you were not placed under the necessity of marrying a second time. Do not marry again, and you will not run the hazard of being obliged to do that which a digamist is not allowed to do. It is the will of God that we should at all times be in a fit state to administer His sacraments if an occasion should arise." We are very far from meaning to defend the soundness of Tertullian's argument in this passage. We quote it because it is one of the passages which have been brought forward to prove that *he* did not recognise the distinction between the clergy and the laity; whereas a directly opposite inference ought to be drawn. He limits the right of the laity to exercise the ministerial functions to extraordinary cases—to cases of necessity. Were they to assume it in ordinary cases, they would be guilty of an act of criminal presumption, as he indirectly asserts in the tract *de Monogamiâ*, where he pursues the very same train of reasoning in refutation of the same objection.¹ That he recognised the distinction between the clergy and laity is further proved by the fact that, among other accusations which he urges against the heretics, he states that they conferred orders without making strict inquiry into the qualifications of the candidates; and that they not only allowed but even enjoined the laity to assume the sacerdotal office and administer the ceremonies of religion.² In showing that the distinction was recognised by Tertullian, we have incidentally shown that it was generally recognised in the Church. This, indeed, is implied in the very words *clerus* and *ordo ecclesiasticus*, which frequently occur.

¹ "Sed quum *extollimur et inflamur adversus Clerum*, tunc unum omnes sumus: tunc omnes Sacerdotes, quia *Sacerdotes nos Deo et Patri fecit*; quum ad peræquationem disciplinæ sacerdotalis provocamur, deponimus infulas, et impares sumus." *De Monogamiâ*, c. 12. We may, however, infer from this passage that in Tertullian's day the validity of the distinction was occasionally questioned.

² "Ordinationes eorum temerariæ, leves, inconstantes. Nunc neophytos conlocant, nunc seculo obstrictos, nunc Apostatas nostros." *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 41; and in the same chapter, "Nam et Laicis sacerdotalia munera injungunt." In the tract *de Idololatriâ*, c. 7, Tertullian complains that the artificers of idols were admitted into orders; "Adleguntur in Ordinem Ecclesiasticum Artifices Idolorum."

But what, it may be asked, is Tertullian's meaning when he says that the distinction between the clergy and the laity is established by the authority of the Church? Before we can answer this question we must ascertain what was his notion of the Church; and for this purpose we will turn to the tract *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, in which he takes a rapid survey of its origin and progress. "Christ," he says, "during His residence on earth, declared the purposes of His mission, and the rule of faith and practice, either publicly to the people or privately to the disciples, of whom He attached twelve more immediately to His person, intending that they should be the teachers of the Gentiles.¹ One of them betrayed Him; but the remaining eleven He commanded to go and instruct all nations, and to baptize them in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. These eleven, having added to their number a twelfth, in the room of him who had been cut off, and having received the promised effusion of the Holy Spirit, by which they were endowed with supernatural powers, first preached the gospel and founded churches in Judæa: they then went forth to the Gentiles, preaching in like manner and founding churches in every city. From these churches others were propagated and continue to be propagated at the present day, which are all reckoned in the number of apostolic churches, inasmuch as they are the offspring of apostolic churches. Moreover, all these churches constitute one Church,² being joined together in the unity of faith and in the bond of peace." In conformity with this view of the origin of the Church, Tertullian never fails, when arguing upon any disputed point of doctrine or discipline, to appeal to the belief or practice of those churches which had been actually founded by the apostles; on the ground that in them the faith taught and the institutions established by the apostles were still preserved. When, therefore, he says that the authority of the Church made the distinction between the clergy and laity, the expression, in his view of the subject, is manifestly equivalent to saying that the distinction may be traced to the apostles, the founders of the Church. Thus he

¹ C. 20. Compare cc. 32, 36. "Si hæc ita se habent, ut veritas nobis adjudicetur quicumque in eâ regulâ incedimus quam Ecclesia ab Apostolis, Apostoli a Christo, Christus a Deo tradidit," c. 37.

² On the Unity of the Church, see c. 32, and *de Virgin. vel.* c. 2. This Church Tertullian calls the house of God. *De Pudicitia*, c. 7. In it were preserved the authentic rule of faith and discipline, and the genuine Scriptures. *De Præscript. Hæreticorum*, cc. 21, 37, *et passim*. With respect to particular churches, Tertullian admits by implication that they may fall into error, c. 27.

contends that all virgins should be compelled to wear veils,¹ because such was the practice in those churches which had been founded either by the apostles or by apostolic men; and consequently the probable inference was that it was of apostolic institution. It is true that, after his separation from the Church, he held a different language. He then began to contend, as we have already seen,² that wherever three, though laymen, were gathered together, there was a church; and in the tract *de Pudicitia*,³ he says that any number of individuals, who meet together under the influence of the Spirit, constitute a church; which is not a number of bishops, but is the Spirit itself acting through the instrumentality of a spiritual man (*πνευματικὸς* as opposed to *ψυχικὸς*)—that is, of a man who believed in the revelations and prophecies of Montanus.

At the same time that Tertullian bears testimony to the existence of a distinction between the clergy and laity, he bears testimony also to the existence of a distinction of orders among the clergy. One of his charges against the heretics is that they neglected this distinction. "With them," he says, "one man is a bishop to-day, another to-morrow; he who is to-day a deacon will be to-morrow a reader; he who is a priest to-day will to-morrow be a layman."⁴ In the tracts *de Baptismo*⁵ and *de Fugâ in Persecutione*,⁶ the three orders of bishops, priests, and deacons are enumerated together; and in the former the superior authority of the bishop is expressly asserted.

The episcopal office, according to Tertullian, was of apostolic institution. In the tract *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, he throws

¹ *De Virginibus vel.* c. 2.

² Chap. i. p. 30.

³ "Nam et Ecclesia propriè et principaliter ipse est Spiritus, in quo est Trinitas unius Divinitatis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Illam Ecclesiam congregat, quam Dominus in tribus posuit. Atque ita exinde etiam numerus omnis qui in hanc fidem conspiraverint, Ecclesia ab auctore et consecratore censetur, et ideo Ecclesia quidem delicta donabit: sed Ecclesia Spiritus per Spiritalem hominem non Ecclesia numerus Episcoporum," c. 21. Compare *de Pœnitentiâ*, c. 10. "In uno et altero Ecclesia est; Ecclesia vero Christus." *De Fugâ in Persecutione*, c. 14. "Sit tibi in tribus Ecclesia." Pamelius, as we observed in chapter i. p. 30, note 5, supposes without sufficient grounds that, in the tract *de Pudicitia*, c. 21, by the three who were to constitute a church, Tertullian meant Montanus and his two prophetesses. There is no necessity to invent absurdities for our author, who has to answer for so many of his own. Again, in the tract *de Baptismo*, c. 6, "Quoniam ubi tres, id est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ibi Ecclesia quæ trium corpus est."

⁴ "Itaque alius hodie Episcopus, cras alius: hodie Diaconus, qui cras Lector: hodie Presbyter, qui cras Laicus." *De Præscript. Hæreticorum*, c. 41.

⁵ C. 17.

⁶ C. 11. See also *de Præscript. Hæreticorum*, c. 3.

out the following challenge to the heretics.¹ "Let them show," he says, "the origin of their churches; let them trace the succession of their bishops, and thus connect the individual who first held the office, either with some apostle, or some apostolic man who always remained in communion with the Church. It is thus that the apostolic churches show their origin. That of Smyrna traces its bishops in an unbroken line from Polycarp, who was placed there by St. John; that of Rome from Clemens, who was placed there by St. Peter:² and every other church can point out the individual to whom the superintendence of its doctrine and discipline was first committed by some one of the apostles." The same statement is repeated in the fourth book *against Marcion*.³

But how clearly soever the distinction between the bishops and the other orders of clergy may be asserted in the writings of Tertullian, they afford us little assistance in ascertaining wherein this distinction consisted. In a passage to which we have just referred, the right of the priests and deacons to baptize is said to be derived entirely from the authority of the bishop, who is styled *Summus Sacerdos*, the Supreme Priest.⁴ Bingham says that Tertullian commonly gives to bishops the title of presidents or provosts of the Church;⁵ but the passages to which he refers scarcely bear him out in the assertion. One of them we have already considered.⁶ In another, Tertullian says

¹ C. 32. See also the tract *de Fugâ in Persecutione*, c. 13. "Hanc Episcopatu formam Apostoli providentius condiderunt."

² Irenæus, l. iii. c. 3, says that Linus was the first bishop of Rome, Anacletus the second, and Clemens the third; and that the Church of Rome was founded jointly by St. Peter and St. Paul. Bingham reconciles this difference by supposing that Linus and Anacletus died whilst St. Peter lived, and that Clemens was also ordained their successor by St. Peter. L. ii. c. 1. sect. iv. Had the works of Irenæus and Tertullian proceeded from Semler's Roman Club, this apparent contradiction would probably have been avoided.

³ C. 5, *sub in*. Among other statements contained in the passage is the following: "Habemus et Ioannis alumnos Ecclesias. Nam etsi Apocalypsin ejus Marcion respuit, *ordo tamen Episcoporum ad originem recens in Ioannem stabit Auctorem*. Sic et cæterarum (Ecclesiarum) generositas recognoscitur." The words in italics Bingham has translated, "The *order of bishops*, when it is traced up to its original, will be found to have St. John for one of its authors." L. ii. c. 1. sect. iii. We do not deny that this inference may be legitimately drawn from Tertullian's words. But by the expression *Ordo Episcoporum* he did not mean the *order of bishops*, as distinct from priests and deacons, but the *succession of bishops* in the churches founded by St. John.

⁴ See note 5 on p. 115. "Dandi (baptismum) quidem habet jus summus Sacerdos, qui est Episcopus; dehinc Presbyteri et Diaconi, non tamen sine Episcopi auctoritate, propter Ecclesiæ honorem." *De Baptismo*, c. 17.

⁵ L. ii. c. 2, sect. v.

⁶ In note 1, p. 111. The passage is in the *Apology*, c. 39.

that the communicants received the eucharist only from the hands of the presidents;¹ and in a third, that a digamist was not allowed to preside in the church.² But in neither case is it certain that Tertullian meant to speak exclusively of bishops, since priests might administer the sacraments; and he says that he had himself known instances of *priests* who had been degraded for digamy.³ The bishops, doubtless, presided when they were present; but in their absence the office devolved upon one of the presbyters. The regulation of the internal economy of each particular church was certainly vested in the hands of the bishop.⁴ He appointed, for instance, days of fasting, whenever the circumstances of the church appeared to call for such marks of humiliation.⁵

The passages already alleged sufficiently prove that, in Tertullian's estimation, all the apostolic churches were independent of each other, and equal in rank and authority.⁶ He professes, indeed, a peculiar respect for the Church of Rome; not, however, because it was founded by St. Peter, but because both that apostle and St. Paul there sealed their testimony to the gospel with their blood, and St. John was there thrown into the cauldron of burning oil.⁷ From a passage in the tract *de Pudicitia* it appears that the words of our Saviour to St. Peter—"On this rock I will build my Church," and "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven"—were not supposed *at that time* to refer exclusively to the Church of Rome, but generally to all the churches of which St. Peter was the founder.⁸ Tertullian himself contends that they were spoken by our Saviour with a

¹ *De Coronâ Militis*, c. 3. "Eucharistiæ Sacramentum nec de aliorum manu quam de Præsidentium sumimus."

² *Ad Uxorem*, l. i. c. 7, also quoted in note 1, p. 111. "Quum digamos non sinit præsidere."

³ *De Exhort. Castit.* c. 7, quoted in note 1, p. 112. "Quum ipsi Sacerdoti Digamo facto auferatur agere Sacerdotem."

⁴ *De Virginibus velandis*, c. 9.

⁵ "Benè autem quod et Episcopi universæ plebi mandare jejunia assolent, non dico de industriâ stipium conferendarum ut vestræ capturæ est, sed interdum et ex aliquâ sollicitudinis Ecclesiasticæ causâ." *De Jejunis*, c. 13.

⁶ We have seen that in one sense our author called all orthodox churches apostolic.

⁷ *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 36.

⁸ C. 21. "De tuâ nunc sententiâ quæro unde hoc jus Ecclesiæ usurpas. Si quia dixerit Petro Dominus: *Super hanc petram*, etc., idcirco præsumis et ad te derivâsse solvendi et alligandi potestatem, id est, ad omnem Ecclesiam Petri propinquam, qualis es evertens atque commutans manifestam Domini intentionem personaliter hoc Petro conferentem? *Super te*, inquit, ædificabo Ecclesiam meam, et dabo *tibi* claves, non *Ecclesiæ*; et quæcunque *solveris* vel *alligaveris*, non quæ *solverint* vel *alligaverint*. Sic enim et exitus docet. In ipso Ecclesia extracta

personal reference to St. Peter, in whom they were afterwards fulfilled. "For he it was who first put the key into the lock, when he preached the gospel to the assembled Israelites on the day of Pentecost. He it was who opened to them the kingdom of heaven, by baptizing them with the baptism of Christ, and thereby loosing them from the sins by which they had been bound; as he afterwards bound Ananias by inflicting upon him the punishment of death. He it was who, in the discussion at Jerusalem, first declared that the yoke of circumcision ought not to be imposed on the necks of the Gentile brethren, thereby loosing them from the observance of the ceremonial, and binding them to the observance of the moral law." There is, however, in the *Scorpiace* a passage in which Tertullian appears at first sight to admit that Christ had transmitted the power of the keys through Peter to His Church.¹ "Nam etsi adhuc clausum putas cœlum, memento claves ejus hic Dominum Petro, et per eum Ecclesiæ reliquisse, quas hic unusquisque interrogatus atque confessus ferat secum." But the concluding words show his meaning to have been, not that the power of the keys was transmitted to the Church as a society, but to each individual member who confessed, like St. Peter, that Jesus was Christ, the Son of the living God; or as he expresses himself in the tract *de Pudicitia*, to the spiritual Church of Montanus.² For the *Scorpiace* was, as we have seen, written after he had recognised the divine inspiration of Montanus, though probably before he actually seceded from the Church.

In opposition to the opinion above expressed respecting the independence of the Christian Churches, a passage has been quoted from which it is inferred that even at that early period the Bishop of Rome had assumed to himself the titles of Pontifex Maximus and Episcopus Episcoporum.³ Allix indeed affirms that our author is speaking of an edict promulgated, not by the

est, id est, per ipsum; ipse clavem imbuit; vides quam—*Viri Israelitæ, auribus mandate quæ dico: Iesum Nazarenum, virum a Deo vobis destinatum, et reliqua.*" (Acts ii. 22.) "Ipse denique primus in Christi baptismo reseravit aditum cœlestis regni, quo solvuntur alligata retro delicta, et alligantur quæ non fuerint soluta secundum veram salutem, et Ananiam vinxit vinculo mortis," etc. Compare *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 22. "Latuit aliquid Petrum ædificandæ Ecclesiæ *petram* dictum, claves regni cœlorum consecutum, et solvendi et alligandi in cœlis et in terris potestatem."

¹ C. 10.

² See the passage quoted in note 2, p. 115 of this chapter.

³ "Audio etiam edictum esse propositum, et quidem peremptorium, *Pontifex* scilicet *Maximus, Episcopus Episcoporum* dicit—'Ego et mœchiæ et fornicationis delicta pœnitentiâ functis dimitto.'" *De Pudicitia*, c. 1.

Roman Pontiff, but by the Bishop of Carthage.¹ In the remarks prefixed to the opinions delivered by the bishops at the Council of Carthage on the subject of heretical baptism, Cyprian asserts the perfect equality of all bishops, and uses the following remarkable expressions:—"Neque enim quisquam *nostrum* Episcopum se Episcoporum constituit, aut tyrannico terrore ad obsequendi necessitatem collegas suos adigit." That this remark is aimed at some bishop who had called himself *Episcopus Episcoporum*, cannot, we think, be doubted. The majority of writers apply it to Stephen, Bishop of Rome, from whom Cyprian differed on the point in question. Allix, on the other hand, supposes that Cyprian, having Tertullian's words in his mind, alluded to the pretensions of his predecessor in the see of Carthage, for the express purpose of disclaiming them. He infers also, from a passage in a letter of Cyprian to Antonianus, that the controversy respecting the re-admission of adulterers to the communion of the Church was confined to Africa, and that the Roman Pontiff took no share in it.² The statements of both parties in this question must be received with some degree of caution, for each writes with a view to a particular object. The Romanists contend that although Tertullian, then a Montanist, denied the supremacy of the Roman pontiffs, his words prove that it was openly asserted by them in his day—an inference which Allix was naturally anxious to controvert, since he maintained that the jurisdiction of the bishops of Rome did not at that period extend beyond the limits of their own diocese. With respect to the titles then given to bishops, we may observe that Bingham has produced instances of the application of the title, Summi Pontifices, to ordinary bishops.³

The word Papa occurs in the tract *de Pudicitia*, and being coupled with the epithet benedictus, is generally supposed to mean a bishop,⁴ and according to the Romanists, the bishop of Rome.⁵ But whatever may be its meaning in this particular passage, it is certain that the title of Papa was at that period given to bishops in general.⁶ After Tertullian's secession from

¹ C. 8.

² Ep. 55, ed. Fell. "Et quidem apud antecessores nostros quidam de Episcopis istic in Provinciâ nostrâ dandam pacem mœchis non putaverunt, et in totum pœnitentiæ locum contra adulteria clausurunt."

³ L. ii. c. 3, sect. vi.

⁴ "Bonus Pastor et benedictus Papa concionaris," c. 13.

⁵ The Romanists cite the following words from the tract *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 30, in confirmation of their interpretation:—"Sub Episcopatu Eleutherii benedicti."

⁶ See Cyprian's works. *Cler. Rom. ad Cler. Carthag.* Epp. 8, 23, 31, 36.

the Church, his respect for the episcopal office, or rather perhaps for the individuals who were in his day appointed to it, appears to have undergone a considerable diminution. He insinuates that they were actuated by worldly motives, and ascribes to their anxiety to retain their power and emoluments a practice, which had been introduced into some churches, of levying contributions upon the members for the purpose of bribing the governors and military to connive at the religious meetings of the Christians.¹

Besides bishops, priests, and deacons, Tertullian mentions an order of readers, *Lectores*, whose office it was to read the Scriptures to the people.² He speaks also of an order of Widows, and complains that a bishop, in direct violation of the discipline of the Church, had admitted into that order a virgin who had not attained her twentieth year.³ The third book of the *Apostolic Constitutions* is entitled *περὶ χηρῶν*—and it is here directed, in conformity to the injunction of St. Paul, that no widow shall be appointed who has not attained the age of sixty.⁴ She was moreover to have been only once married—a restriction also founded on St. Paul's injunction.⁵ Widows who had brought up families appear to have been preferred, because their experience in the different affections of the human heart rendered them fitter to give counsel and consolation to others, and because they had passed through all the trials by which female virtue can be proved. The duty of the widows consisted in administering to the wants of the poor; in attending upon the sick; in instructing the younger females of the community, in watching over their conduct and framing their morals. They

¹ "Hanc Episcopatus formam Apostoli providentius condiderunt, ut regno suo securi frui possent sub obtentu procurandi: scilicet enim talem pacem Christus ad Patrem regrediens mandavit a militibus per Saturnalia redimendam." *De Fugâ in Persecutione*, c. 13.

² "Hodiè Diaconus, qui cras Lector." *De Præscript. Hæret.*, c. 41." See Bingham, l. iii. c. 5.

³ "Plane scio alicubi Virginem in Viduatu ab annis nondum viginti collocatam; cui si quid refrigerii debuerat Episcopus, aliter utique salvo respectu disciplinæ præstare potuisset." *De Virginibus vel.* c. 9. See also *de Monogamiâ*, c. 16. "Habet Viduam utique, quam adsumat licebit;" and *de Exhortatione Castitatis*, c. 12. "Habe aliquam uxorem spiritalem, adsume de Viduis."

⁴ 1 Tim. v. 3-11. Titus ii. 3.

⁵ So Tertullian, *ad Uxorem*, l. i. c. 7. "Quum Viduam allegi in ordinem nisi univiram non concedit;" and *de Monogamiâ*, c. 11, *sub in.* *De Virginibus vel.* c. 9. "Ad quam sedem præter annos sexaginta non tantum univiræ, id est, nuptæ, aliquando eliguntur, sed et matres et quidem educatrices filiorum: scilicet, ut experimentis omnium affectuum structæ facile norint cæteras et consilio et solatio juvare, et ut nihilominus ea decucurrerint, per quæ foemina probari potest."

were not allowed to perform any of the ministerial functions; to speak in the church, to teach, to baptize, etc.¹ They were maintained out of the common stock, and had a higher place allotted them in the public assemblies. St. Paul appears to speak of widows in the strict sense of the word; subsequently the name was given to females who had led a life of celibacy, and generally to the order of deaconesses.² According to Hammond, there were two sorts of *χηραι*—that is, as he translates the word, lone women—deaconesses, who were for the most part unmarried females, and widows properly so called, who, being childless and helpless, were sustained by the Church;—he supposes St. Paul to speak of the latter.³ Suicer, on the contrary, says that the deaconesses were originally widows, and that the admission of unmarried females was of a subsequent date.⁴ The reader will find in Bingham all the information which ecclesiastical antiquity supplies on the subject.⁵

In addition to the notices which may be collected from the writings of Tertullian respecting the constitution of each particular church, and the distinction of orders in it, we learn from them that synods were in his time held in Greece, composed of deputies from all the churches,⁶ who might be considered as representing the whole body of Christians dispersed throughout Greece. These meetings were always preceded by solemn fasts, and opened with prayer. In them all the more important questions which arose from time to time were discussed;⁷ and thus the unity of doctrine and discipline was preserved. Baronius supposes that Tertullian alludes to particular councils which were convened at that time by Zephyrinus,

¹ "Non permittitur mulieri *in ecclesiâ loqui* (1 Cor. xiv. 34), sed nec docere, nec tinguere, nec offerre, nec ullius virilis muneris, nedum sacerdotalis officii sortem sibi vindicare." *De Virgin. vel.* c. 9. One of Tertullian's charges against the heretics is, that they allowed their females to perform these various acts. *De Præscriptione Hæretic.* c. 41. Compare *de Baptismo*, c. 1, *sub fine*, c. 17. Females, however, might prophesy, agreeably to St. Paul's direction, 1 Cor. xi. 5. "Cæterum prophetandi jus et illas habere jam ostendit, quum mulieri etiam prophetanti velamen imponit." *Adv. Marcionem*, l. v. c. 8.

² *Ignatius ad Smyrnæos*, *sub fine*.

³ Note on 1 Tim. v. 3.

⁴ *Sub voce διακόνισσα*.

⁵ L. ii. c. 22.

⁶ "Aguntur præterea per Græcias illa certis in locis concilia *ex universis Ecclesiis*, per quæ et altiora quæque in commune tractantur, et ipsa repræsentatio totius nominis Christiani magnâ veneratione celebratur.—Conventus autem illi, stationibus prius et jejunationibus operati, dolere cum dolentibus, et ita demum congaudere gaudentibus norunt." *De Jejunis*, c. 13.

⁷ For instance, it was determined in these councils what writings were, and what were not, to be received as genuine parts of Scripture. *De Pudicitia*, c. 10.

Bishop of Rome, for the purpose of condemning the Montanists; others suppose that he alludes to councils held by the Montanists themselves—a supposition which in my opinion is at variance with the whole context. He appears to me to speak without reference to any particular council, and to describe a general custom.

As the converts from heathenism, to use Tertullian's expression, were not born, but became Christians, they went through a course of instruction in the principles and doctrines of the gospel, and were subjected to a strict probation, before they were admitted to the rite of baptism.¹ In this stage of their progress they were called catechumens; of whom, according to Suicer,² there were two classes—one called audientes, who had only entered upon their course, and begun to hear the word of God; the other *συναιτούντες*, or competentes, who had made such advances in Christian knowledge and practice as to be qualified to appear at the font. Tertullian, however, appears either not to have known or to have neglected this distinction, since he applies the names of audientes and auditores indifferently to all who had not partaken of the rite of baptism.³ When the catechumens had given full proof of the ripeness of their knowledge and of the steadfastness of their faith, they were baptized, admitted to the table of the Lord, and styled Fideles.⁴ The importance which Tertullian attached to this previous probation of the candidates for baptism appears from the fact that he founds upon the neglect of it one of his charges against the heretics. "Among them," he says, "no distinction is made between the catechumen and the faithful or confirmed Christian: the catechumen is pronounced fit for baptism before he is

¹ "Fiunt, non nascuntur, Christiani." *Apology*, c. 18.

² *Sub voce κατηχούμενοι.*

³ "An alius est Intinctis Christus, alius Audientibus?" And again, "Itaque Audientes optare Intinctionem, non præsumere oportet." *De Pænitiâ*, c. 6. In the same chapter Tertullian speaks of the Auditorum tyrocinia, and applies the title of Novitioli to the catechumens. In the tract *de Idololatriâ*, c. 24, we find the following distinction:—"Hæc accedentibus ad fidem proponenda, et ingredientibus in fidem inculcanda est;" and the following in the tract *de Spectaculis*, c. 1:—"Cognoscite, qui quum maxime ad Deum acceditis, recognoscite, qui jam accessisse vos testificati et confessi estis." In the tract *de Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, c. 14, our author distinguishes between doctores and quærentes. "Est utique frater aliquis doctor, gratiâ scientiæ donatus: est aliquis inter exercitatos conversatus; aliquis tecum, curiosius tamen, quærens."

⁴ Sometimes, however, the word Fideles included also the catechumens. Thus in the tract *de Coronâ*, c. 2, "Neminem dico Fidelium coronam capite nosse alias, extra tempus tentationis ejusmodi. Omnes ita observant a Catechumenis usque ad Confessores et Martyres, vel Negatores."

instructed ; all come in indiscriminately ; all hear, all pray together." ¹

The teachers, who undertook to prepare the catechumens for reception at the baptismal font, appear to have pursued the course pointed out by the Baptist and by our blessed Lord. They began by insisting on the necessity of repentance and amendment of life.² Unfortunately, the effect of their exhortations upon the minds of their hearers was frequently counteracted by a fatal perversion of the doctrine of the Church respecting the efficacy of baptism.³ In every age the object of a large portion of those who call themselves Christians has been, to secure the benefits without fulfilling the conditions of the Christian covenant—to obtain the rewards of righteousness without sacrificing their present gratifications. When, therefore, the proselyte was told that baptism conferred upon him who received it the remission of all his former sins, he persuaded himself that he might with safety defer the work of repentance ; and passed the time allotted for his probation, not in mortifying his lusts and acquiring a purity of heart and affections suitable to his Christian profession, but in a more unrestrained enjoyment of those worldly and sensual pleasures, in which he knew that, *after baptism*, he could not indulge, without forfeiting his hopes of eternal happiness. So general had this licentious practice become, that Tertullian devotes a considerable portion of the tract *de Pœnitentiâ* to the exposure of its folly and wickedness ;⁴ and the historian of the Roman Empire might there have found better arguments than those which he has extracted from Chrysostom, against the delay of baptism,⁵ though our author's attention was not immediately directed to that subject.

¹ "Inprimis quis Catechumenus, quis Fidelis, incertum est: pariter adeunt, pariter audiunt, pariter orant." And again, "Ante sunt perfecti Catechumeni quam edocti." *De Præscript. Hæretic.* c. 41.

² See the first five chapters of the tract *de Pœnitentiâ*.

³ Tertullian in the following sentence explains the prevalent opinion, at the same time that he points out the qualifications necessary to render baptism efficacious. "Neque ego renuo divinum beneficium, id est, abolitionem delictorum, inituris aquam omnimodo salvum esse ; sed ut eo pervenire contingat elaborandum est. Quis enim tibi, tam infidæ pœnitentiæ viro, asperginem unam cujuslibet aquæ commodabit?" *De Pœnitentiâ*, c. 6.

⁴ See particularly c. 6, where Tertullian argues that baptism, in order to be effectual to the pardon of sin, pre-supposes a renunciation of all sinful habits on the part of him who is to receive it. Men are admitted to baptism because they have already repented and reformed their lives ; not in order that they may afterwards repent and reform. "Non ideo abluimur ut delinquere desinamus, sed quia desiimus."

⁵ Chap. xx. note 68.

While the teacher was endeavouring to impress upon the catechumen the necessity of repentance and amendment of life, he would at the same time gradually unfold the great truths which constitute the objects of a Christian's faith; suiting his instructions to the comprehension and previous acquirements of the proselyte, and proceeding from the simpler to the more sublime and mysterious doctrines of the gospel. Of some the communication was postponed until the convert had been baptized, and numbered among the members of the Church. But after that rite was conferred, there was no further reserve, and the whole counsel of God was declared alike to all the faithful. In our account of Montanus, we stated that part of that knowledge, *γνώσις*, which, according to Clemens Alexandrinus, had been communicated by the apostles to a select few, and through them handed down to his own time by oral tradition, consisted of mystical interpretations of Scripture.¹ We find occasionally in Tertullian's works, expressions implying that he also admitted the existence of interpretations, the knowledge of which was confined to those whom he terms *the more worthy*.² But he condemns, in the most pointed manner, the notion that the apostles had kept back any of the truths revealed to them, and had not imparted them alike to all Christians. He applies to it the name of madness, and considers it as a pure invention of the Gnostics, devised for the purpose of throwing an air of mysterious grandeur around their monstrous fictions, and supported by the grossest misrepresentations of Scripture.³ Having already delivered our opinion respecting the mischievous consequences which have arisen to the Church from the countenance lent by the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus to the notion of a *Disciplina Arcani*, we shall now only express our regret that Protestant divines, in their eagerness to establish a favourite point, should sometimes have been induced to resort to it.

In the passage already cited from the *Apology*,⁴ Tertullian

¹ Chap. i. p. 16.

² Thus in the tract *de Pallio*, where he is speaking of the expulsion of our first parents from Paradise, and of the fig-leaves of which they made aprons, he adds, "Sed arcana ista, nec omnium nôsse," c. 3; and in the tract *de Idololatriâ*, speaking of the brazen serpent set up by Moses in the wilderness, he says, "Sive quæ alia figuræ istius expositio *dignioribus* revelata est," c. 5.

³ "Sed ut diximus, eadem dementia est, quum confitentur quidem nihil Apostolos ignorâsse, nec diversa inter se prædicâsse; non tamen omnia volunt illos omnibus revelâsse: quædam enim palam et universis, quædam secreto et paucis demandâsse." *De Præscriptione Hæretic.* c. 25. See also c. 26.

⁴ See p. III. The sentence was pronounced by the president. "Quomodo ut

states one purpose of the Christian assemblies to have been the maintenance of discipline by pronouncing censures, according to the circumstances of the offence, against those who had erred either in practice or in doctrine. We have seen that the proselyte, before he was admitted to the baptismal font, was subjected to a strict probation.¹ In baptism he received the remission of all his former transgressions, and solemnly renounced all his former carnal desires and impure habits.² If, however, through the weakness of human nature and the arts of his spiritual adversary, he was afterwards betrayed into sin, the door of mercy was not closed against him; he might still be restored to the favour of God and of the Church by making a public confession of his guilt. It was not sufficient that the unhappy offender felt the deepest remorse, and that his peace of mind was destroyed by the remembrance of his transgression: he was required to express his contrition by some public acts, which might at once satisfy the Church of his sincerity, and deter others from similar transgressions. The name given to this public confession of guilt was Exomologesis; and it consisted in various external marks of humiliation. The penitent was clothed in the meanest apparel; he lay in sackcloth and ashes; he either fasted entirely, or lived upon bread and water; he passed whole days and nights in tears and lamentations; he embraced the knees of the presbyters as they entered the church, and entreated the brethren to intercede by their prayers in his behalf.³ In this state of degradation and exclusion from the communion of the faithful he remained a longer or a shorter period, according to the magnitude of his offence; when that period was expired, the bishop publicly pronounced his absolution, by which he was restored to the favour of God and to the communion of the Church.⁴ Such is the account given by Tertullian of the Exomologesis, or public confession enjoined by the Church for sins committed after baptism. Its benefits could be obtained only once;⁵ if the penitent relapsed, a place of repentance was

auferatur de medio illorum? Non utique ut extra Ecclesiam detur; hoc enim non a Deo postularetur quod erat in Præsidentis officio." *De Pudicitia*, c. 14.

¹ P. 122.

² See the tract *de Pœnitentiâ*, cc. 7, 9.

³ Compare *de Pudicitia*, c. 5, *sub fine*, c. 13. "Et tu quidem pœnitentiam mœchi ad exorandam fraternitatem," etc.

⁴ See the passage quoted from the tract *de Pudicitia*, c. 13, in note 4. p. 124, and c. 18 *sub fine*. "Salvâ illâ pœnitentiæ specie post Fidem, quæ aut levioribus delictis veniam ab Episcopo consequi poterit, aut majoribus et irremissibilibus a Deo solo."

⁵ "Collocavit in vestibulo pœnitentiam secundam, quæ pulsantibus patefaciat; sed jam semel, quia jam secundo; sed amplius nunquam, quia proximè frustra." *De Pœnitentiâ*, c. 7. See also c. 9.

no longer open to him. Although, however, he could not be reconciled to the Church in this world, we must not infer that Tertullian intended to exclude him from all hope of pardon in the next. They indeed who, through false shame or an unwillingness to submit to the penance enjoined them, desperately refused to reconcile themselves to the Church by making a public confession, would be consigned to eternal misery.¹ But our author expressly distinguishes between remission of sins by the Church and by God; and affirms that the sincere penitent, though he may not by his tears and lamentations obtain re-admission into the Church, may yet secure his reception into the kingdom of heaven.²

In our attempts to distinguish between the works composed by Tertullian before and after his adoption of the opinions of Montanus, we remarked that the tract *de Pœnitentiâ* belonged to the former class;³ and that he there spoke as if all crimes, committed after baptism, might once, though only once, be pardoned upon repentance.⁴ But in the tract *de Pudicitâ*, which was written after he had seceded from the Church, we find him drawing a distinction between greater and less offences—between those which could not, and those which could be pardoned by the Church.⁵ If, for instance, a Christian had been excommunicated for being present at a chariot race, or a combat of gladiators, or a dramatic representation, or any gymnastic exercise;⁶ for attending any secular game or entertainment, or working at any trade which ministered to the purposes of idolatry,

¹ *De Pœnitentiâ*, cc. 10, 11, 12.

² See *de Pudicitâ*, c. 3. "Et si pacem hic non metit, apud Dominum seminat." Tertullian reasons throughout the tract on the supposition that the more heinous offences, *majora delicta*, can be pardoned by God alone. See cc. 11, 18, *sub fine*.

³ See chap. i. p. 22.

⁴ See particularly the commencement of c. 8. But at other times Tertullian speaks as if idolaters, apostates, and murderers were never re-admitted to the communion of the Church. *De Pudicitâ*, cc. 5, 9, 12, *sub fine*. "Hinc est quod neque Idololatriæ neque sanguini pax ab Ecclesiis redditur." Crimes against nature were also under the same irremissible sentence of exclusion. "Reliquas autem libidinum furias impias et in corpora et in sexus ultra jura naturæ, non modo limine, verum omni Ecclesiæ tecto submovemus; quia non sunt delicta, sed monstra," c. 4. See Bingham, l. xviii. c. 4.; l. xvi. c. 10, sect. ii.

⁵ *De Pudicitâ*, cc. 1, 2. "Secundum hanc differentiam delictorum pœnitentiæ quoque conditio discriminatur. Alia erit, quæ veniam consequi possit, in delicto scilicet remissibili; alia quæ consequi nullo modo potest, in delicto scilicet irremissibili," c. 18, *sub fine*. "Hæc ut principalia penes Dominum delicta." *De Patientiâ*, c. 5.

⁶ "Ita licet dici perisse quod salvum est. Perit igitur et fidelis elapsus in spectaculum quadrigarii furoris, et gladiatorii cruoris, et scenicæ fœditatis, et xysticæ vanitatis, in lusus, in convivia secularis solennitatis; in officium, in

or using any expression which might be construed into a denial of his faith or into blasphemy against Christ; or if from passion or impatience of censure he had himself broken off his connexion with the Church,—still his guilt was not of so deep a dye but that he might, upon his public confession, be again received into its communion. In a subsequent passage he classes among the venial sins—being angry without a cause, and allowing the sun to go down upon our wrath, acts of violence, evil-speaking, rash swearing, non-performance of contracts, violations of truth; and among the heinous sins—homicide, idolatry, fraud, denial of Christ, blasphemy, adultery, and fornication.¹ Of these he says that there is no remission, and that even Christ will not intercede for those who commit them. Such were the severe notions of discipline entertained by Tertullian after he became a Montanist. In his tract *de Pudicitia* he applies them to adulterers and fornicators in particular, and even extends them to those who contract a second marriage;² branding the orthodox,³ who recommended a milder course, with the name of *ψυχικοί*, *animales*, that is, men possessing indeed the *anima* which God breathed into Adam, thereby constituting him a living soul, but strangers to the influence of that Spirit by which the disciples of the Paraclete were inspired.

We may take this opportunity of observing that Tertullian's ministerium alienæ idololatriæ aliquas artes adhibuit curiositatis; in verbum ancipitis negationis aut blasphemiae impegit; ob tale quid extra gregem datus est, vel et ipse forte irâ, tumore, æmulatione, quod denique sæpe fit dedignatione castigationis abruptit; debet requiri atque revocari." *De Pudicitia*, c. 7.

¹ "Cui enim non accidit aut irasci iniquè et ultra solis occasum, aut et manum immittere, aut facillè maledicere, aut temerè jurare, aut fidem pacti destruere, aut verecundiâ aut necessitate mentiri? in negotiis, in officiis, in quæstu, in victu, in visu, in auditu quanta tentamur! ut si nulla sit venia istorum, nemini salus competat. Horum ergo erit venia per exoratores Patris, Christum. Sunt autem et contraria istis, ut graviora et exitiosa, quæ veniam non capiant, homicidium, idololatria, fraus, negatio, blasphemia, utique et mœchia et fornicatio, et si qua alia violatio templi Dei. Horum ultra exorator non erit Christus," c. 19. In the fourth book *against Marcion*, the enumeration of the *delicta majora* is somewhat different. "Quæ septem maculis capitalium delictorum inhorrent, idololatriâ, blasphemîâ, homicidio, adulterio, stupro, falso testimonio, fraude," c. 9. On other occasions Tertullian appears to overlook the distinction between greater and lesser offences. "Quum—omne delictum voluntarium in Domino grande sit." *Ad Uxorem*, l. ii.

² "Et ideo durissime nos, infamantes Paracletum disciplinæ enormitate, *Digamos* foris sistimus, eundem limitem liminis *mœchis* quoque et *fornicatoribus* figimus, jejunas pacis lachrymas profusuris, nec amplius ab Ecclesiâ quam publicationem dedecoris relaturis." *De Pudicitia*, c. 1, *sub fine*.

³ See chap. i. note 1, p. 15. The tract *de Pudicitia* was directed against an edict, published by a bishop (probably of Rome), and allowing adulterers and fornicators to be re-admitted to the communion of the Church upon repentance. See p. 118.