thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in the city something which shall have the same regard for the republic, which you the legislator have, when you establish the laws.

It was mentioned, said he.

But it was not, said I, made sufficiently plain, through fears which pre-occupied you, when you signified that the illustration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult; and it is not indeed altogether easy to go over what remains.

As what?

In what manner a city shall attempt philosophy and not be destroyed, for all grand things are dangerous, and, as the saying is, fine things are truly difficult.

But however, said he, let our disquisition be compleated in making this evident.

Want of inclination, said I, shall not hinder, though want of ability may. And being present, you shall know my eagerness, and consider now how eagerly and adventurously I am going to say, that a city ought to attempt this study in a way opposite to that at present.

How?

At present, said I, those who meddle with it are striplings, who immediately from their childhood, amidst their domestic affairs and lucrative employments, apply themselves to the most abstruse parts of philosophy, and then they go off most consummate philosophers. I call the most difficult part, that respecting the art of reasoning. And in all after time, if, when they are invited by others who practise this art, they are pleased to become hearers, they think it a mighty matter, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work; but towards old-age, besides some few, they are extinguished much more than the Heraclitean sun, in that they are never kindled up again.

But how should they do? said he.

Quite the reverse. Whilst they are striplings and boys they should apply to juvenile instruction and philosophy, and in taking proper care of their body whilst it shoots and grows to firmness, provide for philosophy a proper assistant; and then, as that age advances in which the soul begins to be perfected, they ought vigorously to apply to her exercises; and when strength decays, and is no longer

able for civil and military employments, they should then be dismissed and live at pleasure, and excepting a by-work, do nothing else but philosophize, if they propose to live happy, and at death to have in the other world a lot suitable to the life they have led in this.

How truly, said he, Socrates, do you seem to me to speak with zeal; yet, I imagine, the greater part of your hearers will still more zealously oppose you, and by no means be persuaded, and that Thrasymachus will be the first of them.

Do not divide, said I, Thrasymachus and me, who are now become friends, nor were we enemies heretofore. For we shall no way desist from our attempts, till we either persuade both him and the rest, or make some advances towards that life at which when they arrive they shall again meet with such discourses as these.

You have spoken, said he, but short time.

None at all, said I, with respect at least to the whole of time: but that the multitude are not persuaded by what is said, is no wonder, for they have never at any time seen existing what hath now been mentioned, but rather such discourses as have been industriously composed, and have not fallen in naturally as these do at present. But as for a man who is come up to the model of virtue, and is rendered conformable to it in the most perfect manner possible, both in word and in deed, never at all have they seen such a man, neither one nor more of the kind. Or do you imagine they have?

By no means.

Neither yet, happy friend, have they sufficiently attended to noble and generous reasonings, so as keenly to inquire after the truth, by every method, merely for the sake of knowing it, banishing at a distance such intricate and contentious debates as tend to nothing else but to opinion and contention, both in their courts of justice and in their private meetings.

The case is just so, reply'd he.

On these accounts then, said I, and with foresight of these things, we were formerly afraid; however, being compelled by the truth, we did assert, that neither city nor republic, nor even single man in the same way, would ever become perfect, till some necessity of fortune oblige

these few philosophers, who are at present accounted not naughty, yet insignificant, to take the government of the city whether they will or not, and oblige the city to be obedient to them; or till the sons of those who are in the offices of power and magistracies, or they themselves, by some divine inspiration, be smitten with a genuine love of genuine philosophy: and I aver that no one hath reason to think that either of these, or both, are impossible; for thus might we justly be laughed at as saying things which are only to be wished for. Is it not so?

It is.

If then, in the infinite series of past ages, the greatest necessity hath obliged philosophy to take the government of a state, or is now prevailing in any barbarous region, remote somewhere from our observation, or shall afterwards happen, we are ready in that case to contend in our reasoning, that this republic we have described hath existed and subsists, and shall arise at least when this our muse shall get the government of the state. For this is neither impossible to happen, nor do we talk impossibilities, though we ourselves confess that they are difficult.

I am likewise, said he, of the same opinion.

But you will say, reply'd I, that the multitude do not think so too.

It is likely, said he.

Happy friend, said I, do not thus altogether accuse the multitude; but whatever opinion they may have, without upbraiding them, but rather encouraging them, and removing the reproach thrown on philosophy, point out to them the persons you call philosophers, and define distinctly, as at present, both their genius and their pursuits, that they may not think you call these philosophers whom they think so; or if they mean the same men, you will tell them they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different answers about them from yours. Or do you imagine, that one can be inraged at one who is not in a passion? or that one shall envy the envious, who is himself both void of envy and is of a mild disposition? I will prevent you, and say that I imagine there is in some few so bad a natural temper, but not in the generality.

I likewise, said he, imagine so.

Are you not then of the same opinion with me in this: that these men are the cause of the multitude's being ill affected towards philosophy, who openly satyrize what is no way becoming them, behaving in a scoffing and distasteful manner towards the multitude, always making discourses about particular men, doing what is least of all becoming philosophy.

Certainly, said he.

For certainly, somehow, Adimantus, the man at least who really applies his understanding to real being, has not leisure to look down to the little affairs of mankind, and in fighting with them, to be filled with envy and ill nature; but beholding and contemplating such objects as are orderly and always uniform, such as neither injure nor are injured of one another, but are in all respects beautiful and according to reason, these he imitates and resembles as far as possible. Or do you imagine it possible to find out any contrivance to draw men off from the imitation of that in conversing with which they are filled with admiration?

It is impossible, reply'd he.

The philosopher then who converseth with that which is beautiful and divine, as far as is possible for man, becomes himself beautiful and divine. But calumny is powerful in every thing.

It is entirely so.

If then, said I, he be under any necessity, not merely forming himself alone, but likewise of endeavouring to introduce any thing he beholds there among mankind, in order to form their manners, both in private and in public life, would he prove, think you, a bad artist of temperance and of justice, and of every social virtue?

Not at all, said he.

But if now the multitude perceive that we say the truth of such an one, will they be angry at philosophers, and disbelieve us when we say that the city can never otherwise be happy unless it be drawn by those painters who follow a divine original?

They will not be angry, said he, if they perceive so. But what method of painting do you mean?

When they have got, said I, the city and the manners of men as their canvas, they would first make it clean, which

is not altogether an easy matter. But in this, you know, they differ from others, that they are unwilling to meddle either with private man or city, or to prescribe laws, 'till once they either receive these clean, or cleanse them themselves.

And rightly, said he.

And after this, do not you imagine they will draw a sketch of the republic?

Why not?

Afterwards, I imagine, as they proceed in their work, they will frequently look both ways, both to what is naturally just, and beautiful, and temperate, and the like; and likewise again to that which they can establish among mankind, blending and compounding their human form from different human characters and pursuits, drawing from this which Homer calls the divine likeness and the divine resemblance subsisting among men.

Right, said he.

They will then, I imagine, strike out one thing, and insert another, 'till they have rendered human manners, as far as is possible, amiable to the Gods.

It should thus, said he, be the most beautiful picture.

Do we now then, said I, any way persuade these men, who, you said, were coming upon us in battle array, that such a painter of republics is the man we then recommended to them, and on whose account they were enraged at us, that we committed cities to him, and will they now be more mild when they hear us mentioning it?

Certainly, said he, if they be wise.

For what is there now they can further question? Shall they say that philosophers are not lovers of real being and of truth?

That, said he, were absurd.

Or that their genius, as we described it, is not akin to that which is best?

Nor this neither.

What then? Whilst their genius is such as this, and meets with suitable exercises, shall it not become perfectly good and philosophic, if any other be so? Or will you say those will be more so whom we set aside?

Not at all.

Will they still then be enraged at us, when we say that till the philosophic race have the government of the city, neither the miseries of the city nor of the citizens shall have an end, nor shall this republic, which we speak of in way of fable, come in fact to perfection?

It is likely, said he, they will be less enraged.

Are you content then, said I, that we say not of them they are less enraged at us, but that they are altogether appeased and persuaded, that if we make no more of them, they may at least consent by their blushing?

By all means, said he.

Let them then, said I, be persuaded of this. But is there any one will call this into question, that those of the philosophic genius do not usually spring from kings and sovereigns?

Not one, said he, would alledge that.

And though they were born with a philosophic genius, one may say they are under a great necessity of being corrupted; for indeed that it is a difficult matter for these geniuses to be preserved untainted, even we ourselves agree. But that in the infinite series of time, of the whole of the human race, there should never at all be so much as a single one preserved pure and untainted, is there any one who will call into question?

How could any do it?

But surely, said I, a single one is sufficient, if he exists, and has a city subject to him, to accomplish every thing now so much disbelieved.

He is sufficient, said he.

And when the governour, said I, hath established the laws and customs we have recited, it is not at all impossible that the citizens should be willing to obey him.

Not at all.

But is it wonderful or impossible that what appears to us should also appear to others?

I do not think it, said he.

And that these things are best, if they be possible, we have sufficiently, as I imagine, explained in the preceding part of our discourse.

Sufficiently indeed.

Now then it seems we are agreed about our legislation—that the laws we mention are the best, if they could exist,

but that it is difficult to get them to prevail, not, however, impossible.

We are agreed, said he.

After that this hath with difficulty been brought to a conclusion, shall we not, in the next place, consider what follows? In what manner, and from what education and studies, they shall become the preservers of our republic? and in what periods of life they shall each of them apply to the several branches of education.

We must indeed consider that, said he.

I acted not wisely, said I, when in the former part of our discourse, I left untouched the difficulty attending the possession of women, and the propagation of the species, and the establishing governours, knowing with what envy and difficulty they must be introduced, or be carried no further than theory. For now we are under no less a necessity of discussing these things at present. What relates to women and children is already finished; and we must now go over again, as from the beginning, what refers to governours. We said, if you remember, that they should appear to be lovers of the city, and be tried both by pleasures and by pains, and appear to quit this opinion neither through toils nor fears, nor any other change, and that he who was not able to do this was to be rejected; but he who came forth altogether pure as gold tried in the fire, was to be appointed ruler, and to have honours and rewards paid him both alive and dead. Such were the things we said whilst our reasoning passed over and concealed itself, as afraid to rouse the present argument.

You say most truly, said he, for I remember it.

For I grudged, friend, to say what I am now to adventure on; but now we must even venture to assert this: that the most complete guardians must be made philosophers.

Let this be agreed upon, reply'd he.

But consider that you shall likely have but few of them: for such a genius as we said they must of necessity have, is wont but seldom in all its parts to meet in one; but its different parts generally spring up in different persons.

How do you say? reply'd he.

That such as are wont to be docile, of good memory,

quick, and acute, and endued with whatever qualifications are akin to these, are not at the same time vigorous, and magnanimous in their mind, so as to live decently, with quietness and stability; but that such are carried by their acuteness wherever it happens, and everything that is stable departs from them.

You say true, reply'd he.

With regard then to these firm habits of the mind, which are not at all versatile, and which one might rather employ as trusty, and which are difficult to be moved at dangers in war, are they not of the same temper with reference to learning; they move heavily, and with difficulty learn, as if they were benumbed, and are oppressed with sleep and yawning, when they are obliged to labour at any thing of this kind?

It is so, reply'd he.

But we said that he must partake both these well and handsomely, or else he ought not to share in the most perfect education, nor magistracy, nor honours of the state.

Right, said he.

Do not you imagine this will but rarely happen?

Why will it not?

They must be tried then both in the things we formerly mentioned, in labours, in fears, and in pleasures, and likewise in what we then passed over, and are now mentioning; we must exercise them in various kinds of learning, whilst we consider whether their genius be able for the highest learning, or whether it fails, as those who fail in the other things.

It is proper now, said he, to consider this question at least in this manner. But which learning do you call the highest?

You remember in some measure, said I, that when we had distinguished the soul into three parts, we determined concerning justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom, what each of them is.

If I did not remember, said he, it were just I should not hear what remains.

Do you likewise remember what was said before that?

What was it?

We somewhere said that it was possible to behold these

in their most beautiful forms, but that the journey would be tedious which one must go over who would see them conspicuously. That it was possible, however, to approach towards them in the way of our demonstrations above-mentioned; and you said that these were sufficient; so what was then advanced, came to be spoken far short, in my own opinion, of accuracy, but if agreeably to you, you may say so.

To me at least, said he, they seemed to be discussed in measure; and the rest seemed to think so too.

But, friend, said I, in speaking of matters of this kind, such a measure as leaves out any part whatever of the truth is not altogether in measure. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything—though some at times are of opinion that matters are sufficiently well when brought this length, and that there is no necessity for further inquiry.

Very many, said he, are thus affected through indolence.

But the guardian of the city and of the laws, said I, hath least of all need of that passion.

It appears so, reply'd he.

Such an one then, friend, said I, must go over the longer compass, and labour no less in learning than in the exercises, otherwise, as we were now saying, he shall never at all arrive at the perfection of the highest and most suitable learning.

But are not these, said he, the highest? Or is there yet any thing higher than justice, and those virtues which we mentioned?

There is even higher, said I. And even of these, we must not contemplate only the coarse draught, but not omit the highest finishing. Or is it not ridiculous in other things of small account to employ our whole labour, and to strain hard to have them the most accurate and perfect, and not deem the highest and most important matters worthy of our highest attention, in order to render them the most perfect?

The sentiment, said he, is very just. But however, do you imagine, said he, that any one will let you pass without asking you what indeed is this highest learning, and about what is it conversant, when you call it so?

Not at all, said I, but do you yourself ask me; for assuredly you have not seldom heard it, and at present

you either do not attend, or you intend to occasion me trouble in raising opposition. This I rather imagine, since you have often heard at least that the idea of the good is the highest learning: which idea, when justice and the other virtues use as a model, they become really useful and advantageous; you now almost know that this is what I mean to say, and besides this, that we do not sufficiently know that idea, and that without this knowledge, though we understood all else in the highest measure, you know that it profiteth us nothing: in the same manner, as it would avail us nothing though we possessed any thing whatever without the possession of the good. Or do you imagine there is any more profit in possessing all things without the possession of the good, than in knowing all things without the knowledge of the good, knowing nothing at all that is beautiful and good?

Not I, for my part, indeed, said he.

But surely this too at least you know, that to the multitude pleasure seems to be the good, and to the more elegant it seems to be wisdom.

And very ridiculously, said he.

How indeed can it be otherwise? reply'd I; if when they upbraid us, that we know not what is the good, they tell us that they know, and call it the wisdom of what is good, as if we understood what they say, when they pronounce the word the good.

Most true, said he.

But what, those who define pleasure to be good, are they any way in a lesser error than the others, or are not these too obliged to confess that pleasures are evil?

Extremely so.

They come then to acknowledge, I imagine, that the same things are both good and evil, do they not?

Why do not they?

Is it not evident then that there are great and manifold doubts about it?

Why are there not?

But what, is it not also evident, that with reference to things just and beautiful, the multitude chuse the apparent, even though they be not really so, yet they act, and possess, and are reputed of accordingly; but the acquisition of goods, that were only the apparent never yet

satisfied anyone, but in this they seek what is real, and here everyone despises what is only the apparent.

Extremely so, said he.

This then is that which every soul pursues, and for the sake of this it acts all with a prophetic impression, that it is somewhat yet in doubt, and unable to comprehend what it is, nor to hold by a steady opinion of it, as in other things, and thus are they unsuccessful also in other things, if there be in them any profit. About a matter now of such a kind, and of such mighty consequence, shall we say that even these our best men in the city, and by whom we take in hand to do every thing, shall be thus in the dark?

As little at least as possible, said he.

I imagine then, said I, that whilst it is unknown in what manner the just and beautiful are good, they are not of any great value to a guardian to possess, if it be likely he shall know these, whilst he is ignorant of this, but I prophesy no one will come to the real knowledge of these before he knows what is good.

You prophesy rightly, said he.

Shall not then our republic be completely adorned if such a guardian be set over it as is intelligent in these things?

It must of necessity, said he. But with respect to yourself, whether, Socrates, do you say that the good is science, or pleasure, or something else besides these?

You was ever, said I, a worthy man, and manifestly shewed of old that you was not to be satisfied with the opinions of others about these things.

Nor does it appear to me just, Socrates, said he, that one should be able to tell the opinions of others, but not his own, after having spent so much time inquiring about these things.

But what, said I, does it then appear to you just for one to speak of these things of which he is ignorant, as if he knew them?

By no means, said he, as if he knew them; yet however, according as he imagines, that he should be willing to tell us what he imagines.

But what, said I, have you not observed of opinions void of knowledge how deformed they all are? Or do those, who without understanding form right opinion, seem to

you in any respect to differ from those who are blind, and at the same time go straight on the road?

No way, said he.

Do you incline then that we should examine things deformed, blind, and crooked, having it in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful?

Do not, I entreat you, Socrates, said Glauco, give over at the end; for it will suffice us, if in the same way as you have talked of justice, and temperance, and those other virtues, you likewise talk concerning the good.

And I too shall be very well satisfied, friend, said I, but I'm afraid I shall not be able; and by appearing keen I shall incur the ridicule of the unmannerly. But, my happy friends, let us quit at present this inquiry, what the good is (for it appears to me a greater matter than that in our present pursuit we can overtake, even what I imagine of it at the time); but I am willing to tell you what the offspring of the good appears, and what most resembles it, if this be agreeable to you, and if not, shall let it alone.

But tell us, said he; for you shall afterwards explain to us what the father is.

I could wish, said I, both that I were able to give that explanation, and you to receive it, and not as now the offspring only. Receive now then this child and offspring of the good itself. Yet take care, however, that unwillingly I deceive you not, in any respect, giving an adulterate account of this offspring.

We shall take care, said he, as we are able; only tell us.

I shall tell then, said I, after we shall have settled matters together, and I have put you in mind of what was mentioned in our preceding discourse, and has been frequently said on other occasions.

What is it? said he.

That there are many things, said I, beautiful, and many good, and each of these we say is so, and we distinguish them in our reasoning.

We say so.

But as to the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and in like manner concerning all those things which we then placed as many, now again establishing them according to one simple idea of each particular, as being one, we give

each that appellation which belongs to it; and the things themselves we say are seen by the eye, but not understood by the intellect; but that the ideas are understood by the intellect, but not seen by the eye.

Perfectly so.

By what part then of ourselves do we see things visible?

By the sight, said he.

And is it not, said I, by hearing that we perceive what is heard, and by the other senses all the matters of sense?

Why not?

But have you not observed, said I, with regard to the maker of the senses, how he hath formed the power of sight, and of being visible in the most perfect manner?

I have not entirely perceived it, reply'd he.

But consider it in this manner. Is there any other species, which hearing and sound require, in order that the one may hear, and the other be heard, which third thing if it be not present, the one shall not hear, and the other not be heard?

There is nothing, said he.

Imagine then, said I, that neither do many others (that I may not say none) require any such thing: or can you mention any one that does require it?

Not I, reply'd he.

But with reference to the sense of seeing and the object of sight, do not you perceive that they require something?

How?

When there is sight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to use it, and when there is colour in the objects before him, unless there concur some third species, naturally formed for the purpose, you know that the sight shall see nothing, and the colours shall be invisible.

What is that you speak of? said he.

What you call light, said I.

You say true, reply'd he.

This species then is not despicable. By no small idea then are the sense of seeing, and the power of being seen, connected together; but by a bond the most honourable of all bonds, if light be not dishonourable.

But it is far, said he, from being dishonourable.

Whom then of the Gods in heaven can you assign as the cause of this, that light makes our sight to see, and visible objects to be seen in the best manner?

The same as you, said he, and others do; for it is evident you mean the sun.

Is not the sight then naturally formed in this manner with reference to this God?

How?

The sight is not the sun, nor is that the sun in which sight is, which we call the eye.

It is not.

But yet, I imagine, that of all the organs of sense, it partaketh most of the image of the sun.

Greatly so.

And the power which it hath, doth it not possess as dispensed and flowing from hence?

Perfectly so.

Is not then the sun, which indeed is not sight itself, yet as it is the cause of it, seen by sight itself?

It is so, said he.

Imagine then, said I, that this is what I was calling the offspring of the good, which the good generates, analogous to itself, and that what this is in the intellectual world, with respect to intelligence and the objects of intelligence, the same is the sun in the visible world with respect to sight and visible things.

How is it? said he. Explain to me yet further.

You know that the eyes, said I, when they are no longer directed towards objects whose colours are shone upon by the light of day, but by that faint one of the night, grow dim and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no perfect sight.

Just so, said he.

But, I imagine, when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, they see clearly, and in those very eyes there appears now to be sight.

There does.

Understand then, in the same manner, the case to be so with reference to the soul. When it shall firmly adhere to that which truth and real being enlighten, then it understands and knows it, and appears to have intelligence; but when it adheres to that which is blended with

darkness, which is generated and which perisheth, it fancieth and guesseth, taketh up and layeth down its opinions, and resembleth now one without intelligence.

It has such a resemblance.

That therefore which giveth truth to what is known, and dispenseth the power to him who knows, you may call the idea of good, being the cause of knowledge and of truth, as being known by intelligence. And as both these two, knowledge and truth, are so beautiful, when you deem that the good is something different, and still more beautiful than these, you shall deem aright. Knowledge and truth here are as light and sight there, which we rightly judged to partake most of the image of the sun, but that we were not to imagine they were the sun. So here it is right to judge, that both these partake of the image of the good, but to imagine either of them the good, is not right, but the good itself is worthy of greater honour.

You mean, said he, an inestimable beauty, since it affords knowledge and truth, but is itself superior to these in beauty. And you never any where at all said that it was pleasure.

Softly, said I, and in this manner rather consider its image yet further.

How?

You will say, I imagine, that the sun gives to things which are seen, not only their visibility, but likewise their generation, growth and nourishment, though in itself it be not generation.

Why not?

We may say, therefore, that things which are known have not only this from the good, that they are known, but likewise their being and essence are given them by it, whilst the good itself is not essence. but above essence, superior to it both in dignity and in power.

Here Glauco, with a great laugh, says, what a prodigious excellence is this! I swear.

You yourself, reply'd I, are the cause, having obliged me to tell my opinion about it.

And by no means, said he, stop, if something does not hinder you, but go over again the resemblance relating to the sun, if you are omitting anything.

But I omit, said I, many things.

Do not omit, reply'd he, the smallest matter.

I imagine, said I, there will be a great deal omitted; however, as far as I am able at present, I shall not willingly omit anything.

Do it not, said he.

Attend then, said I, how that we say there are two species, and that the one reigns over the intellectual world, and the other over the visible, not to say the heavens, lest I seem to you to be using sophistry in the expression. You understand then these two species?—the visible, the intellectual?

I do.

As if then you took a line cut into two unequal parts, and cut over again each section according to the same proportion, both that of the visible species, and that of the intellectual—and thus you shall have perspicuity and obscurity placed by one another—in the visible species you shall have in one section images—I call images, in the first place, shadows; next, the appearances in water, and such as appear in bodies which are close, polished, and bright, and everything of this kind, if you understand me.

I do.

Suppose now the other section of the visible which this resembleth, such as the animals around us, and every kind of plant, and all sort of workmanship.

I suppose it, said he.

Are you willing then that this section appear to be divided into true and untrue? And that the same proportion, which the object of opinion has to the object of knowledge, the very same proportion hath the resemblance to that of which it is the resemblance?

I am indeed, said he, extremely so.

But consider now again the section of the intellectual, how it was divided.

How?

How as to one part of it the soul useth the former sections as images, and is obliged to inquire upon hypotheses, not going to the beginning, but to the conclusion; and the other part again, where the soul goes by an hypothesis to a beginning, not supposed, and without those images about it, by the species themselves, making its way through them.

I have not, said he, sufficiently understood you in these things.

But again, said I, for you shall more easily understand me after these things have been premised. For I imagine that those who are conversant in geometry and computations, and such like, after they have laid down hypotheses of excess and of equality, and made their figures, and three kinds of angles, and other things akin, according to each method, they go upon these things as known, having laid down all these as hypotheses, and do not give any further reason about them, neither to themselves nor others, as being things obvious to all; but beginning at these, they directly go over, explaining the rest, and with full consent end at that which their inquiry pursued.

I know this, said he, perfectly well.

And do you not likewise know that when they make use of the visible species, and reason about them, their understandings are not employed about these species, but about those which they are the resemblances of, holding their reasonings about a real square, and about a real diameter, not about that which they draw? And, in the same manner, with reference to other things, those very things which they form and draw, in which number, shadows and images in water are to be reckoned, these they make use of as images, seeking to behold those real things which one can no way see but by his intellect.

You say true, reply'd he.

This, then, I called a species of the intellectual, but that the soul was obliged to use hypotheses in the search of it, not going back to the principle, as not being able to go beyond hypotheses in ascending upwards, but made use of images formed from things below, to lead to those above, as perspicuous, as objects of opinion, and distinct from the things themselves.

I understand, said he, that you mention what happens in the geometrical and other sister arts.

Understand now, that by the other section of the intellectual I mean this, that which reason by itself attains, making hypotheses by its own reasoning power, not as principles, but really hypotheses, as steps and handles to go on to that which was not an hypothesis, but the principle of the whole, and attain to it; and then, again, hold-

ing by all those things which hold by it, to descend down to the conclusion, using no where anything which is matter of sense but the ideas themselves, from some, onwards to others, and concluding in ideas.

I understand, said he, but not sufficiently, for you seem to me to talk of a perplexed subject; but you want, however, to determine that the discoveries concerning real being and the objects of intellect, made by the science of reasoning, are more conspicuous than the discoveries made by the arts, as they are called, which have hypotheses for their first principles, and those who inquire into them are obliged, in their disquisitions, to use their understandings and not their external senses. But as they are not able to perceive by rising up to the principle, but by hypotheses, they seem to you not to have intelligence, though the things are objects of the intellect, by the help of the principle; and you seem to me to call the practice, in geometrical and such other arts, demonstration, and that it is somewhat between opinion and science.

You have comprehended, said I, most sufficiently. And conceive now, that corresponding to my four sections there are these four faculties in the soul: intelligence answering to the highest, demonstration to the second, and assign opinion to the third, and to the last imagination, and range the objects accordingly, that as their objects participate of truth, so reckon that they participate of perspicuity.

I understand, said he, and I agree, and I range them as you desire.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK

THE SEVENTH BOOK

AFTER these things now, said I, compare, with reference to instruction and the want of instruction, our nature to such a condition as follows. Consider men as in a subterraneous habitation resembling a cave, with its entrance opening to the light, and answering to the whole extent of the cave. Suppose them to have been in it from their childhood, with chains both on their legs and necks, so as to remain there and only be able to look before them, but by the chain incapable to turn their heads round. Suppose them to have light of a fire, burning far above and behind them, and that between the fire and the chain'd men there is a road above them, along which observe a low wall built, like that which hedges in the stage of mountebanks on which they show to men their wonderful tricks.

I observe it, said he.

Observe now, along this wall, men bearing all sorts of utensils, raised above the wall, and human statues, and other animals, in wood and stone, and all sort of furniture, and, as is likely, some of those who are carrying these are speaking, and others silent.

You mention, said he, a wonderful comparison, and wonderful chained men.

But such, however, as resemble us, said I. For, in the first place, do you imagine that such as these see any thing of themselves or of one another, but the shadows formed by the fire, falling on the opposite part of the cave?

How can they, said he, if through the whole of life they be under a necessity, at least, of having their heads unmoved?

But what do they see of what is carrying along? Is it not the very same?

Why not?

If then they were able to converse with one another, do

not you imagine they would think it proper to give names to those very things they saw before them?

Of necessity they must.

And what if the opposite part of this prison had an echo, when any of those who passed along spake, do you imagine they would reckon that what spake was any thing else than the shadow passing by?

Not I, truly, said he.

Such as these then, said I, will entirely judge that there is nothing genuine but the shadows of utensils.

Entirely so, reply'd he.

With reference then both to their freedom from these chains, and their cure of this ignorance, consider the nature of it, if such a thing should happen to them. When any one should be loosed, and obliged on a sudden to rise up, turn round his neck, and walk and look up towards the light, and in doing all these things he should be pained, and be unable, from the splendors, to behold the things he formerly saw the shadows of, what do you imagine he would say, if one should tell him that formerly he had seen trifles, but now being somewhat nearer to reality, and having his face turn'd toward what was more real, he saw better; and so, pointing out to him each of the things passing along, should question him, and oblige him to tell what it were, do not you imagine he would be both in doubt, and would deem what he had formerly seen to be more genuine than what was now pointed out to him?

By far, said he.

And if he should oblige him to look to the light itself, would not he find pain in his eyes, and shun it; and turning to such things as he is able to behold, reckon that these are really more certain than those pointed out?

Just so, reply'd he.

But if one, said I, should drag him from thence violently, through a rough and steep ascent, and never stop till he drew him up to the light of the sun, would not he whilst he was thus drawn, both be in torment, and be filled with indignation, and after he had even come to the light, having his eyes filled with splendor, he would be able to see none of those things now called genuine.

He would not, said he, all of a sudden, at least.

But he would need, I imagine, to be accustomed to it some time, if he were to perceive things above. And, first of all, he would most easily perceive shadows, afterwards the images of men and of other things in water, and after that the things themselves. And with reference to these things, he would more easily see the things in the heavens, and the heavens themselves, looking in the nighttime to the light of the stars and the moon, than by day, looking on the sun and the light of the sun.

How can it be otherwise?

And, last of all, he may be able, I imagine, thoroughly to perceive and contemplate the sun himself, not in water, nor images of him, appearing in any thing else, but as he is in himself, in his own proper region, such as he is.

Of necessity, said he.

And after this he would now reason with himself concerning him, that it is he who gives the seasons and years, and regulates all things in this visible region, and that, of all these things which they formerly saw, he is in a certain manner the cause.

It is certain, said he, that after these things, he may come to such reasonings as these.

But what? when he remembers his first habitation, and the wisdom which was there, and those who were there his companions in bonds, do you not imagine he will esteem himself happy by the exchange, and compassionate them?

And that greatly.

And if there were there any honours and encomiums and rewards among themselves for him who most accurately perceived what passed along, and best remembered which of them were wont to pass foremost, which latest, and which of them went together, and from these observations were most able to presage what was to happen, do you imagine he will be desirous of these honours, or envy those who among these are honoured and in power? or rather wish to suffer that of Homer, and greatly desire

——as labourer to work
To some ignoble man for hire——

and rather to suffer anything than to hold such opinions, and live after such a manner?

I imagine so, reply'd he—that he would suffer and embrace any thing rather than live in that manner.

But consider this further, said I, if such an one should descend and sit down again in the same seat, should not he now have his eyes filled with darkness, coming on the sudden from the sun?

Very much so, reply'd he.

And should he now again be obliged to give his opinion of those shadows, and to dispute about them with those who are there eternally chained, whilst yet his eyes were dazzled, and before they recovered their former state (which would require no small time of habit) would he not afford them laughter, and would it not be said of him, that having gone above, he was returned with vitiated eyes, and that it was not proper even to attempt to go above, and that whoever should attempt to loose them and lead them up, if ever they were able to get him into their hands, should even be put to death?

They would by all means, said he, put him to death.

The whole of this comparison now, said I, friend Glauco, is to be apply'd to our preceding discourse; for if you compare this region, which is seen by the sight, to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun, and the ascent above, and the sight of things above, to the soul's ascent into the region of intelligence, you will apprehend my meaning, since you want to hear it. But God knows whether it be true. Appearances then to me appear in this manner. In the intellectual world the idea of the good is most remote, and scarcely to be seen; but if it be seen, it is to be deemed as indeed the cause to all of all things bright and beautiful, generating in the visible world light, and its principle the sun, and in the intellectual world, it is itself the principle producing truth and intelligence, and that this must be beheld by him who is to act wisely, either privately or in public.

I agree with you, said he, in such manner as I can.

Come now, said I, and agree with me likewise in this, and do not wonder that such as come hither are unwilling to act in human affairs, but their souls are carried alway to converse with things above; for it is somehow reasonable

it should be so, if these matters hold according to our comparison above-mentioned.

It is indeed reasonable, reply'd he.

But what, do you imagine this any thing wonderful, that when one comes from divine contemplations to human evils, he should behave aukwardly and appear extremely ridiculous, whilst yet the light is in his eyes, and is obliged, before he is sufficiently accustomed to the present darkness, to contend in courts of justice, or elsewhere, about the shadows of justice, or those statues which occasion the shadows, and to dispute about this point, how these things are conceived of by those who have never at any time beheld justice itself?

This is not at all, said he, to be wondered at.

But if one hath, at least, understanding, said I, he must remember that there is a twofold disturbance of the sight, and arising from two causes, when one comes from light to darkness, and from darkness to light. And when one imagines that these very things happen with reference also to the soul, when at any time he sees one in confusion, and unable to perceive any thing, he will not laugh in an unreasonable manner, but will consider whether the soul, coming from a more enlightened life, be darkened by ignorance, or going from prevailing ignorance to a life more enlightened, be filled with the dazzling splendour; and so will congratulate the one on its fate and life, and compassionate the life and fate of the other. And if he wants to laugh at the soul that goes from darkness to light, his laughter would be less improper than if he were to laugh at the soul which comes from the light to darkness.

You say very reasonably, reply'd he.

It is proper then, said I, that we judge of them after such a manner as this, if those things be true. That education is not such a thing as some undertakers talk of; for they somehow say, that whilst there is no knowledge in the soul, they will insert it, as if they were inserting sight in blind eyes.

They say so, reply'd he.

But our present reasoning, said I, now shows that this power being in the soul of every one, and the organ by which every one learns, and being in the same condition as the eye, if it were unable otherwise than with the whole

body to turn from darkness to light, must in like manner, with the whole soul, be turned from generated being, till it be able to endure the contemplation of being itself, and the most splendid of being; and this we call the good. Do we not?

We do.

This then, said I, would appear to be the art of his conversion, in what manner he shall with greatest ease and advantage be turned. Not to implant in him the power of seeing, but considering him as possessed of it, only improperly situated, and not looking at what he ought, to contrive a method of accomplishing this point.

It seems so, reply'd he.

The other virtues now then of the soul, as they are called, seem to be somewhat resembling those of the body (for when in reality they were not in it formerly, they are afterwards produced in it by habits and exercises), but that of wisdom, as it seems, happens to be of a nature somewhat more divine than any other, as it never loseth its power, but, according as it is turned, is useful and advantageous, or useless and hurtful. Or have you not observed of those who are said to be wicked, yet wise, how sharply the little soul sees, and how acutely it comprehends every thing to which it is turned, as having no contemptible sight, but compelled to minister to wickedness: so that the more accurately it sees, so much the more productive is it of wickedness?

Entirely so, reply'd he.

But however, said I, with reference to this part of such a genius, if, being dressed immediately from childhood, it should be stripped of every thing akin to procreation, as leaden weights, and of all those pleasures and lusts which relate to feastings and such like, which turn the sight of the soul towards things downwards, from all which if the soul, being freed, should turn itself towards truth, the very same principle in the same men would most accurately see those things as it now does these to which it is turned.

It is likely, reply'd he.

But what, is not this likely, said I, and necessarily flowing from what hath been mentioned, that neither these who are uninstructed and unacquainted with truth can ever sufficiently take care of the city, nor yet those who allow

themselves to spend the whole of their time in learning—those, because they have no one scope in life, aiming at which they ought to do whatever they do, both in private and in public; and the latter, because they are not willing to manage civil affairs, imagining that whilst they are yet alive they inhabit the islands of the blest.

True, said he.

It is our business then, said I, to oblige those of the inhabitants who have the best geniuses, to apply to that learning which we formerly said was the greatest, both to view the good, and to ascend that ascent; and, when they have ascended and sufficiently viewed it, we are not to allow them what is now allowed them.

What is that?

To continue there, said I, and be unwilling to descend again to those bondmen, or share with them in their toils and honours, whether more trifling or more important.

Shall we then, said he, do them injustice, and make them live a worse life when they have it in their power to live a better?

You have again forgot, friend, said I, that this is not the legislator's concern, in what manner any one tribe in the city shall live remarkably happy; but this he endeavours to effectuate in the whole city, connecting the citizens together, and by necessity, and by persuasion, making them share the advantage with one another, with which they are severally able to benefit the community. And the legislator, when he maketh such men in the city, does it not that he may permit them to go where each may incline, but that himself may employ them for connecting the city together.

True, said he, I forgot, indeed.

Consider then, said I, Glauco, that we shall no way injure the philosophers who arise among us, but tell them what is just, when we oblige them to take care of others, and to be guardians. We will allow, indeed, that those who in other cities become philosophers, with reason do not participate of the toils of public offices in the state (for they spring up of themselves, the policy of each city opposing them; and it is just, that what springs of itself, owing its growth to none, should not be forward to pay for its nurture to any one). But you have we generated

both for yourselves and for the rest of the state, as the leaders and kings in a hive, and have educated you better, and in a more perfect manner than they, and made you more capable of sharing both in the rewards and labours attending public offices. Every one then must, in part, descend to the dwelling of the others, and accustom himself to behold obscure objects; for when you are accustomed to them, you will infinitely better perceive things there, and will fully know the several images what they are, and of what, from your having perceived the truth concerning things beautiful and just and good. And thus, as a real vision, both to us and you, shall the city be inhabited, and not as a dream, as are the generality of cities at present inhabited by such as both fight with one another about shadows, and raise sedition about governing, as if it were some mighty good. But the truth is in this manner: In whatever city those who are to govern are the most averse to undertake government, that city, of necessity, will be the best established and the most free from sedition; and that city whose governours are of an opposite character, will be in a condition quite opposite.

Entirely so, reply'd he.

Do you imagine then that our pupils will disobey us, when they hear these injunctions, and be unwilling to labour jointly in the city, each bearing a part, but spend the most of their time with one another, free from public affairs?

Impossible, said he; for we prescribe just things to just men. And each of them enters on magistracy from this consideration beyond all others, that they are under a necessity to govern contrarywise to all the present governours of all other cities.

For thus the matter stands, companion, said I. If you shall find out a life for those who are to be our governours, better than that of governing, then it will be possible for you to have the city well established, for in it alone shall those govern who are truly rich, not in gold, but in that in which a happy man ought to be rich, in a good and prudent life. But if, whilst they are poor and destitute of goods of their own, they come to the public, imagining they ought thence to pillage good, it is not possible to have the city rightly established. For the contest being who shall

govern, such a war being domestic and within them, it destroys both themselves and the rest of the city.

Most true, said he.

Have you then, said I, any other kind of life which despises public magistracies, but that of true philosophy?

No truly, said he.

But however, they ought, at least, not to be fond of governing who enter on it, otherwise the rivals will fight about it.

How can it be otherwise?

Whom else then will you oblige to enter on the guardianship of the city but those who are most intelligent in those things by which the city is best established, and who have other honours, and a life better than the political one?

No others, said he.

Are you willing, then, that we now consider this, by what means such men shall be produced, and how one shall bring them into the light, as some are said, from the lower regions, to have ascended to the gods?

Why am I not willing, reply'd he?

This now, as it seems, is not the turning of a shell, but the conversion of the soul coming from some benighted day to the true re-ascent to real being, which we shall say is true philosophy.

By all means.

Ought we not then to consider which of the parts of learning hath such a power?

Why not?

What now, Glauco, may be that discipline of the soul which draws her from that which is generated towards being itself? But this I consider whilst I am speaking. Did not we indeed say that it was necessary for them, whilst young, to be wrestlers in war?

We said so.

It is proper, then, that this piece of learning likewise be added to that which we are inquiring after.

Which?

Not to be useless to military men.

It must indeed, said he, be added if possible.

They were somewhere in our former discourse instructed by us in exercise and music.

They were, reply'd he.

Exercise indeed somehow respecteth what is generated and destroyed, for it presideth over the increase and corruption of body.

It seems so.

This then cannot be the learning we require.

It cannot.

Is it music then, such as we formerly described?

But it was, said he, as a counter-part of exercise, if you remember, by habits instructing our guardians, imparting no science, but only with respect to harmony, a certain propriety, and with regard to measure, a certain propriety of measure, and in discourses, certain other things akin to these, both in such discourses as are fabulous, and in such as are nearer to truth. But as to learning respecting such a good as you now inquire after, there was nothing at all of this in that music.

You have, most accurately, said I, put me in mind, for it treated in reality of no such thing. But, divine Glauco, what may this learning be? for all the mechanical arts have somehow appeared to be servile.

Why have they not? And what other learning is there left yet remaining distinct from music, exercise, and the mechanical arts?

Come, said I, if we have nothing yet further besides these to lay hold of, let us lay hold of something in these which extends over them all.

What is that?

Such as this general thing, which all arts, and reasonings, and sciences make use of, and which every one ought in the first place necessarily to learn.

What is that? said he.

This trifling thing, said I, to understand one, and two, and three: I call this in the general, number, or computation. Or is it not thus with reference to these, that every art, and likewise every science, must of necessity participate of these?

They must of necessity, reply'd he.

And must not the art of war likewise participate of them?

Of necessity, said he.

Palamedes then, in the tragedies, shows every where Agamemnon to have been at least a most ridiculous

general; or have you not observed how he says, that having invented numeration, he adjusted the ranks in the camp at Troy, and numbered up both the ships and all the other forces which were not numbered before; and Agamemnon, as it seems, did not even know how many foot he had, as he understood not how to number them. But what kind of general do you imagine him to be?

Some absurd one, for my part, reply'd he, if this were true.

Is there any other learning then, said I, which we shall establish as more necessary to a military man than to be able to compute and to number?

This most of all, said he, if he would any way understand how to range his troops, and more still if he want to be a man.

Do you perceive then, said I, with regard to this piece of learning the same thing as I do?

What is that?

It seemeth to be of those things which we are inquiring after, which naturally lead to intelligence, but that no one useth it aright, being entirely a conductor towards real being.

How do you say? reply'd he.

I shall endeavour, said I, to explain at least my own opinion. With reference to those things which I distinguish with myself into such as lead towards intelligence, and such as do not, do you consider them along with me, and either agree or dissent, in order that we may more distinctly see whether this be such as I conjecture of it.

Show me, said he.

I show you then, said I, if you perceive some things with relation to the senses, which call not upon the intelligence to the inquiry, as they are sufficiently determined by the sense, but other things which by all means call upon it to inquire, as the sense doth nothing genuine.

You plainly mean, said he, such things as appear at a distance, and such as are painted.

You have not altogether, said I, hit my meaning.

Which then, said he, do you mean?

These things, said I, call not upon intelligence, which do not issue in a contrary sensation at one and the same time; but such as issue in this manner, I deem to be of those which call upon intelligence, since here sense maketh

the one sensation no more manifest than its contrary, whether it meet with it nigh at hand or at a distance. But you will understand my meaning more plainly in this manner: These, we say, are three fingers—the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger?

Plainly so, reply'd he.

Consider me, then, as speaking of them when seen nigh at hand, and take notice of this concerning them.

What?

Each of them alike appears to be a finger, and in this there is no difference, whether it be seen in the middle or in the end, whether it be white or black, gross or slender, or any thing else of this kind; for in all these the soul of the multitude is under no necessity to question their intellect what is a finger, for never at all does sight itself at the same time intimate finger to be finger, and its opposite.

It does not, reply'd he.

Is it not likely then, said I, that such a case as this at least shall neither call upon, nor excite intelligence?

It is likely.

But what, with reference to their greatness and littleness, does the sight sufficiently perceive this matter, and makes it no difference to it that one of them is situated in the middle, or at the end? And in like manner with reference to their grossness and slenderness, their softness and hardness, does the touch sufficiently perceive these things? And in like manner the other senses, do they no way defectively manifest such things? Or does each of them act in this manner? First of all, must not that sense which relates to hard, of necessity relate likewise to soft; and feeling these, it reports to the soul, as if both hard and soft were one and the same?

It does.

And must not then the soul again, said I, in such cases, of necessity be in doubt what at all the sense points out to it as hard, since it calls the same thing soft likewise; and so likewise with reference to the sense relating to light and heavy; the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy, if the sense intimates that heavy is light, and that light is heavy.

These at least, said he, are truly absurd reports to the soul, and stand in need of examination.

It is likely then, said I, that first of all, in such cases as these, the soul, calling in reason and intelligence, endeavours to find out whether the things reported be one, or whether they be two.

Why not?

And if they appear to be two, each of them appears to be one, and distinct from the other.

It does.

And if each of them be one, and both of them two, his understanding will at least perceive two distinct; for if they were not distinct, he could not perceive two, but only one.

Right.

The sight in like manner, we say, perceives great and small, but not as distinct from each other, but as somewhat blended together. Does it not?

It does.

In order to clear this matter, the intellect is obliged again to consider great and small, not as blended together, but distinct, contrarywise of what the sense does.

True.

And is it not from hence, somehow, that it comes first of all to question us, What at all, then, is great, and what is little?

By all means.

And so we have called the one that which is known by intellect, and the other that which is seen by the eye.

Very right, said he.

This then is what at present I was endeavouring to express, when I said that some things call on the intelligence, and others do not. Such as fall on the sense at the same time with their contraries, I define to be such as require intelligence, but such as do not, do not excite intelligence.

I understand now, said he, and it appears so to me.

What now, with reference to number and unity? to which of the two classes do you imagine they belong?

I do not understand, reply'd he.

But reason by analogy, said I, from what we have already said: for if unity be of itself sufficiently seen, or be apprehended by any other sense, it will not lead towards real being, as we said concerning finger. But if there be always seen at the same time something contrary to it, so

as that it shall no more appear unity than the contrary, it would truly want then one to judge of it: and the soul would be under a necessity to doubt within itself, and to inquire, rousing the intellect within itself, and to interrogate it what this unity is. And thus the learning which relates to unity would be of the class of those which lead up and turn the soul towards the contemplation of real being.

But indeed this at least, said he, is what the very sight of it doth in no small measure effect: for we behold the same thing, at one and the same time as one, and as an infinite multitude.

And if this be the case with reference to unity, said I, will not every number be affected in the same manner?

Why not?

But surely both computation and arithmetic wholly relate to number.

They do entirely.

These then at least seem to lead towards truth.

Remarkably so.

They are then, as it appears, of those pieces of learning which we are in search of. For the soldier must necessarily learn these things, for the disposing of his ranks; and the philosopher for the attaining to real being, coming up above what is generated, otherwise he can never become a reasoner.

It is so, reply'd he.

But our guardian at least happens to be both a soldier and a philosopher.

Why is he not?

It were proper then, Glauco, to establish by law this piece of learning, and to persuade those who are to manage the greatest affairs of the city, to apply to computation, and study it, not in a common way, but 'till by the intellect itself they arrive at the contemplation of the nature of numbers, not for the sake of buying nor of selling, as merchants and retailers, but both for war and for the agility of the soul itself, and its conversion from what is generated towards both truth and being.

Most finely said, reply'd he.

And surely now, I perceive likewise, said I, at present whilst this learning respecting computations is mentioned,

how elegant it is, and every way advantageous towards our purpose, if one applies to it for the sake of knowledge, and not to make a traffic by it.

Which way, reply'd he!

This very thing at least, which we now mentioned, how powerfully does it somehow lead up the soul, and put it under a necessity of reasoning about the numbers themselves, no way admitting, if one in reasoning with it shall produce numbers which have visible and tangible bodies. For you know of some who are dextrous in these things, how that if one, in reasoning, shall attempt to divide unity itself, they both ridicule him and will not admit of it, but if you divide it into parts, they multiply them, afraid lest anyhow unity should appear not to be unity, but many.

You say, reply'd he, most true.

What think you now, Glauco, if one should ask them: Wonderful men, about what kind of numbers are you reasoning? In which there is unity, such as you allow of, each whole equal to each whole, and not differing in the smallest degree, having no fraction in itself? What do you imagine they would answer?

This, as I imagine: that they mean such numbers as can be conceived by the mind alone, but cannot at all be comprehended any other way.

You see then, friend, said I, that, in reality, this learning appears necessary for us, since it appears to lay the soul under a necessity at least of employing the intellect itself towards the discovery of truth itself.

And surely now, said he, it does this at least in a very strong degree.

But what, have you hitherto considered this? that those who are naturally computers appear to be acute in all pieces of learning; and such as are naturally slow, if they be instructed and practised in this, though they gain nothing else, all of them however proceed so far as to become more acute than they were before.

It is so, reply'd he.

And surely, as I imagine, you will not easily find any thing, and not at all many, which occasion greater labour to the learner and student than this.

No, indeed.

On all these accounts then, this learning is not to be omitted, but the best geniuses are to be instructed in it.

I agree, said he.

Let this one thing then, said I, be established among us; and, in the next place, what is akin to it, let us consider if it any way belongs to us.

What is it? said he; or do you mean geometry?

That very thing, said I.

As far, said he, as it relates to warlike affairs, it is plain that it belongs to us; for as to encampments, and the occupying of ground, contracting and extending an army, and all those figures into which they form armies, both in battles and in marches, the same man would differ from himself when he were a geometer, and when he were not.

But surely now, said I, for such purposes as these, some little geometry, and some particle of computation might suffice: but we must inquire, whether much of it, and great advances in it, would contribute any thing to this great end, to make us more easily comprehend the idea of the good. And we say that every thing contributes to this that obliges the soul to turn itself towards that region in which is the most divine of being, which it must by all means contemplate.

You say right, reply'd he.

If therefore it oblige the soul to contemplate being, it belongs to us; but if it oblige to contemplate what is generated only, it does not belong to us.

We say so at least.

They then who are but a little conversant in geometry, said I, will not dispute with us this point at least, that this science is quite opposite to the common modes of speech employed in it by those who practise it.

How? said he.

They speak somehow very ridiculously, and through necessity; for all the discourse they employ in it appears to be with a view to operation and to practice. Thus they speak of making a square, of prolonging, of adjoining, and the like; but yet the whole of this learning is somehow studied with a view to knowledge.

By all means indeed, said he.

Must not this further be agreed on?

What?

That it is the knowledge of what is perpetual, and not at all of what is ever generated and destroyed.

This, said he, is agreed on; for geometrical knowledge is of that which is perpetual.

It would seem then, brave Glauco, to draw the soul towards truth, and to be productive of a philosophic understanding, so as to make us raise the powers of the mind to things above, instead of unworthily fixing them on things below.

As much as possible, reply'd he.

As much as possible then, said I, must we give orders that those in this finest city of yours by no means omit geometry; for even its by-works are not inconsiderable.

What by-works? said he.

Those, said I, which you mentioned relating to war; and indeed with reference to all pieces of learning, as to the understanding of them more handsomely, we know somehow that one's having learned geometry or not makes every way an entire difference.

Every way truly, said he.

Let us then establish this second piece of learning for the youth.

Let us establish it, reply'd he.

But what, shall we, in the third place, establish astronomy? or are you of a different opinion?

I am, said he, of the same; for to be well skilled in the seasons of months and years, belongs not only to agriculture and navigation, but equally to the military art.

You are pleasant, said I, as you seem to be afraid of the multitude, lest you appear to enjoin useless pieces of learning. But this is not altogether despicable, though it is hard to persuade them, that by each of these pieces of learning some power of the soul is both purified and invigorated, which was destroyed and blunted by other studies, though more worthy of preservation than ten thousand eyes, for by it alone is truth beheld. To such therefore as are of the same opinion you will very readily appear to reason admirably well; but such as have never observed this will probably imagine you say nothing at all, for they perceive no other advantage in these things

worthy of account. Consider now from this point, with which of these two you will reason; or carry on the reasonings with neither of them, but principally for your own sake, yet not grudge another, if any one shall be able to reap any benefit by them.

In this manner, reply'd he, I chuse, on my own account principally, both to reason, and to question and answer.

Come then, said I, let us go back again, for we have not taken aright in order what comes next after geometry.

How have we taken? reply'd he.

After plain surface, said I, we have taken a solid moving in a circle, before we considered it by itself, but the right method was to have taken the third augment immediately after the second, and that is somehow the augment of cubes and what participates of depth.

It is so, reply'd he. But these things, Socrates, seem not yet to be found out.

The reason of it, said I, is twofold. Because there is no city which holds them in sufficient honour, they are slightly searched into, being difficult; and besides, those who do search into them want a leader, without which they cannot find them out. And this leader is, in the first place, hard to be found; and after that he does exist, as matters are at present, the inquirers into these things, as they are high-spirited, will not obey him. But if the whole city presided over these things, and held them in esteem, such as inquired into them would be obedient, and their inquiries, being carried on with assiduity and vigour, would discover themselves what they were; since even now, whilst they are on the one hand despised, and kept down by the multitude, and on the other by those who study them without being able to give any account of their utility, they yet forcibly, under all these disadvantages, grow up through their native charm, and it is no wonder that they do appear.

Because truly, said he, this charm is very remarkable. But tell me more plainly what you were just now saying; for somehow that study which respects plain surface you called geometry.

I did, said I.

And then, said he, you mentioned astronomy in the first place after it, but afterwards you drew back.

Because whilst I am hastening, said I, to go through all things speedily, I advance more slowly. For that augment by depth which was next in method we passed over, because the investigation of it is ridiculous, and after geometry we mentioned astronomy, which is the circular motion of a solid.

You say right, reply'd he.

We establish then, said I, astronomy as the fourth piece of learning, supposing that one to subsist which we have now omitted, if the city shall enter upon it.

It is reasonable, said he. And now that you agree with me, Socrates, I proceed in my commendation of astronomy, which you formerly reproved as unseasonable. For it is evident, I imagine, to every one, that this piece of learning at least obliges the soul to look to that which is above, and from the things here conducts it thither.

It is probable, said I, that it is evident to every one, but to me; for to me it does not appear so.

How then do you think of it? reply'd he.

In the way these pursue it who introduce it into philosophy, it plainly makes the soul entirely to look downwards.

How do you say? reply'd he.

You seem to me, said I, to have formed with yourself no ignoble opinion of the learning respecting things above, what it is; for you seem to think that if any one contemplates the various bodies in the firmament, and by earnestly looking up apprehends every thing, you reckon he has intelligence of these things, and not merely sees them with his eyes. And perhaps you judge right, and I foolishly. For I, on the other hand, for my part, am not able to imagine that any other learning can make a soul look upwards but that which respects the being, and that which is invisible. And if any one undertakes to learn any thing of sensible objects, whether he gape upwards, or bellow downwards, never at all shall I say that he learns; for I aver he hath no real knowledge of these things, nor shall I say that his soul looks upwards, but downwards, even though he learns lying on his back, either at land or at sea.

I am punished, said he, for you have justly reproved me. But which was the proper way, said you, of learning

astronomy different from the methods they learn at present, if they mean to learn it with advantage for the purposes we speak of?

In this manner, said I, that these variegated bodies in the heavens, as they are varied in a visible subject, be deemed the most beautiful and the most regular of the kind, but far inferior to real beings, according to those orbits in which the real velocity, and the real slowness, in true number, and in all true figures are carried with respect to one another, and carry all things that are within them. Which things truly are to be comprehended by reason and intellect, but not by sight. Or do you think they can?

By no means, reply'd he.

Is not then, said I, that variety in the heavens to be made use of as a pattern for learning those real things, in the same manner as if one should meet with geometrical figures, drawn remarkably well and elaborately by Daedalus or some other artist or painter? For one who were any way skill'd in geometry, or seeing these, would truly think the workmanship most excellent, yet would esteem it ridiculous to consider these things seriously, as if from thence he were to learn the truth as to what were in equal, in duplicate, or in any other proportion?

Why would it not be ridiculous? reply'd he.

And do not you then imagine that he who is truly an astronomer is affected in the same manner when he looks up to the orbits of the planets? And that he reckons that the heavens and all in them are indeed established by the Former of the heavens, in the finest manner possible for such works to be established. But would not he deem him absurd, who should imagine that this proportion of night with day, and of both these to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other planets to such like things, and towards one another, existed always in the same manner, and in no way suffered any change, though they have a body, and are visible, but would search by every method to apprehend the truth of these things?

So it appears to me, reply'd he, whilst I am hearing you.

Let us then make use of problems, said I, in the study of astronomy, as in geometry. And let us drop the heavenly bodies, if we want truly to apprehend astronomy, and

render profitable instead of unprofitable that part of the soul which is naturally wise.

You truly enjoin a much harder task on astronomers, said he, than is taken at present.

And I imagine, at least, reply'd I, that we must likewise enjoin other things, in the same manner, if we are to be of any service as law-givers. But can you suggest any of the proper pieces of learning?

I can suggest none, reply'd he, at present at least.

Motion, said I, as I imagine, affords us not one indeed, but many species of learning, all of which any wise man can probably tell. What occur to us are two.

Which now?

Along with this, said I, there is its counter-part.

Which?

As the eyes, said I, seem to be fitted to astronomy, so the ears seem to be fitted to harmonious motion. And these seem to be sister arts to one another, both as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glauco, agree with them; or how do we do?

Just so, reply'd he.

Shall we not, said I, as they deal greatly in these matters, inquire how they talk about them, and if there be any other thing besides these, inquire into it likewise? But above all these things, we will still watch over our own affairs.

What is that?

That those we educate never at all attempt at any time to learn any of those things in an imperfect manner, and not pointing always at that mark to which all ought to be directed, as we now mentioned with reference to astronomy. Or do not you know that they do the same thing with regard to harmony as in astronomy? For whilst they measure one with another the symphonies and sounds which are heard, they labour like the astronomers unprofitably.

Nay truly, said he, and ridiculously too, whilst they frequently repeat certain notes, and listen with their ears, to catch the sound as from a neighbourhood; and some of them say they hear some middle note, but that the difference is exceeding small which measures them; and others again are in doubt about it, and say that the notes

are the same as were sounded before, and both parties subject the mind to the ears.

But you speak, said I, of the lucrative musicians, who perpetually harass and torment their strings, and turn them on the pegs. But that the comparison may not be too tedious, I shall say nothing of their complaints of the strings, their refusals and stubbornness, but put an end to it. But I say we ought not to chuse these to talk of harmony, but these true musicians whom we spoke of. For these do the same things here as the others did in astronomy; for in these symphonies which are heard they search for numbers, but they pass not thence to the problems, to inquire which numbers are symphonious, and which are not, and the reason why they are either the one or the other.

This is truly, said he, a divine work you mention.

It is then indeed profitable in the search of the beautiful and good, but if pursued in another manner, it is unprofitable.

It is likely at least, said he.

But I imagine, said I, that the proper method of inquiry into all these things, if it reach the union and affinity which they have, and compute in what respects they are akin to one another; this exercise will contribute somewhat towards what we want, and our labour will not be unprofitable, otherwise it will.

I likewise, said he, am of the same opinion. But you speak, Socrates, of a very mighty work.

Mean you the introduction, or what else, said I? Or do not we know that all these things are introductory to the law itself, which we ought to learn; for even the dialectic philosophers do not appear any way expert as to these things.

No, truly, said he, unless a very few of all I have met with.

But whilst they are not able, said I, to offer and to hear reason, shall they ever be able to know any thing of what we say is necessary to be known?

Never shall they be able to do this at least, reply'd he.

Is not this itself then, Glauco, said I, the law? To carry the power of reasoning to its highest perfection, which, being intellectual, the power of sight may be said to re-

semble it; which power endeavours, as we said, first to look at the animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun himself. So when any one attempts to reason without any of the senses, by reasoning he pusheth on to know each particular, what it is; and if he never give over till he apprehend by his intelligence what is the good itself, he then arrives at the perfection of intelligence, as the other does at that of visible.

By all means, said he.

What now? Do not you call this progress reasoning?

What else?

And now, said I, as the loosing the men from their chains, and their turning from the shadows towards the statues, and the light, and their ascent from the subterraneous dwelling to the sun; and when there, the looking at the images in water, from their inability at first to look at animals and vegetables, and the light of the sun. And here the contemplating the divine images themselves, and the shadows of real beings, and not the shadows of images shadowed out by another sort of light, as by the sun: this whole exercise in the arts we have mentioned hath this power, to lead back again that which is best in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in beings, as in the former case that which is brightest in the body is led to that which is brightest in the material and visible world.

I admit, said he, of these things, though truly it appears to me quite difficult to admit of them, and in another respect it is difficult not to admit of them. But however (for we shall hear these things not only now at present, but often go over them afterwards), establishing these things as now expressed, let us go to the law itself, and go through with it as we have done with the introduction. Say then what is the manner of the reasoning power, and into what species is it divided, and what are the paths leading to it? For these, it is likely, conduct us to that place at which, when we are arrived, we shall have repose from travel, and the end of the journey.

You will not as yet, friend Glauco, said I, be able to follow, for otherwise no zeal should be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of what we speak of, but the truth itself. But this is what to me at least it

appears, whether it be so in reality or not, this it is not proper confidently to affirm, but that indeed it is somewhat of this kind may be affirmed. May it not?

Why not?

And further that it is the reasoning power alone which can discover this to one who is conversant in these things we have mentioned, and that by no other power it is possible.

This also, said he, we may confidently affirm.

This at least no one, said I, will dispute with us. That no other method can attempt to comprehend at all, in any orderly way, what each particular being is; for all the other arts respect either the opinions and passions of men, or generations, and compositions, or are all employed in the culture of things generated and compounded. Those others, which we said participated somewhat of being, geometry, and such as are connected with her, these we see, having a dream as it were of the being; but it is impossible for them to see the reality, so long as employing hypotheses they hold by these immoveably, without being able to give the reason of them. For where one holds as a principle what he does not know, and a conclusion and intermediate steps are connected with that unknown principle, what contrivance can there be found by which an assent of such a kind shall ever become science?

None at all, reply'd he.

Does not then, said I, the reasoning method proceed in this way alone, towards the first principle itself, removing all hypotheses, in order to establish it, and disengaging the eye of the soul from a certain barbarian clay with which it was buried, gently draws and leads it upwards, using as helps and assistants those arts we have mentioned, which through custom we frequently call sciences, but they require another appellation more expressive than opinion, and more indistinct than science. We have somewhere in our preceding discourse termed it demonstration. But it is not, as I imagine, about a name they dispute, who inquire into matters of so great importance as we have now before us.

No indeed, said he.

Do you agree then, said I, as formerly, to call the first class science, the second demonstration, the third faith, and the fourth imagination? and both these last opinion,

and the two former intelligence. And that opinion respects what is generated, and intelligence real being; and in the same proportion as being is to what is generated, so is intelligence to opinion, science to faith, and demonstration to imagination. But as for the analogy of the things which these powers respect, and the division of each of them into two, to wit what is matter of opinion, and what is matter of intellect, we omit, Glauco, that we may not be more tedious here than in our former reasonings.

As for me, said he, with reference to those other things, as far as I am able to follow, I am of the same opinion.

But do not you call him a reasoner, who apprehends the reason of the being of each particular? And as for the man who is not able to give a reason to himself and to another, in as far as he is not able, so far will you say he wants intelligence of the thing?

Why should I not say so? reply'd he.

And is not the case the same with reference to the good? Whosoever cannot define it by reason, separating the idea of good from all others, and piercing through all arguments as in a battle, eagerly contending to prove it, not according to opinion, but according to reality, and in all these cases to march forward with unerring reason, such an one knows nothing of the good itself, nor of any good whatever; but if he hath attained to any image of the good, we will say he hath attained to it by opinion, not by science, and is dreaming and sleeping out his present life, and ere he be awakened, he will descend to the lower regions, there to sleep on to the end.

Now truly, said he, I will strongly aver all these things.

But surely you will not, as I imagine, allow your own children at least whom you bred up and educated in reasoning, if ever at all indeed you educate them, to have the supreme government of the most important affairs in the state, whilst they are void of reason as letters of the alphabet.

By no means, reply'd he.

You will then lay down this to them as a law. That in a most especial manner they attain to that piece of education, by which they may become capable to question and answer in the most scientific manner.

I will settle it by law, said he, with your assistance at least.

Do you agree then, said I, that above all the other pieces of learning, we place the art of reasoning as the top stone, and that no other piece of learning can be properly set above it, but that every thing respecting learning is now finished?

I agree, said he.

There now remains for you, said I, the distribution: to whom shall we assign these pieces of learning, and after what manner?

That is plain, said he.

Do you remember then our former election of rulers, what kind we chose?

Why do I not? said he.

As to other things then, imagine, said I, that such geniuses as these ought to be pick'd out. For the most firm and brave are to be preferred, and, as far as possible, the most graceful; and besides, we must not only seek for such as are of noble and stern manner, but they must be possessed of every other natural disposition conducive to this education.

Which dispositions do you recommend?

They must have, said I, happy friend, acuteness for the sciences, that they may not learn with difficulty; for souls are much more discouraged by hard pieces of learning than by severe bodily exercises, as the toil which is proper to them, and not in common with the body, more intimately affects them.

True, said he.

And we must seek for one of good memory, untainted, and every way laborious: or how else do you imagine any one shall be willing to endure the fatigue of the body, and to accomplish at the same time such learning and study?

No one, said he, unless he be every way of a fine genius.

The mistake then about philosophy, and the contempt of it have been occasioned through these things, because, as I formerly said, they apply to it not in a worthy manner; for it ought not to be apply'd to it by the bastardly, but the legitimate.

How? said he.

In the first place, he who is to apply to philosophy ought not, said I, to be lame as to his love of any kind of labour, loving it in some things, and hating it in others: and this is the case when one loves wrestling and hunting, and all exercises of the body, but is not a lover of learning, and loves neither to hear nor to inquire, but in all these respects has aversion to labour. He likewise is lame, in a different manner from this one, who dislikes all bodily exercise.

You say most true, reply'd he.

And shall we not, said I, in like manner account that soul lame as to truth, who hates indeed a voluntary falsehood, and bears it ill in itself, and is beyond measure enraged when others tell a lye; but the involuntary lye, it easily admits, and though at any time it be found ignorant, it is not displeased, but like a savage sow willingly wallows in ignorance.

By all means, said he.

And in like manner, said I, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all the parts of virtue, we must no less carefully attend to what is bastardly and what is legitimate; for when either any private person or city understands not how to attend all these things, they unawares employ the lame and the bastardly for whatever they have occasion; private persons employ them as friends, and cities as governours.

The case is entirely so, said he.

But we, said I, must beware of all such things; for if we take such as are entire in body and in mind for so extensive learning, and so extensive an exercise, and instruct them, justice herself will not blame us, and we shall preserve both the city and its constitution; but if we introduce other sort of persons into these affairs, we shall do everything the reverse, and bring philosophy under still greater ridicule.

That indeed were shameful, said he.

Certainly, said I. But I myself seem at present to be somewhat ridiculous.

How so? said he.

I forgot, said I, that we were amusing ourselves, and spoke with too great keenness; for whilst I was speaking, I cast

my eye towards philosophy, and seeing her most unworthily abused, I seem to have been filled with indignation, and as being enraged at those who are the cause of it, to have spoken more earnestly what I said.

No truly, said he, not to me your hearer at least.

But for me, said I, the speaker. But let us not forget this, that in our former election we made choice of old men, but in this election it will not be allowed us. For we must not believe Solon, that one who is old is able to learn many things; but he is less so than to run. They are the young who perform all great and frequent toils.

Of necessity, said he.

Every thing then relating to arithmetic and geometry, and all that previous instruction which they should be taught before they learn the art of reasoning, ought to be set before them whilst they are children, and that method of teaching observed which shall make them learn without compulsion

Why so?

Because, said I, a free spirit ought to learn no piece of learning with slavery; for the toils of the body, when undergone through compulsion, render the body nothing worse; but no piece of compelled learning is lasting in the soul.

True, said he.

Do not then, said I, excellent friend, compel boys in their learning; but train them up amusing themselves, that you may be better able to discern to what every one's genius naturally tends.

What you say, reply'd he, is reasonable.

Do not you remember then, said I, that we said the boys are even to be carried to war, as spectators, on horse-back, and that they are to be brought nearer, if they can with safety, and like young hounds taste the blood?

I remember, said he.

Whoever then, said I, shall appear the most forward in all these toils, and in all pieces of learning, and in terrors, are to be selected into a certain number.

At what age? said he.

When they have, said I, finished their necessary exercises, for during this time, whilst it continues, for two or three

years, it is impossible to do any thing else; for fatigue and sleep are enemies to learning. And this too is none of the least of their trials, what each of them appears to be in his exercises.

Why is it not? said he.

And after this period, said I, let such as formerly have been selected of the age of twenty receive greater honours than others, and let those pieces of learning which in their youth they learned separately be brought before them in one view, that they may see the relation between the sciences and the nature of real being.

This learning indeed will alone, said he, remain immoveable in those in whom it obtains.

And this, said I, is the greatest trial for distinguishing between those geniuses which are naturally fitted for learning, and those which are not. He who perceiveth this relation is a reasoning genius; he who doth not, is none.

I am of the same opinion, said he.

It will then be necessary for you, said I, after you have observed these things, and seen who are most approven in these, persevering in learning, persevering in war, and in the other things established by law, to make choice of such after they exceed thirty years, chusing a-new from those chosen formerly, and advance them to greater honours; and observe them, trying them by the reasoning power, who of them without the help of his eyes, or any other sense, is able to proceed with truth to being itself. And here, friend, is a work of great care.

For what principally? said he.

Do not you perceive, said I, the evil which at present attends reasoning, how great it is?

What is it, said he, you mean?

How it is somehow, said I, full of what is contrary to law.

Greatly so, reply'd he.

Do you imagine then, said I, they suffer some dreadful thing, and will you not forgive them?

How do you mean? said he.

Just as if, said I, a certain supposititious child were educated in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidst many flatterers, and should perceive when grown up to manhood that he is not descended of those who are said to be his parents, but yet should not discover his real

parents; can you guess how such an one would be affected both towards his flatterers and towards his supposed parents, both at the time when he knew nothing of the cheat, and at that time, again, when he came to perceive it? Or are you willing to hear me, while I guess at it?

I am willing, said he.

I conjecture then, said I, that he will pay more honour to his father and mother, and his other supposed relations, than to the flatterers, and that he will less neglect them when they are in any want, and be less apt to do or say any thing amiss to them, and in matters of consequence be less disobedient to them than to those flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth.

It is likely, said he.

But when he perceives the real state of the matter, I conjecture, he will then slacken in his honour and respect for them, and go after the flatterers, and be remarkably more persuaded by them now than formerly, and truly live according to their manner, conversing with them openly. But for that father, and those supposed relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural disposition, he will have no regard.

You say every thing, said he, as it would happen. But in what manner does this comparison respect our present argument?

In this. We have certain opinions from our childhood concerning just and beautiful, in which we have been educated, as by parents, obeying and honouring them.

We have, said he.

Are there not likewise other pursuits opposite to these, with pleasures flattering our souls, and drawing towards these. They do not however persuade those who are in any degree moderate, but they honour those their relations, and obey them.

These things are so.

What now, said I, when to one who is thus affected the question is proposed, What is the beautiful? and when he, answering what he hath heard from the law-giver, is refuted by reason; and reason frequently and every way convincing him, reduces him to the opinion, that this is no more beautiful than it is ugly. And in the same

manner, as to what is just and good, and whatever else he held in highest esteem, what do you imagine such an one will after this do with regard to these things, as to honouring and observing them?

Of necessity, said he, he will neither honour nor observe them any more in the same manner as formerly.

When then he no longer deems, said I, these things honourable, and a-kin to him as formerly, and cannot discover those which really are so, is it possible he can readily join himself to any other life than the flattering one?

It is not possible, said he.

And from being an observer of the law, he shall, I imagine, appear to be a transgressor.

Of necessity.

Is it not likely then, said I, that those shall be thus affected who in this situation apply to reasoning, and that they should have, as I was just now saying, great forgiveness.

And pity too, said he.

Whilst you take care then lest this compassionable case befal these of the age of thirty, ought you not by every method to accomplish them in reasoning?

Certainly, said he.

And is not this one prudent care? that they meddle not with reasonings whilst they are young: for you have not forgot, I imagine, that the youth, when they first meddle with reasonings, abuse them in the way of amusement, whilst they use them alway in the way of contradiction. And imitating those who are refuters, they themselves refute others, delighting like whelps in dragging and tearing to pieces, in their reasonings, those always who are near them.

Extremely so, said he.

And after they have confuted many, and been themselves confuted by many, do they not powerfully and speedily come to hold none of the opinions they held formerly? And by these means they themselves and the whole of philosophy are scandalised to others.

Most true, said he.

But he who is of a riper age, said I, will not incline to share in such a madness, but will rather imitate him who

inclines to reason and inquire after truth, than one who, for the sake of diversion, amuseth himself and contradicteth; and will both be more modest himself, and render the practice of disputing more honourable instead of being more dishonourable.

Right, said he.

Were not then all our former remarks rightly made, in the way of precaution, in this point, that the geniuses ought to be decent and grave, to which one shall impart the art of reasoning, and not, as at present, when every common genius, and such as is not at all proper, is admitted to it?

Certainly, said he.

Will not then the double of the former period suffice one to remain in imbibing the art of reasoning with perseverance and application, and doing nothing else, but in way of counterpart exercising himself in all bodily exercises?

Do you mean six years, said he, or four?

'Tis of no consequence, said I; make it five. After this you must make them descend to that cave again, and oblige them to govern both in things relating to war, and such other magistracies as require youth, that they may not fall short of others in experience. And they must be still further tried among these, whether being drawn to every different quarter, they will continue firm, or whether they will in any measure be drawn aside.

And for how long a time, said he, do you appoint this?

For fifteen years, said I. And when they are of the age of fifty, such of them as are preserved, and as have excelled in all these things, in actions, and in the sciences, are to be brought to the highest degree, and are to be obliged to direct the beam of their soul towards that which giveth light to all; and when they have viewed the good itself, to use it as a model, each of them in their turn, in adorning both the city and private persons, and themselves, all the remainder of their life; occupied for the most part in philosophy, and when their turn comes on them, they toil in political affairs, and take the government, each for the good of the city, performing this office, not as any thing honourable, but as a matter of necessity.

And after they have educated others in the same manner still, and left such as resemble themselves to be the guardians of the city, they depart to inhabit the islands of the blest. But the city will publicly erect for them monuments, and offer sacrifices, if the oracle assent, as to superior beings; and if it do not, as to happy and divine men.

You have, Socrates, said he, like a statuary, made our governours every way perfect.

And our governesses likewise, Glauco, said I. For do not imagine that I have spoken what I have said any more concerning the men, than concerning the women, such of them as are of a sufficient genius.

Right, said he, if at least they are to share in all things equally with the men, as we explained.

What then, said I, do you agree that, with reference to the city and republic, we have not altogether spoken what can only be considered as wishes, but such things as are indeed difficult, yet possible some way, and in no other way than what has been mentioned, viz., when those who are truly philosophers, whether more of them or a single one, becoming governours in a city, shall despise those present honours, esteeming them illiberal and of no value, but esteeming the right and the honours which come from it above all things, and accounting justice of greatest moment and most absolutely necessary, and ministering to it and encreasing it, thoroughly regulate the constitution of their own city?

How? said he.

As many, said I, of the more advanced in life as have lived ten years in the city, they will send out to the country, and taking their children away from those habits which the domestics have at present, they will educate them in their own manners and laws, which are what we formerly mentioned; and the city and republic we have described being thus established in the speediest and easiest manner, it will both be happy itself, and be of the greatest advantage to that people among whom it is established.

Very much so indeed, said he. And you seem to me, Socrates, to have told very well how this city shall arise, if it arise at all.

Are not now then, said I, our discourses sufficient both

concerning such a city as this, and concerning a man similar to it? For it is also now evident what sort of a man we shall say he ought to be.

It is evident, reply'd he; and your inquiry seems to me to be at an end.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK

Be it so. These things, Glauco, have now been agreed on—that in this city which is to be established in a perfect manner, the women are to be common, the children common, and likewise the whole of education; and, in like manner, their employments both in peace and war are to be common; and that their kings are to be such as most excel both in philosophy and in the arts of war.

These things, said he, have been agreed on.

And surely we likewise agreed on these things, that when the governours are marching with the soldiers, and come to settle themselves, they shall dwell in such habitations as we formerly mentioned, which have nothing peculiar to any one, but are common to all. And besides these houses, we likewise, if you remember, agreed on what sort of possessions they shall have.

I remember, said he, that we were of opinion none of them ought to possess any thing as others do at present; but, as wrestlers in war and guardians, they were to receive a reward for their guardianship from others, or an yearly maintenance on these accounts, and were to take care of themselves and the rest of the city.

You say right, said I. But after we have finished this now, let us recollect whence we made this digression, that we may now proceed again in the same way.

That is no hard matter, said he: for you were mentioning much the same things of the city with those you have done at present, saying that you held such a city to be good, as it was at that time described, and the man to be good who resembleth it; whilst yet it seems you are able to describe a better city and a better man. And you said, moreover, that all the others were wrong, if this one was right. Of the other republics, you said, as I remember, there were four species which deserved to be considered, and to have the errors in them and the lawless people

in them observed; in order that, when we have beheld the whole of them, and when we have agreed which is the best and which is the worst man, we may inquire whether the best man be the happiest, and the worst the most miserable, or otherwise. And when I asked you which you call the four republics, Polemarchus and Adimantus hereupon interrupted; and you in this manner having taken up the subject are come to this part of the reasoning.

You have recollected, said I, most accurately.

As a wrestler, now, afford me again the same opportunity; and whilst I ask you the same question, endeavour to answer what you was going to do then.

If indeed I be able, said I.

And I am truly desirous, said he, for my part, to hear which you call the four republics.

You shall hear that, said I, without difficulty, for they are these I mention, and they have names too. There is that which is commended by many, the Cretan and the Spartan. There is, secondly, that which has a secondary praise, called Oligarchy, a republic full of many evils: and that which is different from this one, and followeth next in order, a Democracy; then genuine Tyranny, different from all these, the fourth and last disease of a city. Or have you any other form of a republic belonging to any distinct species? For your little principalities and venal kingdoms, and such like republics, are somehow of a middle kind between these, and one may find of them as many among the barbarians as among the Greeks.

They are indeed, said he, said to be very many, and very strange ones.

Do you know now, said I, that there is somehow a necessity that there be as many species of men as of republics? Or do you imagine that republics are generated somehow of an oak, or a rock, and not of the manners of those who are in the city, to which, as into a current, all other things likewise are drawn?

By no means do I imagine, said he, they are generated from any thing but from hence.

If then there be five species of cities, the species of souls in individuals shall be likewise five.

Why not?

We have already gone over that one which resembleth

an Aristocracy, which we have rightly pronounced to be both good and just.

We have so.

Are we now, in the next place, to go over the worse species, the contentious and the ambitious man, who is formed according to the Spartan republic; and then him resembling an Oligarchy; then the Democratic and the Tyrannic, that we may contemplate the most unjust, and set him in opposition to the most just, that our inquiry may be completed; how after all, the most finished justice is in comparison of the most finished injustice, as to the happiness or misery of the possessor: that so we may either follow injustice, being persuaded by Thrasymachus, or justice, yielding to the present reasoning?

By all means, said he, we must do so.

Shall we then, in the same manner as we began, consider the manners in republics, before we consider them in private persons, as being there more conspicuous? And according to this method the ambitious republic is first to be considered (for I have no other name to call it by, but it may be called either ambitious, or aspiring after power), and along with it we shall consider a man resembling it; afterwards we shall consider an Oligarchy, and a man resembling Oligarchy; and then, again, when we have viewed a Democracy, we shall contemplate a Democratic man; and then in the fourth place, when we come to Tyranny, and contemplate it, and likewise a tyrannic soul, we shall endeavour to become competent judges of what we proposed.

Both our contemplation and judgment, said he, would in this manner at least be agreeable to reason.

Come then, said I, let us endeavour to tell in what manner the ambitious republic arises out of Aristocracy. Or is not this plain, that every republic changes by means of that part which holds the magistracies, when in this itself there arises sedition; but whilst this agrees with itself, though the state be extremely small, it is impossible to be changed?

It is so indeed.

How then, Glauco, shall our city be changed, or in what shape shall our allies and rulers fall into sedition with one another, and among themselves? Or are you willing that, like Homer, we invoke the Muses to tell us, "How first

sedition rose"? and shall we say, that whilst they talk tragically, playing with us, and rallying us as children, they yet talk seriously and sublimely?

In what manner?

Somehow thus: It is indeed difficult for a city in this manner constituted to be changed; but as every thing which is generated is liable to corruption, neither will such a constitution as this remain for ever, but be dissolved. And its dissolution is this: Not only the vegetable species, but likewise the animal, has seasons of fertility and sterility of soul as well as of body, when their revolutions complete the periphery of their respective orbits—which are shorter to the shorter lived, and contrarywise to such as are the contrary. And with reference to the fertility and sterility of our race, although they are wise, these you have educated to be governours of cities, yet will they not, for all that, by their reason joined with sensation, observe the proper seasons, but overlook them, and sometimes generate children when they ought not. Now the period for a divine generation is that which the perfect number comprehends, and that for a human generation* is that whole geometrical number which is of such an influence as to regulate the better and the worse births—of which when our governours, being ignorant, join our couples together unseasonably, the children shall neither be of a good genius nor fortunate. And though the former governours shall install the best of them in the office, they nevertheless being unworthy of it, and coming to have the power their fathers had, will begin to be negligent of us, in their guardianship in the first place, esteeming music less than they ought, and in the next place the exercises. Hence our youth shall become less acquainted with music, and the guardians which shall be appointed from among these shall not be altogether expert guardians to distinguish, according to Hesiod and us, the several species of geniuses —the golden, the silver, the brazen and the iron; but whilst iron is mixed with silver and brass with gold, dissimilitude arises and unharmonious irregularity. And when these arise, wherever they prevail they perpetually generate war and enmity. To such a race now of men as

* Six or eight lines here omitted, as the text is unintelligible or corrupted.

this, we must suppose them to say that sedition belongs whenever it happens to rise.

And we shall say that they have answered justly at least, reply'd he.

And of necessity, said I, for they are muses.

What then, said he, do the muses say next?

When sedition is risen, said I, two of the species of geniuses, the iron and the brazen, will be carried, after making gain, and the acquisition of lands and houses, of gold and silver. But the golden and the silver geniuses, as they are not in want, but naturally rich, will lead the soul towards virtue and the original constitution; yet as they live in a violent manner, and draw contrary to one another, they make an agreement to divide their lands and houses between them, and to dwell apart one from another; and then enslaving those who were formerly kept by them as freemen, as friends, and tutors, they keep them as domestics and slaves, for service in war and for their own protection.

This revolution, said he, seems to me to arise in such a manner.

Shall not then this republic, said I, be somewhat in the middle between Aristocracy and Oligarchy?

Certainly.

And the change shall happen in this manner, and on this change what sort of life shall it lead? Or is it not plain that in some things it shall imitate the former republic, and in others Oligarchy, as being in the middle of the two, and shall likewise have somewhat peculiar to itself?

Just so, reply'd he.

Shall they not then, in honouring their rulers, and in this that their military abstain from agriculture, from mechanical and other gainful employments, in their establishing common meals, and in studying both gymnastic exercises and contests of war—in all these things shall they not imitate the former republic?

Yes.

But in this, that they are afraid to bring wise men into the magistracy, as having no longer any such as are truly simple and inflexible, but such as are of a mixed kind; and in that they incline for those who are more forward and

rough, whose natural genius is rather fitted for war than peace, and in that they esteem tricks and stratagems, and spend the whole of their time in continual war—in all these respects shall it not have many things peculiar to itself?

Yes.

And such as these, said I, shall be desirous of wealth, as those who live in Oligarchies, and in an illiberal manner value gold and silver hoarded up, as having repositories of their own, and domestic treasuries, where they hoard them up and hide them, and have their houses enclosed about, where, as in nests altogether peculiar, they squander every thing profusely, together with their wives and such others as they fancy.

Most true, said he.

And will they not likewise be sparing of their substance, as valuing it highly, and acquiring it not in an open manner, but love to squander the substance of others, through their dissoluteness and secretly indulging their pleasures. They will likewise fly from the law, as children from their father, who have been educated not by persuasion but by force, having neglected the true muse, which is accompanied with reason and philosophy, and honoured exercise more than music.

You describe entirely, said he, a mixed republic, compounded of good and ill.

It is indeed mixed, said I. One thing is most remarkable in it, from the prevalence of the forward temper, contention, and ambition.

Exceedingly, said he.

Doth not then, said I, this republic arise in this manner? And is it not of such a kind as this, as far as the form of a republic can be described in words where there is not perfect accuracy, as it sufficeth us to contemplate in description likewise the most just and the most unjust man, and it were a work of prodigious length to go over all republics, and all the various manners of men, without omitting any thing?

Very right, said he.

What now shall the man be correspondent to this republic? how shall be he form'd, and of what kind?

I imagine, said Adimantus, he shall be somewhat like Glauco here, at least in a love of contention.

Perhaps, said I, as to this particular; but in other respects he does not seem to me to have a natural resemblance of him.

In what?

He must necessarily, said I, be more arrogant, and unapt to music, but fond of it, and fond to hear oratory, but not at all an orator. And such an one will be rough towards some slaves, without despising them, as he does who is sufficiently educated; he will be mild towards such as are free, and extremely submissive to governours; fond of being in the magistracy and of dignity, reckoning that neither eloquence, nor any such thing, should intitle to magistracy, but political management and military performances, being a lover of exercises and of hunting.

This indeed, said he, is the temper of that republic.

And shall not such an one, said I, despise money whilst he is young, but the older he grows, the more he will always value it, because he partakes of the covetous natural temper, and is not sincerely affected towards virtue, because destitute of the best guardian.

Which? said Adimantus.

Reason, said I, accompanied with music, which, being the alone inbred preservative of virtue, dwells with the possessor through the whole of life.

You say well, reply'd he.

And surely at least such an ambitious youth, said I, resembles such a city.

Certainly.

And such an one, said I, is formed, somehow, in this manner. He happens sometimes to be the young son of a worthy father, who dwells in an ill regulated city, and who shuns honours and magistracies, and law-suits, and all such public business, and wants to be neglected in obscurity, in order that he may have no trouble.

In what manner then, said he, is he formed?

When first of all, said I, he hears his mother venting her indignation, because her husband is not in the magistracy, and complaining that she is on this account neglected among other women, and that she observes him not extremely attentive to the making of money, not fighting

nor scolding privately nor publicly in courts of justice; but behaving on all these occasions indolently, and perceiving him always taken up about himself, and treating her neither with extreme respect nor contempt—upon all these accounts, being filled with indignation, she tells her son that his father is unmanly and extremely remiss, and all other such things as wives are wont to cant over concerning such husbands.

They are very many truly, said Adimantus, and very much in their spirit.

And you know, said I, that the domestics likewise of such families, such of them as appear good-natured, sometimes privately say the same things to the son; and if they see any one either owing money, whom the father does not sue at law, or in any other way doing injustice, they exhort him to punish all such persons when he comes to be a man, and to be more of a man than his father. And when he goes abroad he hears other such like things. And he sees that such in the city as mind their own affairs are called simple, and held in little esteem, and that such as mind not their affairs are both honoured and commended. The young man, now hearing and seeing all these things, and then again hearing the speeches of his father, and observing his pursuits in a near view, in comparison with those of others, being drawn by both these, his father watering and encreasing the rational part in his soul, and these others the concupiscible and irascible, and being naturally no bad man, but spoiled by the bad conversations of others, he is brought to a mean between the two, and delivers up the government within himself to a middle power, that which is fond of contention and irascible, and so he becomes a haughty and ambitious man.

You seem, said he, to have accurately explained the formation of such an one.

We have now then, said I, the second republic and the second man.

We have, said he.

Shall we not after this say with Aeschylus,

"O'er diff'rent cities dif'rent men are set"?

Or, rather, according to our plan, shall we first establish the cities?

By all means so, reply'd he.

It would be Oligarchy then, I imagine, which succeeds this republic.

But what constitution, said he, is it you call Oligarchy?

That republic, said I, which is founded on men's valuations, in which the rich bear rule, and the poor have no share in the government.

I understand, said he.

Must we not tell, first, how the change is made from the ambitious republic to the Oligarchy?

We must.

And surely at least how this change is made, said I, is manifest even to the blind.

How?

That treasury, said I, which every one hath filled with gold destroys such a republic; for first of all they find out for themselves methods of expence, and to this purpose strain the laws, both they and their wives disobeying them.

That is likely, said he.

And afterwards, as I imagine, one observing another, and coming to rival one another, the generality are rendered of this kind.

It is likely.

And from hence then, said I, proceeding still to a greater desire of making money, the more honourable they account this to be, the more will virtue be thought dishonourable. Or is not virtue so different from wealth, that, if each of them be placed in the opposite arm of a balance, they always weigh opposite to each other?

Entirely so, reply'd he.

But whilst wealth and the wealthy are held in honour in the city, both virtue and the good must be more dishonoured.

It is plain.

And what is honoured is always pursued, and what is dishonoured is neglected.

Just so.

Instead then of contentious and ambitious men, they will at last become lovers of gain and of wealth. The rich, on the one hand, they both praise and admire, and bring into the magistracy, but the poor man they despise?

Certainly.

And do not they then make laws, marking out the boundary of the Oligarchic constitution, and regulating the quantity of Oligarchic power according to the quantity of wealth, more to the more wealthy, and less to the less, intimating that he who hath not the valuation settled by law is to have no share in the government? And these things they transact violently, by force of arms, or establish such a republic after they have previously strucken them with terror. Is it not thus?

Thus indeed.

This then, to say in a word, is the constitution.

It is, reply'd he. But what now is the nature of the republic, and what are the faults we ascribed to it?

First of all, said I, this very thing, the constitution itself, what think you of this? For consider, if one should in this manner appoint pilots of ships according to their valuations, but never entrust one with a poor man, though better skill'd in piloting?

They would, said he, make very bad navigation.

And is it not in the same manner with reference to any other thing, or any government whatever?

I imagine so.

Is it so in all cases but in a city, said I? or is it so with reference to a city likewise?

There most especially, said he, in as much as it is the most difficult and the greatest government.

Oligarchy then would seem to have this one, which is so great a fault.

It appears so.

But what, is this anything less than it?

What?

That such a city is not one, but of necessity two; one consisting of the poor, and the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, and always plotting against one another.

Truly, said he, it is no way less.

But surely neither is this a handsome thing, to be incapable to wage any war, because of the necessity they are under either of employing the armed multitude, and of dreading them more than the enemy themselves, or not employing them, to appear in battle itself truly Oligarchic, and at the same time to be unwilling to advance money

for the public service, through a natural disposition of covetousness.

This is not handsome.

But what, with reference to what we long ago condemned, the engaging in a multiplicity of different things the same persons, at the same time, minding in such a republic, agriculture, lucrative employments, and military affairs, does this appear to be right?

Not in any degree.

But see now whether this form of republic be the first which introduceth this greatest of all evils.

What is that?

That one shall be allowed to dispose of the whole of his effects, and another to purchase them from him, and the seller be allowed to dwell in the city, whilst he belongs to no one class in the city, and is neither called a maker of money, nor mechanic, nor horse-man, nor foot-soldier, but poor and destitute.

It is the first, said he.

But yet such an one shall not be prohibited in Oligarchic governments, for otherwise some of them should not be over-rich, and others altogether poor.

Right.

But consider this likewise: When such a rich man as this is spends of his substance, was it of any more advantage to the city with reference to the purposes we now mentioned? or did he appear to be indeed one of the magistrates, but was in truth neither magistrate of the city, nor servant to it, but a waster of substance?

So he appeared, reply'd he. He was nothing but a waster.

Are you willing then, said I, that we say of him, that as when a drone is in a bee-cell it is the disease of the swarm, in like manner such an one, when a drone in his house, it is the disease of the city?

Entirely so, Socrates, reply'd he.

And hath not God, Adimantus, made all the winged drones without any sting? but these with feet, some of them without stings, and some of them with dreadful stings? And of those who are without stings are they who continue poor to old age; and of those who have stings are all these who are called mischievous.

Most true, said he.

It is plain then, said I, that in a city where you observe there are poor, there are somewhere in that place concealed thieves and purse-cutters, and sacrilegious persons, and workers of all other such evils.

It is plain, said he.

What then? Do not you perceive poor people in cities under Oligarchic government?

They are almost all so, said he, except the governours.

And do we not imagine, said I, that there are many mischievous persons in them with stings, whom the magistracy, by diligence and by force, restrains?

We imagine so indeed, said he.

And shall we not say, that through want of education, through bad nurture, and a corrupt constitution of state, such sort of persons are there produced?

We shall say so.

Is not then the city which is under Oligarchy of such a kind as this, and hath it not such evils as these, and probably more too?

It is nearly so, said he.

We have now finished, said I, this republic likewise, which they call Oligarchy, having its governours according to valuation. And let us now consider the man who resembles it, in what manner he arises, and what sort of man he is.

By all means, said he.

And is not the change from that ambitious one, to the Oligarchic, chiefly in this manner?

How?

When such a one hath a son, first of all, he both emulates his father, and follows his steps; afterwards he sees him, on a sudden, dashed on the city, as on a rock, and wasting both his substance and himself, either in the office of a general, or some other principal magistracy; then falling into courts of justice, destroyed by sycophants, either put to death, or strip'd of his dignities, disgraced, and losing all his substance.

It is likely, said he.

When he hath seen and suffered those things, friend, and hath lost his substance, he instantly, in a terror, pusheth headlong from the throne of his soul that ambitious and forward disposition, and being humbled by his poverty,

turns to the making of money, lives meanly and sparingly, and applying to work, scrapes together substance. Or do you not imagine that such a man will then seat in that throne the covetous and avaricious disposition, and make it a mighty king within himself, deck'd out with Persian crowns, and bracelets, and sceptres?

I imagine so, said he.

But he, I imagine, having placed both the rational and the ambitious disposition low on the ground, on either side, and having enslaved them under it, the one he allows to reason on nothing, nor ever to inquire but in what way lesser substance shall be made greater; and the other, again, he allows to admire and honour nothing but riches and rich people, and to receive honour on no other account but the acquisition of money, or whatever conduceth towards it.

There is no other change, said he, of an ambitious youth to a covetous one so sudden and so powerful as this.

Is not this then, said I, the Oligarchic man?

And the change into such an one is from a man resembling that republic from which the Oligarchic republic ariseth.

Let us consider now if he any way resembleth it.

Let us consider.

Does he not, in the first place, resemble it in valuing money above all things?

Why, does he not?

And surely at least in being sparing and laborious, satisfying only his necessary desires, and not allowing of any other expences, but subduing the other desires as foolish.

Certainly.

And being, said I, an emaciated man, and making gain of every thing, a hoarding-up person, such as the multitude extols—would not this be the man who resembleth such a republic?

It appears so to me, reply'd he. Riches then must be most valued both by the city and by such a man.

For I do not imagine, said I, that such a man hath applied his mind to education.

I do not imagine he has, said he, for he would not have taken a blind one to be the leader of his life.

But farther still, consider this attentively, said I: shall we not say that there are in him, from the want of education, the desires of the drone, some of them beggarly, and some of them mischievous, forcibly kept in by some other desire?

Entirely so, said he.

Do you know then, said I, where you will best observe their wickedness?

Where? said he.

In their tutelages of orphans, or in whatever else of this kind comes in their way, where they have it much in their power to do injustice.

True.

And is not this now manifest, that in every other commerce of life, wherever such an one acts so as to be approven, appearing to be just, and by a certain moderate behaviour restrains the other wrong desires within him, he does so, not from any persuasion that it is not better to indulge them, nor from sober reason, but from necessity and fear, trembling for the rest of his substance.

Entirely so, said he.

And truly, said I, friend, you shall find in the most of them desires partaking of the nature of the drone, where there is occasion to spend the things of others.

Very much so, said he.

Such a one as this, then, will not be without sedition within himself, nor be one, but a kind of double man. He will, however, have for the most part desires governing other desires, the better governing the worse.

It is so.

And on these accounts such a one, as I imagine, will be more decent than many others, but the true virtue of a harmonized and consistent soul would far escape him.

It appears so to me.

And the parsimonious man will, in private life, be but a poor rival for any victory, or in any contest of the honourable kind. And being unwilling, for the sake of good reputation, or for any such contests, to spend his substance, being afraid to waken up expensive desires, or any alliance or contest of this kind, fighting with a small part of his forces in an Oligarchic manner, he is generally defeated, and makes rich.

Very true, said he.

Do we then yet hesitate, said I, to rank the covetous and parsimonious man as most of all resembling the city under Oligarchic government?

By no means, said he.

Democracy now, as seems, is next to be considered, in what manner it arises, and what kind of man it produceth when arisen; that understanding the nature of such a man, we may bring him to a trial.

We shall in this method, said he, proceed in a consistency with ourselves.

Is not, said I, the change from Oligarchy to Democracy produced in some such way as this, through the insatiable desire of the proposed good, viz., the desire of becoming as rich as possible?

How now?

As those who are governours in it govern on account of their possessing great riches, they will be unwilling, I imagine, to restrain by law such of the youth as are dissolute from having the liberty of squandering and wasting their substance; that so, by purchasing the substance of such persons, and lending them on usury, they may still become both richer, and be held in greater honour.

They will be more unwilling than any other.

And is not this already manifest in the city, that it is impossible for the citizens to hold riches in esteem, and at the same time sufficiently to possess temperance, but either the one or the other must of necessity be neglected?

It is abundantly plain, said he.

But whilst in Oligarchies they neglect education, and suffer the youth to grow licentious, they lay sometimes under a necessity of becoming poor such as are of no ungenerous disposition.

Very much so.

And these, I imagine, sit in the city, fitted both with slings and with armour, some of them in debt, others in contempt, others in both, hating and conspiring against those who possess their substance, and others likewise, being desirous of a change.

These things are so.

But the money-catchers, still brooding over it, and not

seeming to observe these; but wherever they see any of the rest giving way, they wound them by throwing money into their hands, and drawing to themselves exorbitant usury, fill the city with plenty of drones and of poor.

How can there be, said he, but great plenty?

Nor yet, said I, when so great an evil is burning in the city, are they willing to extinguish it, not even by that method, restraining any one from spending his substance at pleasure, nor yet to take that method by which, according to the second law, such disorder might be removed.

According to which?

According to that which, after that other, is secondary, obliging the citizens to apply to virtue. For if one should enjoin them to trade a great deal in the way of voluntary commerce, and upon their own hazard, they should in a less shameful way make money in the city, and likewise less of those evils we have now mentioned should arise in it.

Much less, said he.

But at present, said I, by means of all these things, the governours render the governed of this kind. And do they not render both themselves and all belonging to them, and the youth likewise, luxurious and idle with respect to all the exercises of body and of mind, and effeminate in bearing both pleasures and pains, and likewise indolent?

What else?

As to themselves, they neglect every thing but the making of money, and make no more account of virtue than the poor do.

They do not indeed.

After they are trained up in this manner, when these governours and their subjects meet together, either on the road in their journeying, or in any other meetings, either at public shows or military marches, either when fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers, or when they see one another in common dangers, by no means are the poor in these cases contemned by the rich; but very often a robust fellow, poor and sun-burnt, when he has his rank in battle beside a rich man bred up in the shade, and swoln with a great deal of adventitious flesh, and sees him panting for breath and in agony, do not you imagine that he thinks it is through their own fault that such fellows grow rich, and

that they say to one another, when they meet in private, that our rich men are good for nothing at all?

I know very well, said he, that they do so.

For as a diseased body needs but the smallest shock from without to render it sickly, and sometimes without any impression from without is in sedition with itself, shall not in like manner a city resembling it in these things, on the smallest occasion from without, when either the one party maketh an alliance with the Oligarchic, or the other with the Democratic, be sickly and fight with itself, and sometimes, without these things from abroad, be in sedition?

And extremely so.

A Democracy then, as I imagine, arises when the poor, prevailing over the rich, kill some and banish others, and share the places in the republic and the magistracies equally among the remainder; and for the most part the magistracies are disposed in it by lot.

This, truly, said he, is the establishment of a Democracy, whether it arise by force of arms, or through others withdrawing themselves through fear.

In what manner now, said I, do these live, and what sort of a republic is this? for it is plain that a man of this kind shall appear some Democratic one.

It is plain, said he.

Is not then the city, in the first place, full of all freedom of action, and of speech, and of liberty, to do in it what any one inclines?

So, truly, it is said at least, reply'd he.

And wherever there is liberty, it is plain that every one will regulate his own method of life in whatever way he pleases.

It is plain.

And I imagine that, in such a republic most especially, there would arise men of all kinds.

How can it be otherwise?

This, said I, seems to be the finest of all republics. As a variegated robe, diversified with all kinds of flowers, so this republic, variegated with all sorts of manners, appears the finest.

What else? said he.

And it is likely, said I, that the multitude judge this republic to be the best, like children and women gazing at variegated things.

Very likely, said he.

And it is very proper at least, happy friend, said I, to search for a republic in such a state as this

How now?

Because it contains all kinds of republics on account of liberty; and it appears necessary for any one who wants to constitute a city, as we do at present, to come to a Democratic city, as to a general fair of republics, and chuse that form which he fancies.

It is likely indeed, said he, he should not be in want of models.

But what now, said I, is not this a divine and sweet manner of life for the present. To be under no necessity in such a city to govern, not though you were able to govern, nor yet to be subject unless you incline, nor to be engaged in war when others are, nor to live in peace when others do so unless you be desirous of peace; and though there be a law restraining you from governing or administering justice, to govern, nevertheless, and administer justice if you incline.

It is likely, said he, it is pleasant for the present at least.

But what now, is not the meekness of some of those who are condemned very curious? Or have you not as yet observed, in such a republic, men condemned to death or banishment, yet nevertheless continuing still, and walking up and down openly, and as if no one minded or observed him, the condemned man returns like a hero?

I have observed very many, said he.

But is not this indulgence of the city very generous, and not at all to say the small regard, but the contempt it shows for all those things we celebrated so much when we settled our city, how that unless one had an extraordinary genius, he never would become a good man, unless when a child he were instantly educated in things handsome, and should diligently apply to all these things. How magnanimously it despises all these things, and does not regard from what sort of pursuits one comes to act in political affairs, but honours him if he only say he is well affected towards the multitude?

This contempt, said he, is very generous indeed.

These now, said I, and such things as are a-kin to these, are to be found in a Democracy, and it would be, as appears, a pleasant sort of republic, anarchical and variegated, distributing a certain equality to all alike without distinction.

What you say, reply'd he, is quite manifest.

Consider now, said I, what sort of man such an one is in private, or, first, must we not consider as we did with respect to the republic in what manner he arises?

Yes, said he.

And does he not in this manner arise from that parsimonious one, who was under the Oligarchy as a son, I imagine, train'd up by his father in his manners?

Why not?

Such a one by force governs his own pleasures, these of them which are expensive, and tend not towards making money, and which are called unnecessary ones.

It is plain, said he.

Are you willing then, said I, that we may not reason in the dark, first to determine what desires are necessary, and what are not?

I am content, said he.

May not such be justly called necessary, which we are not able to remove, and such as when gratified are of advantage to us; for both these kinds our nature is under a necessity to pursue, is it not?

Very strongly.

This then we shall justly say makes the necessary part in our desires.

Justly.

But what now? Such desires as one may banish, if he study it from his youth, and such as whilst they remain do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right?

Right indeed.

Let us chuse out a sample of each of them, that we may understand by an example what they are.

It is proper.

Is not the desire of eating, so far as is conducive towards health and good habit of body, and the desire of food

and victuals, may it not be considered as of the necessary kind?

I imagine so.

The desire of food at least is indeed necessary on both accounts, as meat is advantageous, and as the want of it must put an end to life altogether.

It is.

And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary if it any how contribute any thing towards the good habit of the body.

Certainly.

But what, such desire even of these things as goes beyond these purposes, or such desire as respects other meats than these, and yet is capable of being curb'd in youth, and by being disciplined, to be removed from many things, and which is hurtful both to the body, and hurtful to the soul with reference to her attaining wisdom and temperance, may not such desire be rightly called unnecessary.

Most rightly indeed.

And may we not call these expensive likewise, and the others frugal, as they are conducive towards the actions of life?

Why not?

In the same manner, surely shall we say of venereal desires and the others.

In the same manner.

And did we not by him whom we just now denominated the drone, mean one who was full of such desires and pleasures, and was governed by the unnecessary desires, but that he who was under the necessary ones was the parsimonious and Oligarchic?

Without doubt.

Let us again mention, said I, how the Democratic arises from the Oligarchic, and to me he appears to arise in great measure thus.

How?

When a young man, bred up, as we now mentioned, without proper instruction, and in a parsimonious manner, comes to taste the honey of the drones, and associates with those vehement and terrible creatures who are able to procure all sorts of pleasures, and every way diversified, and from every quarter, thence imagine there is somehow

the beginning of a change in him from the Oligarchic to the Democratic.

There is great necessity for it, said he.

And as the city was changed by the assistance of an alliance from without with one party of it with which it was a-kin, shall not the youth be changed in the same manner, by the assistance of one species of desires from without to another within him which resembleth it, and is a-kin to it?

By all means.

And I imagine at least, if by any alliance there be given counter-assistance to the Oligarchic party within him, either any how by his father, or by the others of the family, both admonishing and upbraiding him, then truly arises sedition, and opposition, and a fight within him with himself.

Why does there not?

And sometimes indeed, I imagine, the Democratic party yields to the Oligarchic, and some of the desires are destroyed, some of them retire, on the rise of a certain modesty in the soul of the youth, and he is again rendered somewhat decent.

It happeneth sometimes, said he.

And again, I imagine, that when some desires retire, there are others a-kin to them which grow up, and through inattention to the father's instruction, become both many and powerful.

It is wont, said he, to happen so.

And do they not draw towards intimacies among themselves, and meeting privately together, generate a multitude?

What else?

And at length, I imagine, they seize the citadel of the soul of the youth, finding it evacuated both of noble learning and pursuits and of true reasoning, which truly are the best watchmen and guardians in the understandings of men beloved of the Gods.

Very much so, said he.

And then indeed, false and boasting reasonings and opinions, rushing up in their stead, possess the same place in such a one.

Strongly so, said he.

And does he not now again, on coming among those Lotophagi, dwell with them openly? And if any assistance come from his friends to the parsimonious part of his soul, those boasting reasonings shutting the gates of the royal wall against it, neither give enterance to this alliance, nor to the ambassadorial admonitions of private old men; but fighting against these, hold the government themselves. And denominating modesty to be stupidity, they thrust it out disgracefully as a fugitive, and temperance they call unmanliness, and abusing it most shamefully, thrust it out; and persuading themselves that moderation, and decent expence, are no other than rusticity and illiberality, they expel them their territories, with many other and unprofitable desires.

This they do mightily.

And after that they have emptied and cleared of all these desires the soul that is held down by them, and is initiated in all the great mysteries, they next lead in, with encomiums and applauses, insolence, and anarchy, and luxury, and impudence, shining with a great retinue, and crowned with crowns; insolence, they denominate Education, anarchy they call Liberty, luxury they call Magnificence, and impudence they call Manhood. Is it not, said I, somehow in this manner that a youth changes from one bred up with the necessary desires into the licentiousness and remissness of the unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures?

And very plainly so, reply'd he.

And such a one, I imagine, after this leads his life, expending his substance, his labour, and his time no more on the necessary than the unnecessary pleasures; and if he be fortunate, and be not excessively debauched, when he is somewhat more advanced in years, and when the great croud of desires is over, he admits a part of those which were thrust out, and does not deliver himself wholly up to such as had intruded, but regulates his pleasures by a sort of equality, and so lives delivering up the government of himself to every incidental desire as it chanceth, till it be satisfied, and then to another, undervaluing none of them, but indulging them all alike.

Entirely so.

And such a one, said I, does not listen to true reasoning,

nor admit it into the citadel, if any should tell him that there are some pleasures of the worthy and the good desires, and others of the ill ones; and that he ought to pursue and honour those, but to chastise and subject these But, in all these cases, he dissents, and says that they are all alike, and ought to be held in equal honour.

Whoever is thus affected, said he, acts in this manner very powerfully.

And does he not live, said I, from day to day, indulging after this manner every incidental desire—sometimes indulging himself in drinking strong drink, and in music, sometimes drinking water, and extenuating himself by abstinence; then again minding the exercises—sometimes too he is quite indolent and careless about every thing; then again he applies as it were to philosophy. Many times he acts the part of a politician, and in a desultory manner says and does whatever happens. If at any time he affects to imitate any of the military, thither he is carried; or of the mercantile, then again hither. Nor is his life regulated by any order, or any necessity, but deeming this sort of life pleasant, and free, and happy, he followeth it throughout?

You have entirely, said he, gone through the life of one who puts all laws whatever on a level.

I imagine at least, said I, that he is multiform, and full of very different manners; and that, like the city, he is fine, and variegated, and that very many men and women would desire to imitate his life, as he hath in him a great many patterns of republics and of manners.

He hath so, said he.

What now? Shall such a man as this be ranked as resembling a Democracy, as he may truly be called Democratic?

Let him be ranked, said he.

But it yet remains that we go over, said I, the most excellent republic, and the most excellent man, viz., Tyranny and the Tyrant.

It does, said he.

Come then, friend companion, in what manner does Tyranny arise? for it is almost plain that the change is from Democracy.

It is plain.

Does not Tyranny arise in the same manner from Democracy, as Democracy does from Oligarchy?

How?

What did Oligarchy, said I, propose as its good, and according to what was it constituted? It was with a view to become extremely rich, was it not?

Yes.

An insatiable desire then of riches, and a neglect of other things, through attention to making money, destroyeth it.

True, said he.

And with reference to that which Democracy denominateth good, an insatiable thirst of it destroys it likewise?

But what is it you say it denominates good?

Liberty, said I. For this you are told is most beautiful in a city which is under a Democracy, and that for the sake of liberty any one who is naturally of a free spirit chuses to live in it alone.

This word, Liberty, said he, is indeed often mentioned.

Does not then, said I, as I was going to say, the insatiable desire of this, and the neglect of other things, change even this republic, and prepare it to stand in need of a tyrant?

How, said he.

When a city, said I, is under a Democracy, and is thirsting after liberty, and happens to have bad cup-bearers appointed it, and grows drunk with an unmixed draught of it beyond what is necessary, it punishes even the governours if they will not be entirely tame and afford a deal of liberty, accusing them as corrupted and leaning towards Oligarchy.

That they do, said he.

But such as are obedient to magistrates, they abuse, said I, as willing slaves and good for nothing, and both in private and in public commend and honour magistrates who resemble subjects, and subjects who resemble magistrates. Must they not in such a city, of necessity, go to the highest pitch of liberty?

Why must they not?

And must not this inbred anarchy, friend, descend into private families, and in the end reach even the brutes?

How, said he, do we say such a thing as this?

Just as if, said I, a father should accustom himself to

resemble a child, and to be afraid of his sons, and the son accustom himself to resemble his father, and neither to revere nor to stand in awe of his parents, that so indeed he may be free, as if a stranger were to be equalled with a citizen, and a citizen with a stranger, and in like manner a foreigner.

It is just so, said he.

These things, said I, and other little things of a like nature happen. The teacher in such a city fears and flatters the scholars, and the scholars despise their teachers and their tutors in like manner. And in general the youth resemble the more advanced in years, and rival it with them both in words and deeds: and the old men sitting down with the young, are full of merriment and pleasantry, mimicking the youth, that they may not appear to be morose and despotic.

It is entirely so, reply'd he.

But that highest pitch, said I, of the liberty of the multitude, how great it is in such a city as this, when the men and women-slaves are no less free than those who purchase them, and how great an equality and liberty the wives have with their husbands, and husbands with their wives, we have almost forgotten to mention.

Shall we not then, according to Aeschylus, said he, say whatever now comes into our mouth.

By all means, said I; and accordingly I do say in this manner; with reference even to the brute creatures, such of them as are under men's discipline, how much more free they are in such a city, one who has not experience of it will not easily believe. For readily even the puppies, according to the proverb, resemble their mistresses; and the horses and asses are accustomed to go freely and gracefully, marching up against any one they meet on the road unless he give way: and many other such things happen full, in like manner of liberty.

You tell me, said he, my dream, for I have often met with this when going into the country.

But do you observe, said I, what is the sum of all those things collected together? How delicate it maketh the soul of the citizens, in so much that if any one bring near to them any thing of slavery, they are filled with indignation and cannot endure it. And do you know, that at

length they regard not even the laws, written or unwritten, that no one whatever by any manner of means may become their master.

I know it well, said he.

This now, friend, said I, is that government, so beautiful and youthful, whence Tyranny springs, as it appears to me.

Youthful, truly! reply'd he. But what comes after this?

The same thing, said I, which springing up as a disease in Oligarchy, destroyed it, the same arising here in a greater and more powerful manner, through its licentiousness, enslaves the Democracy. And in reality, the doing any thing to excess is wont to occasion a mighty change to the reverse: thus in seasons, in vegetable and in animal bodies, and in republics as much as any.

It is probable, said he.

And excessive liberty seems to change into nothing else but excessive slavery, both with a private person and a city.

It is probable indeed.

It is probable then, said I, that out of no other republic is Tyranny constituted but out of Democracy, out of the most excessive liberty I imagine the greatest and most savage slavery.

There is indeed, said he, reason for it.

But this I imagine, said I, was not what you was asking. But what is that disease which enslaves Democracy, resembling that which destroys Oligarchy?

You say true, reply'd he.

That then, said I, I called the race of idle and profuse men, one part of which was more brave and were leaders, the other more cowardly, and followed. And we compared them to drones, some to such as have stings, others to such as have none.

And rightly, said he.

These two now, said I, springing up in any republic, raise disturbance, as phlegm and bile in a natural body. And it behoves a wise physician and law-giver of a city no less than a wise bee-master, to be afraid of these, at a great distance principally, that they never get in; but if they have gotten in, that they be in the speediest manner possible cut off, together with their very cells.

Yes, truly, said he, by all means.

Let us take it then, said I, in this manner, that we may see more distinctly what we want.

In what manner?

Let us divide in our reasoning a Democratic city into three, as it really is; for one such species as the above grows through licentiousness in it, no less than in the Oligarchic.

It does so

But it is much more fierce at least in this than in that one.

How?

Under Oligarchy, because it is not in places of honour, but is debarred from the magistracies, it is unexercised, and does not become strong. But in a Democracy this, excepting a few, is somehow the presiding party, and now it says and does itself the most outrageous things, and then again approaching courts of justice, it maketh a noise, and cannot bear any other to say different from it; so that all things, if it be not some few, in such a republic are administered by such a party.

Extremely so, said he.

Some other party now, such as this, is always separated from the multitude.

Which?

Whilst the whole are somehow in the pursuit of gain, such as are naturally the most temperate become for the most part the wealthiest.

It is likely.

And hence, I imagine, the greatest quantity of honey, and what comes with the greatest ease, is pressed out of these by the drones.

For how, said he, shall any one press out of those who have but a little?

Such wealthy people, I imagine, are called the pasture of the drones.

Almost so, reply'd he.

And the people would be a sort of third species, such of them as mind their own affairs, and meddle not with any others, who have not very much substance, but yet are the most numerous, and the most prevalent in a Democracy, whenever it is fully assembled.

It is so; but this it will not do often, if it does not get some share of the honey.

Does it not always get a share, said I, as far as their leaders are able, robbing those who have substance, and giving to the people, that they may have the most themselves?

They are indeed, said he, sharers in this manner.

These then, who are thus despoiled are obliged to defend themselves, saying and doing all they can among the people.

Why not?

Others then give them occasion to form designs against the people, though they should have no inclination to introduce a change of government, and so they are Oligarchic.

Why not?

But at length, after they see that the people, not of their own accord, but being ignorant and imposed on by those slanderers, attempt to do them wrong, do they not then indeed, whether they will or not, become truly Oligarchic, yet not spontaneously? but this mischief likewise is generated by that drone stinging them.

Extremely so indeed.

And so they have accusations, law-suits, and contests one with another.

Frequently too.

And are not the people wont always to set some one, in a conspicuous manner, over themselves, and to cherish him and greatly to encrease his power?

They are wont indeed.

And this, said I, is plain, that whenever a tyrant arises it is from this president root, and from nothing else that he blossoms.

This is extremely manifest.

What is the beginning then of the change from a president into a tyrant? Or is it plain, that it is after that the president begins to do the same thing with that in the fable which is told in relation to the temple of Lycaean Jupiter, to whom was dedicated the wolf in Arcadia.

Which? said he.

How that whoever tasted human entrails which were

mixed with those of other sacrifices, necessarily became a wolf. Have you not heard the story?

I have.

And must not he in the same manner, who being president of the people, and receiving an extremely submissive multitude, abstaineth not from kindred blood, but unjustly accusing them (of such things as they are wont) and bringing them into courts of justice, stains himself with bloodshed, taking away the life of a man, and with unhallowed tongue and mouth tasting kindred blood, and banisheth, and slayeth, and proposeth the abolition of debts, and division of lands—must not such an one of necessity, and as it is destined, be either destroyed by his enemies or exercise tyranny, and from being a man become a wolf?

Of great necessity, said he.

This is he now, said I, who becomes seditious towards those who have substance, and when he fails he goes against his enemies with open force, and becomes an accomplished tyrant.

It is plain.

And if they be unable to expel him, or to put him to death on an accusation before the city, they truly conspire to cut him off privately by a violent death.

It is wont indeed, said he, to happen so.

And on this account all those who mount up to tyranny invent this celebrated tyrannical demand, to demand of the people certain guards for their person, that the assistance of the people may be secured to them.

This, said he, they take special care of.

And they grant them, I imagine, being afraid of his safety, but secure as to their own.

Extremely so.

And when one who hath substance, and who along with his substance, hath the crime of hating the people, observes this, he then, friend, according to the answer of the oracle to Croesus,

——To craggy Hermus flies,
Nor stays, nor fears, to be a coward deem'd,

because he would not, said he, be in fear again a second time.

But he at least, I imagine, said I, who is caught is put to death.

Of necessity.

It is plain then that this president of the city does not himself behave like a truly great man in a manner truly great, but tumbling down many others, sits in his chair a consummate tyrant of the city, instead of a president.

Why is he not? said he.

Shall we consider now, said I, the happiness of the man, and of the city in which such a mortal arises?

By all means, said he, let us consider it.

Doth he not then, said I, in the first days, and for the first season, smile and salute every one he meets, says he is no tyrant, and promiseth many things, both in private and in public, and frees from debts, and distributes land both to the people in general, and to those about him, and affecteth to be mild and of the patriot spirit towards all?

Of necessity, said he.

But when, as I imagine, he hath reconciled to himself some of his foreign enemies, and destroyed others, and there is tranquillity with reference to these, he in the first place always raises some wars, in order that the people may be in need of a leader

It is likely.

And is it not likewise with this view, that being rendered poor by payment of taxes, they may be under a necessity of becoming intent on a daily sustenance, and may be less ready to conspire against him?

It is plain.

And, I imagine, if he suspect that any of them who are of free spirits will not allow him to govern, in order to have some pretext for destroying them, he exposes them to the enemy. On all these accounts a tyrant is always under a necessity of raising war.

Of necessity.

And whilst he is doing these things, he must readily become more hateful to his citizens.

Why not?

And must not some of those who have been promoted along with him, and who are in power, speak out freely both towards him, and among themselves, finding fault

with the transactions, such of them as are of a more manly spirit?

It is likely.

It behoves the tyrant then to cut off all these, if he means to govern, till he leave no one, either of friends or foes, worth anything.

It is plain.

He must then carefully observe who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wise, who rich, and in this manner is he happy, that, willing or not willing, he is under a necessity of being an enemy to all such as these, and to lay snares till he cleanse the city of them.

A noble cleansing! said he.

Yes, said I, the reverse of what physicians do with respect to animal bodies; for they, taking away what is worst, leave the best, but he does the contrary.

Because it seems, said he, he must of necessity do so, if he is to govern.

In a blessed necessity then truly is he bound, said I, which obliges him either to live with many naughty people, and to be hated too by them, or not to live at all.

In such necessity he is, reply'd he.

And the more he is hated by his citizens whilst he does these things, shall he not so much the more want a greater number of guards, and more faithful ones?

Why shall he not?

Who then are the faithful, and from whence shall he send for them?

Many, said he, of their own accord will come flying, if he give them hire.

You seem, by the dog, said I, again to mention certain drones foreign and multiform.

You imagine right, reply'd he.

But those at home, would he not incline to have them also as guards?

How?

After he has taken away the citizens, to give the slaves their liberty, and make of them guards about his person?

By all means, said he, for these are the most faithful to him.

What a blessed possession, said I, is this which you men-

tion belonging to the tyrant, if he employ such friends and faithful men, after having destroyed those former ones!

But surely such at least, said he, he does employ.

And such companions, said I, admire him, and the new citizens accompany him, but the worthy men both hate and fly from him.

Why will they not?

It is not without reason, said I, that tragedy in the general is thought a wise thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it.

For what?

Because he uttered this, which is the mark of a good understanding: That tyrants are wise, by the conversation of the wise, and he plainly said those were wise with whom they hold converse.

And he commends, too, said he, Tyranny as a divine thing, and says a great many other things of it, as do likewise the other poets.

Therefore then, said I, those composers of tragedy, as they are wise, will forgive us, and such as establish the government of cities in a manner nearly resembling ours, in not admitting them into our republic as being panegyrists of Tyranny.

I imagine, said he, such of them at least as are more polite will forgive us.

But going about among other cities, I imagine, and drawing together the crouds, and putting to sale their fine, magnificent and persuasive words, they will draw over the republics to Tyrannies and Democracies.

Extremely so.

And do they not further receive rewards, and are held in honour chiefly by Tyrants, as is natural, and in the next place by Democracy? But the further on they advance towards the republics the reverse of these, their honour forsakes them the more as if it were disabled by an asthma to advance.

Entirely so.

Thus far, said I, we have digressed. But now again let us mention in what manner that army of the Tyrant, which is so beautiful, so numerous and multiform, and no way the same, shall be maintained.

It is plain, said he, that if at any time there be any sacred things in the city, these they will spend, that so what they sell for may still answer their demands, and the people be obliged to pay in the lighter taxes.

But what shall they do, when these fail them?

It is plain, said he, that he and his drunken companions, and his associates, male and female, shall be maintained out of the paternal inheritance.

I understand, said I, that the people who have made the Tyrant shall nourish him and his companions.

They are under great necessity, said he.

How do you say? reply'd I. What if the people be enraged, and say that it is not just that the son who is come to maturity be maintained by the father, but contrarywise that the father be maintained by the son; and that they did not make and establish him for this purpose, to be a slave to his slaves when he should be grown up, and to maintain him and his slaves with their other tumultuary attendants, but in order that they might be set at liberty from the rich in the city, who are also called the good and worthy, by having set him over them. And now they order him and his companions to be gone out of the city, as a father drives out of the house his son with his tumultuary drunken companions.

Then indeed at least shall the people, said he, know truly what a beast they are themselves, and what a beast they have generated, and hugged, and bred up, and that whilst they are the weaker, they attempt to drive out the stronger.

How do you say? reply'd I. Will the Tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and if he cannot persuade him, will he strike him?

Yes, said he, even stripping him of his armour.

You call, said I, the Tyrant a parricide and a miserable nourisher of old-age; and yet, as it is probable, Tyranny would really seem to be of this kind, and according to the saying, the people, defending themselves against the smoke of slavery amid free men, have fallen into the slavish fire of despotism; instead of that excessive and unseasonable liberty, embracing the most rigorous and the most wretched slavery of bond-men.

These things, said he, happen very much so.

What then, said I, shall we not speak modestly, if we say that we have sufficiently shown how Tyranny arises out of Democracy, and what it is when it doth arise?

Quite sufficiently, reply'd he.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK

THE NINTH BOOK

THE tyrannical man himself, said I, remains yet to be considered, in what manner he arises out of the Democratic, and when he doth arise, what kind of man he is, and what kind of life he leads, whether wretched or happy.

He indeed yet remains, said he.

Do you know, said I, what I still want?

What is it?

We do not appear to me to have sufficiently distinguished that matter of the desires, of what kind they are, and how many; and whilst this is defective, the inquiry we make shall be less evident.

May it not be done, said he, in good season still.

Certainly. And consider what it is I want to know about them; for it is this. Of those pleasures and desires which are not necessary, some appear to me to be repugnant to law: these indeed appear to spring up in every one, but being chastised by the laws, and the better desires, along with reason, they either forsake some men altogether, or are less few in number, and feeble; in others they are more powerful and in greater number.

Which are these you mean? said he.

Such, said I, as are excited in sleep, when the other part of the soul, such as is rational and mild, and which governs in it, is asleep, and the part which is brutal and savage, being filled with meats and drunkenness, frisks about, and pushing away sleep, wants to go and accomplish its practices. In such a one you know it dares to do every thing, as being loosed and disengaged from all modesty and discretion; for it scruples not the embraces, as it imagines of a mother, or of any one else, whether of Gods, of men, or of beasts; nor to kill any one, nor to abstain from any sort of meat, and, in one word, is wanting in no folly nor impudence.

You say most true, reply'd he.

But I imagine, when one is in health, and keeps himself

temperately, and goes to sleep, having stirred up the rational part, and having feasted it with worthy reasonings and inquiries, coming to an unanimity with himself, and allowing the part of the soul which is concupiscible neither to be starved nor glutted, that it may lye quiet and give no disturbance to the part which is best, either by its joy or grief, but suffer it by itself alone and untainted to inquire, and to desire to apprehend what it knoweth not, either something of what hath existed, or of what now exists, or what will exist hereafter; and having likewise soothed the irascible part, not suffering it to be hurried by any thing to transports of anger, and to fall asleep with agitated passion, but having quieted these two parts of the soul, and excited the third part, in which wisdom resides, shall in this manner take rest—by such an one, you know, the truth is chiefly apprehended, and the visions of his dreams are then least of all repugnant to law.

I am altogether, said he, of this opinion.

We have, indeed, been carried a little too far in mentioning these things. But what we want to be known is this, that there is in every one a certain species of desires which is terrible, savage, and irregular, even in some who entirely seem to us to be moderate. And this species becomes indeed manifest in sleep. But consider if there appear to be anything in what I say, and if you agree with me.

But I agree.

Recollect now what kind of man we said the Democratic one was. For he was somehow educated from his infancy under a parsimonious father, who valued the avaricious desires alone; but such as were not necessary, but rose only through a love of amusement and finery, he despised. Was he not?

Yes.

But being conversant with those who are more refined, and such as are full of those desires we now mentioned, running into their manner and all sort of insolence, from a detestation of his father's parsimony; however, having a better natural temper than those who corrupt him, and being drawn opposite ways, he settles into a manner in the middle of both, and participating moderately, as he imagines, of each of them, he leads a life neither illiberal

nor licentious, becoming a Democratic man from an Oligarchic.

This was, said he, and is our opinion of such an one.

Suppose now again, that when such a one is become old, his young son is educated in his manners.

I suppose it.

And suppose too, the same things happening to him as to his father: that he is drawn into all kind of licentiousness —which is termed, however, by such as draw him off the most compleat liberty—and that his father and all the domestics are aiding to those desires which are in the middle, and others also give aid likewise. But when those curious magicians and tyrant-makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in their power any other way, they contrive to excite in him a certain love which presides over the indolent desires, and such as minister readily to their pleasures a certain winged and large drone; or do you imagine that the love of these things is anything else?

I imagine, said he, it is nothing other than this.

And when other desires make a noise about him, full of their odours and perfumes, and crowns, and wines, and those pleasures of the most dissolute kind which belong to such copartnerships, and being encreased and cherished, add a sting of desire to the drone, then truly he is surrounded with madness as a life-guard, and that president of the soul rages with phrensy; and if he find in himself any opinions or desires which seem to be good, and which yet retain modesty, he kills them and pusheth them from him, 'till he be cleansed of temperance, and is filled with additional madness.

You describe perfectly, said he, the formation of a tyrannical man.

Is it not, said I, on such an account as this that of old love is said to be a tyrant?

It appears so, reply'd he.

And, friend, said I, hath not a drunken man likewise somewhat of a tyrannical spirit?

He hath indeed.

And surely at least he who is mad and is disturbed in his mind undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but likewise the Gods.

Entirely so, said he.

The tyrannical man then, divine friend, becomes so in perfection, when either by temper, or by his pursuits, or by both, he becomes drunk, and in love, and melancholy.

Perfectly so indeed.

Such a one, it seems then, arises in this manner. But in what manner does he live?

As they say in their plays, reply'd he, that you will tell me likewise.

I tell then, said I. For I imagine that after this there are feastings among them, and revellings and banquetings, and mistresses, and all such things as may be expected among those where Love the tyrant, dwelling within, governs all in the soul.

Of necessity, said he.

And every day and night do there blossom forth many and dreadful desires, indigent of many things.

They are many indeed.

And if they have any supplies, they are soon spent.

What else?

And after this there is borrowing and pillaging of substance.

What else?

And when every thing fails them, is there not a necessity that the desires, on the one hand, nestling in the mind, shall give frequent and powerful cries; and the men, on the other hand, being driven, as by stings, both by the other desires, and more especially by Love itself, commanding all the others as its life-guards, shall rage with phrensy, and search if any one have any thing which they are able, by deceit or violence, to carry off?

Extremely so, said he.

They must of necessity therefore be plundering from every quarter, or be tormented with great agonies and pains.

Of necessity.

And as with such a man his new pleasures have more to say than his antient ones, and take away what belonged to them, shall not he deem it proper in the same manner, that himself being young, should have more than his father and mother, and take away from them, and, if he

hath spent his own portion, encroach on that of his parents?

Why will he not? said he.

And if they do not allow him, will he not first endeavour to pilfer from, and beguile his parents?

By all means.

And where he is not able to do this, will he not, in the next place, use rapine and violence?

I imagine so, reply'd he.

But, wonderful friend, when the old man and the old woman oppose and fight, will he not revere them, and beware of doing any thing tyrannical?

I, for my part, am not quite secure, said he, with reference to the safety of the parents of such an one.

But do you truly, Adimantus, imagine that for the sake of a newly beloved and unnecessary mistress, such a one would give up his antiently beloved and necessary mother; or for the sake of a blooming youth newly beloved, and not necessary, give up his decayed, his necessary and aged father, the most antient of all his friends, to stripes, and suffer these to be enslaved by those others, if he should bring them into the same house?

Yes, truly I do, said he.

It seems, said I, to be an extremely happy thing to beget a tyrannical son.

Not altogether so, said he.

But what, when the substance of his father and mother fails such an one, and when now there is the greatest swarm of pleasures assembled in him, shall he not first break into some house, or late at night strip someone of his coat, and after this shall he not rifle some temple? and in all these actings those desires, newly loosed from slavery and become as the guards of love, shall along with him rule over those antient opinions he had from his infancy, the established decisions concerning good and evil—these desires which heretofore were only loose from their slavery in sleep, when he was as yet under the laws and his father, when under Democratic government, now when he is tyrannized over by love, such as he rarely was when asleep, such shall he be always when awake; and from no horrid slaughter, or food, or deed of any kind, shall he abstain. But that tyrannical love within him, living with-

out any restraint of law or government, as being sole monarch itself, shall lead on the man it possesseth, as a city, to every mad attempt whence he may support himself and the crew about him; which partly entereth from without from ill company, and partly through their manners and his own is become unrestrained and licentious. Or is not this the life of such a one?

It is this truly, said he.

And if there be, said I, but a few such in the city, and the rest of the multitude be sober, they go out and serve as guards to some other tyrant, or assist him for hire, if there be any war; but if they remain in peace and quiet they commit at home in the city a great many small mischiefs.

Which do you mean?

Such as these: they steal, break houses, cut purses, strip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people slaves; and where they can speak they sometimes turn false informers, and give false testimony, and take gifts.

You call these, said he, small mischiefs, if there be but a few such persons.

What is small, said I, is small in comparison of great; and all those things, with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedness and misery of the city, do not, as the saying is, come near the mark; for when there are many such in the city, and others accompanying them, and when they perceive their own number, then these are they who through the foolishness of the people establish as tyrant the man who among them hath himself most of the tyrant, and in the greatest strength within his soul.

It is probable indeed, said he, for he shall be most tyrannical.

Shall he not be so, if they willingly submit to him? But if the city shall not allow him, in the same manner as he formerly used violence to his father and mother, so now again shall he chastise his country if he be able, and bringing in other young people, he shall keep and nourish under subjection to these his formerly beloved mother- and father-country, as the Cretans say? And this shall be the issue of such a man's desire.

It shall be entirely this, said he.

But do not these, said I, become such as this, first in private, and before they govern? In the first place by

the company they keep, either conversing with their own flatterers, and such as are ready to minister to them in every thing, or if they need anything themselves, falling down to those they converse with, they dare to assume every appearance as friends, but after they have gained their purpose, they act as enemies.

Extremely so.

Thus they pass the whole of their life, never friends to any one, but always either domineering, or enslaved to another. But liberty and true friendship the tyrannic disposition never tastes.

Entirely so.

May we not then rightly call these men faithless?

Why not?

And surely we may call them most of all unjust, if we have rightly agreed about justice, in our former reasonings, what it is.

But we did rightly agree, said he.

Let us finish then, said I, our worst man. He would then seem such a one awake, as we described as asleep.

Entirely so.

And does not that man become such a one, who, being most tyrannical by natural temper, is in possession of supreme power, and the longer time he lives in tyranny, the more he becomes such a one?

Of necessity, reply'd Glauco, taking up the discourse.

And shall not the man, said I, who appears the most wicked, appear likewise the most wretched, and he who shall tyrannise for the longest time, and in the greatest measure, shall in reality, in the greatest measure, and for the longest time, be such a one? But as many men, as many minds.

Of necessity, said he, these things at least must be so.

And would this tyrannic man at least differ anything, said I, as to likeness when compared with the city under Tyranny, and the Democratic man when compared with the city under Democracy, and the same way of others?

How should they?

As city then is in respect of city as to virtue and happiness, will not man be to man in the same way?

Why not?

What then? How is the city which is tyrannized over,

in respect of that under kingly government, such as we at the first described?

Quite the reverse, said he, for the one is the best, and the other is the worst.

I will not ask, said I, which you mean, for it is plain; but do you judge in the same way, or otherwise, as to their happiness and misery? And let us not be struck with admiration, whilst we regard the tyrant alone, or some few about him; but let us, as we ought to do, enter into the whole of the city, and consider it, and going through every part, and viewing it, let us declare our opinion.

You propose rightly, said he; and it is evident to every one that there is no city more wretched than that which is under Tyranny, nor any more happy than that under regal power.

If now, said I, I should propose the same things with respect to the men, should I rightly propose, whilst I account him worthy to judge about them, who is able by his understanding to enter within, and see through the temper of the man and who may not, as a child beholding the out-side, be struck with admiration of tyrannical pomp, which he makes a shew of to those without, but may sufficiently see through him. If then I should be of opinion that all of us ought to hear such a one, who, having dwelt with the man in the same house, and having been along with him in his actions in his family, is able to judge in what manner he behaves to each of his domestics (in which most especially one appears strip'd of theatrical shews), and likewise in public dangers; and after he hath observed all these things, we shall bid him declare, how the Tyrant is as to happiness and misery, in comparison of others.

You would advise to these things, said he, most properly.

Are you willing then, said I, that we pretend to be ourselves of the number of those who are thus able to judge, and that we have already met with such men, that we may have one who shall answer our questions?

By all means.

Come then, said I, consider in this manner. Recollect the resemblance of the city and the man to one another, and thus considering each of them apart, tell the affections of each.

Which affections? said he.

To begin first, said I, with the city. Do you call the one under Tyranny either free or enslaved?

Slavish, said he, in the greatest degree possible.

And yet, surely, at least, you see in it masters and free men.

I see, said he, some small part so; but the whole in it, in the general, and the most excellent part, is disgracefully and miserably slavish.

If then the man, said I, resembleth the city, is it not necessary that there be the same regulation in him likewise, and that his soul be full of the greatest slavery and illiberality, and that these parts of his soul which are the noblest be enslaved, and that some small part which is most wicked and frantic is master.

Of necessity, said he.

What now? shall you say that such a soul is slavish or free?

Slavish somehow, I say.

But does not then the city, which is slavish and tyrannized over, least of all do what it inclines?

In great measure.

And shall not the soul too, which is tyrannized over, least of all do what it shall incline, to speak in the general of the whole soul; but hurried violently by some stinging passion, shall be full of tumult and inconstancy?

Why shall it not?

But whether shall the city which is tyrannized over be necessarily rich or poor?

Poor.

And the soul under Tyranny be of necessity likewise indigent and insatiable.

Just so, said he.

But what? Must not such a city and such a man of necessity be full of fear?

In great measure.

Do you imagine you will find more lamentations and groans and weepings and torments in any other city?

By no means.

But with reference to a man, do you imagine that these things are greater in any other than in this tyrannical one, who madly rages by his desires and lusts?

How can they, said he?

It is then on consideration of all these things, and others such as these, I imagine, that you have deemed this city the most wretched of cities?

And have I not deemed right? said he.

Extremely so, said I. But what say you again with reference to the tyrannical man, when you consider these things?

That he is by far, said he, the most wretched of all others.

You do not as yet say this rightly, reply'd I.

How? said he.

I do not as yet imagine, said I, that he is such in the greatest degree.

But who then is so?

This one shall probably appear to you to be yet more miserable than the other.

Which one?

He, said I, who being naturally tyrannical, leads not a private life, but is unfortunate, and through some misfortune it is brought upon him to become a Tyrant.

I conjecture, said he, from what was formerly mentioned, that you say true.

It is so, said I. But we ought not merely to conjecture about matters of such importance as these, but most thoroughly to inquire into them by reasoning of this kind: for the inquiry is concerning the most important matter, a good life and a bad.

Most right, said he.

Consider then whether there be any thing in what I say; for, in considering this question, I am of opinion we ought to perceive it from these things.

From what?

From each particular one of private men, such of them as are rich and possess many slaves, for those have this resemblance at least of Tyrants, that they rule over many, with this difference, that the Tyrant has great numbers.

There is this difference.

You know then that these live securely, and are not afraid of their domestics.

What should they be afraid of?

Nothing, said I; but do you consider the reason?

Yes; it is because the whole city gives assistance to each particular private man.

You say right, reply'd I. But what now, if some God should lift some man who had fifty slaves or upwards out of the city, both him and his wife and children, and set him down in a desert with his other substance and his domestics, where no freeman was to give him assistance, in what kind of fear, and in how great, do you imagine he would be about himself, his children and wife, lest they should be destroyed by the domestics?

In the greatest possible, said he, I imagine, for my part.

Would he not be obliged even to flatter some of the very slaves, and promise them many things, to set them at liberty when there was no occasion for it: and appear to be himself a flatterer of servants?

He is under great necessity, said he, to do so, or be destroyed.

But what, said I, if the God should settle round him many other neighbours, who could not endure if any one should pretend to lord it over another; but if they any where found such a one, should punish him with the extremest rigour.

I imagine, said he, that he would be still more in all sort of distress, thus beset with all sort of enemies.

And in such a prison-house is not the tyrant bound, being such by disposition, as we have mentioned, full of many and most various fears and loves of all kinds? And whilst he has in his soul the greatest desire, he alone of all in the city is neither allowed to go anywhere abroad, nor to see such things as other men are desirous of; but creeping into his house, lives mostly as a woman, envying the other citizens if any of them goes abroad and sees any good.

It is entirely so, said he.

And besides such evils as these, does not the man reap still more of them who, being under ill policy within himself (which you just now deemed to be the most wretched Tyranny), lives not as a private person, but through some fortune is obliged to act the tyrant, and without holding the government of himself, attempts to govern others, as if one, with a body diseased, and unable to support itself,

were obliged to lead their life not in a private way, but in wrestling and fighting against other bodies?

You say, Socrates, reply'd he, what is altogether most likely and true.

Is not then, friend Glauco, said I, this condition altogether miserable, and does not the tyrant live more miserably still than the man deemed by you to live most miserably?

Very much so, said he.

True it is then, though one may fancy otherwise, that the truly tyrannical man is truly slavish with respect to the greatest flatteries and slaveries, and is a flatterer of the most abandoned men. Nor does he ever in the smallest degree obtain the gratification of his desires, but is of all the most indigent of the most things. and appeareth poor indeed, if one knoweth how to contemplate his whole soul; and full of fear through the whole of life, being filled with anxieties and griefs, if indeed he resembles the constitution of that city which he governs. But he doth resemble it, doth he not?

Extremely, said he.

And shall we not, besides these things, likewise ascribe to this man what we formerly mentioned, that he must necessarily be, and, by governing still, become more than formerly envious, faithless, unjust, unfriendly, unholy, and a sink and breeder of all wickedness; and from all these things be most especially unhappy himself, and then render all about him unhappy likewise.

No one, said he, who hath understanding will contradict you.

Come now, said I, as a judge who pronounces after considering all, so do you tell me who, according to your opinion, is the first as to happiness, and who second, and the rest in order, they being five in all—the Regal, the Ambitious, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, and the Tyrannic.

But the judgment, said he, is easy; for as if I had entered among them, I judge of them as of public performers, by their virtue and vice, and by their happiness, and its contrary.

Shall we, then, hire a Herald? said I, or shall I myself declare that the son of Ariston hath judged the best and justest man to be the happiest (and that this is the man

who hath most of the regal spirit, and ruleth himself with a kingly power), and that the worst and the most unjust is the most wretched; and that he again happens to be the man who is most tyrannical who in the greatest degree tyrannizes over himself and the city.

Let it be published by you, said he.

Shall I add, said I, whether they be unknown to be such or not both to all men and Gods?

Add it, said he.

Be it so, said I, this would seem to be one proof of ours. And this, if you are of the same opinion, must be the second.

Which is it?

Since the soul, said I, of every individual is divided into three, in the same manner as the city was divided into three parts, it will, in my opinion, afford a second proof.

Which is it?

It is this. Of the three parts of the soul, there appear to me to be three pleasures, one peculiar to each one; and the desires and governments are in the same manner.

How do you say? reply'd he.

There is one part, we said, by which a man learns, and another by which he is irascible; the third is so multiform, we are unable to express it by one word peculiar to itself, but we denominated it from that which is greatest, and most impetuous in it; for we called it the concupiscible, on account of the impetuosity of the desires relative to meat, drink, and venereal pleasures, and whatever others belong to these, and we called it avaricious likewise, because it is by means of wealth most especially that such desires are accomplished.

And we said rightly, reply'd he.

If then we say that its pleasure and delight are in gain, shall we not best of all reduce it under one head in our discourse, so as to express something to ourselves, when we make mention of this part of the soul, and calling it the covetous, and the desirous of gain, shall we not term it properly?

So I imagine at least, said he.

But what, do not we say that the irascible ought wholly to run after superiority, victory, and applause?

Extremely so.

If then we term it the contentious and ambitious, shall it not be accurately expressed?

Most accurately.

But it is evident to every one that the part of the soul by which we learn is wholly intent always to know the truth, and as to wealth and glory, it careth for these least of all.

Extremely so.

When we call it then the desirous of learning and the philosophic, we shall call it according to propriety.

Why shall we not?

And do not these, said I, govern in souls, one of them in some, and in others another, as it happeneth?

Just so, said he.

On this account then we said there were three original species of men: the philosophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious.

Entirely so.

And that there were likewise three species of pleasures, one subject to each of these.

Certainly.

You know then, said I, that if you were to ask these three men, each of them apart, which of these lives is the most pleasant, each would most of all commend his own. And the avaricious will say, that in comparison with the pleasure of making gain, that arising from honour, or from learning, is of no value, unless one make money by them.

True, said he.

And what says the ambitious? said I; does not he deem the pleasure arising from making money a sort of burden, and likewise that arising from learning, unless learning brings him honour, does he not deem it smoke and trifling?

It is so, said he.

And we shall suppose the philosopher, said I, to deem the other pleasures as nothing in comparison of that of knowing the truth, how it is, and that whilst he is always employed in learning something of this kind, he is not very remote from pleasure; but that he calls the other pleasures truly necessary, as wanting nothing of the others, but where there is a necessity for it.

This, said he, we must well understand.

When therefore, said I, these several lives, and the

respective pleasure of each, dispute among themselves, not with reference to living more worthily or more basely, or worse or better, but merely with reference to this, of living more pleasantly, or on the contrary more painfully, how can we know which of them speaks most conformably to truth?

I am not quite able, said he, to tell.

But consider it thus. By what ought we to judge of whatever is to be rightly judged of? Is it not by experience, by prudence, and by reason? Or hath any one a better criterion than these?

How can he? said he.

Consider now; of the three men, who is the most experienced in all the pleasures? Whether do you imagine that the avaricious man, in learning truth itself, what it is, is more experienced in the pleasure arising from knowledge than the philosopher is in that arising from making money?

There is, said he, a great difference; for the philosopher, beginning from his childhood, must of necessity taste the other pleasures; but what it is to know real beings, and how sweet this pleasure is, the lucrative man hath no necessity of tasting, or of becoming experienced in, but, rather, when he uses earnest endeavours it is no easy matter.

The philosopher then, said I, far surpasseth the lucrative man, at least in experience of both the pleasures.

Far indeed.

But what with reference to the ambitious man? Is he more experienced in the pleasure arising from honour than the philosopher is in that arising from knowledge?

Honour, said he, attends all of them, if they obtain each of them what they aim at; for the rich man is honoured of many, and so is the brave, and the wise; so as to that of honour, what sort of pleasure it is, all of them have the experience. But in the contemplation of being itself, what pleasure there is, it is impossible for any other but the philosopher to have tasted.

On account of experience then, said I, he of all men judgeth the best.

By far.

And surely, along with prudence at least, he alone becomes experienced.

Why does he not?

But even the organ by which these pleasures must be judged is not the organ of the lucrative, nor of the ambitious, but of the philosopher.

Which is it?

We said somewhere that they must be judged of by reason, did we not?

Yes.

But reasoning is chiefly the organ of the philosopher.

Why is it not?

If then the things to be determined were best determined by riches and gain, what the lucrative man commended or despised were of necessity most agreeable to truth.

Entirely.

And if by honour, and victory and bravery, must it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined?

It is evident.

But since it is by experience, and prudence, and reason?

Of necessity, said he, what the philosopher and the philologist commends must be the most true.

Of the three pleasures then, that is the most pleasant which belongs to that part of the soul by which we learn most, and in whomsoever of us this part governs, his life is the most pleasant.

How can it, said he, be otherwise? For the wise man being the sovereign commender, commends his own life.

But which life, said I, doth our judge pronounce the second, and which the second pleasure?

It is plain that of the war-like and ambitious man, for this is nearer to his own than that of the lucrative.

And that of the covetous, as it appears, is last of all.

Why not? said he.

These things now have thus succeeded one another in order. And the just man hath twice now overcome the unjust. The third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is sacred to Olympic Jupiter, the deliverer: for consider, that the pleasure of the others is not every way genuine, but that of the wise man is, nor are they pure, but some-

how coloured over, as I imagine I have heard from one of the wise men. And this truly now would be the greatest and most complete downfall of the unjust.

Extremely so; but how do you mean?

I shall thus trace it out, said I, whilst in searching you answer my questions.

Ask then, said he.

Tell me then, reply'd I, do we not say that pain is opposite to pleasure?

Entirely so.

And do we not say likewise, that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is somewhat?

We say it is.

That being in the middle of both these, it is a certain tranquillity of the soul with reference to them.

Do you not thus understand it?

Thus, reply'd he.

Do you not remember, said I, the speeches of the sick diseased, which they utter in their sickness?

Which?

How that nothing is more pleasant than health, but that it escaped their notice before they became sick, that it was the most pleasant.

I remember it, said he.

And are you not wont to hear those who are under any acute pain say, that there is nothing more pleasant than a cessation from pain?

I am wont to hear them.

And you may perceive in men, I imagine, the same thing, when they are in many other such like circumstances, where, when they are in pain, they extol a freedom from pain, and the tranquillity of such a state, as being the most pleasant, and do not extol that of feeling joy.

Because this, it is likely, said he, becomes at that time pleasant and desireable tranquillity.

And when any one ceaseth, said I, to feel joy, this tranquillity from pleasure will be painful.

It is likely, said he.

This tranquillity then, which we just now said was between the two, shall at times become each of these, pain and pleasure.

It appears so.

But is it truly possible that what is neither of the two should become both?

I do not imagine it is.

And surely at least, when any thing pleasant or any thing painful is in the soul, both sensations are a sort of emotion; are they not?

Yes.

But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be tranquillity, and in the middle of these two?

It appears so indeed.

How is it right, then, to deem it pleasant not to be in pain, or painful not to enjoy pleasure?

It is by no means.

In these cases, then, tranquillity is not really so, said I, but it appeareth pleasant in respect of the painful, and painful in respect of the pleasant. And there is nothing genuine in these appearances as to the truth of pleasure, but a sort of imposture.

As our reasoning shows, said he.

Consider then, said I, the pleasures which do not arise from the cessation of pains, that you may not frequently in the present discourse imagine, that by nature these two are universally in this manner, pleasure, the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure.

How, said he, and which pleasures do you mean?

There are many others, said I, but chiefly if you incline to consider the pleasures from smells; for these, without any preceding pain, are on a sudden immensely great, and when they cease, they leave no pain behind them.

Most true, said he.

Let us not then be perswaded that pure pleasure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleasure.

Let us not.

But yet, said I, these which reach the soul, by means of the body, and which are called pleasures, the greatest part of them almost, and the most considerable, are of this species, certain cessations of pain.

They are so.

And are not the pre-conceptions of pleasure and pain, which arise in the mind from the foresight of these things, of the same kind?

Of the same.

Do you know then, said I, what kind they are of, and what they chiefly resemble?

What? said he.

Do you reckon, said I, there is any such thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle?

I do.

Do you imagine then, that any one when he is brought from the below to the middle, imagines any thing else than that he is brought to the above, and when he stands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine he is any where else but in the above, whilst yet he hath not seen the true above?

Truly, said he, I do not think that such an one will imagine otherwise.

But if he should again, said I, be carried to the below, he would imagine he was carried to the below, and would imagine according to truth.

Why would he not?

Would he not be affected in all these respects, from his not having experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below?

It is plain.

Should you wonder then that whilst men are inexperienced in the truth, they have unsound opinions about many other things, and that as to pleasure and pain, and what is between these, they are likewise affected in this same manner? So that even when they are brought to what is painful, they imagine truly, and are truly pained; but when from pain they are brought to the middle, they strongly imagine that they are arrived at fulness of pleasure. In the same manner as these who along with the black colour look at the grey, through inexperience of the white, are deceived; so those who consider pain along with a freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleasure.

Truly, said he, I should not wonder, but much rather if it were not so.

But consider it at least, said I, in this manner. Are not hunger and thirst, and such like, certain emptinesses in the bodily habit?

What else?

And is not ignorance and folly an emptiness in the habit of the soul?

Extremely so.

And is not the one filled when it receiveth food, and the other when it hath intelligence?

Why not?

But which is the more real repletion, that of the less, or that of the more real existence?

It is plain that of the more real.

Which species, then, do you imagine participates most of a more pure substance; whether these which participate of bread and drink, and meat, and all such sort of nourishment; or that species which participates of true opinion, and knowledge, and intelligence, and in general, of all virtue? And judge of it in this manner. That which resides in that which is always alike, and immortal, and true, and is so itself, and ariseth in what is such, does it appear to you to exist more really than that which resides in what is never alike, and mortal, is so itself, and ariseth in what is such?

This, said he, differs much from that which is always alike.

Does then the essence of that which is always alike participate any more of essence than of science?

By no means.

But what with relation to truth?

Nor of this neither.

If it participate less of truth, doth it not likewise do so of essence?

Of necessity.

In general then, do not the species relating to the care of the body participate less of truth and essence than the species relating to the care of the soul?

By far.

And the body less than the soul; do you not think so?

I do.

Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itself a more real being, in reality more truly filled than that which is filled with less real beings, and is itself a less real being?

Why not?

If then it be pleasant to be filled with what is suitable to

nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, must be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleasure; but that which participates of less real being must be less truly and solidly filled, and participateth of a more uncertain and less genuine pleasure.

Most necessarily, said he.

Such then as are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and are always conversant in feastings and such like, are carried as it appears to the below, and back again to the middle, and there they wander for life. But never at all, getting beyond this, do they look towards the true above, nor are carried to it, nor are they ever really filled with real being, nor have they ever tasted solid and pure pleasure, but after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, and bowed towards earth and their tables, they live feeding and coupling, and from a lust of these things, kicking and pushing at one another with iron horns and hoofs, they perish through their unsatiableness, as those who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themselves.

You pronounce most perfectly, Socrates, as from an oracle, said Glauco, the life of the multitude.

Must they not then, of necessity, be conversant in pleasures mixed with pains, images of the true pleasure, painted over, and coloured by their position beside one another, hence both their pleasures and pains appear vehement, and engender their mad passions in the foolish. Hence also they must fight about these things, as Stesichorus says those at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one.

Of necessity, said he, the matter must be something of this kind.

And what as to the irascible part of the soul? Must not other such like things happen wherever any one gratifies it, either in the way of envy through ambition, or in the way of violence through contentiousness, or in the way of anger through moroseness, pursuing after a glut of honour, of conquest, and of anger, both without reason and without intelligence?

Such things as these, said he, must necessarily happen with reference to this part of the mind.

What then, said I, shall we boldly say concerning all the pleasures, both respecting the avaricious and the ambitious part, that such of them as are obedient to intelligence and reason, and along with these follow after and obtain the pleasures to which wisdom points, shall obtain the truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to attain true pleasure, and in as much as they follow truth, pleasures which are properly their own, if indeed what is best for every one be most properly his own?

But surely it is most properly, said he, his own at least.

When then the whole soul is obedient to the philosophic part and there is no sedition in it, then every part in other respects does its proper business and is just, and also reaps its own pleasures, and such as are the best and as far as is possible the most true.

Certainly, indeed.

But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleasures, and it obliges the other parts to pursue a pleasure foreign to them, and not at all true.

It does so, said he.

Do not then the parts which are the most remote from philosophy and reason most especially effectuate such things?

Extremely.

And is not that which is most remote from law and order, likewise most remote from reason?

It plainly is.

And have not the amorous and the tyrannical desires appeared to be most remote from law and order?

Extremely.

And the royal and the moderate ones, the least remote?

Yes.

The tyrant then, I imagine, shall be the most remote from true pleasure, and such as is most properly his own, and the other shall be the least.

Of necessity.

And the tyrant, said I, shall lead a life the most unpleasant, and the king the most pleasant one.

Of great necessity.

Do you know then, said I, how much more unpleasant a life the tyrant leads than the king?

If you tell me, said he.

As there are three pleasures, as it appears, one genuine, and two illegitimate, the Tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reason, dwells with slavish pleasure as his life-guards, and how far he is inferior, is not easily to be told, unless it may be done in this manner.

How? said he.

The Tyrant is somehow the third remote from the Oligarchic; for the Democratic was in the middle between them.

Yes.

Does he not then dwell with the third image of pleasure, distant from him with reference to truth, if our former reasonings be true?

Just so.

But the Oligarchic is the third again from the Royal, if we suppose the Aristocratic and the Royal the same.

He is the third.

The Tyrant then, said I, is remote from true pleasure, the third from the third.

It appears so.

A plain surface then, said I, may be the image of tyrannical pleasure, as to the computation of length.

Certainly.

But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifest, by how great a distance it is remote.

It is manifest, said he, to the computer at least.

If now, conversely, one shall say the King is distant from the Tyrant as to truth of pleasure, as much as 729 and 70 are distant from 9, shall he not, on compleating the multiplication, find him leading the more pleasant life, and the Tyrant the more wretched one by this same distance?

You have heaped up, said he, a prodigious account of the difference between these two men, the just and the unjust, with reference to pleasure and pain.

Yet the numbers are true, said I, and corresponding to their lives, if indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correspond to them.

But these, said he, do correspond to them.

If then the good and just man surpasseth so far the evil and unjust man in pleasure, in what a prodigious degree

further shall he surpass him in decorum of life, in beauty and in virtue?

In a prodigious degree, truly, said he.

Be it so, said I. Since now we are come to this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we first said, on account of which we have come hither: and it was somewhere said that it was advantageous to do injustice, if one were compleatly unjust but were reputed just. Was it not so said?

It was indeed.

Now then, said I, let us settle this point, since we have now settled the other with reference to acting justly and unjustly, what power each of these hath in itself.

How? said he.

Let us in our reasoning make a resemblance of the soul, that the man who said those things may know what he said.

What kind of resemblance? said he.

One of those creatures, said I, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimaera, of Scylla, of Cerberus, and many others are spoken of, where many particular natures existed together in one.

They are spoken of indeed, said he.

Form now one figure of a creature, various and many-headed, having all around heads of tame creatures and of wild, and having power in itself of changing all these heads, and of breeding them out of itself.

This is the work, said he, of a curious former; however, as the formation is easier in reasoning than in wax and such like, let it be formed.

Let there be now one other figure of a lyon, and one of a man, but let the first be by far the greatest, and the second be the second in bulk.

These are easy, said he, and they are formed.

Conjoin now these three in one, so as to exist somehow with one another.

They are conjoined, said he.

Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of the man, so that to one who is not able to see what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature.

This is formed around, said he.

Let us now tell him who saith that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, but to do justice is unprofitable, that he saith nothing else than that it is profitable for him to feast the multiform creature, and to make it strong; and likewise the lyon, and what respecteth the lyon, whilst the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, so as to be dragged whichever way either of those drag him, and never accustom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but to suffer them to be biting one another, and to fight and devour one another.

He, said he, who commendeth the doing injustice saith undoubtedly these things.

And doth not he again who saith it is profitable to do justice say that he ought to do and to say such things by which the inner man shall come to have the most entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, shall take care of the many-headed creature, cherishing the mild ones, and nourishing them, and hindering the wild ones to grow up, taking the nature of the Lyon as his ally, and having a common care for all, make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so nourish them?

He who commendeth justice undoubtedly says such things as these.

In all respects then, he who commendeth justice would seem to speak the truth, but he who commendeth injustice to speak what is false; for with regard both to pleasure, and applause, and profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, and he who discommends it speaks nothing genuine. Nor does he discommend with understanding what he discommends.

Not at all, said he, as appears to me at least.

Let us then in a mild manner persuade him (for it is not willingly he errs), asking him, happy man, do not we say that the maxims of good and evil become so upon such accounts as these? These are good which subject the brutal part of our nature most to the human, or rather to the divine, but these evil which enslave the mild part of our nature to the brutal. Shall he agree with us? or how?

He shall, if he be advised by me, said he.

Is there then any one, said I, whom it avails, by this reasoning, to take gold unjustly, if something of this kind

happens, if whilst he takes the money he at the same time subjects the best part of himself to the worst; or if, taking gold, he should enslave a son or daughter, and that even to savage and wicked men, this would not avail him, no, though he should receive for it a prodigious sum? But if he enslaveth the most divine part of himself to the most unhallowed and most polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched, and taketh a gift of gold to his far more dreadful ruin than Euriphyle did when she received the necklace for her husband's life?

By far, said Glauco, for I will answer you for the man.

And do you not imagine that to be intemperate, hath of old been discommended on such accounts as these, because that in such a one that terrible, that great and multiform beast was indulged more than was meet?

It is plain, said he.

And are not arrogance and moroseness blamed, when the lyon and the serpentine disposition encrease and stretches beyond measure?

Entirely so.

And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissness and looseness of this disposition, when it engenders in the man cowardice?

What else?

Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when any one maketh this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lyon to become an ape?

Entirely so, said he.

But why is it, do you imagine, that bodily toil and handicrafts are despicable? Shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when one hath the best part of his constitution naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but to minister to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them?

It is likely, said he.

In order then that such a one may be governed in the same manner as the best man is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who hath within him the divine governour? not at all imagining that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject (as

Thrasymachus imagined), but as it is best for every one to be governed by one divine and wise, most especially having it of his own within him, if not subjecting himself to it without; that as far as possible we may all resemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the same?

Rightly indeed, said he.

And law at least, said I, plainly shows it intends such a thing, being an ally to all in the city, as does likewise the government of children, in not allowing them to be free 'till we establish in them a proper government, as in a city; and having cultivated that in them which is best, by that which is best in ourselves, we establish a similar guardian and governour for youth, and then truly we set it free.

It shows indeed, said he.

In what way then shall we say, Glauco, and according to what reasoning, that it is profitable to do injustice, to be intemperate, or do any thing base, by which a man shall indeed become more wicked, but yet shall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power?

In no way, said he.

But how shall we say it is profitable for the unjust to be concealed, and not to suffer punishment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, still become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is punished, hath the brutal part quieted and made mild, and the mild part set at liberty. And the whole soul being settled in the best temper, in possessing temperance and justice, with wisdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does in acquiring vigour and beauty, with a sound constitution, in as far as the soul is more valuable than the body.

Entirely so, said he.

Shall not every one then, who hath understanding at least, regulate his life in bending the whole of his powers hither, in the first place, in honouring those pieces of learning which will render his soul of this kind, and despising all other things?

It is plain, said he.

And next, said I, with reference to a good habit of body and its nourishment, he will spend his life in attention to these, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleasure, nor yet with a view to health, nor principally

regarding this, to become strong, and healthy, and beautiful, unless by means of these he is to become temperate likewise; but he always appears to adjust the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony which is in the soul.

By all means, said he, if indeed he is to be truly musical.

That arrangement then, said I, and symphony arising from the possession of wealth, and that vulgar magnificence, he will not, struck with admiration of the felicity of the multitude, encrease to infinity, and bring on himself infinite evils.

I do not think it, said he.

But having an eye, said I, to that polity within himself, and taking care that nothing there be moved out of its place, through the greatness or smallness of his substance, governing in this manner as far as he is able, he will add to his substance, and spend out of it.

Entirely so, said he.

He will regard honours likewise in the same manner; some he will willingly partake of and taste, which he judges will render him a better man, but those which he imagines would dissolve that habit of soul which subsists within him, he will fly from, both in private and in public.

He shall not then, said he, be willing to act in polities, if he take care of this.

Yes, truly, said I, in his own city, and greatly too. But not probably in his country, unless some divine fortune befal him.

I understand, said he. You mean in the city we have now established, which exists in our reasoning, since it is no where on earth, at least, as I imagine.

But in heaven, probably, there is a model of it, said I, for any one who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himself accordingly; and it is no matter to him whether it does exist any where, or shall ever exist here. He does the duties of this one alone, and of no other.

It is reasonable, said he.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK

THE TENTH BOOK

I OBSERVE, said I, with reference to many other things, that we have established a city in a right manner, beyond what all others have done, and among these establishments I mean that respecting poesy as none of the least.

Which? said he.

That no part of it which is imitative be by any means admitted. For it appears, now most of all and with greatest perspicuity, that it is not to be admitted, after that the several principles of the soul have been distinguished apart from one another.

How do you mean?

To tell it as to you (for you will not accuse me to the composers of tragedy, and the rest of the imitative kind), all such things as these seem to be the ruin of the understanding of the hearers; such of them as have not a medicine to enable them to discern what kind they are of.

From what consideration, said he, do you say so?

It must be spoken, said I, although a certain friendship, at least, and reverence for Homer, which I have had from my childhood, restrains me from telling it; for he seems truly both to have been the first teacher and leader of all these good composers of tragedy: but the man must not be honoured preferably to the truth. But what I mean must be spoken.

By all means, said he.

Hear me then, or rather answer me.

Ask.

Can you tell me perfectly what at all imitation is? for I do not myself altogether understand what it means?

And shall I then anyhow understand it? said he.

That would be no way strange, said I, since those who are dim-sighted perceive many things sooner than those who see more clearly.

The case is so, said he; but whilst you are present, I

should not be able to adventure to tell, even though something did appear to me. But consider it yourself.

Do you incline then that we hence begin our inquiry in our usual method; for we were wont to suppose a certain species with respect to many individuals, to which we give the same name; or do you not understand me?

I understand.

Let us suppose now of the many, which you chuse; as for example, there are many beds and tables, if you incline.

Why are there not?

But the ideas, at least, respecting these pieces of furniture are two; one of bed, and one of table.

Yes.

And are we not wont to say that the workmen of each of these pieces of furniture, looking towards the idea, make in this manner, the one the beds, and the other the tables which we use? and all other things after the same manner. For no one of the artists maketh, at least, the idea itself; for how can he?

In no way.

But see now whether you call such a one as this an artist?

Which one.

One who doth all things, whatever each particular mechanic does.

You mention some dextrous and wonderful man.

Not yet, at least, but you will much more say so presently; for this same mechanic is not only able to make all sorts of utensils, but he maketh also every thing which springeth from the earth, and he makes all sorts of animals, himself, as well as others; and besides these things, he maketh the earth, and heaven, and the Gods, and all things in heaven and in the world below.

You mention, said he, quite a wonderful sophist.

You do not believe me? But tell me, do you imagine there is no such artist at all? or that, in one respect he is the maker of all these things, and in another he is not? Or do you not perceive that even you yourself might be able to make all these things, in a certain manner at least?

And what, said he, is this manner?

'Tis no difficult manner, said I, but is many ways and quickly performed; but in the quickest manner of all, if you chuse to take a mirror and carry it round everywhere,

you shall quickly make the sun, and the things in the heavens, quickly the earth, quickly yourself, and the other animals, and utensils, and vegetables, and all that was now mentioned.

Yes, said he, the appearances, but not however the real things at least.

You come well, said I, and seasonably, with your remark; for I imagine that the painter too is one of these artists. Is he not?

Why is not he?

But you will say, I imagine, that he doth not make genuine what he makes, although the painter too, in a certain manner, at least, maketh a bed, does he not?

Yes, said he, he too maketh only the appearance.

But what with reference to the bed-maker? Did you not indeed say just now that he doth not make the species which we say exists, which is bed, but a particular bed?

I said so indeed.

If then he doth not make that which is, he doth not make real being, but some such thing as being, but not being itself; but if any one would say, that the work of a bed-maker, or of any other handicraft, were real being, he would seem not to say true.

He would, said he, as it would appear at least to those who are conversant in such kind of reasonings.

Let us not then at all wonder if this likewise happen to be somewhat obscure with reference to the truth.

Let us not.

Do you incline then, said I, that with reference to these very things we inquire concerning the imitator who he really is.

If you incline, said he.

Are there not then these three sorts of beds? One which exists in nature, and which we may say, as I imagine, God made, or who else?

None, I imagine.

And one at least which the joiner makes.

Yes, said he.

And one which the painter makes. Is it not so?

Be it so.

Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, these three preside over three species of beds.

They are three indeed.

But God, whether it were that he did not incline it, or whether there was some necessity for it that he should not make but one bed in nature, made this one only, which is really bed; but two such, or more, have never been produced by God, nor ever will be produced.

How so? said he.

Because, said I, if he had made but two, one again there would have appeared, the species of which both these two would have partaken of, and that species would be that which is bed, and not those two.

Right, said he.

God then knowing these things, as I imagine, and willing to be the maker of bed, really, and really existing, but not of any particular bed, nor to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature.

It appears so.

Do you incline then that we call him the creator of this one, or something of this kind?

It is just in reason, said he, since he hath, in their nature, made both this and all other things.

But what as to the joiner? Is not he the workman of a bed?

Yes.

And is the painter too, the workman and maker of such a work?

By no means.

But what will you say he is with relation to bed?

This, said he, as I imagine, we may most reasonably call him: the imitator of what these are the workmen.

Be it so, said I. You call him then the imitator who maketh what is generated the third from nature?

Entirely so, said he.

And this the composer of tragedy shall be likewise, since he is an imitator, rising as a sort of third from the King and the truth, and in like manner all other imitators.

It seems so.

We have agreed then as to the imitator. But tell me this concerning the painter. Whether do you imagine he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artists?

The works of artists, said he.

Whether such as they really are, or such as they appear? Determine this further.

How do you say? reply'd he.

Thus: Does a bed differ anything from itself, whether he view it obliquely, or directly opposite, or in any particular position? or does it differ nothing, but only appears different? And in the same way as to other things?

Thus, said he, it appears, but differs nothing.

Consider this too: with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work? whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears? and whether is it the imitation of appearance or of truth?

Of appearance, said he.

The imitative art, then, is far from the truth; and on this account, it seems, he is able to make these things, because he is able to attain but to some small part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we say that a painter shall paint us a shoemaker, a joiner, and other artists, though he be skilled in none of those arts; yet he shall be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a good painter, when he paints a joiner, and shows him at a distance, so far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner.

Why not?

But this, I imagine, friend, we must consider with reference to all these things; that when any one tells us of such a painter, that he hath met with a man who is skilled in all manner of workmanship, and every thing else which every several artist understands, and that there is nothing which he does not understand more accurately than anyone else, we ought to reply to such a one that he is a simple man, and that it seems, having met with some impostor and mimic, he hath been deceived; so that he hath appeared to him to know every thing, from his own incapacity to distinguish between science, and ignorance, and imitation.

Most true, said he.

Ought we not then, said I, in the next place, to consider tragedy, and its leader, Homer, since we hear from some that these poets understand all arts, and all human affairs respecting virtue and vice, and likewise all divine things,

for a good poet must of necessity compose with knowledge, if he means to compose well what he composes, else he is not able to compose. It behoves us then to consider whether these who have met with those imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third distant from real being, and that their works are such as can easily be made by one who knows not the truth (for they are phantoms they make, and not real beings); or whether they do say somewhat, and that the good poets in reality have knowledge in these things which they seem to the multitude elegantly to express.

By all means, said he, this is to be inquired into.

Do you imagine then, that if any one were able to make both of these, that which is imitated and likewise the image, he would allow himself seriously to apply to the workmanship of the images, and propose this to himself as the best thing in life?

I do not.

But if he were in reality intelligent in these things which he imitates, he would far rather, I imagine, seriously apply himself to the things than to the imitations, and would endeavour to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himself, and would study rather to be himself the person commended than the commender.

I imagine so, said he; for neither is the honour nor the profit equal.

As to other things then, let us not call them to account, asking Homer or any other of the poets whether any of them were any way skilled in medicine, and not an imitator only of medical discourses; for which of the antient or latter poets is said to have recovered any to health, as Aesculapius did? or what students in medicine hath any left behind him, as he did his descendants? Nor let us ask them concerning the other arts, but let them alone: but with reference to those greatest and most noble things which Homer attempts to speak of, with reference to wars, and armies, and constitutions of cities, and the education belonging to men, it is just, somehow, to question him, whilst we demand of him: Friend Homer, if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, being the workman of an image (which we have defined an

imitator to be), but art the second, and art able to discern what pursuits render men better or worse, both in private and public, tell us which of the cities hath been by you better constituted, as Lacedaemon was by Lycurgus, and many other both great and small cities by many others? But what city acknowledges you to have been a good lawgiver, and to have been of advantage to them? Italy and Sicily acknowledge Charondas, and we Solon; but shall any one acknowledge you as any thing?

I fancy not, said Glauco. It is not then pretended even by the Homerics themselves.

But what war in Homer's days is recorded to have been well conducted by him as leader or counsellour?

Not one.

But what are his discoveries? as among the works of a wise man there are many discoveries and inventions spoken of respecting the arts and other affairs—as of Thales the Milesian, and of Anacharsis the Scythian?

By no means is there any such thing.

But if not in a public manner, is Homer said to have lived as a private tutor to any, who delighted in his conversation, and have delivered down to posterity a certain Homeric manner of life, in like manner as Pythagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and even to this day such as denominate themselves from the Pythagorean manner of life appear to be somehow eminent beyond others?

Neither is there, said he, anything of this kind related of Homer. For flesh-lover Creaphilus, Socrates, the companion of Homer, may probably appear more ridiculous still in his education than in his name, if what is said of Homer be true. For it is said that he was greatly neglected when he lived under Homer's tuition.

It is said indeed, reply'd I. But do you imagine, Glauco, that if Homer had been able to educate men and to render them better, as being capable not only to imitate with respect to these matters, but to understand them, would he not then have procured himself many companions, and have been honoured and beloved by them? But Protagoras the Abderite, and Prodicus the Chian, and many others are able to persuade the men of their times, conversing with them privately, that they shall neither be

able to govern their family, nor yet their city, unless they themselves shall preside over their education; and for this wisdom of theirs they are so exceedingly beloved, that their companions almost carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left him or Hesiod to go about singing their songs, if he had been able to profit men in the way of virtue, and not rather have retained him with gold, and obliged him to stay with them? or, if they could not persuade him, they would as scholars have followed him everywhere, 'till they had got sufficient education?

You seem to me, said he, Socrates, to say perfectly right.

Shall we not then establish this point: That all the poetical men, beginning with Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compose, but that they do not attain to the truth? but as we just now said, a painter who himself knows nothing about the making of shoes, shall draw a shoemaker, who shall appear to be real to such as are not intelligent, but who view according to the colour and figures?

Entirely so.

In the same manner, I imagine, we shall say that the poet colours over with his names and words certain colours of the several arts, whilst he understands nothing himself, but merely imitates, so as to others such as himself who view things in his compositions, he appears to have knowledge; and if he say anything about shoe-making in measure, number, and harmony, he seems to say quite well, and in like manner if of an expedition, or of any thing else, so great an enchantment have these things naturally —since you know, I imagine, in what manner poetical things appear when stript of musical colouring, and expressed apart by themselves, for you have somewhere beheld it.

I have, said he.

Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of people who are in their prime, but who are not beautiful, such as they appear when their bloom forsakes them?

Entirely, said he.

Come now, and consider this. The maker of the image, whom we call imitator, knoweth nothing of real being, but only of the apparent. Is it not so?

Yes.

Let us not then leave it expressed by halves, but let us sufficiently perceive it.

Say on, reply'd he.

A painter, we say, shall paint reins and a bit.

Yes.

And the leather-cutter and the smith shall make them.

Certainly.

Does then the painter understand what kind of reins and bit there ought to be, or not even he who makes them, the smith nor the leather-cutter, but he who understands to use them, the horseman alone?

Most true.

Shall we not say it is so in every thing else?

How?

That with reference to each particular thing, there are these three arts—that which is to use it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitiate it?

Yes.

Is then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utensil, and animal, and action for nothing else but for the use for which each particular was made or generated?

Just so.

Of all necessity then, he who useth each particular must be the most skilful, and be able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with reference to the use in which he useth it. Thus, for example, a player on the pipe tells the pipe-maker concerning pipes, what things are of service towards the playing on the pipe, and he shall give orders how he ought to make them, but the work-man does not so.

What else?

Does not the one then being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad pipes, and the other, believing him, make accordingly.

Yes.

With reference then to one and the same instrument, the maker shall have right opinion concerning its excellence or naughtiness, whilst he is conversant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who useth it shall have science.

Entirely so.

But whether shall the imitator have intelligence from using the things he paints, whether they be handsome and right, or otherwise; or shall he have right opinion from his being necessarily conversant with the intelligent, and from being enjoined in what manner he ought to paint?

Neither of the two.

The imitator then shall have neither knowledge nor right opinion about what he imitates, with reference to excellence or naughtiness.

It appears not.

The imitator then should be very agreeable in his imitation, with regard to wisdom concerning what he paints.

Not entirely.

But, however, he will imitate at least, without knowing concerning each particular in what respect it is ill or good; but it is likely, such as appears to be beautiful to the multitude and those who know nothing, that he shall imitate.

What else?

We have now indeed sufficiently, as it appears at least, settled these things: that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning in those things which he imitates, but that imitation is a sort of amusement, and not a serious affair; and likewise, that those who apply to tragic poetry in iambics and heroics are all imitators in the highest degree.

Entirely so.

But certainly, said I, this of imitation, is it not somehow in the third degree from the truth? Is it not?

Yes.

To what part then of man bears it a reference, having the power it hath?

What part do you speak of?

Of such as this. The same magnitude, perceived by sight, does not appear in the same manner near at hand and at a distance.

It doth not.

And the same things appear crooked and streight, when we look at them in water and out of water, and concave

and convex, through the mistake of the sight as to colours; all this disturbance is manifest in the soul. And this infirmity of our nature painting lays hold of and leaves nothing of imposture undone, in the same way as magic doth, and many other arts of this kind.

True.

And have not the arts of measuring, numbering and weighing appeared to be most ingenious helps in these things, that so the apparent greater or less, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but the numbered, the measured, and the weighed?

What else?

But this again is at least the work of the rational part in the soul.

It is so indeed.

But whilst reason often measures and declares some things to be greater or less than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the same time with reference to these things.

Yes.

But did not we say that it was impossible for the same person to have contrary opinions about the same things at the same time?

And thus far at least we said rightly.

That part of the soul, then, which judgeth contrary to the measure, would seem not to be the same with that which judgeth according to the measure.

It would not.

But surely at least that which trusteth to measure and computation would seem to be the best part of the soul.

Why not?

That then which opposeth itself to it would seem to be some of the naughty parts of us.

Of necessity.

It was then this I inclined should be agreed upon, when I said that painting, and imitation in general, being far from the truth, delight in their own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and are its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose.

Entirely so, said he.

Imitation then, being naughty in itself, and joining with that which is naughty, generates naughty things.

It seems so.

Whether, said I, is the case thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the sight only, or is it likewise so with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry?

Likely as to this also, said he.

We shall not therefore, said I, trust to the appearance in painting, but we shall proceed to the consideration of that part of the intellect with which the imitation by poetry is conversant, and see whether it is naughty or valuable.

It must be done.

Let us proceed then thus. Poetic imitation, we say, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily, and imagining that in their acting they have done either well or ill, and in all these cases, receiving either pain or pleasure. Does it any more than this?

No more.

In all these, now, does the man agree with himself, or, as he disagreed with reference to sight, and had contrary opinions in himself of the same things at one and the same time, does he in the same manner disagree likewise in his actions, and fight with himself? But I recollect that there is no occasion for us to settle this at least; for in our reasonings above we sufficiently settled all these things, that our soul is full of a thousand such contrarieties existing in it.

Right, said he.

Right, truly, said I, but it appears to me necessary to go over now what was then omitted.

As what, said he?

We said somewhere formerly, said I, that a good man when he meets with such a fortune as the loss of a son, or of anything else, which he values the most, will bear it of all men the easiest.

Certainly.

But let us now consider this further, whether will he grieve none at all, or is this indeed impossible, but he will, however, moderate his grief?

The truth, said he, is rather this last.

But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you imagine that he will struggle more with grief and oppose it, when he is observed by his equals, or when he is in solitude, alone by himself?

Much more, said he, when he is observed.

But when alone he will venture, I imagine, to utter many things which, if any one heard him, he would be ashamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wish any one saw him doing.

It is so, said he.

Is it not then reason and law which command him to restrain his grief, but what drags him to grief is the passion itself?

True.

As then there is in the man an opposite conduct with regard to the same thing, at one and the same time, we must necessarily say that he has two conductors.

What else?

And shall we not say that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him?

How?

Law in a manner says that it is best in misfortunes to have the greatest tranquillity possible, and not to bear them ill; since the good and evil of such things as these is not manifest, and since no advantage followeth the bearing these things ill, and as nothing of human affairs is worthy of great concern, and besides their grief proves a hinderance to that in them which we ought to have most at hand.

What is it, said he, you speak of?

To deliberate, said I, on the event, and as on a throw of the dice, to regulate his affairs according to what casts up, in whatever way reason shall declare to be best. And not as children when they fall, to lye still and waste the time in crying, but always to accustom the soul to apply in the speediest manner to heal and rectify what was fallen and sick, dismissing lamentation.

One would thus, said he, behave in the best manner in every condition.

And did not we say that the best part is willing to follow this which is rational?

It is plain.

And shall not we say that the part which leadeth to the remembrance of the affliction, and to wailings, and is insatiably given to these, is irrational and idle, and a friend to cowardice?

We shall say so truly.

Is not then the grieving part that which admits of much and of various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is always uniform with itself, is neither easily imitated, nor when imitated, easily understood, especially by a popular assembly, where all sorts of men are assembled together in a theatre? For it is the imitation of a disposition which is foreign to them.

Entirely so.

It is plain then that the imitative poet is not made at least for such a part of the soul as this. Nor is his skill fitted to please it, if he mean to gain the applause of the multitude; but he applies to the passionate and the multiform part, as it is easily imitated.

It is plain.

May we not then, with justice, lay hold of the imitative poet and place him as correspondent to the painter; for he resembles him, both in that, as to truth, he does but naughty things, and in this too he resembles him, in being conversant with a different part of the soul from that which is best. And thus we may with justice not admit him into our city, which is to be well regulated, because he excites and nourishes this part of the soul, and strengthening it, destroys the rational; as, when one in a city makes the wicked powerful, he betrays the city and destroys the best men, in the same manner we shall say that the imitative poet establisheth a bad republic in the soul of each individual, gratifying the foolish part of it, which neither discerns what is great nor what is little, but deems the same things sometimes great and sometimes small, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth.

Entirely so.

But we have not, however, as yet at least, brought the greatest accusation against it, for that is, somehow, a very dreadful one: that it is able to corrupt even the good, if it be not a very few excepted.

Why will it not, since it acts in this manner?

But hear now, and consider; for somehow, the best of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers imitating some of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth

long speeches in their sorrow, bewailing and beating their breasts, you know we are delighted, and yielding ourselves, we follow along and sympathizing with them, we seriously commend him as an able poet, whoever most affecteth us in this manner.

I know it.

Why do you not? But when any domestic grief befals any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourselves on the opposite behaviour, if we can be quiet and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the other case we commended.

I perceive it, said he.

Is this commendation then, said I, a handsome one, when we see such a man as one would not deign to be one's self, but would be ashamed of, not to abominate but to delight in him, and commend him?

No, truly, said he; it appears unreasonable.

Certainly, said I, if you consider it at least in this manner.

How?

If you consider that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly restrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of such a kind as is desirous of these, is the very part which is by the poets filled and gratified; but that part in us which is naturally the best, being not sufficiently instructed, neither by reason nor habit, grows remiss in its guardianship over the bewailing part, by attending to the sufferings of others, and deems it no way disgraceful to itself to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilst he professes to be a good man. But this it thinks it gains, even pleasure, which it would not chuse to be deprived of, by despising the whole of the poem. For I imagine it falls to the share of few to be able to consider that what we feel with respect to the fortunes of others must necessarily be felt with respect to our own, since it is not easy for one to bear up under his own misfortunes, who strongly cherisheth the bewailing disposition over those of others.

Most true, said he.

And is not the reasoning the same with reference to the ridiculous? For when you hear, in imitation by comedy,

or in private conversation, what you would be ashamed to do yourself to excite laughter, and are delighted with it, and imitate it, you do the same thing here as in the tragic: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly restrained by reason from a fear of incurring the character of scurrility, you now letting loose, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own behaviour a buffoon.

Extremely so, said he.

And the case is the same as to venereal pleasures, and anger, and the whole of the passions, as well the sorrowful as the joyful; which, truly, we have said, attend us in every action that the poetical imitation of these has the same effect upon us; for it nourishes and waters those things which ought to be parched, and constitutes as our governour those which ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, instead of being worse and more miserable.

I can say no otherwise, said he.

When therefore, Glauco, said I, you meet with the commenders of Homer, who tell how this poet instructed Greece, and that he deserves to be taken as a master to teach one both the management, and the knowledge of human affairs, and that one should regulate the whole of his life according to this poet, we should indeed love and embrace such people, as being the best they are able, and agree with them that Homer is most poetical, and the first of tragedy writers; but they must know that the hymns of the Gods, and the praises of worthy action are alone to be admitted into the city. But if it should admit the pleasurable muse likewise, in songs or verses, you should have pleasure and pain reigning in the city, instead of law and of that reason which alway appeareth best to the community.

Most true, said he.

Let these things now, said I, be our apology, when we recollect what we have said with reference to poetry, that it was with reason we then dismissed it from our republic, since it is such as is now described: for reason obliged us. And let us tell it further, lest it accuse us of a certain roughness, and rusticity, that there is an old

variance between philosophy and poetry. For such as these,

"That bawling bitch, which at her mistress barks,"

and

"He's great in empty eloquence of fools,"

and

"On trifles still they plod, because they're poor,"

and a thousand such like, are marks of an antient opposition between them. But nevertheless let it be said, that if any one show reason for it, that the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleasure ought to be in a well-regulated city, we for our part shall gladly admit them, as we are at least conscious to ourselves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth were an unholy thing. For are not you yourself, friend, charmed by this imitation, and most especially when you see it performed by Homer?

Very much so.

Is it not just, then, that we introduce it, apologizing for itself, either in song or in any other measure?

By all means.

And we may at least grant, somehow, even to its defenders, such as are not poets but lovers of poetry, to speak in its behalf, without verse, and show that it is not only pleasant, but profitable for republics, and for human life; and we shall hear with pleasure, for we shall gain somewhat if it shall appear not only pleasant but also profitable.

Why shall we not gain? said he.

And if it happen otherwise, friend, we shall do as those who have been in love, when they deem their love unprofitable: though it is a violence on them, they however desist; so we in like manner, through this inborn love of such poetry that prevails in our best republics, shall be well pleased to see it appear to be the best and truest, and we shall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we shall take along with us this discourse we have held, as a counter-charm and incantation, being afraid to fall back again into a childish and vulgar love. We may perceive then that we are not to be much in earnest about

such poetry as this, as if it were a serious affair, and approached to the truth, but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himself, and to hold those opinions of poetry which we mentioned.

I entirely agree, said he.

For great, friend Glauco, said I, great is the contest, and not such as is imagined, to become a good or a bad man, so as to be moved neither through honour, nor riches, nor any magistracy, nor poetic imitation, ever to neglect justice and the other virtues.

I agree with you, from what we have discussed, and so I imagine will any other.

But we have not yet, said I, gone through the greatest prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her.

You speak of some prodigious greatness, said he, if there be other greater than those mentioned.

But what is there, said I, can be great in a little time? for this whole period from infancy to old age is but little in respect of the whole.

Nothing at all, indeed, said he.

What then? Do you imagine an immortal being ought to be much concerned about such a period, and not about the whole of duration?

I imagine, said he, about the whole. But why do you mention this?

Have you not perceived, said I, that our soul is immortal, and never at all perisheth?

On which, he, looking at me and wondering, said: Not I, indeed. But are you able to show this?

I should otherwise do a wrong, said I. And I imagine you yourself can show it, for it is, in no respect, difficult.

To me, at least, said he, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult.

You shall hear then, said I.

Only speak, reply'd he.

Is there not something, said I, you call good, and something you call evil?

I own it.

Do you then conceive of them in the same manner as I do?

How?

That which destroys and corrupts everything is the evil, and what preserves and profits it is the good.

I do, said he.

But what? Do you not say there is something is good, and something is bad, to each particular? As blindness to the eyes, and disease to every animal body, blasting to corn, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron, and as I am saying, almost every thing hath its peculiar evil and disease?

I imagine so, reply'd he.

And when any thing of this kind befalleth anything, does it not render that which it befalleth naughty, and in the end dissolveth and destroyeth it?

Why doth it not?

Its own peculiar evil then, and naughtiness, destroys each particular, or if this does not destroy it, nothing else at least can ever destroy it. For that which is good at least, can never at all destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil.

How can they? said he.

If then, we shall be able to find among beings any one which hath indeed some evil, which rendereth it naughty, but is not, however, able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not then know that a being thus constituted cannot be destroyed at all?

So. reply'd he, it appears.

What then? said I. Is there not something which renders the soul evil?

Certainly, reply'd he, all these things which we have now mentioned, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does then any of these dissolve and destroy it? And attend now, that we may not be imposed on in imagining that an unjust and foolish man, when he is catched doing injustice, is then destroyed through his injustice, which is the naughtiness of his soul. But consider it thus: As disease, which is the naughtiness of animal body, dissolveth and destroyeth body, and reduceth it to be no longer that body, and all those things we mentioned, being destroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and possessing them, are reduced to a non-existence. Is it not so?

Yes.

Consider now the soul in the same manner. Doth injustice or other vice possessing it, by possessing it, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, 'till bringing it to death, it separate it from the body?

By no means, doth it this, said he.

But it were absurd, said I, that any thing should be destroyed, by the naughtiness of another, but not by its own.

Absurd.

For consider, Glauco, said I, that neither by the naughtiness of victuals, whether it be their mouldiness, or rottenness, or whatever else, do we imagine our body can be destroyed, but if this naughtiness in them create in the body a naughtiness of the body, we will say that through their means the body is destroyed by its own evil, which is disease. But we will never allow that by the naughtiness of food which is one thing, the body which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time destroyed.

You say most right, reply'd he.

According to the same reasoning then, said I, unless the naughtiness of the body create a naughtiness of the soul, let us never allow that the soul can be destroyed by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another.

There is reason for it, said he.

Let us then either refute these things as not good reasoning, or so long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time say that the soul shall be ever in any degree the more destroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other disease, or by slaughter, not even though one should cut the whole body into the smallest parts possible, 'till one show that through these sufferings of the body, the soul herself becomes more unjust and impure. But we will never allow it to be said that when a foreign evil befalleth anything, whilst its own proper evil is not within it, that either the soul or any thing else is destroyed.

But this at least, said he, no one shall ever show, that the souls of those who die are by death rendered more unjust.

But if any one, reply'd I, shall dare to contend with us in reasoning, and, in order that he may not be obliged to own the souls are immortal, will say that when one dies he

becomes more wicked and unjust, we shall somehow justly demand of him to show, if he says true in telling us this, that injustice is deadly to the possessor, as a disease, and that those who embrace it are destroyed by it as by a disease destructive in its own nature—of those most speedily who embrace it most, and those more slowly who embrace it less, and not as at present, where the unjust die having this punishment inflicted on them by others.

Truly, said he, injustice does not appear altogether dreadful, if it shall be deadly to him who practiseth it (for that were a deliverance from evil); but I rather imagine it will appear to be altogether the reverse, it destroying others as far as it can, but rendering the unjust extremely alive, and along with his being alive rendering him wakeful likewise; so far, it seems, does it dwell from being deadly.

You say well, reply'd I, for when one's own wickedness and peculiar evil is insufficient to kill and destroy the soul, hardly can that evil at least, which aims at the destruction of another, destroy a soul or any thing else, but what it is aimed against.

Hardly indeed, said he, as appears to me at least.

When therefore it is destroyed by no one evil, neither peculiar nor foreign, is it not plain that of necessity it always exists, and if it always exists, it is immortal?

Of necessity, reply'd he.

Let this then, said I, be fixed in this manner. And if it be, you'll perceive that the same souls shall always remain, for their number shall never become less, none being destroyed, nor shall it become greater; for if anyhow the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal.

You say true.

But let us not, said I, imagine this (for reason will not allow of it), nor yet that the soul in its truest nature is of such a kind as to be full of much variety, diversity and difference, considered in itself.

How do you say? reply'd he.

That can hardly, said I, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which hath not the finest composition,

as hath now appeared to us to be the case with reference to the soul?

It is not likely, at least.

That the soul then is something immortal, both our present reasonings and others too, may oblige us to own; but in order to know what kind of being the soul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it, as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body and by other evils, as we now behold it, but such as it is when become pure, such it must by reasoning be fully contemplated, and he (who doth this) shall find it far more beautiful at least, and shall more plainly see through justice and injustice, and every thing we have now gone over. We are now telling the truth concerning it, such as it appears at present. We have seen it, indeed, in the same condition in which they see the marine Glaucus, where they cannot easily perceive his antient nature, because the antient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away, and he altogether damaged by the waves; and besides, other things are grown to him, such as shell fish, sea weed, and stones, so that he every way resembleth a beast, rather as what he naturally was. In such a condition do we behold the soul under a thousand evils. But we ought, Glauco, to behold it there.

Where? said he.

In its philosophy, and to observe to what it applies, and what intimacies it affects, as being ally'd to that which is divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it would become if it pursued wholly what is of this kind, and were by this pursuit, brought out of that ocean in which it now is, and had the stones and shell fish shaken off from it, which at present, as it is fed on earth, render its nature in great measure earthy, stony, and savage, through those enjoyments which are said to render happy. And then should one behold its true nature, whether multiform or uniform, and everything concerning it. But we have, now, as I imagine, sufficiently gone over its passions and appearances in human life.

Entirely so, reply'd he.

Have we not now, said I, discussed everything else in our reasonings, but have not produced those rewards and

honours of justice (as you say Hesiod and Homer do), but we find justice itself to be the best reward to the soul; and that it ought to do what is just, whether it have, or have not Gyges' ring, and along with such a ring, the helmet likewise of Pluto.

You say most true, said he.

Will it not now then, Glauco, said I, be attended with no envy, if besides these, we add those rewards to justice and the other virtues, what and how great there are afforded to the soul both by men and Gods, both whilst the man is alive, and after he is dead?

By all means, said he.

Will you then restore me what you borrowed in the reasoning?

What, chiefly?

I granted you that the just man should be deemed unjust, and the unjust be deemed to be just. For you were of opinion, that though it were not possible that these things should be concealed from Gods and men, it should however be granted for the sake of the argument, that justice in itself might be compared with injustice in itself; or do you not remember it?

I should indeed be unjust, said he, if I did not.

Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, in behalf of justice, that as you allow it to be indeed esteemed both by Gods and men, you likewise allow it to have the same good reputation, that it may also receive these prizes of victory which it acquires from the reputation of justice, and bestows them on those who possess it, since it hath already appeared to bestow those good things which arise from really being just, and that it doth not deceive those who truly embrace it.

You demand what is just, said he.

Will you not then, said I, in the first place restore me this? That it is not concealed from the Gods what sort of man each of the two is.

We will grant it, said he.

And if they be not concealed, one of them shall be beloved of the Gods, and one of them hated, as we agreed in the beginning.

We did so.

And shall we not agree that, as to the man who is beloved

of the Gods, whatever comes to him from the Gods shall all be the best possible, unless he have some necessary ill from former miscarriage.

Entirely so.

We are then, to think in this manner of the just man, that if he happen to be in poverty, or in diseases, or in any other of those imaginary evils, these things to him issue in something good, either whilst alive, or dead. For never at all is he neglected by the Gods at least, whoever he is who inclines earnestly to endeavour to become just, and practises virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God.

It is reasonable, reply'd he, that such an one should not be neglected by him he resembles.

And are we not to think the reverse of these things, concerning the unjust man?

Entirely.

Such then would seem to be the prizes which the just man receiveth from the Gods.

Such they are indeed in my opinion, said he.

But what, said I, do they receive from men? Is not the case thus? (if we are to suppose the truth). Do not cunning and unjust men do the same thing as racers who run well at the beginning, but not so at the end? for at the first they briskly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But such as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes and are crowned. Does it not happen thus for the most part as to just men? that at the end of every action and intercourse of life they are both held in esteem, and receive rewards from men.

Entirely so.

You will then suffer me to say of these what you yourself said of the unjust. For I will aver now, that the just when they are grown up, shall arrive at power if they desire magistracies, they shall marry where they incline, and shall settle their children in marriage where they incline, and everything else you mentioned concerning the others, I now say concerning these. And on the other hand, I will say of the unjust, that the most of them, though they may be concealed whilst they are young, yet being catched at the end of the race, are ridiculous, and when they be-

come old, are wretched and ridiculed, and shall be scourged both by foreigners and citizens, and they shall afterwards be tortured and burnt, which you said were terrible things, and you spoke the truth. Imagine you hear from me that they suffer all these things. But see if you will admit of what I say.

Entirely, said he, for you say what is just.

Such as these now, said I, are the prizes, the rewards and gifts, which a just man receives in his life time, both from Gods and men, besides those good things which justice contains in itself.

And they are extremely beautiful, said he, and likewise permanent.

But these now, said I, are nothing in number or magnitude, when compared with those which await each of the two at death. And these things must likewise be heard, that each of them may compleatly have what is their due in the reasoning.

You may say on, reply'd he, not as to a hearer who hath heard much, but who hears with greater pleasure.

But, however, I will not, said I, tell you the apologue of Alcinus, but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the son of Armenius, by descent a Pamphilian, who happening on a time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already all corrupted, he was taken up sound, and being carried home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when laid on the funeral pile, he revived, and being revived, he told what he saw in the other state, and said: That after his soul went out, it went with many others, and that they came to a certain region of spirits, where there were two gulphs in the earth, near to one another, and other two openings in the heavens, opposite to them, and that the judges sate between these. And when they gave judgment, they commanded the just to go to the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, fixing before them the accounts of the judgment pronounced; but the unjust they commanded to the left, and downwards, and these likewise had behind them the accounts of all they had done. But on his coming before the judges, they said it behoved him to be a messenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to

hear, and to contemplate every thing in the place. And that he saw here, through two openings, one of the heaven and one of the earth, the souls going away, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he saw, rising through the one out of the earth, souls full of squalidness and dust; and through the other he saw other souls descending pure from heaven; and that always on their arrival, they seemed to come off a long journey, and that they gladly went to rest themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly, and saluted one another, such as were of acquaintance, and that these who rose out of the earth, asked the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven asked them concerning the things below, and that they told one another: those wailing and weeping whilst they called to mind what and how many things they suffered and saw in their journey under earth (for it was a journey of a thousand years), and that these again from heaven explained their enjoyments and spectacles of inexpressible beauty. To narrate many of them, Glauco, would take much time; but this, he said, was the sum, whatever pieces of injustice any had committed, and how many soever any one had injured, they were punished for all these separately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of an hundred years, the life of man being considered as so long, that they might suffer tenfold punishment of the injustice they had done. So that if any one had put any to death, either by betraying cities, or armies, or bringing men into slavery, or being confederates in any other wickedness, for each of all these they reaped tenfold sufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been just and holy, they reaped what was worthy, according to these actions. Of those who died very young, and lived but a little time, he told what is not worth relating in respect of other things. But of impiety and piety towards the Gods, and parents, and of suicide, he told the more remarkable retributions. For he said he was present when one was asked by another where the great Aridaeus was? This Aridaeus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time, and had killed his aged father and his elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds, as it was reported. And he said the one who was

asked, reply'd: He neither comes, said he, nor ever will come hither. For we then surely saw this likewise among other dreadful spectacles, when we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to come up after having suffered all our sufferings, we beheld both him on a sudden, and others likewise, the most of whom were tyrants, and some private persons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they imagined they were to get up, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of those who were so polluted with wickedness, or who had not been sufficiently punished, made an attempt to ascend. And then, said he, fierce men, and all of fire to look at, standing by and understanding the bellowing, took them and led them apart, Aridaeus and the rest, binding their hands and their feet, and thrusting down their head, and pulling off their skin, dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns, declaring always to those who passed by, on what accounts they suffered these things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus. And hence, he said, that amidst all their various terrors, this terror surpassed, lest the mouth should bellow, and that when it was silent, every one most gladly ascended. And that the punishments and torments were such as these, and their rewards were the reverse of these. And that every one, after they had been seven days in the meadow, arising thence, it behoved them to depart on the eight day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, from whence they perceived from above, through the whole heaven and earth, a light stretched as a pillar, mostly resembling the rainbow, but more bright, and pure. At which they arrived in one day's journey, and thence they perceived through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended: for that this light was the belt of heaven, like the transverse beams of ships in like manner keeping the whole circumference united. And that from the extremities hung the distaff of necessity, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whose spindle, and point, were both of adamant, but its whirl mixed of this and of other things, and that the nature of the whirl was of such a kind, as to its figure, as is any one we see here. And you must conceive it, from what he said, to be of such

a kind as this. As if in some great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was such another, but lesser within it, fitted to it, like casks fitted one within another, and in the same manner a third, and a fourth, and other four, for that the whirls were eight in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming round the spindle one united convexity of one whirl; and that the spindle was driven through the middle of the eight; and that the first and outmost whirl had the widest circumference in the lip, that the sixth had the second wide, and that of the fourth is the third wide, and the fourth wide that of the eight, and the fifth wide that of the seventh, the sixth wide that of the fifth, and the seventh wide that of the third, and the eighth wide that of the second. And that that of the largest is variegated, that of the seventh is the brightest, and that of the eighth hath its colour from the shining of the seventh, that of the second and fifth like to one another, more yellow than those others. But the third hath the whitest colour, the fourth reddish; the second in whiteness surpassing the sixth, and that the distaff must turn round in a circle with the whole it carries, and whilst the whole is turning round, the seven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole. And that of these, the eight moves the swiftest, and next to it, and equal to one another, the seventh, the sixth and the fifth; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them compleated its circle in the same way as the fourth. The fourth in swiftness was the third, and the fifth was the second, and it was turned round on the knees of necessity. And that on each of its circles there was seated a Syren on the upper side carried round, and uttering her voice in one monotone, but that the whole of them being eight, composed one harmony. That there were other three sitting round at equal distance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of necessity, the Fates, in white vestments, and having crowns on their heads; Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Syrens, Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future. And that Clotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the spindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle; and Atropos, in like

manner, turned the inner ones with her left hand; and that Lachesis touched both of these severally with either hand. After they arrive here, it behoves them to go directly to Lachesis. That then a certain prophet first of all ranges them in order, and then taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lachesis, and ascending a lofty tribunal, he says: The speech of virgin Lachesis, the daughter of necessity; souls of a day! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race. The daemon shall not receive you as his lot, but you shall chuse the daemon: he who draws the first, let him first make choice of a life, to which he must of necessity adhere: virtue is independent which every one shall partake of, more or less, according as he honours, or dishonours her: the cause is in himself, who makes the choice, and God is blameless. And that when he had said these things, he threw on all of them the lots, and that each took up the one which fell beside him, and that he was allowed to take no other than it. And that when he had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn. That after this he placed on the ground before them, the models of lives many more than those we see at present. And that they were of every kind. For there were lives of all sorts of animals, and human lives of every kind. And that among these, there were tyrannies also, some of them perpetual, and others destroyed in the midst of their greatness, and ending in poverty, banishment, and want. That there were also lives of renowned men, some for their appearance as to beauty, strength, and agility; and others renowned for their descent and the virtues of their ancestors. There were the lives of renowned women in the same manner. But that there was no disposition of soul among these models, because, of necessity, on chusing a different life it becometh different itself. As to other things, riches and poverty, sickness and health, they were mixed with one another, and some were in a middle station between these. There, then, as appears, friend Glauco, is the whole danger of man. And, on these accounts, this, of all things, is most to be studied, in what manner every one of us, omitting other studies, shall become an enquirer and learner in this study, if by any means he be able to learn and find out who shall make him expert and intelligent to

discern a good life and a bad; and to chuse everywhere, and at all times, the best of what is possible, considering all the things now mentioned, both compounded and separated from one another, what they are with respect to the virtue of life. And to understand what good or evil beauty operates when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of soul; and what is operated by noble and ignoble descent, by privacy, and by public station, by strength and weakness, docility and indocility, and everything else of the kind which naturally pertains to the soul, and likewise of what is acquired when blended one with another; so as to be able from all these things to compute, and having an eye to the nature of the soul, to comprehend both the worse and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worse which shall lead the soul to become more unjust, and that to be the better life which shall lead it to become more just, and to dismiss every other consideration. For we have seen that in life and in death this is the best choice. But it is necessary that one have this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he goes into the other world, in order that there also he may be unmoved with riches, or any such evils, and may not, stumbling into tyrannies, and other such practices, do many and incurable mischiefs, and himself suffer still greater; but may understand to chuse always the middle life, as to these things, and to shun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is possible, and in tne whole of hereafter. For thus man becomes most happy. For that then the messenger from the other world further told how that the prophet spoke thus: Even, to him who comes last, chusing with judgment, living consistently, there is prepared a desirable life, no way bad. Let neither him who is first be heedless in his choice, nor let him who is last, despair. He said that when the prophet had spoken these things, the first who drew a lot run instantly and chose the greatest tyranny, but through folly and insatiableness had not sufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant that in this life there was this destiny, the devouring of his own children, and other evils, and that afterwards, when he had considered it at leisure, he wailed and lamented his choice, not having observed the admonitions of the prophet above men-

tioned. For that he did not accuse himself, as the author of his misfortunes, but fortune and the daemons, and every thing instead of himself; and that he was one of those who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by custom without philosophy, and that in general among these, there were not a few found who came from heaven, as being unexercised in trials. But that the most of those who came from earth, as they had endured hardships themselves, and had seen others in hardships, did not precipitantly make their choice; and hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to most souls there was an exchange of good and evil things. Since if one should always, whenever he comes into this life, soundly philosophize, and the lot of election should not fall on him the very last, it would seem from what hath been told us from thence, that he shall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again shall not be earthy and rugged, but smooth and heavenly. This spectacle, he said, was worthy to behold, in what manner the several souls made choice of their life; for it was both pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold, as each for the most part chose according to the habit of their former life. For he told that he saw the soul which was formerly the soul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a swan, through hatred of womankind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he suffered from them. He saw, likewise, the soul of Thamyris, making choice of the life of a nightingale, and he saw likewise a swan turning to the choice of human life, and other musical animals, in like manner, as is likely. And that he saw one soul, in making its choice, chusing the life of a lyon, and that it was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, shunning to become a man, remembering the judgment given with reference to the armour. That next he saw the soul of Agamemnon, and that this one, in hatred also of the human kind, on account of his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life of an eagle. And that he saw the soul of Atalante chusing her lot amidst the rest, and having attentively observed the great honours paid an athletic man, was unable to pass by, but took it. That after it he saw the soul of Epaeus the Panopean going into the nature of a skilful workwoman.

And that far off, among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites assuming the ape. And that by chance, he saw the soul of Ulysses, who had drawn its lot last of all, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time seeking the life of a private man of no business, and with difficulty found it lying somewhere, neglected by the rest. And that when it saw it, it said that he would have made the same choice if he had gotten the first lot, and gladly made choice of it. And that in like manner the souls of wild beasts went into men, and men again into beasts. The unjust changing into wild beasts, and the just into tame, and that they were blended by all sorts of mixtures. That after all the souls had chosen their lives according as they drew their lots, they went all in order to Lachesis, and that she gave to every one the daemon he chose, and sent him along to be the guardian of his life, and the accomplisher of what he had chosen. He first of all conducts it to Clotho, to ratify under her hand and by the whirl of the vortex of her spindle, the destiny he had chosen by lot; and after being with her, he leads him back again to the spinning of Atropos, who maketh the destinies irreversible, and that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Necessity. And after he had passed by it, as all others passed, they marched all into the plain of Lethe amidst dreadful heat and scorching, for he said that it is void of trees and everything that the earth produceth. That when night came on they encamped beside the river Amelete, whose water no vessel contains; a certain measure then of the water all of them must of necessity drink, and such of them as are not preserved by prudence, drink more than the measure, and that he who drinks, always forgets every thing. And that after they were laid asleep, and it became midnight, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a sudden carried upwards, some one way, and some another, approaching to generation, like stars. But that he himself was forbidden to drink of the water. Where however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he knew nothing, but suddenly looking up in the morning he saw himself already laid on the funeral pile. And this fable,

Glauco, hath been preserved, and is not lost, and it may preserve us, if we observe it, and shall happily pass over the river Lethe, and shall not contaminate the soul.

But if the company will be persuaded by me, accounting the soul immortal, and able to bear all evil and all good, we shall always hold the road which leads above. And justice with prudence we shall by all means pursue in order that we may be friends both to ourselves and to the Gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we receive its rewards, like victors assembled together; and, we shall both here, and in that thousand years' journey we have described, enjoy a happy life.

THE END OF THE TENTH BOOK

THE TEMPLE PRESS LETCHWORTH ENGLAND


EVERYMAN.
I WILL GO WITH
THEE.
& BE THY GVIDE
IN THY MOST NEED
TO GO BY THY SIDE