

argues about the will and the purpose of God. Mathematics, as Spinoza long ago protested, might as well discuss the circularity of a triangle. Will and purpose are attributes of the limited and conditioned; they imply an end external to the agent, and a desire on his part to accomplish it. Attempt to attach these ideas to the idea of the Absolute and Infinite, and you will find yourself plunged into a bottomless sea of absurdity. How can there be an end external to the Absolute? and how can the Infinite pass through states of consciousness, constituting the act of volition? Even intelligence or consciousness itself is conceivable only as a relation, and therefore the Absolute cannot be thought of as conscious. Intelligence demands

a conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty..... may be for the moment evaded by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and the absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation.<sup>1</sup>

Or, to put the matter in language elsewhere employed by Spencer himself,

"intelligence, as alone conceivable by us, presupposes existence independent of it and objective to it.....To speak of an intelligence which exists in the absence of such alien activities is to use a meaningless word." Hence, the intelligence ascribed to the Absolute Being "answers in no respect to that which we know by the name. It is intelligence out of which all the characters constituting it have vanished."<sup>1</sup>

The fundamental assumptions of rationalistic theology are thus, as Dean Mansel concludes, self-destructive. Turn where we will, choose our vocabulary as we may, we must inevitably commit ourselves to endless confusion, so long as we rest in even the highest and purest forms of anthropomorphic theism—so long, that is, as we persist in thinking of the ultimate reality that religion calls God as a *quasi*-human entity, and deceive ourselves into believing that we are gaining anything like a truer and deeper understanding of his nature by ascribing to the Infinite and Absolute Existence qualities and attributes that can have no possible meaning when taken out of connection with the finite and conditioned. Hence it is evident that the further progress of thought "must force men hereafter to drop the higher anthropomorphic characters given to the First Cause, as they have long since dropped the lower."<sup>2</sup>

It is only necessary to add to this part of the argument that the impossibility, thus made apparent, of defining the ultimate reality in terms of human activities means, of course, the impossibility of defining the ultimate reality in any terms at all. Humanity furnishes us with our highest conception of life.

<sup>1</sup> Mansell, quoted in *First Principles*, § 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, § 658.     <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



That the infinite universe contains forms of existence transcending ours in inconceivable ways and in almost infinite degrees is, beyond question, a rational supposition; but any attempt to image such superior forms must still be circumscribed by what we know of intelligence in the highest manifestations in which it has yet been revealed to us. We cannot in the nature of things get rid of our own limitations; wander where it will, our imagination must still be tethered fast to our own conditions. If, then, passing from the thought of transcendently superior phenomenal existences, which as phenomenal must have a certain kinship with ourselves, to the thought of the noumenal existence, which as noumenal can possess none of the characteristics of the phenomenal, we find inevitably that our human nature furnishes us with no kind of standard, criterion, or point of departure; we are bound to realise that no standard, criterion, or point of departure is possible to us. If the highest that we know leaves us without help in our effort to conceive that which an infinitely superior phenomenal intelligence would still be as far from apprehending as ourselves, then it is clear that the enterprise itself has to be relinquished. And thus, by noting the failure which must of necessity follow every attempt to frame a conception of the ultimate reality, we are led round to the great truth made clear the moment we recognise the relativity of all our thinking—the truth, namely, that all conception of Absolute Being is for ever beyond our grasp.

#### V.

Here, then, we have established certain negative conclusions. We have seen, in the first place, that, according to the doctrine of evolution, we cannot regard

man as possessing an innate, transcendental sense of Deity, and that we must, therefore, seek a natural genesis for religious as for all other ideas. One current hypothesis is thus overthrown. In the second place, we have found that the progress of religious thought has largely consisted in the gradual elimination of anthropomorphic elements from the idea of Deity, and that this elimination must go on until all human or *quasi*-human attributes are entirely expunged. Accepted theological teachings in regard to the personality and character of God are thus shown to belong to a lower stage of religious thought—a stage already partly, and presently to be entirely, outgrown.

But, fortunately, we do not have to rest in these emphatic repudiations of so much that seems most sacred in our modern heritage of thought. There is a positive as well as a negative aspect to our whole argument—a constructive as well as destructive side. To this we will now turn.

That larger charity, which is one of the most striking results of evolutionary habits of inquiry, has taught us to recognise not only “the soul of goodness in things evil,” but also the soul of truth in things erroneous. We no longer discard as absolutely and entirely without foundation even the strangest and most grotesque ideas that have ever gained foothold in the thoughts of our race. Absurd as they may seem to the superficial or careless observer, the mere fact that they have existed and have held their own may be taken to prove that they originally “germinated out of actual experiences—originally contained, and perhaps still contain, some small amount of verity.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *First Principles*, § 1.



If this is true in regard to beliefs in general, especially must it be held to be true in regard to such beliefs as have given evidence of unusual and persistent vitality. It was a cheerful doctrine of the old theology that if a thing were pleasant it was, therefore, certain to be wrong; whence, by analogy, it might be assumed that the more widespread an idea, the less chance there would be of its embodying any nucleus of reality. But, from the standpoint here adopted, this atrabilious supposition is shown to lack foundation. For, when any belief has become deeply embedded in human nature, when it resists modifications of fashion and thought, and holds its ground in perennial strength amid all the intellectual and moral upheavals of the ages, we see reason to infer that it does so because, whatever may be its encumbrances and adulterations of error, it contains some core of essential truth. Now, suppose that, recognising this trait of universality and persistency in a given belief as *prima facie* evidence of its possessing a strong basis of verity, we observe that it is not only very general and very stable, but also that it is a constituent element common to many otherwise conflicting systems of thought—what is the inference that we are compelled to draw? The inference, surely, that, generated among different men under almost infinitely varied conditions, caught up by and preserved in creeds and philosophies having scarcely another point of similarity, and enduring amid the most sweeping changes and far-reaching developments of thought, this belief must hold some kernel of truth of supreme importance—must shoot out some tendrils running far down into the deepest subsoil of human life and experience.

Bearing this in mind, we may revert to a point already dealt with. In seeking for the broadest possible definition of the religious idea, we concluded that in the last analysis that idea would everywhere be found to depend upon the sense of an existence other than the existence which we describe as natural. Belief in a mode of life and power other than our own—in a “something not ourselves,” the influence of which is none the less felt through all our existence—is, therefore, the central belief around which all concrete forms of religion have gradually accumulated; it is the belief which all such concrete forms, whatever may be the diverse courses of their evolutions, continue to hold in common; it is the residual element left when all their differences are cancelled and all their antagonistic factors thrown aside. Almost if not quite universal, and obstinately persistent, it is therefore the belief that, however much it may be distorted or disguised, must be taken as embodying the largest and most important truth. Now, all religious systems have built upon the foundation furnished by this belief a theory of explanation—a philosophy—of the universe; recognising one and all, from lowest to highest, that a mystery lies at the heart of things—a mystery from the overwhelming sense of which there is no possibility of escape. And what, in regard to this universal recognition of the problem of the universe, has been the course of the evolution of religious thought? Every stage in advance has only served to bring the sense of mystery into more conspicuous relief. Earlier interpretations, shown by wider knowledge and larger outlook to be insufficient, are discarded or modified; hypotheses framed by one generation are seen by the next generation to be



untenable ; until at length the inevitable goal of the whole movement comes within sight, and the most thoughtful inquirers begin to realise that the mystery of which all the creeds have sought an explanation is a mystery for which no explanation can ever possibly be found. Thus, however much religious systems may differ from one another in their suggested solutions of the problem of life, and from that most developed philosophy which, conscious that every hypothesis that ever has been or ever can be framed concerning it is untenable, declares the problem itself to be insoluble, they are at one upon the supreme point, that the mystery is there. This is a truth "respecting which there is a latent agreement among all mankind, from the fetich-worshipper to the most stoical critic of human creeds."<sup>1</sup>

In endeavouring to trace the natural history of the religious idea we throw no discredit, then, upon that idea in its higher developments, any more than we throw discredit upon the moral idea in its higher developments by following that down to its crudest forms. We recognise, of course, that man in the beginning was potentially religious, as he was potentially intelligent, and potentially moral. Given this potentiality, our business is simply with the *growth* of the religious idea ; in studying which we find, in all its changes and ramifications, some vital germ of truth. Here, as in the case of the moral sense, it is difficult to see what advantage the advocates of supernatural origin can possibly claim over those against whose theories of a natural origin they so fiercely protest. Indeed, the advantage is rather on the other side, since, as Dr. Fairbairn has

pointed out, the supernaturalistic theory implies that man must have had what Schelling called "an original atheism of consciousness."

Thus we have two permanent elements in religious thought : the belief in a mode of life and power other than our own, and a sense of the ultimate mystery of the universe ; the former of them being used as a key to the latter. We have seen that the inevitable tendency of religious development is to make this mystery more apparent. Let us now inquire into the evolution of the other element—that idea of an existence not our own, upon which all religious interpretations of the origin and meaning of the universe have been based.

The following extract from Spencer's *Ecclesiastical Institutions* (§ 659) will serve our purpose much better than any words of our own :—

Every voluntary act yields to the primitive man proof of a source of energy within him. Not that he thinks about his internal experiences ; but in these experiences this notion lies latent. When producing motion in his limbs, and through them motion in other things, he is aware of the accompanying feeling of effort. And this sense of effort, which is the perceived antecedent of changes produced by him, becomes the conceived antecedent of changes not produced by him—furnishes him with a term of thought by which to represent the genesis of these objective changes. At first this idea of muscular forces as antecedent unusual events around him carries with it the whole assemblage of associated ideas. He thinks of the implied efforts as efforts exercised by beings like himself. In course of time these doubles of the dead, supposed to be workers of all but the most familiar changes, are modified in conception. Besides becoming less grossly material, some of them are developed into larger personalities presiding over classes of phenomena which, being comparatively regular in their order, suggest a belief in beings who, while far more powerful than men, are less variable in their modes of action.

<sup>1</sup> *First Principles*, § 14.



So that the idea of force as exercised by such beings comes to be less associated with the idea of a human ghost. Further advances, by which minor supernatural agents are merged in one general agent, and by which the personality of this general agent is rendered vague while becoming widely extended, tend still further to dissociate the notion of objective force from the force known as such in consciousness; and the dissociation reaches its extreme in the thoughts of the man of science, who interprets in terms of force not only the visible changes of sensible bodies, but all physical changes whatever, even up to the undulations of the ethereal medium. Nevertheless, this force (be it force under that statical form by which matter resists, or under that dynamical form distinguished as energy) is to the last thought of in terms of that internal energy which he is conscious of as muscular effort. He is compelled to symbolise objective force in terms of subjective force from lack of any other symbol.

See, now, the implications. That internal energy which in the experiences of the primitive man was always the immediate antecedent of changes wrought by him; that energy which, when interpreting external changes, he thought of along with those attributes of a human personality connected with it in himself—is the same energy which, freed from anthropomorphic accompaniments, is now figured as the cause of all external phenomena. The last stage reached is recognition of the truth that force as it exists beyond consciousness cannot be like what we know as force within consciousness; and that yet, as either is capable of generating the other, they must be different modes of the same. Consequently, the final outcome of that speculation commenced by the primitive man is that the Power manifested throughout the universe distinguished as material, is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness.

Little comment upon this passage is called for. The sense of a mode of life and power other than our own, which, as we have seen, has from the first been taken as the clue to the arcanum of the universe, necessarily arises under an anthropomorphic form, and under this form continues to persist

through all the less developed stages of thought. Meanwhile, the tendency to de-anthropomorphisation little by little modifies all the earlier religious conceptions by depriving them one by one of their human and *quasi*-human characteristics, beginning with the lower, but gradually passing onward to the higher; until finally, through continuance of the same tendency, all such characteristics will disappear. When this has at length taken place, there will be nothing left in thought but the permanent and inexpugnable sense of the power of which all the phenomenal universe is but the transient expression—the reality that underlies it all. Thus the conception of the life not ourselves—the life out of which all existence arises, and by which it is sustained—just as it has been enlarging from the very beginning, “must go on enlarging, until, by disappearance of its limits, it becomes a consciousness which transcends the forms of distinct thought, though it for ever remains a consciousness.”<sup>1</sup>

All this is surely a sufficient answer to those who maintain that Spencer's doctrine of the Absolute is merely a negation. On the contrary, for him it is the highest possible affirmation. Unknowable in itself, the noumenon—the reality behind phenomena—is still the foundation of all our knowledge. Whatever else may be doubted, this at least can never be called in question. It is the one inexpugnable element in consciousness, left over in the last analysis as the ultimate, inexplicable, indestructible first principle of thought. Obliterate it, and the whole fabric of our knowledge would crumble to nothing.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, § 658.

<sup>2</sup> *First Principles*, § 26.



## VI.

To recapitulate. Stating the matter broadly, and in the first place regarding only its negative aspects, we have seen that the Spencerian doctrine cuts the ground directly from beneath all forms of anthropomorphic theism, in which God appears as "Man's giant shadow, hailed divine."<sup>1</sup> There are low and high forms of such theism, varying all along the line from that of the Fijian, who pictures his gods as cannibals as brutal and bloody as himself, to that of so refined and subtle a thinker as Dr. Martineau, who talks of the "character of God" and "the order of affections in Him"; but, be their differences otherwise what they may, they correspond in their ascription to the Absolute and Infinite Power of traits and characteristics having purely relative and finite connotations. But it is now clear that even the highest form of anthropomorphism is, philosophically considered, without justification. All our knowledge is limited to phenomena; and when, from dealing with phenomena, we pass on to think or speak of that which is not phenomenon, but reality, we are bound to think and speak in terms which necessarily lose all exact meaning in the transfer. Will, intention, foresight, personality, purpose—we know what these signify when applied to creatures conditioned like ourselves; applied to the Unconditioned, they are empty words, having no meaning at all, or meanings which involve countless absurdities and contradictions. "To think that God is, as we can think him to be, is blasphemy"—such is the conclusion to which we are ultimately forced. However vast, however deep,

our knowledge of the phenomenal universe may hereafter become, it is that phenomenal universe which must for ever oppose an adamant barrier to our thought. Science may press forward in every direction, and open up vistas of which at present we do not even dream; but her ever-widening circle will only bring us into larger touch with the nescience that lies beyond. The dividing line between appearance and reality can never be passed, no matter what achievements of insight and genius and knowledge the future ages may hold in store; and for all mankind, as for us, the eternal and ever-working power revealed to us only in its manifestations must still remain beyond definition, beyond even conception.

But happily our philosophy brings a message of promise as well as a message of discouragement. In his controversy with Mr. Frederic Harrison, some years ago, Spencer very properly called his brilliant antagonist to task for loudly applauding the irreparable defeat which theology had sustained at his (Spencer's) hands, while refusing to acknowledge the services he had rendered to religion by showing the essential germ of truth which, whatever its errors and divagations, every theology contains. The whole discussion only served to emphasise in many minds the feeling that it is not a little unfortunate that Spencer should have made such prominent use of the word "unknowable," not because his meaning is not perfectly plain to the careful student of Part I. of *First Principles*, but because he has thus left a loophole for what has been well described as some of the dreariest twaddle which has been given to the world under the name of philosophical discussion since the days of mediæval

<sup>1</sup> William Watson, *The Unknown God*.



scholasticism. For the word "unknowable" has allowed the adverse critic to assume, and to build a whole superstructure of argument upon the assumption, that Spencer's doctrine of the Absolute is a vacuum—a mere negation of thought. So far from this being the case, we have shown that, for the Spencerian, the truth that behind all we know and can know, eluding thought and transcending imagination, there is the one Eternal Reality, is the corner-stone of all our knowledge—the one fact that can never be either analysed or got rid of. And here we may notice how, in this final datum of consciousness, religion and science find their complete and permanent reconciliation. For the supreme and everlasting power which religion calls God is the eternal and inscrutable energy which science finds at the back of its widest generalisations and beneath its deepest investigations. All science leads at last to the mystery with which all religion begins. Science, indeed, speaks of that mystery in language which is formal and colourless, for its statements are purely intellectual. But translated into the language of the emotions, its ideas become deeply religious.<sup>1</sup>

It is true that all this means the inevitable sacrifice of many of the ideas now most deeply embedded in the current creeds. It is true that it compels us to look for a more and more complete purgation from the conception of Deity of all human attributes; since to speak of the Divine will, or a Personal Creator, or an

<sup>1</sup> To prevent misapprehension, I may add that I do not myself rest in this somewhat blank form of reconciliation between science and religion. But I content myself here and in what follows with indicating merely what appear to me to be the immediate implications of Spencer's own thought.

intelligent Governor of the universe, is, from the standpoint of philosophical exactness, scarcely more admissible than to go back at once to the quaintly man-like images of the early Hebrew Scriptures. It is true that it forces us to realise with ever-increasing vividness how little all our feeble guessings must be worth in face of the Great Enigma, since, as the choice lies, not between personality and something lower, but between personality and something inconceivably higher, we are probably incalculably further from the truth when we speak of the Infinite and Absolute in terms of human emotion and human intelligence than we should be if we attempted to describe human emotion and human intelligence in terms of a plant's functions. But all this notwithstanding, and though we are forced to admit the futility of all the efforts of all the theologies to formulate that which is forever beyond formulation, we are not therefore to suppose that we are left without touch upon the Unseen and Eternal, or that there is no kinship and no communion between our spirits and the Source and Sustainer of all things—"the Power in darkness whom we guess." Given the ultimate Reality—the great central fact of consciousness—and we are bound to conceive of that Reality, not, indeed, as personal and conscious in the strict meaning of these words, but still as the power which is manifested in personality and consciousness in ourselves; personality and consciousness being modes in which the Eternal Energy expresses itself in us by reason of the fact that we are conditioned by that which is not ourselves. Thus, seeing our human necessity to give some form to our conceptions, and our human inability to find any form higher than



the highest within ourselves, we may even allow ourselves to carry the ideas of personality and consciousness with us in our thought of the ultimate Reality, and I hold that we are justified in so doing, if we bear ever in mind the one supremely important qualification that our language does not *define*, but *symbolise*, and thus avoid the danger of passing from symbolism, which is defensible, to definition, which can lead to nothing but the confusion of empty dogmatism, and the ignorance which mistakes itself for knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Does this seem, after all, to be offering little in place of that which is taken away? To the present generation this must needs perhaps be so. Men move with difficulty from concrete image to abstract statement. The religious progress of the world has been like the slow ascent of a man up a sheer perpendicular cliff—every new foothold upward has been carved out and graven deep with infinite labour and countless tears. The thought a little in advance of the emotional grasp of each era has to that era necessarily seemed chilling and repulsive—it has lacked the warmth, the glow, the appealing power, which are possessed only by ideas long steeped in the

<sup>1</sup> For myself I go with Fiske when he says: "I do not hold.....that we are justified in using such an expression as 'infinite personality' in a philosophical inquiry, where clearness of thought and speech is above all things desirable. But I do hold most emphatically that we are not debarred from ascribing a *quasi*-psychical nature to the Deity simply because we can frame no proper conception of such a nature as absolute and infinite." It must be remembered (though it is too often forgotten) that, unless we cease to think altogether, we *must* think anthropomorphically; and, as Dr. Martineau rightly protested, materialism as a theory of things is quite as anthropomorphic as the current theism.

feelings. No wonder, then, that when his anthropomorphic error had been proved to him, the old monk Serapion should have cried aloud in all the agony of his despair, "You have robbed me of my God!" No wonder that in the hour of unspeakable craving Luther's wife should have exclaimed against the coldness and hardness of her new creed. This must necessarily be the cry of many in every period of transition from lower to higher thought in the future, as it has already been the cry of many during every such crisis in the past. Every movement forward out of familiar forms and feelings has inevitably been attended by some wrenching of the religious nature; and not without still further agitation and upheaval shall we pass at length out of anthropomorphic theism altogether into that cosmic theism to which the long course of religious evolution has from the very first been slowly leading us. In the development of thought, as Professor Clifford pointed out, the feelings can never quite keep pace with the intellect—a truth which throws a flood of light upon the religious crisis of our own day. When the existing balance between knowledge and emotion is disturbed by the discovery of fresh truth, the intellect will readily adjust itself to the new conditions, while the emotions cling tenaciously about the things that are being left behind. Thus, while intellectually we may seize and appropriate those vast cosmical ideas which the wider knowledge of our time is yielding us in place of the simpler and cruder imaginings of the past; while we may even realise more or less clearly that these new ideas are in themselves infinitely more impressive, more awe-inspiring, more truly religious, than any that have been possible to mankind hitherto; yet until these



ideas can grow sacred to us through habit and association, until they can sink down into our feelings and dwell there, and become saturated with the finer atmosphere of our thought, they will be little to us but the abstractions of philosophy. That the mass of men will progress far in the difficult task of thus incorporating them and making them their own, in our time, or for many generations to come, can hardly be supposed. But that adjustment of emotion to knowledge, which is a constant accompaniment of evolving life, will in time vitalise and spiritualise these new and now strange concepts of our philosophy—perhaps more rapidly than some of us are apt to imagine.

“The common problem—yours, mine, everyone’s,

Is—not to fancy what were fair in life  
Provided it could be—but finding first  
What may be, then find how to make it fair  
Up to our means—a very different thing.”

And the religious problem of the race at large is similar to this. The emotions of each generation, adjusted to the average knowledge of that generation, cannot but receive a rude shock when some new scientific revelation sweeps away their old foundations, and thus shatters the ancient bases of religious faith. At such a crisis what is to be done? Nothing, but to accept the new truth in all humility, and, in the firm trust that the further evolution of thought will presently lead to the complete reharmonisation of knowledge and feeling, to set our faces resolutely towards the light. The true religious teacher in such a transitional period is, therefore, not the man who enters the battlefield of thought to fight for the knowledge of yesterday against the knowledge of to-day; but rather he who,

gifted with prophetic vision, is the first to enter sympathetically into all that science reveals concerning the order of the universe, and to proclaim its religious bearings to a world that, for the time being, it has blinded “by excess of light.” Would that our preachers and theologians could only thus realise their privileges and their responsibilities, and from the history of the many epochs of dire struggle and confusion through which, amid darkness and despair, men have in the past been carried forward, as on a tidal wave, to higher levels of thought and feeling, could but catch the inspiration of a larger faith in what the future holds in store! Meanwhile, it is to the great poets particularly that we have to look for help. In the following magnificent lines of Wordsworth, for example, we may perhaps read the promise of a near and complete translation of the religious ideas which we have been here trying to interpret—the ideas of an Eternal Power manifesting itself through the order of Nature, and of the essential unity of all life—out of the language of science into the language of the feelings—the natural language, be it ever remembered, for all religious faith and aspiration:—

“I have felt

A presence that disturbs me with the joy  
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime  
Of something far more deeply interfused,  
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  
And the round ocean and the living air,  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:  
A motion and a spirit that impels  
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,  
And rolls through all things.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Lines Composed a few Miles above Tintern Abbey*, 1798. This superb passage, together with such poems as Tennyson’s *Ancient Sage* and *Akbar’s Dream*, may be profitably compared with those passages in *The Task* in which Cowper gave expression to the mechanical



Of one thing at least we may rest assured. As each larger thought of the universe has at length been absorbed into the emotions, and as from the vantage-point then reached men have looked back and seen their older conceptions in all their limitations and crudity ; so will this largest thought yet brought upon our horizon be also emotionally appropriated ; and so, also, when this has been done, will men realise how imperfect were all the ideas belonging even to the highest stage of anthropomorphism. Then, indeed, will the religious emotions, harmonising with a wider, truer, and deeper knowledge of the Cosmos, and a fuller and profounder sense of the Reality of which the universe is but the fleeting manifestation, as much transcend the religious emotions of our own day as do these the

theism of Paley and his school. Such a comparison enables us to appreciate the real advance that we have made towards an emotionalisation of the new thoughts of science concerning the universe and the final mystery of life.

religious emotions of the fetich-worshipping savage. Nor can the future progress of science do otherwise than strengthen and enlarge them. As knowledge grows "from more to more," so will "more of reverence in us dwell," and the choral harmonies of knowledge and feeling in the time to come will be richer and vaster than the broken music of the past. For with every fresh exploration through a universe which is literally pulsating with life—a universe "boundless inward in the atom, boundless outward through the whole"—one truth will rise into ever greater distinctness, and fill a larger and larger place in the minds of men. For amid all the "mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the absolute certainty" that we are "ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed." Here Science finds with Religion the ultimate and everlasting Fact of facts.



## APPENDIX

### CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF SPENCER'S WRITINGS

- [THE more important of Spencer's magazine articles, and of his shorter separate publications, are contained in the Library edition of his Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative, issued by Messrs. Williams & Norgate. The volume numbers added to various of the following titles refer to this collection.]
1842. Letters on the Proper Sphere of Government.
1844. Remarks on the Theory of Reciprocal Dependence in the Animal and Vegetable Creations (Philosophical Magazine, February. Republished in Autobiography, vol. i., Appendix F).
1847. The Form of the Earth no Proof of Original Fluidity (Philosophical Magazine, March. Republished in Autobiography, vol. i., Appendix J).
1850. Social Statics. (Selections from this work were published along with a new edition of *The Man versus The State* in 1892.)
1852. Theory of Population. (Afterwards developed in Part VI. of *The Principles of Biology*.)  
 Use and Beauty (vol. ii.).  
 The Development Hypothesis (vol. i.).  
 The Sources of Architectural Types (vol. ii.).  
 Philosophy of Style (vol. ii.).  
 Gracefulness (vol. ii.).  
 A Theory of Tears and Laughter (Leader; December 11th.)  
 Use of Anthropomorphism.
1853. Over-Legislation (vol. iii.).  
 Valuation of Evidence (vol. ii.).  
 The Universal Postulate. (Afterwards embodied in *The Principles of Psychology*, Part VII., chapter xi.)
1854. Manners and Fashion (vol. iii.).  
 The Genesis of Science (vol. ii.).  
 The Art of Education. (Now forming chapter ii. of the work on Education.)  
 Railway Morals and Railway Policy (vol. iii.).  
 Personal Beauty (vol. ii.).
1855. Principles of Psychology (first edition).
1857. Progress: its Law and Cause (vol. i.).  
 Origin and Function of Music (vol. ii.).  
 Transcendental Physiology (vol. i.).  
 Representative Government (vol. iii.).
1858. State Tamperings with Money and Banks (vol. iii.).  
 Moral Education. (Now forming chapter iii. of the work on Education.)  
 The Nebular Hypothesis (vol. i.).  
 Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton.
1859. The Laws of Organic Form. (Afterwards developed in Part IV. of *The Principles of Biology*.)  
 Physical Education. (Now forming chapter iv. of the work on Education.)  
 What Knowledge is of most Worth? (Now forming chapter i. of the same work.)  
 Illogical Geology (vol. i.).  
 The Morals of Trade (vol. iii.).
1860. Bain on the Emotions and the Will (vol. i.).  
 The Social Organism (vol. i.).  
 The Physiology of Laughter (vol. ii.).  
 Parliamentary Reform (vol. iii.).  
 Prison Ethics (vol. iii.).
1861. Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical. (Cheap reprint by the Rationalist Press Association, 1903.)
1862. First Principles. (Sixth and final edition, 1900.)  
 On Laws in General and the Order



- of their Discovery (vol. ii.). (A chapter from the first edition of First Principles, omitted from the reorganised edition.)
1864. What is Electricity? (vol. ii.).  
Classification of the Sciences (vol. ii.).  
Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte (vol. ii.). (First published as an appendix to the just-named article.)
1865. The Collective Wisdom (vol. iii.).  
Political Fetichism (vol. iii.).  
Mill *vs.* Hamilton—The Test of Truth (vol. ii.).
1866. On Circulation and the Formation of Wood in Plants (Transactions of the Linnæan Society, vol. xxv. Republished in Principles of Biology, vol. ii., appendix C.).
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## INDEX

---

- ANTHROPOMORPHISM, 105-110, 114  
 Ancestor worship, 100, 103, 104  
 Avebury, Lord (Sir John Lubbock), on religion of savages, 98 *note*, 99, 100 *note*, 102
- BENTHAM, JEREMY, 83, 87  
*Biology, Principles of*, 58-61  
 Bolingbroke, Lord, on *à priori* methods in philosophy, 43 *note*  
 Browning, R., 108 *note*, 118
- CHRISTIANITY, Spencer's attitude towards, 18  
*Civil Engineer*, Spencer's contributions to, 15  
 Classical culture, Spencer's view of, 14  
 Clifford, Professor, 117  
 Coleridge, S. T., on individuation, 49; quoted 43  
 Comte, A., Spencer and, 36 *note*  
 Conscience, Mill on, 87; Spencer's interpretation of, 89, 90  
 Consciousness, evolution of, 62; mystery of, 62 *note*  
 Correlation of forces, 47  
 Courtney, Leonard, address at cremation of Spencer's remains, 24  
 Creeds, dependence of, on social state, 104, 105, 106 *note*
- DARWIN, C., 31, 32, 36, 38, 60  
 De-anthropomorphisation, 107-110, 114  
 Deductive method, use of, in *Synthetic Philosophy*, 44, 45, 53, 54; in a science of ethics, 93, 94  
*Development Hypothesis, The*, 32, 33, 37  
 Differentiation, one side of evolution, 33, 50-52  
 Dissolution and evolution, 55-57  
 Double, theory of the, see *Ghost-theory*
- Economist, The*, Spencer's connection with, 19  
*Education*, influence of, 24 *note*  
 Eliot, George, Spencer's friendship with, 20  
 Empiricism, 34 *note*, 63  
 Equilibration, 57, 58 *note*, 59-61, 95, 96  
 Ethics, Spencer's system of, 79-96; place of, in his philosophy, 81, 82; absolute and relative, 70 *note*
- Evil, problem of, how treated by Spencer, 91, 95, 96  
 Evolution, Spencer's acceptance of, 16; his historic relation to theory of, 36; basis of his philosophy, 39, 40; his formula of, 49-53; factors of, 32, 33, 38, 59; in psychology, 34, 35, 61-63; in society, 67, 68; and ethics, 79-81, 95, 96; and dissolution, 55-57
- FERTILITY, animal, and progress, 60, 61  
*First Principles*, 47, 48  
 Fiske, John, on Spencer's use of "nervous" for "psychical," 62 *note*; on "the brute inheritance," 92; on religion, 109, 117  
 Force, persistence of, 47, 57
- Genesis of Science, The*, 33, 40 *note*  
 Ghost-theory of religious origins, 101-103  
 Godwin, 31, 60 *note*  
 Goethe, 45 *note*, 50  
 Government, true functions of, 76-78
- HARTLEY, DAVID, 87 *note*  
 Heterogeneity, increase of, one side of evolution, 33, 50-52, 54  
 Hobbes, 92  
 Holmes, O. W., on rhythm, 56 *note*; on religious evolution, 107  
 Homogeneity, instability of state of, 53, 57  
 Huxley, 18, 96
- IBSEN, 91  
 Individual, the, and Society, 69-78  
 Individualism, Spencer's, 19, 65-78  
 Individuation, 50; and reproduction, 60, 61  
 Inductive method, as used by Spencer, 44, 52, 54; limits of, 44 *note*  
 Inductive theory of morals, 83-90  
 Industrial régime in society, 72  
 Innate ideas, 63  
 Integration in evolution, 50, 51  
 Intuitional theory of morals, 83-89
- JAPAN, Spencer's influence in, 24 *note*  
 Justice, Spencer's formula of, 70, 71, 77
- KANT, 63, 89 *note*  
 Knowledge, relativity of, 45, 46, 111



- LAISSEZ-FAIRE, Spencer on, 78  
 Lamarck, 16, 59  
 Law, uniformity of, 47  
 Lecky, W. E. H., on utilitarianism and intuitivism, 84; quoted, 17  
 Leibnitz, 63  
 Lessing, 81, *note*  
 Lewes, G. H., 19  
 Life as adjustment, 58  
 Locke, 18, 63  
 Lyell, Sir C., his *Principles of Geology*, 16
- MACKINTOSH, SIR J., 66  
 Macpherson, H., 14, 24  
 Malthus on population, 59, 60  
*Manners and Fashion*, 33  
 Martineau, J., 115, 117 *note*  
 Materialism, Spencer's repudiation of, 64  
 Mexico, Spencer's influence in, 24 *note*  
 Mill, J. S., his early education, 12; his generous offer to Spencer, 22 *note*; on the evolutionary psychology, 34 *note*; on utilitarianism, 87  
 Miller, Hugh, 28 *note*  
 Miracles, 17, 18  
 Militarism, 74, 75  
 Military régime in society, 72  
 Morality, crisis in, 81, 82; diversities in theory and practice, 85, 86. See also *Ethics*  
 Motion, rhythm of, 47, 55 *note*, 57  
 Multiplication of effects, law of, 33, 51, 53, 57
- NATURAL SELECTION, 30, 38, 59, 80  
 Nature-worship, 100, 101  
 Nebular Hypothesis, 39
- OPTIMISM, Spencer's, 61, 95, 96  
*Origin and Function of Music*, 33, 43 *note*
- PERSISTENCE OF FORCE, 47, 57  
 Philosophy, defined by Spencer, 46  
*Philosophy of Style, The*, 33, 43 *note*  
 Population, Spencer's treatment of the problem of, 59-61  
 Progress, revolutionary belief in, 59. See also *Evolution*  
*Progress, its Law and Cause*, 33, 37, 39, 50  
*Proper Sphere of Government*, Letters on the, 19, 29, 30
- Psychology, Spencer's method in, 61, 62  
*Psychology, Principles of*, 20, 21, 34, 61-64
- RELATIVITY of knowledge, 45, 46, 111  
 Religion, evolution of, 97-114; future of, 115-119  
 Rousseau, Spencer and, 36 *note*
- SCIENCE, defined, 46  
 Segregation, 53, 57  
 Shelley, 60 *note*  
 Smith, Goldwin, 52, 79 *note*  
 Social contract, 71 *note*  
 Social evolution, 67, 68  
 Social organism, 66-69  
*Social Statics*, 19, 30, 31, 42 *note*, 49, 50, 53  
 Society, a growth, 29; justification of, 71  
 Sociology, Spencer's, 65-78  
 Specialisation, in industry, 75; implies limitation, 75, 76  
 Spencer, Thomas, 12, 13  
 — W. G., 10  
 Survival of the fittest, 30, 38, 59, 80  
*Synthetic Philosophy, The*, begun, 21; greatness of the work, 22; conditions under which written, 22, 23; completion of, 22, 23; translations of, 24 *note*; genesis of, 40; programme of, 40-42; summary of doctrines of, 56, 57; method pursued in, 44, 53, 54
- TENNYSON, 88, 92, 118 *note*  
 Theism, development of, 104; anthropomorphic, 115; cosmic, 117  
 Transcendentalism, 63  
 Tyler, E. B., 99, 100 *note*
- UNIFORMITY of law, 47, 80  
 Unknowable, doctrine of the, 46, 97, 115, 116  
 Utilitarianism, 83-90, 93
- VOLTAIRE, 60 *note*  
 Von Baer's law, 50, 54, 56
- WALLACE, A. R., 31  
 Weismann, 38 *note*  
 Williams, C. M., quoted, 81  
 Wordsworth, 59, 96, 118
- YOUMANS, E. L., 22 *note*



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