

second, and through the second the third is produced from the first; so that the last or ultimate is the first embodied by means of the intermediate. Here is the universal principle—in everything and all things exhibited—and its meaning finds its only expression as that of Cause, Instrument, and Effect. In this fact lies the philosophy of Degrees as applicable to nature, and as the medium of discovery there.

That this principle may be clearly seen, take the case of feeling ending in speech. Here, the feeling is the *cause* of the thought; the thought is the *means* or instrument by which the feeling takes form and is recognisable; and the speech is the *effect* of the Cause (feeling), acting through its instrument (thought) to produce the effect, through that sound in the air, of the primary feeling in others. The meaning of discrete degrees, then, is that the first, inmost, or highest degree is Cause in relation to the others; the second is the means or Instrument for the production of the first in ultimates; and the third is that ultimate or Effect itself which reveals and contains at once the Instrument and the Cause.

Here is a universal principle, then, applicable to all nature, and the key to much that is now enigmatic.¹ For of this we may be certain, if of anything, that nature is the same in the greatest as in the least, her principle one throughout; and the discovery of her mode or principle of operation means the throwing open of her doors to interior knowledge. This principle clears the way for far-reaching analogies, which at once become determinant of interpretations; and men may thereby walk in light where before they walked

¹ For a statement of the principle of Degrees, see Swedenborg's "Divine Love and Wisdom" (Speirs, Bloomsbury, London), and for an elaborate application of it to Anatomy and Physiology see the same writer's "Animal Kingdom" and "Economy of the Animal Kingdom."

in darkness. Nor matters it whether the application be in physics and in chemistry, or in anatomy and physiology. The action of nature is parallel in all degrees and spheres, and discovery through nature's instrument in one sphere throws open the gate of knowledge in all others. If men of science would only trust nature in the use of this principle of a true natural philosophy, they would be able to make such splendid "guesses at truth" that experience would lag behind in impatience, and the vista widen with glorious desire of verification.

Thus we reach the reasons why Haeckelism can never solve the Riddle. They are two-fold: because, in common with science, it has no explicit recognition of Degrees as an interpretative principle; and because, as science does not, it grovels upon the one plane of material continuity. To Haeckelism, true Science, because true insight, is wanting, and true insight, because true principle. We have seen that Haeckelian monism is simply the doctrine of the reduction of all powers and degrees to sameness or identity—as if *that* could constitute the depths of nature or be the solution of her profundities. Yet her profundities are simplicities when once we are willing to know her planes and to follow the lesson of her analogues. Reduce effects to sameness, and how hold the infinite and explain its method? The Haeckelian conception of unity is not variety in unity, but the identity of the dead—dead nature, dead men, extinct immortality, a dead God—all dead before even the simulacrum of life is over. And the eye-sockets of this universal death's head are filled with the sepulchral lights of a sham ghost-soul, the identical of a dead physical energy. Such is the Haeckelian notion of unity and strength and truth and grace.

It cannot conceive of the three forms of substance constituting its grand unity, Divine, Spiritual, and Physical. The Physical cannot pic-

ture, it must *be*, all the rest. There is no good and true and beautiful beyond it. There is no Cause and Instrument of the ever glorious effect, exemplar and correspondent of living forces, human and Divine, known as "the wondrous world we see." Nothing is a symbol to Haeckelism. Poetry and soul have vanished with God and life. We must be, perforce, content to accept the external dead form for the internal and only eternal reality. We must transfer all our living ideal thought, reserved for the inmost beauty and the inmost good, to the electrified dirt of which we are made, and all because we cannot conceive of unity except as expressed in its lowest or physical terms. We are neither philosophic, scientific, nor human in our thought. We take the terms for the meaning, the letter for the spirit, the body for the soul, the external for the internal, the effect for the Cause; and since we are content with the husk, we think others fools and idealists who look for the kernel, who believe that that can alone be found in that Power above us that makes for righteousness and the order of Divine and Spiritual law. And because such believe in a righteous Cause which makes for righteousness, they are held as unwilling to face the facts of nature and life and science, and as eager to read proclivities into nature; yet it is those who so think of them who are the true dreamers of sensuous dreams, the men born blind, who imagine that they see, who mistake for simplicity the annihilation both of Unity and Cause, who leave out humanity from their judgments of nature, just as they leave out God from their essential thought. Their self-intelligence imagines matter as able to do the work of the Divine and endows it with a meaningless necessity, to save themselves from believing in the God whom they rob of His power in order to bestow it under another name upon a physical force which knows neither necessity nor cause.

There is little wonder we should say that Haeckelism will never read the Riddle while it reduces a Divine Universe—the Burning Bush of the Omnipotent Good, the sign of the Ever-present Holy Cause and moving Love—to a waste of physical simulacra of cause, from which inward degrees of order, intelligence, beauty, and life, both spiritual and Divine, are banished for a continuity of atoms with unconscious sensation and will, with a corresponding continuity of force credited with the ability to feel and think.

The only degrees recognized by continuity are those that are, like itself, continuous. It knows that light shades off into darkness, power into helplessness, heat into cold, density into rarity, and all things material into decreasing force and final death—the only form of degrees in which it can believe. Of degrees in discreteness, and above all, of the natural and philosophic principle of such degrees, it knows nothing. In nature, it will recognize no cause but herself; how then can it conceive an instrument by which, as an effect, that nature is produced? Failing, it must attribute infinity to nature; and eternity to its substance.

Level all degrees to the material, by all means, and then, in need of Cause, and in lieu of God, give to your material the properties of the Divine. For to that, by one road or another, for one reason or another, *must* we come at last, and in caricature, right our humanity and God by restoring their claims; only, righting them as you would your neighbour from whom you had stolen his clothes, by decking therewith a scarecrow, or a clown. It is all a hideous caricature and burlesque of genuine thinking, of science and of humanity, and no more an interpretation of the Riddle than it would be to "make a wilderness and call it peace."

In brief, there can be no interpretation where Efficient Cause is absent, discreteness lost in the continuity of

the lowest, and substance denied its unity in variety, by making its lowest form, the All.

CHAPTER XVII

Man—Spiritual Substance, with Immortality

WE leave to Haeckel the elaborate pretence of tracing the soul of man from the moneron, preferring the discussion of the human on its own account. Taking man, body and soul, as he is, we desire to know what may be derived from the facts themselves as to his nature, spiritual or otherwise. We do not therefore directly start with the abstract question whether brain comes from mind or mind from brain, but wish rather to realize what this mind of man's may be—whether substance or not, or just what plain conclusions the facts yield up to us.

The brain of man, commonly credited with being the organ of mind, is a physical organism having certain properties, such as mass, weight, physical and chemical activities, etc., plainly showing itself in these things *plus* its movements to be, so far, a subject of physical force. These discernible physical properties and activities, and, so far as they are concerned, its subjection to physical force, are proof sufficient, if proof were needed, of the brain being a physical substance. At least, it is proved physical in exactly the same way as any substance is proved physical, though in substance that is tangible we do not generally need to go through any syllogistic form to prove sensuous matter to be substance.

The case is other, however, with that indefinite class of effects that, whether appealing to the senses or not, do not directly show substantial properties, and therefore about which we may not be sure at first as to their substantiality, or whether, say, they are but effects of substance—light, for example. Such

an effect, not being matter, because not having substantial properties, is, or may be, a property of some other substance, and may accordingly exhibit itself as such, as, in this case, light may be of the ether. In light and similar qualities we may then have effects of substance, though not themselves substance, proved by their relations in the material sphere, such as creating sensation, or being subject to physical tests, the *impact* or *force* of which is physically felt or seen.

Here is a form or effect of substance which arrests us because of its seeming similarity in general position and qualities to the subject under consideration—man as mind or soul (between which we need not here distinguish); both seeming and sometimes declared, to partake of the intermediate qualities of effects which are not substance. Is this so? Is there any parallel between mind and such intermediate effects in nature? Is mind an effect of substance the impact or force of which is perceived by our senses, and therefore subject to material tests as are these intermediates between the tangible and the intangible? Here we come straight into facts, and probably differentiating facts, and therefore necessary to be dealt with, if only to prepare the way for positive considerations by showing us the negative. The subject, therefore, spaces itself out as follows:—1. Man as mind. *a.* What mind is not; *b.* What mind is. 2. The environment of man as mind. 3. The question of his immortality.

1. MAN AS MIND.

a. What mind is not.

The intermediate effects, such as light, are not substance since they have no substantial properties. Light, briefly, does not occupy space, nor is in itself subject to its laws; it does not possess gravity; it is not inert, nor imponderable: has no property of substance. Yet it affects our bodies and physical conditions, subjective and objective, changing our sensations, inducing physical health, increasing disease, causing material things to appear, inducing new

relations, is physically decomposable, can be shut out of space, etc.—all of which things go to show that, while not a material substance, it can as force from substance, the ether, be materially perceived, and change material conditions. Light, for us, may be summed up as sensation derived by impact of force from etheric substance, and a consequent subject of our physical knowledge.

What, then, of mind? It is not an appearance in space, nor does it appeal objectively or from without; it neither imparts nor removes any physical function, but acts upon such as are given, to increase or retard their power, according to its states; it never enters the physical sphere, is not the subject of physical force, comes under no physical law, is not therefore classable with physical phenomena, having no physical properties; it cannot therefore act physically or within the physical order, but only *upon* it, or *through* it, cannot reveal physical forms or touch physical things: it is not, in turn, the subject of the senses, nor of any physical test—being neither structurally nor chemically observable nor analyzable, because, as we have seen, neither physical nor acting in or among physical conditions or laws, or forces, or facts. Thus, like light, it neither occupies space, nor is the subject of gravitation; though, unlike light, it transcends all physical tests, and, in itself, stands clear of, nor appears amongst, physical associations. In a word, however it may, *qua* mind, influence material organization, mind, as such, is absolutely non-material both in substance (if it *be* substance) and in the sphere of its activities.

We cannot here pass the crude conception that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. Not concerning ourselves with the glaring assumption of the only point in question, that mind is the product of brain, we observe the glaring fallacy of the illustration. The liver is a physical substance, and therefore its

secretions will be physical. The brain is also a physical substance, and therefore *its* secretions will be physical—and are. Is thought among these?

Thus it appears that mind does not enter the material sphere, is not subject to material tests, is not therefore a material substance; and there is consequently no parallel between it and light—or liver.

b. What mind is—its positive aspect.

Let us put brain and mind over against each other and compare them. In brain we have a set of physical properties constituting a physical substance, subject, as such, to physical law: in the mind we have a series of immaterial properties, constituting, therefore, an immaterial substance, subject to immaterial law.

Let us apprehend the *nexus* in the argument—this, that *properties constitute substance*. Here is an absolutely general proposition, which is either true or not true. Haeckel says it is true, and Mr M'Cabe endorses the position. It used, moreover, to be the staple argument employed by the one time materialist lecturers, who put it, and its consequent, thus: Since properties constitute substance, it follows that when the properties disappear the substance involving them ceases; therefore when man dies, he's done with: Q.E.D. We apply the principle, with a difference, but the principle itself holds as good to-day as ever it did.

Do properties constitute substance? Well, if I put a stick in the fire and it is consumed, what has become of the stick? It has, of course, ceased, *as* stick, to exist. Why? because the *properties* of the stick have ceased: had they still existed, the stick would still exist, and because they have ceased, the stick has ceased. And these properties? They were its occupancy of space, its weight, its inertia, its impenetrability, etc. Now all these have gone and the stick with them, nor can the stick be stick again without them: the only condition of your having the stick again is that they

should come back. Consequently, these properties constitute the stick; hence the disappearance of the one means the disappearance of the other. Our principle stands, then: Properties constitute substance.

So long as we apply this dictum to material things, all is plain sailing, and everybody agrees. Nor, while the materialist could freely apply it under his belief of there being only one form of substance, viz., matter, had he any objection to the principle as universal. But somehow, it would be hard to say just why, trouble arises with its use directly an immaterial substance is so much as imagined. But why a universal principle should be true when matter is held the only substance, and lapse from universality when *another* form of substance is suggested, or why a universal principle regarding substance should not be true in all spheres in which substance exists, or can be imagined, it would certainly be hard to explain except from the logical inconsistencies involved in pre-conception. However, we are not wishful either to imagine or to assume an immaterial substance: we only want to prove it; and we do it thus:—

Properties constitute substance.

But the mind, *qua* mind, consists of immaterial properties. Therefore the mind, as such, is immaterial substance.

Can these statements be separately disputed, or their logical form as a whole? Then the fact of an immaterial substance is established, together with the fact that that substance is the mind. But let us "ca' canny," as the Scotch expressively say, and examine the particulars closely. First, then, the major premiss has been proved and needs no further handling; we take it as true that properties constitute substance: and even when we look upon the ashes of the stick as a new form of substance, *that*, as such, is constituted of its properties, like everything else.

Come then to the minor premiss: "the mind, *qua* mind, consists of im-

material properties." We have inserted the phrase "as mind" in order to steer clear of those gentlemen who would immediately blunder into the idea that the mind we are discussing is connected with matter. So it is, but cannot such think of the mind by itself, for once in a way? Now we opine that when the fact of mind *as such* is faced they must admit that the properties of the mind as such, and leaving its origin and relations out of account, are immaterial. If not, then might we advise that some of those *material* mental properties be taken out and tested, say, by nitric acid? They could then observe how they behave and be able to report. But can any sane man really hold that feeling, or desire, or passion, or emotion or even sensation as such, is material? Is *thought* material, or imagination, or the activities of the understanding? Is the power of the perception even of external objects material, *qua* perception or mental fact, and as distinct from the physical correspondent, the eye-sight? Are these, or any mental powers, material? Why, it is their very, as they have imagined it, shady *un*-physical character which has led them to be thought insubstantial and hence unreal, in a word, immaterial. Reasoners start with the preconception that there is no substance but matter, and therefore stand prepared to discount as insignificant, immaterial to any vital purpose, the vague and shadowy and seeming unreal forms they call even their own minds. When unreality begins there, they are doomed to find reality nowhere; so, if you please, we return to our syllogism and press it home that in this minor premiss—"mind, as such, consists of immaterial properties"—we have only a piece of plain and unmistakable truth.

Or perhaps they question, not that these properties are immaterial, but that the immaterialities of the mind are *properties*? If then, all phases of feeling and thought and mental activity are not mental properties, what are they? Or what are the mind's true properties?

Either these mental factors or properties constitute the mind or not. If not these, what are those that do? Because we shall be quite willing to accept any description or arrangement of mental properties decided on, providing only that they *are* mental, and then we shall have to find how it is that these said properties do *not* constitute mind. But in truth there is no escape from the position that mental facts are mental properties, and that such properties constitute mental substance, and are necessarily immaterial.

This brings us to the conclusion from these premisses, "Therefore, the mind, as such, is immaterial substance." If properties constitute substance, and these properties are immaterial in any given case, then assuredly that given case is immaterial substance, be it mind or whatever else. If it be asked in scorn, *What* is an immaterial substance? We can safely reply, That which is constituted of immaterial properties. You see, you have to bring your mind up to this new fact, *down* to it, if you will; but come to it you must if you would be true to yourself and your reason on premisses you have never hitherto thought of repudiating. But if you find any difficulty in the word "immaterial" we can easily substitute an equivalent—*spiritual*, for instance; and then the issue is that you find proved on your hands that which, not improbably, you may have spent your life in denying—that there is an actual spiritual substance and that that immaterial, mental or spiritual substance turns out, for you, to be—yourself; that you yourself are a spiritual fact or substance, one in this spiritual substantiality with all the world of mind; and that it is proved to you on premisses you may always have held your own.

One more point here. Since man is mind or spiritual substance, and substance of whatsoever kind is necessarily body, and organic substance is necessarily organic body or organism, it follows that man or mind is a spiritual body or organism: and there-

fore that "there *is* a natural body and there is a spiritual body"—as a certain professed authority has declared; thus, that man *is* mind and *has* a body; or, what is the same thing, is a spiritual body and has a physical.

So much for the first point here: mind is negatively and positively considered; with the result that mind, hence man, is spiritual substance. This essential point made, we desire now to realize

2. *The environment of man as spiritual substance or mind.*

Great stress is laid by science, and rightly laid, on environment, especially as essential to the very being and development of the enviroined; but of course the environment which Science considers is that of the physical body. It has not yet opened itself to the contemplation (except in unreal or dream moments) of a possible environment of mind as coming naturally or legitimately within its province. It is this point we desire to unfold.

Mind, then, is substance, but though in absolute correspondence with brain is not identical with it, since brain is material, and mind is immaterial substance. Since, however, every substance has, and in the nature of the case, must have an environment, it follows that mind as spiritual substance has an environment adapted to its nature as spiritual substance, and therefore one of identical quality of substance with itself, that is to say, spiritual. This is inevitable seeing that, of course, the environment must always be of a like general kind with the essential nature of the enviroined—physical with physical, spiritual with spiritual. As there is a physical sphere which is the proper environment of the physical body, so there is manifestly a spiritual sphere, which is, and alone can be, that proper environment of the spiritual body or organism which is of necessity to its existence, as is the material sphere to the material body. The argument and the parallel hold inevitably, since the

idea of a body of any kind without an environment is absurd. As we have seen proof of a spiritual body, the environment follows of necessity, even were there no evidence of its existence; but its presence must be indicated.

What is the meaning of the common facts of telepathy, in which one mind can influence or deliberately will another, and all quite normally, to do or to think certain things without even the consciousness of being so willed or influenced? Such minds may be quite unknown to each other, mere passers by in the street, yet one willing the other to turn round, he does so. What is the path of communication? There certainly is one, and as we shall see, merely physical influence will not suffice to explain it; and to those who assert the so-called influence to be an affair of chance, we have only to say that they know nothing of the matter. Circumstances which may be repeated at will cannot pass into the currency of life on a basis of fortuity. There is no question of a trance-state among the facts indicated: all is perfectly normal and, in many cases, quite of the web of the life—as usual as the open asking and answering of questions. The whole fact is based precisely on the fact of a *mental* intercourse, whether as distinct from a physical or as based upon it, and those who are most distinctively in mental sympathy need least of the physical media and may voluntarily use none whatever. Thought passes thus from mind to mind without a glance of the eye, or a movement of the lips, or the faintest indication of physical recognition, equally in company, as alone, just as well out of physical presence as in it, and often with not a thought of intention on the part of either mind. To deny such human states or modes is really to put one's self out of court: and not to see, moreover, that all life is indirectly based on it, that social intercourse and the solidarity of life have this as their unrecognised law of communication, is to fail in the realisa-

tion of the most human of human facts.

Well, we know all about that, some will say, but the question, when all is said, is simply a physical problem: if mind communicates with mind in this way, it is through *brain* that it is done; the physical agency is, in the last analysis, the only permanent explanation—apart from that offered for incidental circumstances by the thousand and one intangible ways in which physical communications may be unconsciously produced. Let us, then, look closely at a case in point, admitted, for the sake of argument, as being a genuine case of such communication. Suppose that into the mind of a person in company there has come an idea, and that without willing or not willing anything in the matter, he in wonder hears that idea, relevant of nothing at the moment, suddenly given expression to by another of the company—what, supposing this a genuine case of communication, is the offered explanation? The first person, whether conscious of thinking in words or not, is supposed to have done so, but whether or not, the feeling or idea entering his mind becomes, it is said, a physical force because emanating from brain, creates a wave of invisible force, which, radiating forth from itself, even as speech might, finds a brain in state congenial with its own, and that recipient brain, receiving the impact, the idea is conveyed to it as sent forth, even as speech might convey thought, and that mind, in turn, gives utterance to it, quite unconscious of its origin. The whole process is assumed as physical, and as requiring no other or additional explanation.

On the physical theory alone, consider now what the brain-force is imagined to effect. Into the mind of one quietly conversing or playing cards, there enters an idea about some subject, and another present immediately expresses it. Solution: brain-force does it. Reply: brain-force is a fine pseudonym for physical force, yet all the

physical force involved is merely that caused in a single brain-cell by the entrance of an idea. Yet without any voluntary act, or the intention of the mind it enters to send it forth again, that cell-movement, which, physically, *is limited there to conveyance of an impression to certain ganglia or other cells*, is supposed to be of such intensity as to send a wave of motion through the brain substance and skull and intervening atmosphere of certain yards across, of power enough to pierce another skull and brain-substance and find its way, itself untaught, to a certain cell of that brain, animating it to think and speak by the positive creation of a new idea!

Is this science or nescience? It would assuredly require some considerable physical force to accomplish the feat, by such a path. What new power is this? And think of the skill and knowledge involved; or was it the attraction of gravitation perchance? It was at least the feeling or idea that started the force and sent it out on its arduous journey, just as it was the reciprocal feeling that met and entertained it on its mental path from mind to mind. And why should *not* instantaneous thought-force, through the spiritual sphere, do what clumsy physical force would find impossible? Nevertheless, thought-force it was that produced the whole business, whatever royal chariot it may have used to reach its end.

Granting that the physical force of the brain could do the physical work with which it is accredited, that which is conveyed, when all is said, is a *feeling* or *idea*, and the more clearly so in the case in which the original thinker does not think out in detail, or at all, the feeling or thought entering his mind and in which it is conveyed as a general impression to the recipient. That feeling or idea sets up brain action, which is conveyed to brain and there reproduced. It is incumbent on those who say this to explain how a mental process can be conveyed across

space on a brain-wave—by a purely physical channel, *i.e.*,—and physically reproduced. That is to say, the explanation omits to account for the main factor in the case—the conveyance of something *non-physical* by a physical or brain-force. Granting the brain-force conveyed (the physical explanation having as much right to the physical *form* of communication as the spiritual has to the mental *substance*) how, by such a channel, does the brain-force convey the feeling, or how is it conveyed at all *unless there is a spiritual sphere of environment for the conveyance of spiritual substance*, just as there is a physical or brain-sphere for the conveyance of the brain-force, or form of the idea? It is not with the physical sphere we are concerned but with the mental as the conveying environment of the mental state: and while we maintain with strictness that the physical basis of brain, as well as the physical basis of environment both visible and invisible, are necessary for the corresponding mental states in the recipient, we can by no means justify the physical half of the fact being stated for the whole, and the question treated as if the impact of material force covered all the case.

What is certain is that since mental and physical are conjoined in the brain, both for the production and the reception of the feeling, they must also be conjoined in its transmission; thus that, the facts being witness, there can be no communication of mental states without a mental sphere any more than there can be a communication of physical states without a physical sphere: the two must be maintained throughout; and the conclusion indicated is that this mental or spiritual sphere or environment constitutes, by necessity of its very place and meaning, a common sphere of all souls, *the spiritual world* in other words, within the physical and acting in correspondence with it, yet not subject to its laws; as the mind or soul is within the body and in corre-

spondence with it, though neither physical nor interpretable by the laws of matter.

As facts pointed for long to the existence of an ether, the source of light, within gross matter, till it became no longer an hypothesis but a reality accepted and proved, so do facts otherwise inexplicable point to the hypothesis of a spiritual world within the natural as the ultimate explanation of the origin, existence and sustenance of mind, and to the true disclosure of the nature of man. The existence of an all-permeating sphere of spiritual substance within the physical, and using all its degrees of Aura, Ether and Air for spiritual ends, satisfies the facts of mind and life down to their physical relations, and shows the means by which feeling and thought are inter-communicated, even here, by a spiritual environment in this world and in that, and lifts our sight to a wide outlook upon otherwise intangible, inscrutable phenomena which are as wide as the world and as old as man and his interior, significant emotions. For minds, even in this world, do not and cannot come into the physical atmosphere; they are, in strictness, not *here* at all—like light, in space without being of it or in any manner its subjects. If they were, they would be as much under physical force—gravitation and its fellows—as are physical objects themselves; and that conception of things reduces even thinking itself to the absurd.

Running as an undertone through all this, to some minds, will be the refrain, What then, *is* spiritual substance? Let such first ask themselves what a *material* substance may be; whether they know *that* in itself, or anything which is a subject of knowledge, except by its forces, appearances, relations, effects and laws; and whether they do not know spiritual substance precisely in the same way—only that they have not allowed themselves directly to contemplate it. In truth, this spiritual knowledge is the only

direct knowledge they have; yet they seem willing to use this primal source of human perception and power for the investigation of any object but itself. True, Psychology on the natural side of the mind seems willing to entertain a psychic research. Yet, too, these feelings, thoughts and mental energies have as fixed and definite relations among each other as have the organs of the body, or the constituents of any physical substance. Yet again, these relations and their laws are no more identical with gravitation and its affinities, as exemplified even in the body itself, to say nothing of external nature, and no more convertible into them or they into mind, than are feelings into forms of matter, or inorganic substances into thoughts and emotions. Who has weighed sentiments in scales or measured duty by a tape-line? If there is no common standard of measurement for spiritual and physical phenomena, it is because each is the subject of its own distinctive form of force, and to be directly interpreted only by means of its own laws. Two sets of properties, then; two sets of laws; two forms of substance—here is the primal fact with which we have to deal; but what in itself any substance may be, its creator alone can know.

We, in our ignorance, deal with external forms which we call facts and things, using them as if they were realities; but he who, while so using them, sees deeper, knows that they are but counters and symbols expressive of the Casual Divine Substance behind which and its meaning we cannot pass. At our first approach to nature, her cry is "Symbol!" In our last knowledge of her depths, it is symbol still before which we must bow. The test of our quality is this: Do we, in spite of all, worship the Reality of the Divine Human in our inmost hearts, or only the barren Symbol of it—which in itself, is nought, and only becomes Truth as it reveals and expresses that Divine?

3. The Immortality of man as a spiritual organism.

Since man is rationally concluded to be a spiritual organism having a spiritual environment, we naturally turn to enquire as to the possibilities of immortality so far as our knowledge of his nature reveals them. Here, too, the facts speak with no uncertain voice.

This spiritual environment, or sphere, or world, within the physical, we must try to place in the scale of being, and to discover its meaning there. According to the doctrine of Degrees and also of Rational, as distinguished from Naturalistic Monism, we see that the three forms or spheres of substance stand as Cause, Instrument and Effect—the Divine, the Spiritual and the Physical: that is to say, the Divine Substance produces the Spiritual Substance or World from Itself, and through it, as Instrument or Secondary Cause, produces the Physical, or world of Effects. From this it appears that, to us, and from our point of view, the spiritual sphere or world is the cause of the natural world.

This brings on a principle before adverted to, which it is necessary should be more distinctly apprehended: the absence of Cause, even in a secondary sense, from nature or the physical Degree, and its presence only in the sphere of mind or the spiritual. Of course it is a truism that nature is a line of sequence exhibited as antecedent and consequent, and therefore those who have no idea where true Cause is to be found as shown by a Rational Monism, and are ignorant of the conception of a sphere above or within nature from which its Cause descends or emanates, either think at once to find that yet necessary origin to the satisfaction of their need of Cause by going back among these sequences a little way—beyond *i.e.*, the horizon of their tiny ken—and there, arbitrarily stopping the sequence, call the cloud-matter there imagined, the Infinite and Eternal Cause of all that follows in sequential order—either this, or else

they imagine the one great sequential fact of the Universe to be itself the Cause of its own order and therefore of itself.

It is plain, however, that since it is this physical universe itself that has to be explained as to its Cause (being admittedly an effect only, and in every step of its process) it is an illegitimate proceeding to credit the effect to be explained with being its own cause, and one untrue to that universal philosophic principle by which the conception of Cause is rendered rational, *viz.*: the explanation of facts as to their origin out of and apart from themselves, as to their instrumental agency by which alone the Cause can operate to produce them, and as to the effect itself that needs explanation in the light of its origin and instrument. Here is a universal principle which faces man everywhere and always, in every detail of his own nature, of the world, and of life, yet the last object to which he seems to think it necessary to apply that principle is the universe itself which, before all, and as such, needs explanation in the light of Cause. This principle shows plainly that Cause not being in nature, if still Cause there is (and Cause there must be whatever else there is) it must be found outside of, in the sense of interior to, the physical sequence of nature—in an Infinite and Eternal within or beyond or above nature, giving law to it, and not in any sense physically part of it or subject thereto.

Now, since the one fact known to us as cause in nature, but not of it, or approximating to it, is *mind*, it follows that in this fact lies the key to Cause. For, plainly, if mind is strictly the only conceivable originating Cause, even finite mind approximating thereto, it directly follows that the true and only rightful Cause in the last sense as Primal Originating Power, is an Infinite and Eternal Mind. Applying here therefore, the only Causal Principle—that from which, that by which, and that into which—and interpreting the

physical universe now as it only can and should be interpreted, viz., by that principle; having first discovered the Efficient Cause as Mind, we next find the necessary Instrumental Agency in that sphere of mind or the spiritual, derived from that Primal Mind, and to which man essentially belongs, and as that through which the physical is necessarily produced. The direct agent, then, by which this world was and is produced—the Spiritual world, or relative world of Cause—is the world of mind. Now as that Mind as Secondary Cause is not only *in* man but *is* man, it follows that, under the Primal Cause, this spiritual or universal derivative sphere of mind in and around man is the cause of all that we know as physical, including of course, man's physical body.

Looking abroad then on this physical world or ultimate plane of being, we see it as the theatre of decay and of reproduction: that is to say, individuals die physically but the reproductive cause persists—it is immortal; and even if this world itself were to perish, the cause behind it could not, would not cease to operate. For it is a principle of order that though a specific effect may cease, the cause continues. Hence all things that have life, therefore all physical bodies, perish in turn, but life itself continues, the proof of the continuance of cause. But the cause of man's body in man *is* man, since the spiritual is the cause of the physical: that cause continues, man therefore continues as an organised spiritual body. He remains where he always was even while in the flesh—a denizen of the spiritual world. Man does not die, since man is mind, and mind is cause relatively to physical body. That body ceases, as living individual physical effects always do, but he himself lives on since the cause continues although the effect may cease. And the spiritual in man, which man *is*, is the cause of the physical which man has; and with the immortality of the cause relatively to the effect which is

the body, the immortality of man would seem a proved conclusion, even when, and even because, his physical body has ceased to be. He has himself, a spiritual Agent, a necessarily continuous life in the sphere of Causes, of which he is and always has been a part. For the spiritual is the world of causes, as the physical is the world of effects. Immortality is secured through the up-building and consolidation of the organised spiritual body during its abode in the flesh, in immediate connection with the First, through will and thought. And this immortality applies to all men in virtue of their existence in the causal world; but immortality is not eternal life.

CHAPTER XVIII

Free Determination

“THE freedom of the will,” says Haeckel (p. 6), “is not an object for critical scientific enquiry at all, for it is a pure dogma, based on an illusion, and has no real existence.” Again, p. 47, “The great struggle between the determinist and the indeterminist, between the opponent and the sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended to-day, after more than 2000 years, completely in favour of the determinist. The human will has no more freedom than that of the higher animals, from which it differs only in degree, not in kind. In the last century the dogma of liberty was fought with general philosophic and cosmological arguments. The nineteenth century has given us very different weapons for its definitive destruction—the powerful weapons which we find in the arsenal of comparative physiology and evolution. We now *know*¹ that each act of the will is as fatally determined by the organisation of the individual, and as dependent on the momentary condition

¹ Italics not Haeckel's in this one place of the quotation.

of his environment, as every other psychic activity. The character of the inclination was determined long ago by *heredity* from parents and ancestors; the determination to each particular act is an instance of *adaptation* to the circumstances of the moment wherein the strongest motive prevails, according to the laws which govern the statics of emotion. Ontogeny teaches us to understand the evolution of the will in the individual child. Phylogeny reveals to us the historical development of the will within the ranks of our vertebrate ancestors."

This statement consists of assumptions which it may be useful to analyse.

1. That the character of the inclination is determined by ancestry. The answer is that in no case is the character of the inclination the same as that inherited, the original inclination being modified, and daily modified, both by the general character of the individual and by his surroundings, as well as by the man himself. Nor does the statement, even were it true, touch the character of the *act*, as free or otherwise, that not being eventually determined by inclination inherited or modified but by *the man*, through the separate faculty of *judgment* given in each case upon the inclination. Nor is the inheritance of original inclination in question seeing that no one doubts the fact. It was necessary for Haeckel, in order to show that the *character* of the inclination is inherited, to prove (1), that inherited inclination is never modified, and (2), that it is always acted out. Whereas *all* inclinations are at some time checked or modified, and some, even the strongest, prohibited from issuing in action, and themselves *never* act in any case.

2. That acts of will are determined by organisation and environment. It suffices to reply that, as a matter of fact, they are *not*, but are determined by *the man*, acting *from* judgment *through* will, by *the use* of his organisation and environment. Organisation and environment never act of them-

selves any more than inclinations; and certainly judgment always has a voice, even when disregarded. Action determined by organisation and environment, without judgment, would clearly be automatic and necessary; the man himself, confounded with his organisation, would be an automaton; and the statement that makes him so, an incompetent analysis.

3. That "the strongest motive prevails" in the determination to each act. The statement, true in itself, is useless for Haeckel's purpose unless he can show that the strongest motive is an inherited unmodified inclination in all and every case; that the *motives* act, without the man; and that judgment has no place in human action. On the contrary, the fact is that all motives are *formed*, and formed *from* judgment (more or less obscure) *upon* inclination, by the man—the whole man, and that the strongest motives arise precisely in *resistance* to the assumed all-dominant principle of inclination and heredity, from that slowly formed, increasing power of judgment, which all fresh circumstances demand. For judgments and motives are not general in their character but *special*, given under arising circumstances. Neither of these are, nor ever could be inherited, in the nature of the case, and form no part of the original organisation and continued environment; though the *capacity* for both does so. The strongest motive, in fact, is that which appeals to the *whole* man as against *particular* inclinations; and if even the motive were original to his organisation, which it is not, Haeckel would still have to prove that it is the *motive* which acts, and not *the man* in the use of the motive.

4. That the determination to each particular act is an instance of "adaptation" to the circumstances of the moment. He means, if he means the fact, that the determination to each act is an "adaptation" not *to* the circumstances, but of them, towards

a further end in the man himself, determined by his judgment among and upon them, and effected by his will.

5. Neither "the evolution of the will in the individual child," nor "the development of the will within the ranks of our invertebrate ancestors," are of the slightest significance in the problem till the essential developed human facts are settled. We can only solve the problem of free-determination, however, not by answering assumptions that don't even touch the real point, but by obtaining a comprehensive view of man's nature, thus narrowing down upon the actual facts which show the character and causes of his determinations.

1st. Necessity and choice are both facts of life. A very general cast of mind is that which only troubles to see one side of any question. If it adopts "necessity," for example, it will not recognise freedom of choice; if it believes in freedom, it repudiates necessity. Our position is that both have their place.

Man is, *of necessity*, under physical law in a physical world, and so long as he chooses to continue here. He must breathe, he must eat, and he may not eat poisons—if he pleases to remain. His general physical conditions are thus determined for him. Yet that determination has its limits. He must breathe and eat if he wishes to remain, but he *need* not remain: the physical law under which he must necessarily act does not compel him to stay under it. Nor does it compel him, though he must live somewhere, to abide by this or that locality. He must eat, but among all the varieties of food provided, nothing is *determined* for him after his power of choice arrives; and he can control the preference if he should find his natural taste tending to limit his choice. Pleasure is his natural motive, but the sense of duty to himself or to others may set it aside: since, be his acts free or provided, he must alike act from motive. It thus appears

that neither necessity nor freedom is absolute; nor can they be in a conditioned creature with a field of choice—whatever that choice may prove to mean; but, assuredly, if necessity were his law, absoluteness would be its mode of rule, and the fact that it is not so is the clearest proof he could have that his acts are not determined but the results of individual freedom in an enveloping sphere—Coleridge's freely moving water in a ball of crystal.

Such is the view under which natural circumstances present man; and though complications arise from artificial life, the principle is essentially the same throughout—that of necessity as the background of free determination. The only element under these natural conditions indicating the complications of advanced life—the point, in short, at which difficulty enters, is that of the control of personal preference and the substitution of a motive named duty—to his physical well-being, for instance, or from regard to the welfare of others—for that of instinctive pleasure. Suppose the case of pleasing another instead of self. Here are two motives; do we ask which is the stronger? The question cannot be answered, and to judge from results is merely to beg the point; but this we know that if determinism is true, and if the case ends in pleasing another, the man was *necessitated* to please that other, had no choice between motives, one motive (supposing both existed) being everything and the other nothing; that the motives made no appeal to the man to act; that they themselves acted, using the man (reduced to muscles) as their instrument; that the man had no concern with the question at issue—if there was to him a question at all—nor with the result, could have no interest in such matters, could not determine, and would not care to determine, whether the action, all one to him either way, were right or wrong; and as the result here, being a type of all results, the man himself is free from responsibility, and necessarily free, in matters which he has not decided, seeing that it was

not or is not *he* that decides or acts, and not even *his* motives (for they are *not* his), but those of certain powers of quite arbitrary kind, not in the least under his control, and forming no part of him as a responsible agent. In fact, he has neither motive, nor will, nor executive power—the strange motive which has conquered, possessing all, and being the only actor in the drama: himself as motive will or power, being but a simulacrum.

Here is the issue of determinism; and a straight-speaking matter-of-fact man would make no bones about calling such contravention of fact a piece of downright nonsense. But it is the science of Haeckelistic Monism. Yet what are motives, says our straight-speaking friend, apart from the man? If they are not his, whose are they, and how do they come to be motives at all? Nay, *what* are they, apart from the man? Are they persons that they should have an interest in courses of action, and in forcing special results, moral, immoral, or indifferent? Why should they seek to maintain their own way, or how could they as impersonal feelings? Are *they* the man, then, after all? If so, we can begin, he says, to understand that it was not they that acted, or could act, but the man himself whose motives they were; that therefore, he alone was responsible for the results; acted among primary capacities more or less formed into inclinations and among conditions necessitated by his existence, but acted among these in freedom by deciding for himself what it was right or best or desirable to do; but with the action his, and the responsibility his always, and knowing it—knowing also the absurdity of believing that a motive ever carried *itself* out into act in this or any other world.

On the lines thus laid down, of choice on the background of necessity we come to consider

2nd. That man is a recipient of life and mental power. "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" is a question applicable to all the primary

or constituent elements of humanity. Man is essentially, that is, as to his root powers, the subject of a gift, including that of the universe itself. It is this fact, no doubt, that has led some to the idea that since he is a gift to himself—a product, as to its essential capacities, in which he has had no share—he is in no way responsible for what he does and becomes as the result of the use of these capacities and their environment: since his life, mental and bodily, has been received he is bound to act as he is made, such think, and is not free to be more, less, or other, than was the life and power originally bestowed by their conditions. This position is called that of common-sense, and is likened by some to a "wolf" devouring all opposed to it.

This vaunted position is manifestly unphilosophic, not to say superficial and confused in its thinking. It might have been fairly supposed, in the first place, by any one capable of entering such a discussion, that it was not quite the fact of man's being "made," whether by God or a goddess heredity, that settled or even touched the question of his determination, free or otherwise. That question is not opened by the assertion, for the palpable reason that it is not the mere fact of his being made, but *how* he has been made, that is likely to throw any light upon the character of his determinations. Who shall affirm that the Infinite could not make man in such fashion that he shall, subject to his natural limitations, be free to act with choice among the powers bestowed upon him? The only supposed infinite that could not do this would be that of Matter-force, whose law is necessity absolute, or determinism; but does not this throw light back upon the nature and limits of that suggested infinite?

Again, these individual limitations are another source of confusion. It seems to be supposed that because every man is limited, and cannot exceed his limits or rise into a plane of

power the original elements for which are lacking in him, no man is free *within* his limits or capable of indefinite voluntary expansion, or of equally voluntary retardation of his powers by neglect or misuse. Thus a man who, lacking the original capacities is not free to be a Shakespeare, or a Browning, would be considered in no sense free, not even to expand or retard the common elements of humanity in himself, and hold himself an embodiment of righteousness or permit himself to slip gradually backward and to become a sot. Here, again, what if the "how" of his making permitted this very freedom from necessity by leaving him to act apart from the compulsion either of original desire or of original motive, by a principle applicable to all men alike and quite apart from the original composition of his nature?

Again, it seems to be imagined under this notion of "making" that man is born with every faculty he is afterwards found employing, whereas in no case is a man born into any power, as are the animals, but only into certain latent capabilities. These afterwards take, under many varieties, the general forms of will, thought, and executive faculty; but one law controls them in common—they have to be *formed*, and into that formation in any given direction, there enters not, as imagined, the consent or compulsion of the original capacities or tendencies, but the consent of the free impersonal principle above referred to, backed by the *self*-compulsion of the individual, acting in its light, and always in opposition to some or other of these original tendencies. To speak as if the power making man had given him a primary will already formed, from which he cannot in any circumstances depart, is palpably wide of the fact.

The will is not an original specialised power, but a *capacity for willing*; and that capacity has to be exerted all along the line of growth, by the individual (who is more than will) in whom it is under the direction and instruction of

an altogether different faculty. In short, Man's original gift of life and mind, and until he becomes a voluntary agent, knows only *tendencies*, which, within certain limits in every case, may take any direction, according to the moulding power of individual self-compulsion, acting under accepted enlightenment from without. Of this, more hereafter. Man's powers, *as man*, are neither given, nor inherited; but the tendencies or capacities within the limits assigned the individual alone constitute the *necessary* element of man's life. To confound this necessary gift—necessary as a basis for the building up of man—with the free powers thereafter acquired and built on that foundation by the man himself, is to confound at the outset the difference, eternally essential to manhood, between necessity and free determination. Further, the secret assumption in this "making" of man notion is that these original elements or tendencies of his nature *themselves act*. This is so transparently fallacious that the wonder is it has never suggested its own erroneousness. It is, however, the true key to Determinism, and means this: there is no neutral, independent, reflective power or agent standing between the tendency and the act, but it is the tendency itself that goes forth into act, so that the act is simply transformed, automatic tendency, otherwise called *will*.

It is a significant circumstance in the light of this deterministic making of man, that the powers bestowed upon him, derived by him, and essentially constituting his unformed inherited nature—the powers called feelings, affections, desires, emotions, motives, in a word, tendencies or latent capacities which some say God has bestowed, and which determine all actions, are precisely those powers in man *which never act at all*, and *could not*, from the nature of the case.

Here is the part of man's nature equally claimed by us and by determinism as, of necessity, the primary gift

i.e. power

to man, the body of tendencies with which he starts his inheritance, which are supposed to bring man into the deterministic sphere; and fully accepting the necessity of such inheritance, we ask for proof that it is these tendencies that act or that effect action. That they prompt to action, is true, and it is also true that each has its individual motive (so to say) for its prompting; but that they themselves ever act or carry out activities is plainly not the fact, however necessary the supposition may be for determinism. It is, in one form or other, and however covertly expressed, the root of the necessitarian idea.

Yet these tendencies have their place. It is not their function to act, but to *desire* action to be done; and they might clamour till the opportunity passed—they might suggest, beseech, impel, and all to no purpose in action so far as they are concerned, if some other power did not determine and execute the determination. Between these tendencies and the act, there is the fixed gulf of voluntary origination of action. The man himself is the court of appeal, decision and determination, through the powers in him, other than tendencies, appropriate to their purpose, down to and through the very muscles of his body.

From which it appears that, as in the ordinary external facts of his life in natural circumstances, so here in the inmost of his mind and character, a place for necessity exists; but as in the outward forms of his life, so here again, this necessary background or basis of life and action is the prepared sphere for a higher class of powers and functions, in which he himself, the whole man, as compared with the desires of the individual inclination, steps in between specific desire and its desiderated act, approves or rejects, but in all cases decides; and forthwith the action is settled, whether for or against. He acts among his tendencies *as if he himself had created them*: they are gifts to him, but among the gifts he

has power to choose as from himself, and as his freedom emerges and becomes enlarged and confirmed by voluntary choice, it is at last himself that decides and determines, free king among his powers. But how this is brought about we have yet to see.

3rd. That man is a re-transmitter and distributor of power, whether original or acquired.

Observing the basis of necessity as shown by the gift of man's life to him, with its attendant inclinations; we perceive that as matter of fact, and in the nature of the case, it is not these original elements or gifts that act or determine conduct. We realise in a general way, that such determinations are the results of the man's own judgment and executive power or will acting upon, among, and from the bulk of his original nature as against some particular inclination at any one time. We further realise that the bulk of that nature, or executive powers consisting of judgment and will, are not found already formed to his hand within him, but are formed by the man himself according to some principle *not* given in his original constitution but accepted by himself from without and applied by him, voluntarily, to the control and regulation of the necessary and inherited inclinations or gifts from within. Perceiving and in a measure realising these things, we desire to complete this rough survey of the facts at this point by making good the position that it is man himself that determines and acts—a determination and action shown in his ability to arrest, re-transmit and distribute, as a conscious personal act, either the original or the acquired powers within him. When we have considered the significance of this re-distributing faculty, we shall enquire into the origin of these distributing powers—afterwards investigate the source of that ability in him to stand between his bestowed or necessary gifts and the free-determinations of his life; and then consider the free principle by which he accepts from without the

guiding means to that end; closing with some account of this free- or self-determination in reference to the origin of evil.

We consider now the import of man's re-transmission of power. When the original tendencies (using that word in its widest application) have become formed into any measure of explicitness as desire, their appeal for satisfaction is continually being made to the man, and he accepts that appeal as to himself, made by some element within himself—holds the desire, indeed, as consciously his own, because within himself. Does he therefore at once proceed to gratify it? Not necessarily; there may be a variety of considerations against that course; even one may be powerful enough to check compliance. Compliance of whom? Of the *MAN as an agent capable, and consciously capable, of granting or refusing* the request made by part of his nature to the whole.

Varieties of appeals may thus be made easy or difficult in fulfilment; but variety and difficulty are alike non-essentials of the problem. It is the appeal itself that is the question—the appeal to the man as capable of granting or of refusing the desire. Again, he may not at the moment be in a condition, either from strength of feeling or from external considerations, to do other than answer in one way, but that also is an accident of the moment, peculiar to that desire, and non-essential to the problem—which is that the appeal is made to one to whom a *right of decision* is fundamental (whether he has given away that right in any given case or not), to whom, however, no such right is absolute but relative, because to one to whom freedom is a *growth*—as of necessity it must be to one who may equally have to decide against, as for, the appealing desire. As a man emancipates himself from the necessitarian tyranny of inherited inclination by using the inclination *for other ends than its own*, sought strictly by himself as a man with a human ideal purpose—such a man is in the process

of growth in freedom, sloughing off the necessitarian conditions requisite to the life of a necessary gift, to put on the free determination of a living man. "To whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey."

What, then, happens when the inclinations make their appeal? An inevitable halt of mental operations—a mental pause, a turning of the mind's attention to the desire and the new position it creates. No matter how relatively swift the whole process may be, that mental pause for direct consideration of the problem is inevitable. Whence does it come? Can we imagine automatic powers considering what they will do next, let alone pausing to consider? Can we conceive them as necessitating decision or as accomplishing it? Is it possible that automatic action should weigh evidence, look carefully at either side, ponder long and even anxiously and painfully the problem and its possibilities, should come to a decision with a full consciousness of responsibility, and think out ways and means by which the decision may be effected? Such consideration is incredible and pause for it impossible. That pause marks the boundary between free and automatic action. Before it, comes the clamorous, irreflective automatism of irresponsible desire; after it, the consideration and decision of a man reaching forth to freedom, or willing to sell it for a taste of pleasure. The pause and consideration do not mean that the man is freeing himself in that subject of decision before him: they merely mean that he is free to *be* free if he only wills to throw off the yoke and to be more and greater than that he would conquer.

We thus see the great place occupied in human life by decision and the inevitable mental arrest in order to it. There is more, however, in this arrest, or halt, or pause. Its object is to gather up the mental forces for a particular end, and that end is *the*

deliberate mental grip of the subject or desire urged by the inclination, with a clear view not merely to adjudication thereon, but to a possible or inevitable *redistribution* of the powers and the relations of the powers involved, according to the results of the adjudication. This thereupon happens. As soon as any decision is arrived at, the man takes upon himself the burden of its issue; makes the decision *his* decision, even as the will producing it he believes and knows to be *his* will. That decision may involve a new relation to the whole world about him, or it may affect but a small corner of personal feeling.

In either case, the outlook and the relation of his powers are alike new; and this new attitude has been reached by an arrest of the flow of his ordinary feeling or inclination, by the deliberate seizure of that new feeling as his own, and by the voluntary forth-putting or distribution of it into the channels indicated, and to the purpose in view, when his re-determination was reached. Whatever be the explanation, that voluntary re-distribution is a fact, just as the arrest and reconsideration of the direction of his powers was a fact: facts both, of which the meaning is by no means difficult to see. There first stands the clear truth that he not only does these things, but that it is his function as a man to do them, for which he is equipped with the powers. His ability to arrest and re-distribute his powers and his conscious standing in the breach between the old and the new, the past and the future, for that very end, is a position the first count in which is the utter foreignness from it, as from himself, of any determination of his actions for him, and one not to be answered by the statement that the arrest and re-distribution are facts indeed, but that the powers of judgment and will accomplishing them are determined to that very end.

He knows, on the contrary, how that judgment and will have been formed; that they could not, in the nature of the

case, determine anything in the sense of effecting it; that if they were the powers of an executive personality they might accomplish such work, but only then as the faculties and instruments of that personality using them for that specific end. He will never believe that powers can use personality when he knows that his personality uses its powers. He knows, too, that the crux of the question is there, and that he will never accede the control of his personality to any powers whatever—that to do that is the last degradation of man. He holds personality first and his powers for the sake of it—not his personality for his powers. It is as a personal self or whole, that he intervenes to arrest and re-distribute powers—the powers belonging to him—appropriates the facts of feeling and motive as his, the right to determine as his, his also the responsibility, and the results as matter for personal appropriation. Such is the plea and conviction of the human consciousness; and we may yet be able to see that it is fairly well founded.

If this fact of re-distribution, and of consequent acceptance of responsibility needed confirmative illustration, such can be found as a physical correspondent in man's own body. Determinism ought to think that when an idea enters a brain-cell it conveys itself at once, and without arrest, to the periphery and so into action. Apart from the recently observed fact of the transmission first by a loose fibre to a neighbouring cell of the movement to be conveyed into the body, it is to be noted that when the movement leaves the brain it is conveyed to some one of the ganglia clustered about the brain and along the spinal marrow, and from the ganglion it is re-transmitted to its destination. The function of these ganglia is to arrest, and re-distribute after arrest, the power to be conveyed to the internal organs of the body or to the periphery. No movement is ever directly conveyed to the organs involved; but is arrested in these cell-

clusters, held there, and re-transmitted from thence to its destination. The ganglion is the bodily will, as the will is the mental ganglion: their functions are in strict correspondence; for here is not merely an illustration of the will's function in arrest and transmission of feeling, it is a physiological correspondent—a practical exhibition in the body of nature's method in the mind—of the personal responsibility thrown upon the will in gathering, considering, accepting and re-transmitting afresh, *from itself and as its own*, the inclinations of the mind corrected by the truths of the intellect. Man's free determination, so far at least as re-transmission can show it, is a reality both for the body and mind.

4th. The formation and place of the determining and executive powers, judgment and will.

Man's primary and inherited powers are tendencies or inclinations of a three-fold character—the tendencies of feeling (moral), the tendencies of thought (intellectual), and the tendencies (resulting from these) towards action. Under such a condition of things—where the tendencies constitute the whole being—free-determination in any true sense is out of the question. The state of youth in general, therefore, is not a state of freedom, for while youth feels, or thinks, or acts, it does so, in the main, from the states determined to it as its present tendencies in all three ways, from heredity and environment. Even then, however, gleams of the coming power are present.

When what are called the years of discretion open, a new state begins. It has been gradually dawning, but its day now appears, and it arrives through *the slow detachment of the intellect* from the other powers. In previous states, the intellect was merely the embodiment of inclination—the thought of desire, often also made the means of justification of it. But the side of the intellect now to be opened (always essentially of its nature, indeed) is that which reveals its formal detachment

from feeling, its capacity for finding a separate field of activities and therein of separate action, shown in its enquiry into the nature of things; its recognition of ideas beneath facts; in its perception that where things themselves may be mere appearances ideas are the only truths of things, and that truths are what it seeks; in its contentment in their possession, its perception that they must be, are made to be, the law of its life, nay, of *all* life, even of the inclinations of that self in which it finds itself a part—a part, yet now separate. For truth has given the intellect a new standard—new and impersonal—from which it begins to judge among these inclinations, standing aloof from them as if it were in and belonged to another sphere. So long and intimate has been its companionship with the inclinations that at first it seems like judging itself to judge them, but as the perception of truth and the power of separate judgment grows, the abstract impersonal nature of the intellect reveals itself increasingly; and it finally settles into judgment of these inclinations as coolly, as severely drawn, with as much aloofness, as if they were no part of the one personality. Indeed, that consideration never enters: its perceptions are just as clear about the rights and wrongs, merits and demerits, of such inclinations as if they belonged to quite other persons.

The secret of this is that it is not persons the intellect concerns itself with, but states of mind in the light of the truth which is its object. Its judgments finally formed are absolutely impersonal, abstract, and according to no standard within itself, but of that supreme Idea of Truth which it has begun to recognize. It judges and condemns with equal freedom, and not seldom creating intensity of pain that the personality of which it is part should be so far from the truth it apprehends, and is seemingly so anxious that both itself and these inclinations should accept in common.

Thus the intellect has broken away

from the inclinations, is a separate power, of different nature, cool where they are passionate, reasonable where they are unreasonable; *and has come to be their judge*. This faculty of judgment grows—of judgment, according to truth as it knows it. Round that judgment, anxiously, lovingly dependent on it, almost worshipping it, range themselves all the best of those inclinations of the personality, to whom the intellect transmits the truths it has acquired, which, in turn, they eagerly receive. Thus a community of interests founded on the truth as the intellect sees it has been formed between all the best powers of the personality, with the truths of the intellect as their guide—a community of affections and thoughts founded on the desire of right *as against* the worsen part of the old inclinations. Here, at last is a new mind, or way of thinking, formed within the old and in antagonism to it—two opposed camps within the man, two natures his—the one founded on the old necessarian claims of inclination and necessary loves of the self, unable to forego an iota of its demands: the other founded on union for an end outside of the self—devotion to truth, with *conscience* now formed within it as the truth's reflector. Between these two camps there is war to the death. Victory is not always with the best, for, as Paul says, "I find, then, a law that when I would do good, evil is present with me." So on to the end the struggle goes, the new power fighting for the truth and its life, knowing that that way liberty lies, and in the old way, slavery and death.

In all this growth of truth in the mind, what has become of the will? It is not difficult to see. There can be no power capable of making any claims, affectional or intellectual, that does not thereby form itself a will for their accomplishment. The necessarian inclinations constitute the old will in the man—the will of desires, of passions, of the original self, and its loves. Is there, then, a new will? Just so, for

that is formed in the intellect by the union with it of the higher inclinations and desires, by their surrender to, even abnegation for, the truth, and by that love of it which leads into freedom. For it is the inmost law of freedom that "ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

The line towards the issue in freedom is so far easily traced. A mental form, that of the apprehension of truth known as the intellect, capable of dealing with abstractions, of following its own bent of truth-finding, of raising itself free of the self-inclinations, of critically estimating and deciding for or against them from abstract truth received from without, gathers round itself the higher inclinations and forms with them a new force within the personality contrary to its original loves and desires. The mind, therefore, as a whole becomes self critical, free to judge and decide among its powers, either for or against them. Here lies the way to a free personality—free to determine away from self-love in the light and by the power of an influence received from without. Here is the power that stands between the old loves and the new lines of action, and decides on abstract grounds of principle and of truth, as known to it, the place of merit or of demerit of the concrete inclinations, and the action of the entire personality in regard to them. Consciously or unconsciously, knowingly or not, this order is the basis of every serious, or even of the lightest, moral decision. Thus a man cannot merely "control his actions to a great extent," as Mr M'Cabe tells us,¹ but he can *determine* them before control on all questions relative to personality. The question is, "*Is this determination done in freedom?*" An analysis of the elements here presented will enable us to answer.

Take the act of judgment. If a man simply allows his inclination to decide, and follows it, he is not free, but a "born slave," *doulos*, as Jesus

¹ *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 60.

Christ proclaimed him; and this case covers the common conception of the determinist. So far, of course, he is right, and no thinking man disputes the position. But that is only the beginning of the story. Is judgment prejudiced in the same way? Yes, says the determinist, because the man takes his judgment from his inclinations. This is practically only saying the same thing over again, seeing that the determinist looks upon the judgment in man as one with his inclinations. His psychology is in error; judgment is an essentially different faculty, able to decide on quite different grounds. Yes, but if it is won over by the inclinations? If it be, and so far as it is, we say as before, that the man is *doulos*, a born slave; but the question is not as to certain imperfectly developed forms of humanity, either as individuals, or as faculties, but as to all that is either actual or possible for humanity. To deny a faculty of judgment distinct from inclinations, exercised among and upon these inclinations, and from an independent source, is to vilify human nature and to be contradicted by fact. Judgment, as such, is a faculty without prejudice, and condemns the inclinations bound up in the personality of which it makes a part, in the same way, from the same source, as it condemns them in other personalities.

What is that source? The apprehension of the truth, or what it conceives to be such. It *decides on the truth*, and compels, or the man behind it compels, the original inclination to follow both the truth and its decision. Or otherwise, the inclination contends for its own desires and produces argued ideas in support of them; the judgment hears, and unbiassed by inclination, and apart from it, confronts the desires either with abstract perceptions of fact or truth, *i.e.* of abstract right, or with consolidated human experiences or concrete right. In either case when the original inclinations are successfully opposed, a true and practical step has been taken towards freedom. The

man by voluntarily following truth and right has delivered himself from himself, and so far as he has done this is no longer the slave of the inclinations successfully opposed. He has to that extent delivered himself from his necessarian conditions, and therein becomes a new man—his own man, instead of inclination's slave. We said he acted "voluntarily": is that so? Our original question was, Can man act freely (voluntarily) among determined powers? and here the question is answered, and the mode of the freedom shown. The standard of free action is achieved; that is, he can act among his inclinations, either against or for them, in virtue of an abstract power of his mind, itself aloof from these inclinations, introducing from without a perception and therefore a standard of truth above inclination, by acting with which he is able to free himself from it. On the practical question of achievement, the palm of freedom is his: he has delivered himself—has determined his *own* deliverance, in the light, and for the reason, of considerations above himself. This is freedom actual, whatever academic questions there may still be to settle. The man "knows" the truth, and action on that knowledge brings control, and control brings freedom. To decide against necessitated determined inclinations is freedom, however that decision arises; but when it arises on quite impersonal grounds, apart from inclination and against it, there can be no longer question as to the actual freedom of the *man* between such opposing powers, especially when one is an inclination and the other a perception.

Two further questions arise: (a) was the judgment free in deciding for truth? and (b) was the man free in accepting the judgment?

(a). Was the judgment free? If judgment were a faculty whose primary purpose is decision between inclinations and therefore necessarily, as is thought, with a bias to the stronger, the question would be settled; but its

primal purpose is quite different—it is the discovery, through perception, of what is the *state of the case* in any given circumstances—of what is the abstract right or truth—of what is the fact. We are here dealing with direct perception and knowledge, according to which special inclinations have to be tested. Such direct perceptions or knowledges do not come under determinations, free or otherwise, which only arise in regard to the will or man, and therefore under moral states. To say that a perception of fact, knowledge, truth, is *determined*, or comes under any such category, is like saying that you are determined in the perception that you are writing with a pen, or sitting on a chair, or seeing trees through a window—which is a mere burlesque of the whole business. The determination in the matter, here, would consist in your being *compelled to look* at the pen, the chair, or through the window; in which case you have only got to shut your eyes, to turn your attention, or to walk out of the room, and the determination vanishes. It is with the mind's perceptions of truth as with bodily sight; they are direct, *spontaneous*, and achieved in the mind's own free use of itself. Truths are freely seen and freely acknowledged; nor are you compelled or determined to remain in sight of any of them, except on one of two suppositions—either you are a free agent and *compel yourself* to look, or else you are a monomaniac or a lunatic.

We may have the old radical determinist objection brought up here and applied to judgments of truth, viz.: that judgment and its affinity with truth are as much "given" to man as are the truths concerning what he judges. The answer, once for all, is that all essential powers are "given," given *because* essential, but that, as everywhere and always, so in regard to judgment and truth, the necessitated powers are throughout followed and confronted by manipulating adaptation to voluntary ends within the sphere of truths open

to the man's capacity—a case of the universally combined elements of necessity and freedom in man. As before we saw that he might select his food, either for personal or abstract reasons, from the sphere of material foods provided him, so now we perceive that he may shape and use the foods of the intellect for like voluntary ends—those ends, like the means, being deliberately chosen, or personally endorsed where provided by nature, but in all cases accepted *as the man's own*, and followed with personal purpose.

(b) Is the man free in accepting the judgment and determining upon it? Is his action determined for him when he accepts the right? Is acting from a *perception of right*, necessity?

Our answer is that he is just as free in accepting the judgment and acting on it as was the faculty of judgment itself in the perception of the right as means to ends. We are out of the region now of self-determination against the self—the region of practical freedom, and in a more refined air; still the process can be followed. The free-determination here lies in this that, through his judgment he sees, delights to see, spontaneously sees, the right; but no power on earth could compel him to do it, either within or without his mind: he must do it *himself* if it is to be done at all—the one sole power at this moment that can act in this business. Inclination and right have each furnished him with *reasons* for action—all that they could ever do; he has decided for himself between them, and now must *act* for himself, and act alone. The inclinations do not compel him to the act nor does the judgment; and what is more, they cannot act themselves. Nothing can act here and now, but himself. Here is his crisis: hands are off him all round—the one moment of independence, *self-dependence*, has come, and his act must be that of self-compulsion. It is as if he were in a momentary vacuum, with himself the only presence and the only power.

He has to gather up all within himself and re-distribute all in a new act—an act of *origination*, from himself, done by himself—*his* share in the work of right: that origination and that share being an act of acceptance and discharge done once for all—*his* act, and all that the will in him, the true self, is called upon to do. He is aware at that moment that he can, *if he only will*, defy all consequences in spite of his desire to do the right, and though he himself has elected it: these things are not the final thing, *the act*—and he knows that at the last moment he can refrain, and deny his own will, and turn from what should be the final end and consummation, and forswear all in that turning. It wholly depends on *him*. In that dramatic pausing moment he is free—free as he has never been before, as he may often be again, or never—free alike of inclination on the one hand and of the right on the other, because *they* have done all they can do, and must leave him—the man, the will—in whom all is concentrated and on whom all depends—to confirm or reject their petitions. So destiny is made—and *man*, by the human will or personality in its final determination of action from itself alone.

Yet after all is said, does not the truth with which the intellect sees and the man accepts come from without, from heredity and environment? All truth comes from without to man; he has to admit it into himself; but it does not therefore determine himself and his actions, as we are so dogmatically told. But really the explanation is simple. The freeing truth can only enter *when and as he admits it*. Even hereditary power is not admitted into the manhood produced by freedom until it approves itself to the man admitting it. What man by nature is—there you have the one thing; what he is in the exercise of self-compulsion from the light of truth—there you have another, and an altogether different; and the difference lies in the acceptance, as against himself, of the truth which

controls inclination—the difference between the kingdoms of darkness and of light; just the difference which Jesus Christ came to teach mankind, as the means to an affectional, rational, free-determining manhood. If a man “knows” the good, it depends on him alone to compel himself to action. “To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” There lies the whole secret of free-determination.

5th. Self-determination and the origin of evil.

If evil is original to man, then God and nature would seem to be the cause. If it is acquired, and acquired on the lines laid down—those of self-determination, then man is its source. Yet the solution is not difficult.

Evil, we define as a lower good deliberately confirmed by man's self-determination. If man can now choose between good and evil, he can choose, and can in the past have chosen, between a lower good or higher. Is this so? Then the origin of evil is known.

Man, all through his history, has exhibited two levels of character: one, that of natural feeling, thought and energy, of both good and evil kinds, tending, however, towards external or natural things: the other, spiritual in the character of its feeling, thought and energy, tending towards internal or Divine things; yet it is possible for man to live on both planes in harmony according to a law of natural order between them. Now if man is free or self-determining on both levels, he is free as *between* these levels, so that either can be pitted against the other, the true order of their relations disturbed and perverted, and instead, say, of the lower or natural serving the higher, the higher shall become the servant of the lower. If this were so, the mystery of the origin of evil is solved. But how might it be brought about?

Suppose a man in the early times (laying aside the question of civilisation,

so called, which counts for nothing towards *manhood*) in a state of clearly combined spiritual and natural feeling; in whom the love and service of God (as men speak) existed in perfect accord with the love and service of man. Imagine that man as led to consider *why* it is that he does so readily such services as his fellows request of him. As he ponders he eventually comes to see that he really need not do such services unless he pleased—that however much he wishes to be of use to others, he is not *compelled* to serve them, except apparently by his own feeling. He has a certain relation to them which he cannot quite define; but on further pondering, a new and startling idea emerges, and he becomes aware of what he can only call a sense of duty or obligation upon him to act so to others. He perceives, too, on prolonged thought and some experience that that duty not infrequently conflicts with his personal purposes—yes, and if he *must* see such things, with his personal ease. He has no wish that it should be otherwise; but he is only recognising facts not before observed.

As he continues this line of thought, he may even remain pondering these things, pre-occupied by them, when next asked for service, instead of, as aforesaid, alertly, instinctively, answering the call. Now, on the principle of solidarity, states of mind likely to arise in one man may at the same time arise in many; thus ponderings of this problem might be the current thought of the age in which our "man" existed. One can easily imagine consequences. We can see how it might be that much pondering and pre-occupation on such questions might almost involuntarily lead to remissness in natural acts; how, from being in freedom on both the spiritual and natural levels of mind, the men of that age might come to pit these planes and their claims against each other; how the higher good of the one and the lower good of the other might be perceived and acknowledged; how

questions as to the reasons of this might supervene; how they might be disturbed by the conflict of unsettled questions; how their own natures might in time get thrown out of gear and the one time directness and simplicity to fade from their life; how thus they might come to slip gradually into the service of the lower or self-good—momently only, and with recoveries—and perhaps at bottom only to see, from a speculative curiosity, whether the service of the spiritual and the natural might not be brought into different relations—or even be reversed; how some might be led on into the endeavour to reverse them and begin to subject the spiritual to the natural impulses; how, when this had proceeded some stages, such a change might pass over their feeling as to become willing that such reversal should be the fact, and even the desire for it arise; how, action having led them into that state, judgment should follow, and be compelled to find justification for their action—as it would in such a condition; thus how it might come about that the lower good should gradually be accepted in place of the higher, be confirmed both by thought and act, and—evil emerge as the consequence of such confirmation.

A process like this might take ages to accomplish in full; yet it is a perfectly natural process. Evil would not arise as such; it never does, nor gets accepted as such; it would arise, first of all, after much preliminary speculation, as a lower good; be accepted, justified and confirmed as such; but when confirmed, then evil had finally emerged. A lower good confirmed *is* evil.

Suppose some such process of decline as this to have taken place in mankind, should we not gain an insight, in ways not otherwise obtainable, into man's nature as now exhibited—to say nothing of a new psychology that would interpret much at present mysterious and inscrutable, showing itself only in hints and suggestions?

Should we not then see how man came by a perversion of the nature bestowed upon him, yet in virtue of the main element therein, his freedom inverted, to forego higher claims for lower—spiritual for natural—until the natural mind was confirmed in its sense of the right to rule, the spiritual become at first subservient, until even finally denied with some? In which case, who is to blame for the evils of the world but man himself—as, indeed, an instinctive perception and much common knowledge assures us. The perversion of the best is always the worst; and the degradations and miseries and manifold torturings and hellish evils are by a perfectly natural and adequate hypothesis laid at his own door, as the indirect outcome of the very differentiating powers of freedom by which man is distinguished from all beneath him. Moral elevation can neither be achieved nor held except in freedom; and as by the perversion of freedom man might thus plainly have descended to the depths, it must, we may plainly now perceive, be by free self-determination, that moral and spiritual good can be again accomplished, and man yet reach the summit of a glorious manhood.

CHAPTER XIX

“Our Monistic Religion”

WE are naturally curious to discover just where “religion” enters materialistic monism. The doctrine of Monism is that of one substance, and that substance, matter *plus* force, both of which are material: where is the place for religion? There seems little enough likelihood of finding it under such a guise.

Nor are we reassured by Haeckel's opening statement in the chapter under above heading. “Many distinguished monistic scientists,” he tells us, “hold that religion is played out, meaning that

the clear insight into the evolution of the world . . . will satisfy . . . even our highest emotional cravings. This view is correct in the sense that the two ideas, religion and science, would indeed blend into one if we had a perfectly clear and consecutive system of monism.” Religion, then, is played out; only, monism still keeps religion in virtue of blending it with science. The “two ideas,” *i.e.*, become one by dropping one of them as played out by itself and substituting for it the ethics of science: just as the two ideas of God and matter may both be kept by the simple process of dropping the first as played out, keeping the name which stands for it, and putting the energy of nature in its place. Then, of course, for what simulacra of God and religion you can still discover you are indebted to matter and force in virtue of calling force “God,” and matter the trine of “the true, the good, and the beautiful.”

Granting, however, the desire of materialistic monism to retain the name of religion, and to find in nature as thus read the satisfaction of “the ethical craving of our emotions,” it becomes plain from Haeckel's own confession that even from monism religion has vanished and that its substitute is to be the purely “ethical craving.” Religion and ethics are thus revealed as one and the same thing, or religion at best is but a branch of ethics—“our ethical craving” directed to the universe, as distinct from the ethical craving directed towards man, or ethics proper. But it is this “ethical craving of our emotions” that matter and force are to satisfy under the name of religion. Let us see how this is to be brought about.

“In order” (p. 119) “to compass these high aims, it is of the first importance that modern science not only shatter the false structures of superstition and sweep their ruins from the path, but that it also erect a new abode for human emotion on the ground it has cleared—a ‘palace of reason,’ in which under the influence of our new

monistic views, we do reverence to the real trinity of the nineteenth century—the trinity of ‘the true, the good and the beautiful’ . . . We must enquire into the features of the three goddesses of the monist truth, beauty and virtue; and we must study their relation to the three corresponding ideals of Christianity which they are to replace.” Further, monism “shatters, at the same time, the three central dogmas of the dualistic philosophy—the personality of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will.” Once more (p. 23) “monistic cosmology proved¹ . . . that there is no personal God; comparative and genetic psychology showed that there cannot be an immortal soul.”

It thus appears that God and Immortality are “shattered” and proved non-existent; that they are to be replaced by the true, the good and the beautiful; that the “ethical craving of the emotions” is to be satisfied by enquiring into the features (*sic*) of the three goddesses of the monist; and that we must study their relation to the corresponding Christian ideals displaced.

1. Monistic cosmology has proved, on the basis of the law of substance, that there is no personal God.

“Cosmology” is the doctrine of the cosmos or universe. This doctrine is monistic in the sense of teaching that there is but one substance of the universe, force and matter; the law of that substance is that the whole universe as we know it, has been evolved from “a cloud of infinitely attenuated matter”—to adopt Mr M‘Cabe’s phrasing; and the conclusion is that *therefore* there is no personal God.

The case is here put with exactness, but with purposed baldness, in order to get down to the bed-rock of facts; and truly it is difficult to take such “argument” seriously. It starts with the supposed proof of the eternity and infinity of the universe (that part of it, *i.e.*, which we know), based, as the reader saw earlier, on the fact that

¹ Italics ours.

telescopes cannot see the end of it!—another statement of very rude fact. But since the universe is thus to be assumed infinite and eternal, and the “law” of substance shows its evolution to be what we know, it follows that a personal God is proved non-existent. We have dealt already with the question of the infinity and eternity of our corner of the universe, every particle of which has been manufactured out of a substance totally different in kind from material atoms. This portion of the universe is also “developed,” though how a part of the universe (of course, in that case, definite in space) can be infinite, and how the infinite can be *developed*, are both rather puzzling assumptions. Yet it is this cosmos (or part of one) whose substance is manufactured, that is supposed to prove that a true Infinite, or Infinite God, does not exist, seeing of course that it must have manufactured and developed itself by a “law,” and been always doing it, necessitated to do it by the fact of its existence. But the fact of its being “made” as we know it puts the self-making out of account. If something or somebody made what we know out of something else, then that something else was also made; and go back as far as you will the logic of the facts still demands a maker of some sort or kind.

Now, by going back we do not mean going back in time and in physical line, but going back *inward* to changed states and forms and internal powers and livingness, until the matter or made thing with which we started is left absolutely behind. Still the matter is before us—onward and inward, but no longer matter; and the soul, wearied of this attribution of powers of production to the thing itself produced, will no more of this triviality, but cries out for a true Creator—“for God, the Living God—when shall I come and appear before God!” The real difficulty here is that sensible men can impose upon their rationality by trying to think in a vacuum, and babble the decrepit nonsense of dreams and call it thought.

The simple idea of the case is that the conditioned and finite involve the Unconditioned and Infinite: that has always been, is now, and always, we may be certain, will be, the thinking of the human race. It is inevitable and rational, and something different from Haeckel's vain-glorious "shattering" of a personal God, and the ludicrous means by which Caro thinks that "science has conducted God to its frontiers, thanking Him for His provisional services!"

2. A personal God is to be replaced by "the true, the good and the beautiful." Why replaced? What inconsistency is there between a personal God and what is good and true and beautiful? If a personal God is truly conceived He can only be conceived as the Good, the True, the Beautiful in one, or as absolute Love, Wisdom, and Energy, the Cause in Himself, and Creator, of all the good, truth, and beauty that the cosmos can exhibit. Rightly conceived, the only satisfying monism is that of the One Substance of the Personal God producing from Itself all substance in its degrees, and therefore including all that the materialistic monist can discover in the cosmos.

How will good, truth and beauty ever replace a Personal God? These are abstractions, and what is more, abstractions of the human mind itself, having no objective existence whatever, and only thought of by us as existing in certain objects as their properties. Can abstractions, then, mere names of qualities as we estimate them, satisfy the needs of a personal being and supplant the personal response and care of an Infinite Love radiating from a Divine Personality? These merely *subjective states of mind*, then, are to be our gods, and there are to be three of them. Haeckel talks much, like many less instructed people, of going to nature and finding our needs and desires and ethical emotions satisfied there. It is characteristic of the blind sides of this man's mind that he never even imagines that what one finds in nature in the way

of either good or truth or beauty is what one brings to it—that no man can find that in nature which he does not bring to it. Our gods return upon ourselves then; and how will monists escape the charge, which they have so often thrown at others, nay, at human nature, of creating its own gods? Here is their leader, through sheer perversity of psychological blindness drawing them openly into the trap. Nature is to us as moods and states are, responds only to these (which are strictly individual and personal emotions) and can do no other. She is no living active Energy, like God, but re-active only—inert and dead; and therefore our states and moods and feelings thrown out upon her, come back to ourselves for lack of response, and we are playing with but illusive reflections of our own condition. This is the religion of the looking-glass, and has always been a favourite cult; but only the vanity of man could suggest the admiration of his own image as the way of finding God. Some of us poor mortals will have to look a long time.

Yet is it in *nature* that all this good and truth and beauty are—to *her*, actually, that we have come to attribute these things? Where is the nature that, when *God* was supposed its Creator, was wildly exhibited as "red in tooth and claw"—the very embodiment, if you believed the tirades, of all that was cruel, inhuman, ungod-like—consistently and on fixed law and principle vicious? So long as God is nature's maker, she can be freely misinterpreted; but, when she becomes our god, circumstances alter the case, and while we respectfully speak of the "grim struggle for life,"¹ we are ecstatic over her beauty, truth, and goodness. In truth, nature never was, nor is, either as good or as bad as she has been represented by those having an end to serve. The fundamental principle of nature is Order and therefore Righteousness, but neither of these her own; yet, within these, "room and

¹ P: 122.

verge" enough, for the play of spiritual forces, which, because emanating from human evils converging and aggregated in the spiritual world, are powerful enough to modify that "creation which groaneth and travaileth in pain together with us even until now." But this is a subject too occult for the man who finds his god in matter-force. Superficial, and therefore material, explanations delight him: give him a *real* explanation and he explodes with laughter. Yet is not this to be cheated with the vain idea of the place of Eternal Love filled by illusions that mock, and appearances whose only reality behind them is a collection of atoms stirred by a motion we call force?

Nor is it difficult to diagnose the state of mind which believes in the religion of nature, so called. It is that of a doctrinaire, and pseudo-philosopher and knowledge-monger, who knows, and probably cares, little about man, his needs, and his human satisfactions. He can, as a notion, even as an intellectual rapture, believe in, because, perhaps, even seeing something of, the true, the good, the beautiful in nature through a science of ephemerals which has become a religion for him, and through the ideal spectacles of a self-pleasing imagination viewing all from the height of powers and knowledge unknown to the common herd. But what of that same "herd" and their needs and lack of the very sense of the goodness, truth, and beauty in which, according to the monist, they should find their religion? If religion for such depended on these perceptions, they would be pariahs in a materialistic universe dispensing those favours to smatterers in knowledge which it withheld from humanity. Such a universe would have nothing for man: the little key of the specialist—too often one of the least of human creatures—alone could open the door of reverence or devotion—a reverence which finds its climax in small raptures over nature's adaptations, but would, mayhap,

shudder at the thought of that "herd" sharing with him and his fellows these divine favours of his goddesses.

Nor would that commonalty care for such things or understand them. What they could understand or believe in is a personal response to a personal need—the answer of a Divine Humanity to their very human distress and prayers, to the petitions of the spiritual suppliant, for whom to conquer in temptation, and to lift himself by the aid of Divine Love into the measure of a man, is to be as the angels in heaven. Such things, of which the wise and prudent of this world know nothing, he *can* understand, because he is human, which they have yet hardly begun to be. If the future has anything in the way of religion to offer us, it must be a religion for humanity; not for the specialist in science or the dabbler in knowledge, but for the man, whether behind knowledge or without it; the religion which is the answer to *use* and not to curiosity; which recognises the spiritual quality of man beneath an ignorance of nature how dense soever; the religion whose God, the object of whose reverence, is Personal Love and Justice; but *not*—of all things in heaven or earth—the religion which worships knowledge or is its accompaniment, which worships that force that is the necessitated manipulation of atoms—not the religion of a Haeckel, which God forbid.

3. The ethical craving of our emotions is to be satisfied by enquiring into the features of the three goddesses of the monist.

Here is the dream of the man who manifestly never knew what religion meant. "Ethical craving" forsooth! Soul-needs are not to be measured by ethical cravings, from which they are as wide asunder as the poles. Such needs are not to be bounded by "enquiries" of any kind; and the idea of enquiring into "the features of a goddess" in such a connection is a grave degradation of the whole con-

ception—an unconscious expression of bad taste from a sensuous intellectuality. No man with a shadow of conception of what a religious earnestness meant could have framed such a phrase at such a juncture. Moral cravings are well, but they are “as moonlight unto sunlight or as water unto wine” compared with the need of self-conquest, with the sensitive fear of personal wrongdoing, with the deep free manhood’s breathing of him who overcomes, and with the strenuous living “as seeing Him who is invisible” of the man whose religious emotions are awake and active. And to dream of cleansing forth the sense of sin, of quelling the spiritual battles and satisfying the aspirations of a truly, sanely religious soul with such a nostrum as “enquiring into the features” even of “the true, the good and the beautiful” as exhibited in the arrangements of matter, is a piece of such cold-blooded inhumanity and irreligion as only the intellectual sensualist, confounding beauty-raptures with moral feeling, could find in his heart to utter in response to the deepest needs of humanity. The flat-dish of nature’s appearances is not that in which the spiritual stork’s deep bill can feed. Such a proposed “satisfying” of our religious emotions, putting aside the shallow insincerity of it all, is a glaring imposition upon the credulity of man, devised (shall we say automatically?) by a brain given up to the last human delusion—belief in matter; which cannot estimate what itself is offering, nor the cool insult it is to “the strong swimmer in his agony” bent on attaining the greatest of all human achievements—spiritual life, the life of God in the soul of man.

But we are to seek “the true?” Undoubtedly, so man ought; but not in *place* of religion and God, seeing that it is neither; though both are the true, yet much more. It is here that the unconscious mockery of a fanciful, unreal materialism enters, the fruit of a mind unable to conceive of truth except as a material expression—mis-

taking always the shell for the kernel, the form for the reality, the body for man, the physical for the spiritual, nature for God—the external always and in all things for the internal; who cannot see that nature may hold deeper truth than appears in the conformation and order of her parts; cannot realise that she may be a symbol of facts diviner than herself, and of which her science is but the surface seeming—of facts whose truths as far transcend the physical knowledges given in her external order as the wisdom of a full manhood the babblings of the child. That last—yes, the babbling—is science put in lieu of God’s diviner interior truth: the mistaking “the stones and buildings that are here” for “the house not made with hands.”

And “the good” is to be sought. And even Haeckel must acknowledge here that the best “good” he can find with which to cement the walls of his unmortared monism is the good of Christianity—gird at it as he may or does. But we must exclude the “revelation” of the churches? Perhaps; only we shall have to make sure, and in a deep sense to beware, lest we also exclude the Revelation of God—which is more and greater than that of all the churches, though Haeckel confounds it with them, and is as blind to “the good” of the deeper more interior kind as he is to “the true” for which he unavailingly sends us to nature. But this is a subject which in this present volume cannot be touched.

And “beauty.” But Haeckel knows no more of real beauty than he knows of truth or good. If he once caught sight of that truth which is God’s Revelation, and that good which is its living heart, he might possibly begin to realise that he had never conceived of beauty before, simply because he had never conceived of truth or good; had been mistaking the garments of God for God Himself, denying even *these* as His; attributing all beauty to atoms exhibited in sun-

shine; not knowing of the spiritual good and true and beautiful in the mind and Revelation reflecting God Himself—not knowing. In this light few men are more to be pitied than Haeckel.

4. "We must study the relation of truth, beauty and virtue to the three corresponding ideas of Christianity to be replaced by them."

"The preceding enquiries (especially those of the first and third sections) have convinced us," he says,¹ "that truth unadulterated is only to be found in the temple of the study of nature, and that the only available paths to it are critical observation and reflection—the empirical investigation of facts and the rational study of their efficient causes." This sounds well, as Haeckel always does if you take him at his own valuation—barring, of course, the trifling consideration of the unfortunate mortal who must go without "truth unadulterated" because his can never be the necessary "critical observation," "empirical investigation" and "rational study," which are to lead to religion and ethics. He has led up to the conceptions expressed in this chapter by the idea that many monists think religion played out, and by telling of the success of a lecture of his at Altenburg, and describing the successful reaction of the evangelical churches (at which, knowing the lecture, one does not wonder) in favour of orthodox Christianity as against his monistic teaching. Of course this was enough for Haeckel; and these things really convinced him "that truth unadulterated was only to be found," etc.

Thus section 1 is to study the relation of "truth" to the corresponding idea of Christianity. That idea, of course, is the Revelation of Jesus Christ and all the truth involved therein; and this is how Haeckel "studies" it. We transcribe his study without comment as an example of his style of thought and method of argument. We have

¹ P. 119, on the first of these "studies."

already given the first sentence. He continues: "In this way we arrive, by means of pure reason, at true science, the highest treasure of civilised man. We must, in accordance with the arguments of our sixteenth chapter [a supposed discussion of the provinces of knowledge and belief] reject what is called "revelation," the poetry of faith, that affirms the discovery of truth in a supernatural fashion, without the assistance of reason. And since the entire structure of the Judæo-Christian religion, like that of the Mohammedan and the Buddhistic, rests on these so-called revelations, and these mystic fruits of the imagination directly contradict the clear results of empiric research, it is obvious that we shall only attain to a knowledge of the truth by the rational activity of genuine science, not by the poetic imagining of a mystic faith. In this respect it is quite certain that the Christian system must give way to the monistic. The goddess of truth dwells in the temple of nature, in the green woods, on the blue sea, and on the snowy summits of the hills—not in the gloom of the cloister, nor in the narrow prisons of our gaol-like schools, nor in the clouds of incense of the Christian Churches. The paths which lead to the noble divinity of truth and knowledge are the loving study of nature and its laws, the observation of the infinitely great star-world with the aid of the telescope, and the infinitely tiny cell-world with the aid of the microscope—not senseless ceremonies and unthinking prayers, not alms and Peter's-pence. The rich gifts which the goddess of truth bestows on us are the noble fruits of the tree of knowledge and the inestimable treasure of a clear, unified view of the world, not belief in supernatural miracles and the illusion of an eternal life." And this is Haeckel's way of "studying" the Christian ideal of truth and of comparing scientific ideas with it!

Section 2.—Here, in regard to "the

good" or virtue, he says, the case is different. "The idea of the good which we call virtue in our monistic religion, coincides for the most part with the Christian idea of virtue"; at least with that of primitive Christianity, but is "not applicable to the Vatican caricature" for 1200 years. "The best part of Christianity, to which we firmly adhere, is represented by the humanist precepts of charity and toleration, compassion and assistance"; but he does not show us how he derives these good things from nature—from which alone, according to his position, he has any right to get any form of good. The golden rule, he holds, belongs to humanity—to Christians and atheists alike; and "Christian ethics have been marred by a narrow insistence on altruism and a denunciation of egoism." Our monistic ethics "finds perfect virtue in the just balance of love of self and love of one's neighbour." So that "the good" of Christianity is received with a superior acknowledging sniff, as the context of disparagement shows, and the superiority is left with monistic ethics (we thought it was *religion* we were discussing?) which can successfully balance egoism and altruism. We shall have, however, to show another side of this comfortable fallacy of "the just balance" of these two loves when we come to discuss the monistic ethics.

Section 3.—Beauty is held to be the bone of contention between monism and Christianity. It follows from the teaching of Primitive Christianity "that all we find in the life of a man here below, all that is beautiful in art and science, in public and in private life, is of no real value. The true Christian must avert his eyes from them; he must think only of a worthy preparation for the life beyond. Contempt of nature, aversion from all its inexhaustible charms, rejection of every kind of fine art, are Christian duties: and they are carried out to perfection when a man separates himself from his fellows, chastises his body and spends all his

time in prayers in the cloister or the hermit's cell." And this is Christ's conception of beauty—the only idea that here avails! A more egregious travesty could hardly be found, or a more wilful confusion between the teaching of Christ and the degradation of the Christian standard presented by much corruption and imperfect development in the Church. The facts of perversion he emphasises when it suits him to call them Christian, as now, and to compare with them, to their inevitable disparagement, the beauty of nature—which, in turn, he seems to accredit to science, or takes over as if it were science's especial perquisite. Yet we had thought it was Christ who spoke of the lilies of the field as arrayed beyond Solomon, advised men to "consider" them, and spent His nights on the hills of Galilee under the Syrian stars.

What is the result of this "study" of the relation of the monistic goddesses to Christian ideals? To condemn as Christian what he knows well not to be so; to put aside as impossible the truth as revealed in and by Christ; yet to accept the essence of that revelation in "the good" which Christ, as human, was and taught. Would it not have been more to the purpose if he had dared to *contrast* (his real and only point, indeed), with accuracy of thought and language, the true, the good, and the beautiful, with the Christ Himself? He would then, perhaps, have discovered a comparison impossible where his three goddesses were already embodied in the Divine Man, and something of the travesty of the whole attempt at such a "study" of contrasts where, not contrast, but identity lies ready to his hand.

CHAPTER XX

"Our Monistic Ethics"

THE ethics of monism start with the assumption that as there is no other world than the material its ethical system must treat "the spiritual and moral life of man as part of this cosmos," that is to say, as a physical evolution of matter-force. Then in Haeckel's usual dogmatic style we are told, "There are not two different separate worlds—the one physical and material, and the other moral and immaterial"; and to the same intent, in the same style, we read on the same page (123), "Monistic cosmology *proved*¹ on the basis of the law of substance, that there is no personal God; comparative and genetic psychology showed that there cannot be an immortal soul: and monistic physiology proved the futility of the assumption of free-will. Finally, the science of evolution made it clear that the same eternal iron laws that rule in the inorganic world, are valid, too, in the organic and moral world."

Out of these iron laws "that rule in the organic world," we are to find "our monistic ethics." How?

"Modern science," we are told, "renders the positive service of substituting for dualism the new structure of ethical monism." The feeling of duty rests on no moral imperative, but on *social instinct*; the science that "shows" this aims at establishing "a sound harmony between egoism and altruism, between self-love and the love of one's neighbour"; and Herbert Spencer is credited with "the founding of this monistic ethics on a basis of evolution." We shall see before we close how much life-blood Spencer was able to draw from this stone of evolutionary ethics for his personal welfare.

In contrast with the infinite sadness of Spencer's longing, backward, unsatisfied gaze from his barren ethic to

¹ Italics ours.

religion, let us turn to Haeckel's assured complaisance and boundless confidence in himself and "our monistic ethics." "Man belongs" (p. 124) "to the social vertebrates, and has, therefore, like all social animals, two sets of duties—firstly to himself, and secondly to the society to which he belongs. The former are the behests of self-love or egoism, the latter of love for one's fellows, or altruism. The two sets of precepts are equally just, equally natural and equally indispensable." "The equal appreciation of these two natural impulses, or the moral equivalence of self-love and love of others, is the chief and the fundamental principle of our morality. Hence the highest aim of all ethics is very simple—it is the re-establishment of 'the natural equality of egoism and altruism, of the love of one's self and the love of one's neighbour.'"

Here is the principle of our ethics—the natural equality and moral equivalence of self-love and the love of others. It will be our business (1) to examine this principle in order to find its truth or otherwise, and its value as moral; (2) to consider it as pitted against Christianity; and (3) the claim of monism to the idea, or how it gets ethics out of "iron laws."

(1) The natural and moral equivalence of self-love or egoism, and of altruism or the love of others.

Are these two loves either naturally or morally equivalent? Haeckel argues, quoting from his *Monism* "three important theses," (a) That "both are natural laws of equal importance and necessity for the preservation of the family and society." We were certainly unaware that things equally *important* were *themselves* equal—a very different thing we should have said, and a sample of the lax and utterly inadequate method of meeting a case constantly exhibited by Haeckel. It may be equally important that one should rise at six A.M., and that he should pay a certain account by twelve, so far as equality may be judged of in such

cases; but the rising at six and the paying an account are not themselves equivalent facts, and no one would dream that they were—except Haeckel when he has to assume his own case. Moreover, the two loves are of equal importance “for the preservation of the family and society.” There you have the key-note of the matter: ethics are intended for the preservation of self and the species—at least they act in that way. So they may and in a hundred other ways, but how does that prove the two loves equal? Preservation of family and species are excellent things, but by no means equal, any more than acts done at different hours, or than—egoism and altruism.

(b) Social duties are evolutionary forms of social instincts. That may be, but how does this show that morality is founded on the equivalence in question?

(c) Ethics, a “science of rules” “is connected with his (man’s) view of the world and consequently with his religion.” He is welcome to hold ethics a “science of rules” and to be “connected with our view of the world and religion,” since it is only another way of saying that his ethics are monistic (whatever that may mean), but how do any of these notions help on the equivalence we seek? “The fundamental principle of ethical morality” so far, then, goes unproved as the equivalence of egoism and altruism.

However, Haeckel quotes in proof, the Golden Rule: “from this highest precept of Christianity it follows of itself that we have just as sacred duties towards ourselves as we have towards our fellows.” Now that Rule says nothing of duties towards ourselves any more than does the other old law, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” unquoted by Haeckel here. They both lay down our duty to *others*, but they give no self-duty; it is not our duty to *ourselves* that is to be the measure of our duty to others, but what we wish *others* to do that is the measure of *our* duty to *them*.

Let us come to the principle itself: the equality of egoism and altruism. Are they in themselves equivalent? How can our love of ourselves be the equal of our love of others, or *vice versa*? How shall we contrive to adjust such loves? We might, for instance, divide our income between ourselves and—whom else? Which are “the others” here? Is this what Haeckel means? But when you come to “love,” to *feelings*, it is simply farcical to speak of their equivalence as if they were a pair of nicely adjusted scales. In plain blunt truth, a man either loves himself more than his neighbour, or—O rare human soul!—his neighbour more than himself; but an equality of the two loves, either actual or to be acquired, would be a torture of equilibrium as impossible to preserve as to attain—an aim, in either case, enough to drive a sensitive soul mad through sheer lack of answering knowledge or consciousness. Of course, we quite understand that there are men who would accept the doctrine and live with perfect self-complaisance under it, for whom it would mean no more of strenuousness, *i.e.*, of morality, especially of “the foundation of their morality,” than it does for Haeckel himself. A genuine interpretation of men might show us a leading principle in the mind, with others serving it; but that would be a singularly incongruous psychology that could even affect to find equivalence where knowledge would be as impossible as fact.

What is the meaning of being under a leading or ruling principle? Plainly that the faculties are truly united in the main towards one great or ideal end, or towards a low and grovelling purpose,—the faculties converging to either aim because led by it as a ruling power.

That there can be, and that there is such leading principle is common knowledge—the love of God, for instance, or the love of man, or the love of self—of pleasure or of wealth—and that the leadership would bring about a “sound” or an unsound harmony;

but it is certain that that harmony is secured precisely by the exclusion of any other principle as an equal leader. That supposition, of any that could be made, is the one intolerable—the plainly impossible.

What, then, shall be the relation of any secondary to a leading principle or ideal? Is the relation of possible leading principles, such as Egoism or Altruism, to be a case of *alternation*? Manifestly, though maintained by high authority, this position is as impossible as the idea of two equally governing principles. Of course there will be changing states and a consequent changing consciousness under any leading principle: these are not in question, though easily mistaken for the alternations of leading purposes; because, amid them all, a certain end for the mind dominates and persists, and that end is the fundamental, distinctive qualifying aim which constitutes the personality. The mind is a unit and seeks what is for it an ideal—high or low. And the leading principle must be as the ideal is, seeing that that ideal is itself the leader—that they are one and the same, the principle being but the ideal put into a form of words. Either two leading or two alternative principles would be impossible thus. Ideals do not so readily admit a rival or give place to alternative powers. May the love of God as an *ultimate end* rule alternately with the love of evil, and both of them, with mental consistency, be sought as ends? The love of evil as an end most assuredly cannot tolerate the love of God, and *vice versa*, and where the two appear to co-exist, the one is the fundamental aim, however imperfectly understood, the other is the subordinate, striving to overthrow its rival. Such is the fight, whichever end as leader; and therein lies the solution we seek.

The mind being a unit must of necessity to its self-existence have a definite fundamental aim, with the other principles subservient in consequence; if the leading principle or ideal is the

end, other principles will be used as *the means* towards that end. This conception brings harmony, consistency, order. We see now how possible it would be for a man to love God and his neighbour (these always going together) as his end or aim, and how the love of self could and would be made subservient to that great end. We also see how consistent would be the love of self as an end with the love of the neighbour as the means used for that end; for where the self is sought in the first place, there the neighbour would certainly be courted and seeming good actions done for him, while all the time being used as an instrument for the aggrandisement of the self. Plain, too, is it, that were the love of others the aim, the self would be used as the instrument for that end's accomplishment, till purity of character supervened on the killing of the selfish, egoistic, self-seeking loves. The end or aim of the mind becoming enlarged as it advances, or circumscribed as it recedes, may, in the one case, pass by enlightenment and natural progression, from the love of self to the love of others and the love of God. Here is a hierarchy of aims all serving the highest, and here manifestly is the highest or perfect order; for it is impossible that the man who loves God truly should not love others before himself, or bend his energies to that ideal.

Thus it may be seen that the monistic ethic, by which the love of self is the supposed equivalent for the love of the neighbour is a piece of impossible psychology and of perfectly hopeless morals. If, then, this supposed equivalence is the fundamental principle of monistic morality, just where does that morality stand, and what is its value?

(2) The contrast between this monistic conception and the ethics of Christianity.

If no such aim is possible as the monistic ethic presents in the straddling adjustment of riding two principles at once, the comparison he thus institutes will not be to the monistic advantage;

but Haeckel, curiously, having laid that twofold monistic aim before us, immediately withdraws it, and substitutes for it "the great ethical principle" of "doing to others as you would have them do to you"—quite a different thing from the monistic amalgam of self and the neighbour—and then proceeds to criticise adversely what he is pleased to call Christianity in the light of that central principle of it which he holds to be older than itself.

1. "The supreme mistake of Christian ethics . . . is its exaggeration of the love of one's neighbour at the expense of self-love" (p. 125). "Christ attacks and despises egoism on principle." Nothing could more surely reveal their writer's incompetence for moral analysis than the paragraph of which these words are the leading idea; and if we want to see a bit of moral confusion and of singular psychology, let us take the words, "egoism is the passion that urges to great sacrifices!" But surely Haeckel knows that both egoism and self-love have two quite distinct meanings. Egoism, in the philosophic sense of rational care for the personality, Christ most surely never despises, and could not, seeing that He urges us to use that very egoism for a higher end than itself—the service of man—involving the care of it for that end—a service in which, whether Haeckel knows it or not, we are exalted and humanised. Self-love, again, is condemned from the exclusively selfish side; and will not any man with a spark of nobleness follow suit? But Haeckel's words here, as always, are saturated with assumptions both on his own side and against his opponents, which he desires to maintain, and ought to prove. We never knew a writer who with more unblushing effrontery took, and consistently took, his own statements for proof, as if he acted on the idea that dogmatic complaisance would prove a heavy make-weight towards belief in him. Probably he is right—as to some.

2. Christianity teaches the neglect of the body. This is false. Yet Christianity contains no commands as to daily ablutions! True, and for a reason that ought to be manifest to any man—that It prefers the wider view and the profounder method which gives principles to the mind instead of the "science of rules" for the body. Has Haeckel really never yet grasped so elementary a truth as that principles may dispense with rules?

3. Christ exalts man above the rest of nature. So would all sanity; seeing that he is the only creature in it that understands it, or is even able to try. If man does not approach the Divine Image, does "our brother" ape come any nearer? Really, the "wisdom of the wise" is sometimes appalling.

4. Christianity teaches men to make light of earthly goods. Did Haeckel never hear of comparative values? If there is, or if Haeckel should some day come to think that there might be, such a presently estimated folly as a Kingdom of Heaven, would he think the love of earthly goods, to its exclusion, a wise monistic principle? Surely Christ does a service for man not to be despised when He shows him, speaking of what He knew, a heaven and earth in right perspective. But what of the moral status of that man of science who caricatures Christ in order to exalt those things which he knows Christ never condemns? It is hard to read such a chapter, or, indeed, much of the book, without the keenest moral nausea, saved from excess by the sense that such misrepresentations are what one would naturally expect—which Haeckel himself compels us to come to expect—from a writer of such seemingly imperturbable moral density.

5. Christ belittles the life of the family! "The family is justly regarded as the foundation of society . . . Christ, however, was of a very different opinion"! "He thought as lightly of women and of the family as of all other goods of this life"! "Sexual love . . . seems to have been regarded

by Jesus as a necessary evil"! Then this man seeks to snatch a miserable advantage over the apostle Paul, putting a false construction on his words by choosing to ignore the evils which they were written to correct. And this is the outcome of monistic ethics!

6. Christ had "no personal acquaintance with that *refining of man's true nature*¹ that comes only from the intimate life of man with woman. He shared the idea that woman is subordinate to man and that intercourse with her is 'unclean.'" And this coarse-minded man can without twinge or a misgiving write so of the ineffable moral beauty of Jesus Christ!

Such are "our monistic ethics" in contrast with Jesus Christ, and it is well we should know them from Haeckel's own teaching, which constitutes the best warning word that could be written as to what the world may expect if such men come to be leaders of ethical life. The atmosphere of this chapter, like others, is morally asphyxiating: we feel that our minds are as if steeped in noxious gas, and our moral standard lowered by contact with insensitive coarseness.

(3) The claim of monism to the moral idea, or how it gets ethics out of "iron laws."

The ethics, of course, consist in loving ourselves and our neighbour equally; and we have seen something of the impossibility, not to say absurdity, of any such moral standard. On the contrary, could any conception be more morally exhilarating than that of the pure, loving, complete surrender to the good and service of others—the life spent with this as the motive, in the spirit and power of the Master? How profoundly true is that word of His, and going to the root of the whole moral question between the individual and the race—"He that loveth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life, for My sake, shall find it." There can be no perishing in the service of man

¹ Italics ours.

for Christ's sake. It is a continuous ennoblement—an ascent to greater heights of well-being, to the invigorating air of unselfish, spiritual motive, and to the elasticity and power which means "finding" the life, in contrast with that fearing regard for the self and its loves which can only mean life's loss. One might test men by this moral standard. Could you test them honestly, broadly, on a genuine human basis, by any standard which admitted the egoistic, self-loving motive as the end, much less by any cold and hot business which fears to let go of self in the attempt at service for others? By this, let monistic morality stand or fall: and fall, beyond question, it does below any standard that a *man* could count noble. The claim of monism to the moral, or true ethical, human ideal is weighed in the balance and found wanting.

This, then, is how it gets ethics out of "iron laws": because they are not there to be found, it temporises with human life, escaping, by that plea, from nature; finding the self, and the not self, and not knowing how to find the higher synthesis between these two, it blindly gropes after putting a foot on each, in the certainty of finding in the one what it misses in the other. External nature contains no moral guidance for man. She is not to be disparaged for that: it was not her place. The lower may reflect, but cannot teach the higher: a soul cannot live without a house of the soul, and man attempts this when he stands on nature only, seeks to draw his life from her, and suck her breasts for the milk of human ethics. For ethics are not nature's; they are man's; yea, God's; and any attempt to live so, from the lower, must end in pain and failure and regret.

If ever there was a man on earth who should have found his salvation in evolutionary ethics, that man was Herbert Spencer. If the "sound harmony" which Haeckel asserts of

the combined monistic ethics of self and man could reach any mind it must have come to his who gave up mind and life and body and all he had to the proclamation of this supposed great ethic. Most significant is the outcome. At seventy-three years of age he wrote words which one has called "the epitaph on his own philosophy,"¹ in which he sums up all that his tremendous labour in the exposition of science and monistic ethics had brought him, and in that summary of a life and its seekings and expositions there echoes the unavailing regret that his own soul has remained unsatisfied by that with which he sought to convince and satisfy others. From all this weary ethical toil he turns restlessly away, groping back to some *religious* solution, if only it could be had, as containing by possibility what his own monistic ethics, vaunted by Haeckel himself, had failed to give him—failed absolutely, pitifully. Hear him, and hear also the sadness and regret—the utter unrest and dissatisfaction—the *cui bono* of it all:—"The religious creeds, which in one way or other occupy the sphere that rational interpretation seeks to occupy and fails, and fails the more the more it seeks, I have come to regard with a sympathy based on community of need, feeling that dissent from them results from inability to accept the solutions offered, joined with the wish that solutions could be found."

Let any high-minded monist imagine to himself the situation—let him look past Haeckel's pretentious decrepitudes for a moment—let him, in sympathy and with what deep emotions the circumstances should call forth, sit down beside Herbert Spencer's sofa and listen: "Friend, I expected everything from this, and have got nothing—nothing. All my soul and life are in this monistic exposition. It is all said, and from it, I myself turn empty away. No, the satisfaction is not there. After all is said my needs cry

¹ *T. P.'s Weekly*, No. 80.

out for religion. There the solution *ought* to lie—yet I have not found it. My wish is that there it might have been found.—If it but only might!"

CHAPTER XXI

"Science and Christianity"

IN discussing the notorious seventeenth chapter which appears in the *Riddle* under the above heading, our only desire is to get at the facts, and, so far as one can, at all the facts, concerning it, both as to the substance and tone of it, and as to its somewhat significant history. While we have expressed pretty plainly our opinion of Haeckel as a controversialist, and especially as a religious controversialist, we have not *attacked* him in any sense, neither do we wish to do so here, but to seize and to judge the facts of the case, both inward and outward, as they appear to us, that the quality of Haeckel's mind as to scientific honesty and reputable tone may be understood. It is perhaps of some consequence all round that the more significant of the facts of an external order should be put together and interpreted (which we have never seen done), as well as that those of an internal order should be at least briefly discussed.

The original edition of the *Riddle* was, we believe, published in 1899, in which a certain authority for different statements concerning Christ and Christianity was given in chapter seventeen. In October of that year an "Open Letter" to Haeckel was inserted in the *Christliche Welt* by Prof. Loofs of Halle, exclusively on historical statements made in that chapter, pointing out Haeckel's mistakes and their implications. To this letter a reply was published by Haeckel in the *Zeitschrift*. Loofs, dissatisfied with Haeckel's reply, which he thought disingenuous and evasive, issued a Pamphlet during the spring of 1900. Upon this, Haeckel

published a popular edition of the *Riddle*, with a few alterations and an appendix, but left this seventeenth chapter practically unchanged, giving also the authority above referred to, and adding a high estimate of him and his work, and a lengthy adverse criticism of Loofs and his Pamphlet. What Haeckel's alterations were, and who the authority was, will be seen presently. An English translation, by Mr M'Cabe, of the original German edition of the *Riddle* was published in 1902 as one of the *Cheap Reprints* of the Rationalist Press Association. This was followed, in September 1903, by an English edition of Loofs' book, in which the whole matter was placed before the English public, including Loofs' Open Letter, Haeckel's reply, a supporting letter from Dr Bischoff (Editor of the *Christliche Welt* in which the Open Letter appeared), and a new preface, reviewing the facts, by Loofs. For this letter Bischoff afterwards expressed his regret to Loofs and confessed his error. Such is the outer story, except for the addition that a reprint of the *Riddle*, with chapter seventeen amended, has recently been issued. We now want to know what it was all about. This will be easiest followed by taking the facts and publications in their order.

1. Loofs' *Open Letter* to Haeckel.

Loofs' purpose in this letter is plainly told and as strictly adhered to—not to discuss the Virgin Birth as given in Luke and Matthew ("This," he says, "I would expressly emphasise," adding, that his views on that matter can be seen elsewhere), but that "I should publicly refute certain monstrous assertions made by you in your latest book, *The Riddle*, etc.," limiting himself to two particulars. He says:—

"It is far from my intention here to take up in their entirety, the vast number of scientifically baseless assertions you have made in the chapter referred to. Still less do I think of touching on the comments with which your assertions are accompanied; as for many of them, I pity the readers to whom they give pleasure. I will only select two specially important particulars, as to which you will, I

hope, be obliged to confess that you have been the victim of deplorable credulity, and that the authorities you have trusted would justly receive the prize for malignity and ignorance."

This means, of course, that Loofs had divined that Haeckel had been quoting from some worthless source already exploited by historical authority, though not yet knowing the author.

Then follows the first of the "particulars," for which he quotes Haeckel (Ger. Ed. p. 110) thus:—

"As to the four canonical Gospels, we now know that they were selected from a host of contradictory and forged manuscripts of the first three centuries by the 318 bishops who assembled at the Council of Nicæa in 327. The entire list of Gospels numbered forty; the canonical list contains four. As the contending and mutually abusive bishops could not agree about the choice, they determined (according to the *Synodicon* of Pappus) to leave the selection to a miracle. They put all the books together underneath the altar, and prayed that the apocryphal books, of human origin, might remain there, and the genuine, inspired books might be miraculously placed on the table of the Lord. And that, says tradition, really occurred. The three Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke—all written *after* them, not *by* them, at the beginning of the second century) and the very different fourth gospel (ostensibly 'after' John, written about the middle of the second century) leaped on the table, and were thenceforth recognised as the inspired (with their thousand mutual contradictions) foundations of Christian doctrine."

In reply to this, Loofs points out, first,¹ the wrong date given for the Nicene Council, and, elsewhere, the wrong number of bishops; second, that the *Synodicon* (list of synods) edited by Pappus, was issued in 1601, was, and could be, no authority for what took place thirteen centuries before, that there are good contemporary records of the Nicene events, that no such story exists in them, and is entirely legendary, without foundation in fact, that yet the *Synodicon* of the seventeenth century *did* contain a story which "reminds one" of the narrative Haeckel has given, but that there is nothing there of the elaborate story, especially about the Gospels, told by

¹ Points numbered here throughout for the sake of convenience.

Haeckel. Third, that the subjects of the Gospels and the formation of the Canon were never discussed at the Nicene Council at all, while, as a fact, they had been settled in the second century, and recognised in their books by the leaders of the Church at that date—150 years before the Council of Nice had met.

Loofs then proceeds with his second "particular," quoting from Haeckel thus:—

"The fathers of the Church enumerate from forty to fifty of these spurious or apocryphal gospels; some of them are written both in Greek and Latin—for instance, the gospel of James, of Thomas, of Nicodemus, and so forth. The details which these apocryphal gospels give of the life of Christ, especially with regard to His birth and childhood, have just as much (or, on the whole, just as little) claim to historical validity as the four canonical gospels, so-called 'genuine.' Now we find in one of these apocryphal gospels an historical statement, confirmed, moreover, in the *Sepher Toldoth Jeschua*, which probably furnishes the simple and natural solution of the 'world-riddle' of the supernatural conception and birth of Christ. The author curtly gives us in one sentence the remarkable tale which contains the solution: 'Josephus Pandera, the Roman officer of a Calabrian legion which was in Judea, seduced Miriam of Bethlehem, and became the father of Jesus.'"

Loofs, in reply, first, drives home the responsibility of Haeckel for these statements, whoever was his authority. Second, points out that there is no apocryphal gospel known which contains any such statement, and begs him to reveal the secret of which of them it is. Third, convicts him of having borrowed unacknowledged assertions, not only untrue but disreputable. Fourth, proves that Haeckel's authority is as "malicious as he is ignorant," by showing that though the gospel of Nicodemus states that, before Pilate, the Jews charged Jesus with illegitimacy ("altogether born in sins") the charge was not only "refuted by other Jews present," but was *not* the statement quoted by Haeckel. Fifth, that the *Sepher Toldoth Jeschua* (Book of the Origins of Jesus), the professed authority for his Greek parentage,

is a Jewish lampoon of the eleventh or thirteenth century; that a simpler form of the story is given by Celsus, preserved by Origen; that "Celsus makes the Jews say that the mother of Jesus was divorced by the carpenter who had married her, because she was convicted of adultery, and had borne a child to a certain soldier named Pantheras," and that the story emanated from the Jewish slanderers who abounded (for it is common knowledge) in the second century.¹

2. Haeckel's reply to this Open Letter.

He has neither time nor inclination for a complete reply; takes up half his letter with charging upon Loofs the doctrine of the supernatural conception of Jesus (wrongly, as it proves), entering thus on the question Loofs disclaimed dealing with, and had not touched; avoids the direct issues Loofs had raised; coolly implies that his information comes from Celsus out of the *Talmud* (the *Sepher Toldoth*) *not* the *Jeschua* of the eleventh or thirteenth century (which he had declared to be the source), gives the correct name "Pantheros" instead of "Pandera" as used by him before—in other words, *adopts* (for he had been in communication with Dr Bischoff) *as his own*, and without acknowledgment, the facts communicated to him by Loofs himself in the Open Letter! He finds, in short, that Loofs has proved him wrong, so, instead of acknowledging, like an honourable man, the mistakes he had made, he turns round, *adopts* Loofs' facts, and implies that these were what he had meant all the time, yet does not even dare to say as much as that openly. Such, then, is scientific

¹ Of whom Dean Farrar (Chambers' Ency. vol. 6, p. 315), says:—"The blasphemous scandals and innuendos of the Talmud, which culminate in such deplorable mediæval calumnies as the *Toldoth Jeschua* are lamented by all respectable Jews, indeed, they refute themselves by their preposterous anachronisms and impossible absurdities, alluding to Jesus as 'so and so,' 'absalom,' 'the fool,' 'the hung,' etc."

honour, manly honour, in the hands of Haeckel. How is it possible to wonder at the strength of language Loofs uses in dealing with him? But there is more to follow. Meantime, observe his claim that the slanderous statements thus rightly traced by Loofs constitute *the sole positive statement* we have to rely upon as to the origin of Jesus; and remember that he has left his version of the origin of the *Gospels* absolutely intact.

3. Loofs' *Pamphlet* and the seventeenth chapter of the *Riddle*.

Section IV. of the *Pamphlet* is given to this subject; and throughout he convicts Haeckel of ignorance and incompetence. But first, on general subjects, such as the Primitive Church, the History of the Gospels, the Pauline Epistles; and on many matters of detail, such as the condition of the Middle Ages, the paternity of Paul, the relative numbers of Christians, Buddhists, Brahmanies, and Mahomedans, Jansen's *History of the German People*, introduction of celibacy, the Evangelical Alliance, claim of Infallibility, election of Popes, the Immaculate Conception, of Protestant relation to the doctrine, and of the Immaculate oath. In short, the whole of this seventeenth chapter of the *Riddle* is saturated with ignorance of its subject; and this Loofs says of one who wrote on Science and Christianity "in order to appreciate correctly the extreme importance of Christianity in regard to the entire history of civilisation, and particularly its fundamental opposition to reason and science."

Turning to the two main particulars on which he had previously tackled Haeckel, and to which such an evasive reply was given, Loofs takes up

1st. Haeckel's statement as to the Birth of Jesus. The evidence for the story is given by him as from "one of the forty or fifty apocryphal gospels as they are enumerated by the Church Fathers themselves." Loofs shows that he got his list of the spurious gospels from a hasty perusal of the

book of Paul de Regla; and the Panthera story itself, not from Celsus and the Talmud, but from the *Sepher Toldoth Jeschua*, though not in the form there given, therefore through some intermediary ignorant source.

Turning to Haeckel's reply to the Open Letter, he shows how he had advantaged from Loofs' own corrections—as we have seen: "*in all of which he has exhibited an amount of ignorance which a healthy scientific conscience would have felt called for silence rather than for dogmatic expressions of opinion.*" Loofs pointed out, for instance, that Celsus never mentions the personal name, Josephus, nor the officer's rank, nor Calabria; that Celsus, indeed, was unknown to Haeckel when he wrote the *Riddle*; that "he must unquestionably have taken his 'historical statement,' *which was in quotation marks*, word for word from somewhere," and that "*no such Talmudic Sepher Toldoth*, from which he pretended he had quoted, *has any existence*—there is simply no such book." Thus it was openly "proved" to the world (though Haeckel knew it all the time) that while writing the *Riddle* "he had never thought of any Talmudic *Sepher Toldoth*; his authority, indirectly, was the eleventh or thirteenth century *Sepher Toldoth Jeschua*," whose references, like those of the gospel of Nicodemus, were merely Jewish calumnies, as attested by so sceptical a critic as Strauss. In an essay (published after his *Life of Jesus*) "On the names, Panther, Pantheras, Pandra, in Jewish and Patristic narratives of Jesus' Origin," he says:—

"The question how slander-mongering Jews can have hit upon the idea of giving just the name above described to the man whom, according to the well-known fiction, they made the natural father of Jesus . . . seems at first thought to be an extremely unimportant matter . . . because the Jewish slander, which collapsed of its own hollowness long ago, now needs no refutation."

4. Loofs' criticism of Haeckel's tone (*Pamphlet*, Pt. v.):—

"Ignorance is no crime. It only becomes wrong when it presumes to judge where it is incompetent to judge. And when it states its baseless judgments in a form which would merit severe censure, even if its grounds were good, it becomes despicable. This is the position of Professor Haeckel. A few passages in proof will suffice.

Haeckel writes: "If any modern 'unbeliever' finds this story of 'the leap of the sacred books' incredible, we must remind him . . . that hundreds of millions of Christians believe just as implicitly in their personal immortality, their 'resurrection from the dead,' and the Trinity of God—dogmas that contradict pure reason no more and no less than that miraculous bound of the Gospel manuscripts." "This," says Loofs, "is not the language of science," and continues, "a writer of scientific dignity and really fine culture" would have remembered that such men as Kant and Hegel believed in the doctrines he thus disparages.

A second example of Haeckel's tone:—

"Naturally these historical details are carefully avoided by the official theologians, because they assort badly with the traditional myth, and lift the veil from its mystery in very simple and natural fashion."

On this Loofs comments:—

"The Panthera story has been seriously investigated by a whole series of 'official theologians' . . . moreover, it is an abominable insinuation. To fling about utterly groundless personal insinuations is not the proper method of scientific discussion. Haeckel's language is simply that of a fanatical and unscrupulous agitator."

"Lastly," says Loofs, "let me quote four consecutive instances of the disgusting character of the language in which Haeckel has indulged in chapter seventeen of his book":—

P. 375 (German Original). "Accordingly this singular God must have stood in the most intimate relations both to mother and daughter; he must, indeed, have been his own father-in-law." Again, Haeckel, after speaking of the Annunciation as the subject chosen by many painters, quotes Svoboda as saying, "The archangel speaks here with a frankness which painting happily could not reproduce. . . . It is true there have been painters whose representations showed that they quite understood the Archangel's embryological observations." Again, "Whenever a king's unwedded daughter, or some other maid of high degree, gave birth to a child, the father was always pronounced to be a god, or a demi-god; in the Christian case, it was the mysterious 'Holy

Ghost.' Other details given about Miriam (the Hebrew name for Mary)—[given, *i.e.*, by the chronicler, who curtly narrates 'the remarkable story of Josephus Pandera'] are far from being to the credit of the Queen of Heaven."

"This is the language," says Loofs, "of a reporter for the yellow press, who seasons his copy with the piquant spice of lubricity."

Chapter VI. ends the Pamphlet. Here Loofs says:—

"At no point have I disputed with Professor Haeckel regarding the *personal convictions of Christian faith*. . . . Out of respect for a brother professor I did not as yet consider it my duty in my Open Letter to assert plainly that Haeckel likewise occupies a different *scientific* standpoint from me—*viz.*, that on the question what constitutes the work, the method, and the conscience of the true man of science, he had other views than I, whose standpoint, I make bold to claim, is simply that of the universal tradition of scholars. Now, however, I believe myself not only to have asserted, but to have proved, that in the chapter of this book which I have examined, Professor Haeckel, by his use of the *most shamelessly vile literature*, by his dogmatic judgments, coupled with the *most disgraceful ignorance*, and by a tone which is utterly discreditable in scientific discussion, or anywhere else, has shown that *he does not possess a healthy scientific conscience*."¹

This criticism will be endorsed by a knowledge of the *source* of the chief of Haeckel's statements, especially concerning Jesus and the Gospels—the subject next in order.

5. The chief source of Haeckel's statements concerning Jesus and the Gospels.

The statements are as to "the leap of the sacred books," the Council of Nice, the *Synodicon* of Pappus, the forty or fifty spurious Gospels, the story of the father of Jesus, the *Sepher Toldoth Jeschua*, and the details as to that reputed father, Josephus Pandera, a Roman officer of a Calabrian legion, etc.

The *source* of the statements turns out to be no other than the one time notorious *Saladin*, Stewart Ross by name, whose work *God and His Book* is still published, with other literature

¹ Italics Loofs'.

of a similar kind, by W. Stewart & Co., Farringdon St. Haeckel says,¹ "Professor Loofs considers it unnecessary to acquaint himself with the remarkable work of the learned and acute *English theologian, Saladin* (Stewart Ross). . . . As I myself build for the most part on this source, I must refer the reader to the book itself for further details." We will, therefore, take Haeckel's advice, so far as we may, and under the guidance of Loofs' chapter eleven, try the taste of this "learned and acute theologian's" quality. "This 'remarkable work'"; says Loofs,² "is nothing but a vulgar pamphlet against the Bible . . . the worst of its blasphemies I cannot repeat. . . . It would be easier to pick the vermin from the coat of a vagrant dog than to collect the scientific follies which mark the volume on every page. . . . I shall illustrate by some examples its ignorance, coarseness and impudence."

"Once upon a time, to occupy His eternity, Jehovah wrote a book. But His methods of publication were peculiar." (Loofs is summarising from Ross.) "He gave His book in keeping to the Jews, placing it in the ark, a shittim-wood box of holy nick-nacks, in which he took great interest, coming down now and again to dance upon the lid (p. 13) or to sit 'on the top of His shittim-wood box, just as you have seen a performing monkey sit on the top of a travelling hurdy-gurdy'" (p. 15). "The Holy Spirit is simply the Holy Wind, and His book must by this time have made him the wealthiest member of the Trinity" (p. 178).

The books were lost, but Ezra re-wrote them, then we come to the following quotation from Ross—

"If Ezra produced the twenty-two books he must have suffered from a far more severe attack of inspiration than Moses had had who produced only five books. In fact . . . the wonder is that, from the overdose, Ezra did not burst" (p. 26).

"The 'holy men of God'—the Ezras, the Pauls, and the rest of them—sitting, pen in hand, with terribly distended abdomens, producing the Bible, 'the source of England's greatness,' is a burlesque . . . In beatific vision, I beheld the holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Wind, each time they dip their pen into the ink with

the one hand they give their abdomen a blow with the other, to try whether it is tense enough to emit the drum-like sound indicative that the possessor is just in the proper key for Bible-writing."

After "some appalling nonsense" from "the profound depths of his ignorance" about the Hebrew language, we read this:—

"Well, my busy friends, you can find out about what *part* of the Scripture is most important from the fact of Jehovah giving it *twice over, word for word*. I have already advised you that 2 Kings xix. and Isaiah xxxvii. are identical. This is evidently Jehovah's crack chapter, the one He prides Himself upon, the one He recites to Sarah and the angels and the beatific beasts on His birthday, and other occasions of high junketting in the Kingdom of Heaven" (p. 61).

"He advises those who wish to be saved to commit to memory two verses of this favourite chapter of Jehovah"—those about finding themselves dead corpses, and adds (p. 63):—

"How surprised those Assyrians must have been when they got up in the morning and found 'they were all dead corpses'! You astonished them that time, Jehovah. Wouldn't even *you* be astonished if you got up in the morning and found yourself a corpse? It is not on record what any dead Assyrian said; but a cockney under the same circumstances would get up, rub his eyes, and ejaculate, 'I say, Bill, I've dead! Tell the ole 'oman I've snuffed it,' etc.," but who wants more of such ribald folly?

"Jehovah," he says, "did not write a better book, because of domestic complications and infelicities in the Divine family circle." If Mary was of use to Jehovah "in the lactation line," she was a considerable source of expense to him; but, he says (p. 79), "We may place as a set off against this the report of a recent tourist in Italy who asserts that 150 convents have each the head-dress of the Virgin. What a heavy sum she must have run up for bonnets! To suppose that a man in the position of Joseph the Carpenter paid for those bonnets is sheer nonsense. . . . No doubt Jehovah had to put His hand deep in His breeches' pocket and pay for these bonnets. Pestered by His poor relations, and especially by His horrible Mary, all things considered, Jehovah has written remarkably well. I am free to admit it to be a wonderful thing, under the circumstances, that the Bible is such a sensible book as it is."

Loofs concludes with the almost unnecessary verdict that such a book

¹ Rejoinder to Open Letter.

² *Anti-Haeckel*, p. 11.

"is simply the vile production of a coarse and ignorant journalist of the lowest order." Then this closes the Section: "It was a new discovery to me that Professor Haeckel has *sunk so far beneath the level of a respectable and self-respecting scholar* as to praise in high tones a book such as this." He might have said, "as even to use such a book."

Such, at least, is the source of Haeckel's statements about Jesus and the Gospels.

6. The English translator of the *Riddle* in relation to Saladin.

The original German edition, from which the English translation is made, contains at least one reference to Saladin, for after Haeckel tells the story of "the leap of the books" we have in parenthesis the words ("compare Saladin"). When Haeckel was challenged in Loofs' Open Letter, there came at the close of his reply the opinion about Saladin's work already quoted—"the remarkable work of a learned and acute English theologian"—together with the statement "as I myself build for the most part on this source, I must refer the reader to the book itself for further details." Thus up to the time of being challenged as to his authority, Haeckel had nothing but praise for Saladin—although, of course, he knew all that the reader now knows as to the scurrilous spirit and phrasing of the book written by that worthy; but in the appendix to his Popular German Edition of the *Riddle*, Haeckel, after renewing his praises of Ross, now adds, "In many details, of course, Saladin has gone astray, just as other expositors of the Bible have done (!) And at many points I must express disapprobation of the odious tone of his virulent attacks upon *Jehovas gesammelte Werke*" [The Collected Works of Jehovah," viz: the Bible]. Yet, as Loofs adds, "In spite of this, Haeckel has left his 17th chapter practically unchanged"—up to that time, that is. But why was nothing of this said before the challenge

as to his authority? Did he know or did he not know of Saladin's egregious blunders? We may think he did not know, since he copied them without question—unless, indeed, he trusted to the book being as unknown as it was difficult to obtain in Germany, where it had been officially suppressed; but he knew at least of "the odious tone of his virulent attacks upon the Collected Works of Jehovah," and he could easily have known all about "Saladin," "Stewart Ross" and "W. Stewart & Co." had he cared to ask. The "odious tone" did not frighten him, it appears, from free quotation, and from using the absurd statements of the book with greater freedom still. To find excuses for Haeckel, as Mr M'Cabe does, under such circumstances, goes far to being as scandalous as Haeckel's own proceeding in so inexcusable a breach of moral and scientific decorum. The book was openly and unaffectedly virulent, and yet Haeckel uses such virulent attack as the words of "the remarkable book of the learned and acute English theologian, Saladin"—"a theologian of very many-sided attainments." The only conclusion we can come to is that Haeckel knew well what he was about, but that any stick was good enough, in his judgment, with which to break the back of Christianity.

Yet Mr M'Cabe, his translator and defender, is in the same boat with himself. When he translated the *Riddle* why did he not only cut out the name of Saladin but omit all reference to so great an authority in whom his master had so trusted? If he knew who Saladin was, the whole matter is explained, for of course he knew the damage it would do the *Riddle* in England: if he did not know, it was a most curious ignorance, with a singular result—the combined result of retaining Saladin's arguments while deliberately expunging all reference to himself. Such ignorance exhibits too much knowledge, and certainly far too much to be easily believed in; but

with his knowledge of Saladin, Mr M'Cabe also knew the already well-known "unreliability" and want of "weight" which "misled" Haeckel, but of which he also is "now" fully convinced.

Yet we need not go upon inference, however inevitable. The translation was not published in English till 1902, and if he did not know before, Haeckel himself had told him who Saladin was in the appendix to the Popular German Edition. It is a case of *suppressio veri*, while he was yet translating Ross's statements as if they were the most reliable evidence in the world. It may be pleaded that it is not a translator's place to suppress passages or arguments; then why did Mr M'Cabe suppress the truth up to the point of *withholding from the English people the great authority upon whom Haeckel was relying*, leading them to think that Haeckel spoke from his own authority, and in the name of ascertained knowledge and science?

But he has used even greater liberties of suppression than this, for there are passages of the *Riddle* in the edition he translated *which do not appear* in his English—shall we now say, "translation," or "version"? Prudence seems to have prevailed in these cases also, or why are such passages omitted as that referring to God as "his own father-in-law," or that other containing the "Archangel's embryological observations"? No, Mr M'Cabe knew, as did Haeckel, only too well the character of this worthless and "virulent attack." Yet these men hold themselves responsible teachers of science and conscientious seekers after truth. It is a piteous spectacle and gives but little hope of the battle with Monism being fought from that side with anything like honour and fairness, whatever the others may do. Are suppression, lust of conquest, and illegitimate means, to be the law of this warfare?

7. The amended English version of the *Riddle's* 17th chapter.

First. The form of amendment.

In a note (p. 110), Fourth Cheap Edition we read:—

"The remainder of this section has been rewritten in the present edition. Until Professor Haeckel was convinced of the unreliability of the authority for his statements in this section and the closing pages of this chapter, the translator did not feel justified in interfering with the text. Professor Haeckel has now recognised that he has been misled as to the weight of his author, and has withdrawn several of the statements in the present chapter. The translator, has, therefore, now amended the text and brought it up to date on these points."

This is a periphrastic and most inherently unpleasant and distasteful way of admitting that the "authority" of Saladin is repudiated, his references deleted, and Loofs triumphant—inherently nauseous, because really admitting all this without appearing to do so, and saving themselves by covering up their tracks: a singularly repulsive proceeding. Nevertheless these things are true, for gone is the story of the Nicene Council with its "leap of the books" and unworthy comments thereon; the necessary corrections are made as to Paul and his Epistles; something of the true state of the case is presented as to the paternity of Jesus and the *Sepher Toldoth Jeschua* story—though with the lingering flavour of desire to make the most of them to the injury and discredit of Jesus; together with matters of minor moment as to the Immaculate Conception, Immaculate Oath, etc.

About three of the double columns of the English translation have been deleted in the fourth cheap edition, and as much new matter inserted. It is not a little singular in view of both Haeckel's and Mr M'Cabe's treatment of Loofs that the excised passages cover the grounds of Loofs' criticism; *the corrections of Loofs are accepted and retained*, but—*without acknowledgment*. The excision is a silent witness to the truth of that criticism and its unanswerableness, as is the acceptance of the corrections. But if the reader looks for any acknowledgment either of Loofs' accuracy or of his accepted state-

ments, or of Haeckel's absurd mistakes, he will look in vain; indeed, we have learnt enough of Haeckel and his ways and "tone" to know by this time that that was hardly to be looked for from him—that nothing in the nature of a dignified and honourable withdrawal, or acknowledgment of his indebtedness, was to be expected. But might not his disciple and translator have suggested a little gentlemanly treatment of his brother Professor, as an opponent, or on his own account? To be just, who knows that he did not? Yet it is hardly likely considering the unfair treatment he has himself meted out to Loofs in his *Haeckel's Critics Answered*. Instead of the open, honourable and gentlemanly action above indicated, all the reader who seeks will find is the sheltering wind-warding footnote for the delicate immaculate Haeckel given on p. 110 and reproduced above. We are aware that this is straight speaking, but there are times when only something of that order will serve the occasion or come near the truth.

Coming to the substance of the footnote, we are told that "the remainder of this section (Primitive Christianity) has been rewritten in the present edition." Who would suppose that, in addition to this, a column and a quarter of the *last* section of the chapter had also been rewritten, as well as a fifth of a column deleted on p. 115? In spite of the reference to "the closing pages of this chapter," it is just a little difficult to recognise the standard by which such writing is to be tested as descriptive of the facts.

Again the footnote tells us that Haeckel has "now" recognised "that he has been misled as to the weight of this author." What evidence can he have received that he had not in *God and His Book* itself? He had the experience of reading that book, and that experience, scurrility and all, failed to give this scientific judge of men and things any notion of the kind of "authority" he had under his hand. Without exclaiming with Dominie

Sampson, this fact does not give Haeckel a high certificate for judgment. But do the facts not convey the meaning that the *will* to be "convinced" failed him? And is this at last the true Haeckel and his scientific method? No evidence for that "now" appears unless there be imagined the gentle pressure of a disciple as to the English distaste for the moral and intellectual character of the whole proceeding in stooping to such a book, as well as to the class of fact involved. Yet even now it is not Haeckel that rewrites the sections altered, but the translator—if we may accept that note as truly putting the case; for we are told while Haeckel "has *withdrawn* several of the statements . . . the *translator* has now amended the text and brought it up to date on these points"—in itself, indeed, an instructive and, on the face of it, an all-too patent fact, whether from the positions claimed or the phrases used.

The whole of the external business connected with this 17th chapter has an ugly look, an unsavoury smell, a very bad mental taste; and constitutes a warning introduction to the treatment of the subject discussed. To this subject we now turn.

Second. The substance of the amendment. This may be put under the counts of (1) Primitive Christianity, (2) Paul's Epistles, (3) The Gospels, and (4) A neglected principle.

(1) Primitive Christianity, or Christianity in its origin.

The general purport of Chapter xvii. is, in the words of Haeckel, "the vehemence of the opposition between science and Christianity." This promising subject, however, soon dissolves into quite another matter, "the defence of science and reason against the vigorous attacks of the Christian Church and its vast army"—a *descensus* indeed, and into quite another region. In order, however, to understand the fundamental opposition "of Christianity" to reason and science, Haeckel divides its history into four

periods (1) Primitive Christianity, (2) Papal Christianity, (3) The Reformation, and (4) Modern pseudo-Christianity—any or all of which, one would think, is extremely little to the point of the “vehement opposition between science and Christianity.” The simple truth is that no such opposition is developed in this chapter, nor could be, seeing that the notion of opposition between Christianity and genuine science is a fiction of the sectarian brain on either side of the hedge. It would be positively amusing to see Haeckel attempt such proof.

So far as Christianity is concerned the only part of this chapter in the least bearing on the subject is that on Primitive Christianity, and even that only so far as the *origin* of Christianity is touched, and amazingly caricatured. Thus has the broad and pretentious title of the chapter shrunk at last to a palpably incorrect statement concerning the Gospels and Epistles; and the vain boast collapses that “in the same proportion in which the victorious progress of modern science has surpassed all the scientific achievements of earlier ages, has the *untenability been proved* of those mystic views (in which Christianity has shared) which would subdue reason under the yoke of an alleged revelation.” We know of no “mystic views” which Christianity expresses in any sense contrary to science and rationality; neither do we know that revelation seeks “to subdue reason to its yoke”; nor has the tenability of Christianity itself been so much as touched either by the Rationalistic attack in general or by Haeckel’s absurd and irrelevant chapter in particular.

However, let us take his statements on the origin of Christianity and see what they amount to. The main point presented is that the canon was settled either in the middle or before the end of the second century; that thus “we have no authority whatever in support of the gospel *narratives* until more than a century after Christ; and that, even if the earliest gospel were dated

70 A.D., there would be the ample margin of forty years” between the death of Christ, that is, and the writing of that Gospel—for the accretion of a mass of “myth and miracle.”

Now, what are the facts? In the first place, will Haeckel or his amender find for us any such “mass of myth or miracle” within the forty years here depicted as forming “an ample margin” for such work? Were they trading on the ignorance of their readers in writing such nonsense as this? Does *Mr McCabe* know no better? It is hard to believe it: but we freely and frankly give him the offer of producing the literature he here names or, by implication, endorses. The truth is, as any one who has looked into such subjects at all is aware, that no such literature as is here referred to came into existence till well on into the second century, and much of it, and those of the most importance, very much later. We need not specify: let them fill up the ample margin of “forty years” and then it will be time to discuss.

And, as every one knows, there was a very sound and sufficient reason why such apocryphal literature did not exist at the beginning of the Christian era. It was, for the most part, a copy of similar Jewish literature, and that did not, and in the nature of things, could not, begin to exist till the genuine and authentic literature of the order imitated had shown the way and produced the models. So with New Testament Apocryphal literature: following the Jewish method, it needed the facts and models as its basis. Hence the genuine Christian literature, in the nature of the case, came first, and the pseudographa followed: nor will the case be altered in the least, except for those who would prejudge it by their own prepossessions, if it be found that the *genuine* literature of either Testament savours of what Haeckel is pleased to call “myth and miracle.” “Miracle” there may be, as, by supposition, the expression of the Divine in the Physical: “myth” there will not be till the facts

have first laid the foundation for it. Does Haeckel really know *anything* about such questions as he here presumes to discuss?

Haeckel's position, essentially, and the only argument adduced, is that Christianity was practically non-existent between 33 A.D. and 150 A.D., or at earliest 70, at which latter dates the Gospels either did arise or might have arisen. It is this position that has now to be overthrown, with its implication that the absence of the Gospel-narratives till 70 at earliest destroys the *nexus* with Christ and any legitimate historical Christianity, allowing for the entrance of myth meanwhile. Is the existence of the Gospels before 70 necessary to a continued historical Christianity? Is there no *other* means of connection between the Christ and the close of the Apostolic Age? Was not that means of connection a more natural and legitimate one than Gospels could ever have been at that time? What we have to look for are the actual facts of the Apostolic Age, setting aside artificial theories as to the necessity for the Gospels and their existence or non-existence then; and the real question thus emerges, *Was there an actual continuity of Christian life and fact from the Christ to the Gospel-narratives*, without the need for establishing fictional positions for these narratives, with fictional implications? This continuity, the most unequivocal evidence for Christianity, can be easily and clearly established. Nor are we concerned with a mere literary continuity, though such lies readily to our hands in the *Logia*, or sayings of the Lord, and in the earlier Apostolic *Narratives*, both of which genuine productions were long precedent of the Gospels, and admittedly entered into their structure. Such a line need not be overlooked, though we are in search for something deeper, stronger, more living than the literary *nexus*. It is to the broad life of the time and its facts, to which we turn.

Speaking at the outset in a general

way, we know that the Apostles were alive at the time of the Crucifixion, and that a Church was established in Jerusalem immediately after that event. We also know that an Apostle of the name of Saul or Paul was brought into the Church from without, and began to take, and did afterwards hold, a prominent place in the Church's affairs in Asia Minor and the Eastern Mediterranean. On no theory are these things denied, nor can be, whatever interpretation we may give to them; yet these facts are connected with later events by the two world-facts and dates of the beginning of the reign of Claudius Cæsar (41 A.D.) and the death of Herod (44), involving the activities of Paul and the specific event of the famine in Judæa. Now, without entering into the discussion of details with the object of fixing specified dates backward to the Crucifixion, it is sufficient for our purpose to say, and we are open in the face of the facts to affirm, that on no possible arrangement of the intervening dates and circumstances can that first and crucial fact of Paul's Christian life, his Conversion, be severed by any distance of time from the Crucifixion of Jesus. Nor is this result in any way affected by the different views we may take of this or that fact, or by the arrangement of the whole we may adopt. The facts are such, and the time required is such, that no arrangement makes a difference of other than a literal year or two backward or forward: in any case the beginning of Paul's life as a Christian Apostle is nearly synchronous with the death of Jesus Christ.

Let us now consider the bearing of these facts on the origin of Christianity. The amender of Haeckel's history, who supposes that he brings Haeckel up to date, goes on the seeming supposition that documents must co-date life. This is, of course, a patent fallacy. Documents have their own place and scope and class of evidence, but *facts of life* must take historic precedence of them; and if this is considered, allowed and

demanding in other regions, why is Christianity to be denied the legitimate historic order, denied the historic right of living its life before its facts can be recorded, and that which is a legitimate historic principle considered a proof of the unhistoricity of Christianity because, forsooth, its Gospels are not coincident with its beginning? Is this, then, a plea for the absence of documents? Not at all; but it is a plea which cuts the ground of the argument from beneath our amender's feet, when he insists that because the Gospels cannot be carried back into co-existence with Christ or coincidence with the primitive Apostolic movements, therefore, through lack of evidence, the claims of Christianity are rendered worthless. To plead that because (as he supposes) we have no authority for the "Gospel-narratives" till the middle of the second century, we have no evidence for Christianity, is to be guilty of a singular historic oversight and to force the rejection of that which he does not wish to believe. What is the ground of Mr M'Cabe's rejection of Christianity as here expressed in the argument for the lateness of the Gospels, but that of which he accuses the opponents of Monism—a philosophy of gaps?

Coming to our work by a better way, we get first into the midst of the facts indirectly attested and unintentionally adduced as evidence, by realising something of the coincidence of the statements of Christianity with the facts of history; and the fundamental fact which this evidence opens to our sight is the absolute *historic continuity* of the Christianity thus definitely placed among the world's events. We see the life of Paul, the chief of the Apostles, stretching forward into the progressive life of the Church, on the one hand, and linked on to the life of Christ and the beginning of Christianity on the other, with the result of the monistic Gospel of Christian "gaps" exploded. At the time when the air is still resonant with the story of the life and

death of the Great Master, and pulsing with the enthusiasm of His Ascension around the recognised Apostles and the infant Church, there arises one from the outside, intolerant in opposition, who finds himself subdued to believing in that which he had begun by persecuting, and ere long taking on himself the burden of carrying the Gospel of this Christ through the world: an Apostle without, and Apostles and the Church within, momentarily suspicious of each other perhaps, but alike knowing the facts whereof they affirmed, and alike supremely willing to bear that testimony even unto the death. Here is evidence on the spot, given through channels strictly historic—for the young Church with its Apostles is as much a reality of that common hour as is the "young man" Paul—without waiting, or requiring to wait, for the necessarily subsequent documents unfolding the vital facts which gave rise to the history. Paul's life, alone, forms a continuous bridge between the life and death of Christ and the publication of the Gospels, and is itself a standing pledge and monument of the historicity of Christianity, as it is an irremovable rebuke of tendencies by which it is sought to break the continuity between the Church and its Founder.

Thus in the very year of the Crucifixion, or the year after it,¹ Paul is seen accepting, and soon teaching, the great facts (as he so held them) of the life, death, and Resurrection of his Lord, unfolded later, as to their secret spring and meaning, in the published Gospels. Where he got these things, nor even their truth, is not in question: that he had them is the necessary and incontrovertible fact.² Would he not know, as would the Apostles and Elders of the Church, if fabrications were set forth in place of the facts which he and they alike accepted: would *they* not know if *he* communicated ideas foreign to the essentials of their common

¹ See *Encyc. Biblica*; CHRONOLOGY.

² Van Manen's view will be presently noticed.

Gospel?¹ And this surely with the more effect that they and he, while in essentials allied and one, were mutually independent, and not altogether, in external rites, seeing eye to eye. A greater security can hardly be imagined for the dissemination of the pure truths of Christianity, whether by speech or by writing, than the relations between Paul and the rest of the Apostolate during these thirty-five years of universal missionary effort. Had such a relation of independent unity been devised for that end, it could not have been a more effectual guarantee of its accomplishment than in practice it proved itself.

To whom could forgeries, by whomsoever, appeal but to the men who had themselves been taught by either these Apostles or their disciples? It is not a question of such forgeries existing later, or of their power to obtain credence from the weak or ambitious, but only of their instant detection and exposure whether by the Apostles or by the Churches they had trained and taught—barring always the elements of weakness or of turbulent ambition. The conditions were such as to warrant and secure the perpetuation in continued line, whether orally or in writing or in both, of a sufficient and healthful volume of that Apostolic teaching known and rejoiced in as the Gospel of Christ which from the first had been preached in its fulness.

There are few positions in this connection that exhibit more credulity than that which professes an apprehension of the primitive Christian facts and yet affects to believe in a consensus of suppression of its common faith by the Church in order to the deliberate accept-

¹ Evidence of this very case and knowledge on the part of the early Church is to hand in a letter of Serapion, Bishop of Antioch (190-209), preserved by Eusebius: "We, brethren, receive Peter and the other Apostles as Christ Himself, but the forgeries current in his name we reject, knowing what they are, for none such have been handed down to us." They were created in the second century. See Dr Sanday's "Inspiration."

ance of that which it knew to be neither common nor the faith once delivered. If anything is true of primitive Christianity, it is its continuity for the first hundred years and the adequacy of the then conditions to secure that end—of which not only the Apostolate in general, but Paul's life and teaching specifically, during the thirty-five years between the living Lord and the written memorials of Him, are a standing attestation. Thus the conception of Jesus as a Jewish Ethical Teacher and His undefined impulse on His disciples did not "grow" by tradition and legends into the supernatural Christ, for there was no space at this period such as mythical forms require for their accumulation, and for the ever-present Lord of the Church to be forgotten; for that sufficing Christ was there, in their hearts and thoughts, and without interval from the beginning, taught at the outset by the men to whom His Presence was an abiding reality and the spring of all their power and joy in life.

How many have strained their resources to discover what, when found, could only have been an impossible primitive mental sleep, or to invent one, during which mythical legends might have grown into the Christianity of the second century, and at length by such accretion have revealed the Christ then taught! If ever there were a case in which the futility of foregone conclusion were shown, in the subject, time, and by the conditions, under which the search for myth was undertaken, it is here—the cause of it found in that rock of primitive truth taught and established without change from the Apostolate to the Apostolic Fathers, against which in vain these critical efforts dash themselves. Was the Divine Christ taught in the second century? He is there in all His fulness in that year of the Crucifixion from which the Apostles in Jerusalem proclaimed Him, and in the time immediately subsequent from which Paul began to preach Him—for they also are on the spot, are his contemporaries and

know—the same crucified and resurrected Lord throughout, the centre all through of the fundamental Redemption and Salvation He had accomplished by the Divine Humanity which had become the “power in heaven and on earth,” the same so-called miracle-working helper of the needs of man as He had shown Himself in the flesh, and the same life-giving Spirit to those whose wills were open to His reception. The Gospel which had created the Christian world was that which, already full and complete, had established itself in the hour of the Crucifixion and produced the martyrdom of Stephen and the Conversion of Paul. Unbroken continuity of a Primary Power and principle is the only solution of the facts, ensured by the conditions.

From this we turn by natural transition to the Epistles of Paul as the source of evidence next in order. All that the amender of Haeckel finds to say on this head is as much to the purpose as the matter of the Gospel-narratives, and is that the Epistles tell us little of the *events* of Christ's life, and that *theologians* differ about the miraculous conception and the real teachings and aims of Christianity—a position merely futile as against the reality of Christianity as a factor in the world's life exhibited through the Epistles.

As to the Epistles in relation to the events of Christ's life, why should an abstract, *a priori* standard of their contents be set up and condemnation implied for not containing what it was manifestly no part of their business to contain—the very absence of which should have been an argument in their favour as implying events already known? Of what consequence, again, in the circumstances under which the Epistles were written, are the mere external events of Christ's life, or of any life, compared with the fact, nature, motive, principle, purpose and effects of it? Plainly, the Epistles not only imply that life and its events, but are deliberately and of necessity built on

it. Judging these, our first direct expository or teaching documents, on their merits relative to Christ, as any fair-minded judicious critic would do, we see plainly revealed to us this Christ and His life and purpose as their very heart and soul—His Divinity, descent from Heaven, Redemptive work, Resurrection and Ascension, and His continuous Divine energy in the Christian life—all are there intact just as in the preaching of the Apostles at the Crucifixion and after, plainly and fully exhibited in these the first known direct teachings of the Church, and as if time had no share in the transactions. When open-minded critics of the highest order pronounce the Pauline Epistles, especially such of them as the two Thessalonians, Galatians, the two Corinthians and Romans, to be both “undisputed and indisputable,” and the very severest sceptics accept Galatians, the two Corinthians, and Romans, as in that category; when we realise that, according to said critical authorities, those to the Thessalonians were written in 53 A.D., the two Corinthians between 55-57 and Romans and Galatians in 58, or that these are held as at least proximate dates; when we perceive how full and comprehensive is the Christian position therein exhibited, and how definite is the acceptance and inculcation of the supernatural character of the facts, we cannot fail to see declared the essential, absolute Christianity of all time—however much we may have misinterpreted the documents containing it.¹

Yet has not the authenticity of these Epistles been of late impugned? Van Manen has made this his province in conjunction with a Dutch School, but surely on the most singular grounds of supposed evidence ever put forward. “With respect to the canonical Pauline Epistles, the later criticism here under consideration,” says he (PAUL: *Encyc. Bib.*) “has learned to recognise that

¹ And indeed these Epistles of Paul have been egregiously interpreted, especially by the Church.

they are none of them by Paul, not even the four so long 'universally' regarded as unassailable"; and the theory is that they were all written or compiled (probably in the second century) from certain "sources." "That they cannot be the work of Paul," Van Manen argues both from their "Form" and their "Contents."

As to (1) their Form, his argument is that they are not "letters" at all, but disquisitions, having "the surprising and (except on his theory) unaccountable features" of addresses "to all in Rome," "to the Church at Corinth" "to the Churches of Galatia." This, he thinks, is artificial: "real letters" are never so written. To which the evident reply is, What then? Suppose the Epistles were not intended to be "real" letters in Van Manen's sense at all, but what they manifestly are, addresses for doctrinal and practical guidance to churches and not to individuals?

Then as to (2) their Contents, he seeks to make six points: I. Paul, a man in authority, *could* not write in a different "tone" to the Romans (whom he did not know by face) and to his own "spiritual children of Corinth and Galatia"! II. Paul *could* not have reached (in a period of twenty years of constant spiritual activity) "such magnitude and depth of Christian life and thought" as the Epistles show! III. That "Paul is not a contemporary but a figure of the past" is shown by the fact that so distinctive a *doctrine* as the Epistles teach could not have gathered in that time so much adhesion and opposition: Paul, therefore, *must* be "the central point of the zeal and effort" of idolizers—who yet spared no pains to show how little some thought of their idol! IV. The Paulinism defended was a "thoroughgoing reformation of the older form of Christianity," in which no longer a Jewish Messiah was presented in the Christ, but "the Son of God"—the law having to yield to the Gospel: and such a change could not be produced

in the time!—though it was *taught* in the time and received as far as it could be, is the inevitable comment. V. The problems discussed in the Churches could not have "belonged to the first twenty or thirty years after the death of Jesus." And these? "Relation between law and Gospel, justification by faith or by works, election and reprobation, Christ according to the flesh and Christ according to the Spirit, this Jesus or another, the value of circumcision, the use of clean or unclean things, sacrificial flesh, common flesh and other ordinary foods and drinks, the Sabbath and other holy days, revelations and visions, the married and the unmarried condition, the authority of the Apostles, the marks of true apostleship, and a multitude of others"—such are the things which should *not* have been discussed in the transition from the old Judaism and heathenism to the new Gospel of Christianity, and under conditions evoking every one of them. VI. The "wisdom haunting the more highly developed minds" transcends the simplicity of the "first disciples"! Just what would Van Manen have had "the more highly developed minds" occupied with except this strange new "wisdom" given them in Christianity? The mere statement of the Gospel truth *is* such wisdom, and why should not the thought of the first, as of any age, be arrested by it—let alone the "highly developed minds"?

And this is the summing up: these epistles were written in a later age, and not by Paul: to which the corollary follows—that the ignorant primitive age must have held a good few minds the equals of Paul's, able to reach his subtle capacity of thought, and capable of dealing with just the problems and conditions surrounding the primitive Church in the thirty years of Paul's Apostleship. But it will go hard for even Van Manen to show why we should multiply causes in the theological any more than in the cosmological field, depose Paul himself

unnecessarily in order to postulate a dozen like him, or why *they* should write of such impossible subjects any more than he.

Mr Thomas Whittaker, author of "The New Platonists" on reading the above article¹ thought "that if the conclusions stated could be established by analysis, then Professor Van Manen must be regarded as the Copernicus of New Testament criticism." This led to the examination of his *Paulus*, and the result is "The Origins of Christianity, with an outline of Van Manen's analysis of the Pauline literature."² As we have not the *Paulus*, we turn to this Analysis" (which is certain not to be unfair to Van Manen), and from a sufficient portion endeavour to test the scientific quality of the new Copernicus. As special mention is made in "Paul" of Romans, we turn to what is defined as the "First Part i. 18—viii. 39," and follow the critic as the Analysis presents him.

But first, observe a reference in "Paul" to Romans ix.-xi., where, says he, "the rejection of Israel is spoken of in a manner that cannot be thought to have been possible before the fall of the Jewish state in 70 A.D." As this is as direct a challenge as "Paul" contains, we accept it, especially as it is continuous with the part whose analysis we are to follow. It is certainly a delicious morsel of most irrelevant criticism, seeing that through the whole of three chapters there is not the shadow of an intimation of the material or political condition of Israel: the whole question turns upon her then spiritual state and her spiritual privileges in the past, as compared with the condition of unrighteousness into which she, on the one hand, had fallen, and God's righteousness in extending these privileges now to the needs of the Gentiles and their satisfaction, on the other. "What shall we say, then?" cries Paul. "That the Gentiles who followed not after

righteousness have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith; but Israel, who followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness, because they sought it by the works of the law; for they stumbled at that stumbling-stone. . . . whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed. Brethren, my heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel is that they may be saved." But is there any need to quote for so palpable a case? These chapters are their own best evidence that the whole reference is to the spiritual condition of the world, both Jew and Gentile; have not the slightest bearing on anything else, political or other; and ought to make any man ashamed of the endeavour to pervert to any purpose whatever so manifest an intention and exposition.

Turning now to Romans i.-viii., we come first upon the Introduction i. 8-17, to find "a complication of inconsistent reasons" why the writer wished to go to Rome: (1) He wanted to give them some spiritual gift, that they might be established and himself comforted—thus securing mutual benefit; (2) He had done this among the Gentiles and wished to do it among them as well; and (3) His general principle for such action was that he was a debtor to all men, Greeks and barbarians, wise and unwise, because his Gospel was the power of God to every one. And these are "inconsistent reasons"! This is certainly not a hopeful introduction.

Turning to the First Part itself, we are met by the supposed difficulty of the method of the writer in linking incompatible positions together—specifically, the mechanical linking of sentences by particles that should denote logical transition—"only intelligible on the supposition of the whole being composite." Leaving the "incompatible position" till we come to the instances given, we have only to note the alleged mechanical connections that should be logical transitions.

¹ PAUL: *Encyc. Biblica.*

² Watts & Co.

The answer is that the transitions *are* logical, and that the whole trouble arises with the critic's mistaking such transitions for mechanical, through not seeing that Paul's logic is that of *thought* and not of mere *terms*. We have a vivid example of the same kind of thing in the reasoning of George Meredith, which is rendered unintelligible to some through the connections being strictly those of the inner thought and not of the words: it is an internal logic and not an external. So with Paul, in whose case the obscurity is sometimes deepened by the very certainty of such connections, linked on from thought to thought by the connective Greek particle. It is simply a case of individuality of style explicable as above, but perplexing to critics who look for the connection of terms and the finished sentences of formal logic. To Paul, they will look in vain—hence all sorts of foolish conjectures as to "sources" and various redactors.

Coming to the examples of "incompatible positions," which are, without warning, softened down to "antitheses," we find that "the following may be noted."

(1) "The God who will render to every man according to his works (ii. 6) is not precisely the God of the Paulinism taught elsewhere in the section. The writer who says that the doers of the law shall be justified (ii. 13) is other than the writer who says that by the works of the law there shall no flesh be justified (iii. 20)."

Where, in the section, is there anything taught contrary to the doctrine that God will render to every man according to his works? That is the very ground-tone of the whole of the Epistle: a man under the Jewish law and "doing it" will be justified, and a man under Gentile law and "doing it" will be justified: for not "the hearers" of law shall be just before God, but its *doers*. So much for men *under* the law and doing it or not doing it: they are saved or condemned; and God thus renders to every man according to his works or deeds.

But what about the quite different case in which the law is abolished and another system enters? "Now the righteousness of God *without* the law is manifested": how? By the man's *whole mental act* (his "faith") being directed to Christ, with conformity to His will ensuing, since Christ is the very "righteousness of God." Thus the man is now justified (*i.e.* secures righteousness) "without" the law, by doing Christ's will—without the law of Moses, by obeying the law of Christ. Suppose now that that man, while believing that this way of salvation is the highest, harks back to the mechanical keeping of the Jewish law, will he *then* be justified or become righteous? Certainly not, for in his case now, as in the case of the man living evilly under the law, justification is impossible: "by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified," since they now know the better and still do the worse.

Thus there are two distinct cases: that under the law, in which men know no higher, and being doers of the law, acting up to their light, are justified by their deeds; and that under Grace, the law of Christ, into which "the deeds of the law" do not enter, and by which, therefore, it is impossible they should be "justified" now that the will of Christ has become the operative righteous and justifying principle within them. They are now freed from the law and its mechanical and legal observances. But the law throughout referred to is not the moral law but the law of Moses, except in the case of the Gentiles, who are under the law of nature. Is this, then, a putting of "incompatible positions"? Let the critic think again. On the contrary, it is a broad, strong, human and absolutely righteous principle; and the mind that seized and expressed it, in spite of its rush of utterance, is a splendid unit, broad, and strong, and human likewise.

"Again, the verses, iii. 25, 26, express a different idea from that which is indicated in iii. 24, and other passages, taken in conjunc-

tion with viii. 20. In the former, the Son of God is offered as a propitiation by God to Himself to satisfy the demands of His own justice. In the latter He is the price of man's redemption paid to a power standing over against God." (The rest will be quoted in our reply.)

From the above one would hardly imagine that verse 24, chapter iii., is part of the same sentence in which the "different idea" is said to be expressed; moreover, verses 25, 26, are nothing but a detailed explanation of the truth stated in verse 24. "Being justified freely," says 24, "by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus," "whom," say 25, 26, "God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness for the remission of sins that are past . . . that He might be just and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus." Thus verses 25, 26 are nothing more than an explanation of how free justification through Christ's redemption was achieved, and the "different idea" collapses.

Then follows Van Manen's interpretation: "In 25, 26, the Son of God is offered as a propitiation by God to Himself to satisfy the demands of His own justice." This statement is pure fiction: there is not a word in the text about propitiation being made *to God*, much less of the reason for this being to satisfy divine justice. Such notions are pure fabrications—readings into a passage of ideas not there, and a good instance of the false interpretation to which Paul has been subjected. The consistent teaching of all these Epistles is that it is *we* "who receive the atonement," "who are reconciled to God"—not God who receives it, or is reconciled to us; that "God was *in* Christ *reconciling the world* unto Himself," not Himself to the world—an idea, like that of the satisfaction of His justice, which is never once uttered; and verses 25, 26 show us Jesus Christ set forth by God to be *the means of reconciliation* for man through belief in His power to purify, that the righteousness of God might be shown, not in

demanding satisfaction—never, but in *the remission* of all past sins. God's love for the world, moreover, is not given as *the result* of that means of reconciliation; but that means is found as the expression of His love—showing in how strict agreement this is with the doctrine of the Gospels, "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son . . . that whosoever *believeth* should have everlasting life." God, in short, is never represented as requiring to be appeased or reconciled, but we are uniformly taught that "all things are of God Who hath reconciled *us* to *Himself*"; and the doctrine of God's not requiring to be reconciled is (Jer. vii. 22) carried so far as even to the professed repudiation by God of His commanding or instituting the Jewish Sacrifices themselves—though into them the element of propitiation does not enter.

Turning now to verse 24, "Justified freely through the redemption of Christ," we are asked to take with it viii. 20, "The creature (creation or nature) was made subject to vanity (change) . . . by reason of Him who subjected it in hope"; and in connection with that last phrase, "*Him* who subjected it," we are asked to compare the following passages, Gal. iii. 13, "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law"; iv. 5, "To redeem them that were under the law"; 1 Cor. ii. 8, "Which (wisdom) none of the princes of this world knew"; v. 5, "To deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh"; viii. 5, "For though there be that are called gods whether in heaven or earth (as there be gods many and lords many)," and x. 20-21, "The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils: ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and of the table of devils." And the meaning of these references? They are to suggest that Christ is "the price of man's redemption paid to a

power standing over against God," hence in contradiction to the propitiation supposed, as we have seen, to be "made by God to Himself." But if there be no propitiation made by God to Himself, and if He required no such thing, as we have also seen, it follows that, even if these passages should contain mention of an outside power, to whom redemption was paid, there can be no possible contradiction. In that case, all we can say is that the first passage does *not* teach that the price was paid to God, and that the others teach that it *was* paid to somebody or something else. Where, then, is the contradiction? Nor, to vindicate Paul, should we require to disprove the suggestion that these passages show another power to whom it was paid.

But the whole truth may as well be stated. Man was in captivity: to whom or what? *To sin*, of which the devil and Satan is the personification under different names; for surely we are not at this day going back to the notion of a great personal devil, or that the Scriptures teach any such absurdity? If man was in captivity to sin, he had to be *redeemed* from that captivity, and by One who could subdue the power that held them in bondage. This conquest over evil was effected by Christ, and effected in Himself by taking upon Himself the evil nature of man and overcoming it there by conquest from His will, thus purifying and glorifying His humanity, and finally making it the absolute and only medium of the Divine; and the inevitable price which had to be paid for that redemption, and was paid to the last drop of His blood, was the agony of soul and body inevitable to contact with evil, the terrific temptations from devils both in this world and the other, and the consequences to Himself of this awful, pivotal conflict with it which was for ever to break its power and release man from its bondage, if he would but ally himself with his Redeemer and live the Redeemer's life. Such is the burden of Paul's

story of the Redemption: and shall we wonder, when its conception first dawned upon him in its vast scope and power, that he should labour, even with turgid eloquence, to express it, and that his phrasing broke beneath the mighty force of the truth?

But the contradictions—where are they? Vanished, like Macbeth's witches, into "thin air."

Whether "the first named passage proceeds from a Jewish minded Paulinist," or "in the second we detect a Gnostic thought," are matters of not the slightest moment, if the passages be, as we have seen, in mutual consistence; for surely a varied mind like Paul's may be allowed the power of impressionability for thought, as well as the scope, if not the graces, of various expression. But when did the use of the faculty of "antithesis" begin to imply a necessary contradiction?

"Further, in the comparison between Adam and Christ (v. 12-19), the coming of death into the world is ascribed alternately to the sin of one man (12a, 13-14) and to the sin of all (12b)."

So, of course, Van Manen is not afraid to draw the tremendous inference that there are at least two writers at work, or that one derived the differing statements from separate "sources." This is the passage, "As by *one man* sin entered into the world and death by sin; and so death passed upon *all men*, for that *all* have sinned." Does this "antithesis" really need any serious discussion? It would in reality be ludicrous if it were not in so grave a connection, though the gravity of the writer certainly doesn't lessen the ludicrousness of his position. The plain fact is that here "the coming of death into the world" is simply *not* "ascribed alternately to the sin of one man and to the sin of all": the "coming" is ascribed to one, but the "sinning" equally to all. Let us put a comparison which shall be also an "antithesis": Because we should describe a certain man as inventing

a new process, whether for good or evil, and others as either inheriting or not, but in any case endorsing or repeating it, should we be held by common sense as ascribing the invention of the process alternately to the one and to the many? And is this really the pass to which criticism, nay, the looked for "Copernicus of New Testament criticism," has come? How is it possible not to laugh openly, if even with pity and something of contempt, in the face of the critic?

"Another antithesis becomes visible in the idea of a permanent moral struggle as distinguished from a redemption once for all completely effected. The impressive passage, vii. 7-25, cannot be reconciled with the passages where the Christian is described as having broken for ever with sin in becoming free from the law. To make the ejaculation of vii. 24, with its note of moral seriousness, refer only to Paul's pre-Christian life, is to reduce it to mere verbiage. The aspiration here is for freedom from the body; and it refers to the inward conflict still to be undergone by those who, from full conviction, have already embraced Christianity. Whatever may be the original source of this passage, the redaction proceeds from one whose aim it was to rescue the Pauline teaching from the reproach of antinomianism."

This piece of, what we can only define as, solemn nonsense, exhibiting an utter lack of the verifying experience, is based on the principle that permanent moral struggle is antithetic to a completed redemptive act; and consequently declares Paul's cry of, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" to be irreconcilable with the passages describing the breaking from sin in becoming free from the law. But what if the completed redemptive act is the very condition of permanent moral struggle; and the being under grace and free from legal sin, the source itself of that acute consciousness of his individual infirmity which leads to this age-long cry? That completed redemptive act in the Lord becomes a permanent redemptive work in the man, and the further the work proceeds the more humiliatingly aware the man becomes, with an ever-quickening con-

sciousness, of the deeper evils in himself, increasingly revealed. The discharge of legal obligations would be easy compared with this constant ever-deepening fight with the self, illuminated and detected by the permanent increasing presence of the pure spirit of the Lord. Do our sage critical professors, then, need teaching the comparative nothingness to a spiritual man, of the freedom from mere legal obligations? Do they imagine him unregenerate because the law against theft or murder is nothing to him? Do they require alphabetic instruction in morals and in the inevitable struggle which the acceptance of a redemptive principle applied to the regeneration of life may bring? Such criticism as Van Manen offers here would surely be incredible in the merest tyro of their classrooms who had a little spiritual experience of himself. He, at least, would know whether struggles with evil can or "cannot be reconciled" with the sense of freedom from legal observance, and the acceptance of the principle of a free-determination to overcome it through the redemptive help of the Lord.

Yet this is not all: something, in one sense worse, because more spiritually crass and undiscerning remains behind. "The aspiration here is for freedom from the body"! Is such crudity possible? We thought that Paul was craving freedom "from the body of *this death*" within him—thus personifying the *evil* as a dead body, within the material, which he carried about with him continually. But this is an effort of some redactor to save Pauline teaching from the reproach of antinomianism! Just as if the living, breathing soul of a Paul, laying down his life daily for his religion, and as its expression, could be an antinomian; or as if Paul were not even too actually ready to defend himself from such a charge, and to assert the freedom of the Christian disciples as against all nominal bondage. But our curious, serious critics must give rein to their

loose mental elements sometimes, we suppose — whether Van Manen or another.

The above "analysis" of the first eight chapters of Romans is a sample, taken almost at hazard, of the latest critical exploits; and if the reader sees the matter at all as we do, he will conclude that anything more crass and blind has rarely, if ever, issued from critical cogitations.

In pursuance of our general conception of the continuity of Christianity from the Lord and Apostles downward, we see the place filled by the Epistles of Paul, both historically and doctrinally. With the object of enlarging the same general conception we turn now to the place of the *Gospels* in the history and continuity of the Church.

It is of more consequence to our purpose to grasp the facts than to discuss questions of dates and authorship—the latter being of little significance in any case. Adhering closely, then, to the historic fact, as we have been able to show that the Epistles are part and parcel of the history, meaning, and continuity of the Church, so can the same be shown also in regard to the Gospels: just as the Epistles arose directly and naturally out of the heart of the Church, so did the Gospels, except that being the fuller and more responsible and essential documents, they took a longer time to come to their maturity, yet arose to take their place when they were needed—after tradition and the Epistles and certain other documents had fulfilled their preparatory function.

For the sake of definiteness, let us accept the idea that the Gospels came into being between the years 70 and 110 A.D. By that time, Paul and all the Apostles had passed or were passing away: their teaching and their writings remained and were embodied in the now fully established Church. But the Gospels were coming into circulation, as independent documents on the one hand, and as documents developed on

the other from pre-existing writings. In the thirty-five years between the death of Paul, when the Church had taken a real hold of the world, and the Lord's crucifixion, a series of writings independent of the Epistles had been coming into being. At first, the Apostles preached and taught from their original knowledge, but it became necessary, as a new generation arose, to be able to put some definite statement of the facts before it, so the *logia* or *sayings* of Jesus began to be collected, and the name of Matthew is especially connected with these as shown in his Sermon on the Mount.

But as the words of the Lord were thus collected and preserved, so also were the incidents of the Lord's life, and these were circulated in the form of *Narratives*: both classes of literature leading up to the *Memoirs*, or Gospels as they were eventually called. This circulation of primary literature—sayings and narratives—was going on during the days of the Apostles and through the period covered by the Epistles of Paul—between the time of the first preaching of the Apostles, and the establishment of the Church as an almost universal spiritual institution. So that, at the close of the lives of the Apostles they were able to see the developed Gospels passing into circulation, containing the facts of their Lord's life which they themselves had been accustomed to recite, and constituting in a permanent form the Churches necessary knowledge for all time to come. The apostles, and the elders, and the Church, were all living witnesses of what had been taught, and they could verify the truth of the published writings as reports of the actual teaching and tradition they had known and believed.

If, during that period of from thirty-five to fifty years, there were issued writings (of which, however, we have no evidence) containing supposed knowledge of fabrications of purely apocryphal origin (though "many" real lives of the Lord were written), there

was always, together with these, the current knowledge of the apostles and of earlier and later disciples, by which fabrications could be tested, issuing in the assured residuum of the accepted canonical Gospels. Thus, as we have before seen, the conditions all along the historic line of the last century were such as effectually forbade the eventual acceptance, and the primary acceptance by other than the ignorant, or other result than the determinate weeding out, of pretenders to the position of authoritative writings, and as effectually secured the final establishment of those Gospels which contained the current knowledge of the apostles and of the Church which they had taught. But all of these—the *Logia* and primary *Narratives*, like the Epistles of Paul and the consolidated Gospels, are now commonly acknowledged to contain, from germ to development, the essential supernatural and miraculous elements or implications without which a Church built on the living faith of a Divine and Resurrected Lord would have been a fact impossible of accomplishment.

And this leads, in concluding this chapter, to a last and wider conception which such writers as Haeckel and M'Cabe seem completely to ignore—the conception of the relation of the apostles of the Church to their Master. Not only, in these finished works, is the Divine nature of Jesus upheld everywhere, like His Ascension and continued Presence, as necessary factors of that Church's existence, but there is another and a deeper issue: how did He come Himself to exist in story and portraiture if He were not Himself the real Christ described? As has so often been pointed out, to conceive that the apostles or disciples could have invented such a character or such a story as that of Christ, is to suppose something contrary to nature, impossible of achievement therefore, and a greater miracle than that of His actual existence. The whole strain and tendency to-day,

among men who have really studied the evidence, is towards the strong outline, distinct and living, of the actual Christ, the only solution of whose presentation in the Gospels is His Divine Reality.

This one thing stands at least assured to us, so far as Rationalistic Criticism is concerned, that it does not make the slightest approach to removing this supernatural Christ from the world's life, nor express an argument towards that end worth the reading twice, nor the least explanation of the conditions of Apostolic times, nor so much as approach to touching with real disparagement the hem of the garment of that majestic, imperishable, Divine Realization on earth. We know all that your "Pagan Christs" and "Golden Boughs" and "Sun Gods" can tell us; but we also know the radical, unconscious mistake they make in common. Slowly and surely is that Great Divine Fact of human life beginning to stand forth; and with whatever intention criticism may have regarded and worked towards the transcendent problem He presents, this, at least, is certain, that that reconstruction has begun which can only end in revealing from behind its earth-clouds that Greatest Glory of humanity; by the gradual emergence of that Face and Form, disclosing the centre of all rational human thought, and the coming object of the race's worship—Jesus Christ the Lord; the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; in whom is all power in heaven and on earth; in whom dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily—the Divine Humanity, who is God Himself revealed.

CONCLUSION

WE set out to enquire into the claims of Haeckel for the solution of the World-Enigmas by the law of substance and the theory of evolution. We have

found these claims quite invalid: the so-called law of substance is in itself a mere notion having no ground of existence in nature, and the theory of Evolution is only one among others, surrounded by innumerable specific difficulties. The result is to leave the Enigmas where they stood, so far as these solutions affect them—the notional law of substance telling us nothing of the nature of matter-force, the origin

of motion, or of sensation and consciousness; while the evolutionary Theory fails absolutely to reveal the origin of life, to explain rational thought, or even the arrangement of nature. As to the *Riddle* as a whole, we have found it to be saturated with philosophic inconsistencies and contradictions, with its Definitions not only at self-variance but antagonised by the teachings of the book itself.

THE END.

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