

humanity ; and if you will further regard the clock hands as the percipient intelligence—the intellectual and the physical consciousness—then the figure becomes not inapt. The human personality is a striking clock ; and neither does the striking move the hands, nor the mere motion of the hands cause the striking ; but both alike are the results of the obscure mechanism within—the hands moving and pointing noiselessly, and the bell doing its part in salient sound. And in the well-ordered clock you cannot have the one without the other. If the machine strikes at random, or always before the hour, you say it has gone wrong : your clock that does nothing but strike is the analogue of the madman ; while your clock which does not strike for the higher sympathies, but marks only egoisms and appetites, is in another way an undesirable instrument.

But, to pass from the metaphor, the important truth for us all is this, that not only are ideas and emotions not antagonistic aspects of consciousness, but they are positively inconceivable apart. There is positively no perception whatever, whether physical or intellectual, whether abstract or concrete, that does not involve an emotion, in its due degree, as surely as an object placed in light casts its shadow. You might smile if I named some of the conditions of mind which, on this principle, are to be conceived of as involving emotion, like every other, on their own small scale ; but it is not perfectly clear that every sen-

sation of physical pleasure and physical pain, to begin with, has an aspect correlative with those higher spiritual exaltations which we best remember; that the gratification of curiosity, the memory of a bereavement, the solution of a mathematical problem, the perception of skill in a work of art, or beauty or ugliness in an object, the appreciation of truth in a thought or nobleness in an action—is it not clear that all these are cases in which a simple state of consciousness, of thought or of simple sense, swells into the suffused sensation which we name emotion, and cannot even be recognised save as the emotion supervenes?

And if this be found invariably true of the higher forms of ideation—if this passage from perceiving to feeling be there a simple matter of course, then it follows that just such a passage from perceiving to feeling takes place in every process of sane consciousness whatever, from the most trivial intellectual operation to the highest and profoundest. You have it in the trifling case of your hardly perceptible satisfaction when you get your change right after making purchases in a shop, and you have it in its fitting degree in the swelling of the heart of Franklin when he found he had drawn lightning from the cloud, of Archimedes when he had solved his problem, of Thackeray when he felt he had accomplished a stroke of genius in his novel;* and you have not merely

* When some one praised the passage in 'Vanity Fair' in which Rebecca admires her husband as he strikes down

noble emotional poetry but the strictest scientific truth in the lyrical cry of Keats over his first reading of Chapman's Homer :

“ Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken ;
Or like stout Cortez, when with eagle eyes
He stared on the Pacific, and all his men
Looked at each other, with a wild surmise,
Silent, upon a peak of Darien.”

Be sure there is no process of reasoning which fails of its throb of emotion in the exact degree of its depth and clearness ; no altitudes of the intellect where the fires of feeling do not glow ; and if it should ever seem to you that that white light of truth which men say shines on the loftier heights is a cold radiance, bethink you whether you might not there at times find healing from the scorchings of the fires of passion and of suffering which you chance upon below, or rest and soothing from the changing heats and chills of the region of social warfare and aspiration. However that may be for each one of us, there the great law remains, that the thrill of the astronomer over the new truth he has wrested from the vast book of the heavens is but a higher phase of the play of cerebral intelligence than the wonder of the earliest man over the strangely-shaped stone in which he divines a deity ; and that when, in contemplating the infinite mystery of things, we are shaken “ with

the Marquis, Thackeray admitted that on writing the description he threw down his pen, exclaiming it was a stroke of genius.

thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls", we are still paralleling the simplest instance in which the awakening of an idea or perception in our consciousness flows into something which, while we cannot dissociate it from the thought, we call an emotion.

And now it may be asked, what is the practical lesson to be drawn from this law of human nature. It is, I think, not obscure, and not unimportant. What we have seen is that while the emotions of the lower man are few, violent and preponderating, being little modified by reflection, those of the higher man are many, are more subtle, are really more extensive than the savage's—seeing that the latter has very many hours of mere lethargy — and are above all balanced and guided by the cultivated reason. The difference between a good clerk and a bad clerk, said a shrewd man of business once to me, is simply that the good clerk does everything twice; and this thinking twice is, broadly speaking, the secret of improvement in conduct. Or, to put it otherwise, what we want is not the divorce of emotion from action, that being indeed a contradiction in terms, but the securing that the force of emotion shall accrue to the best ideas and desires rather than to the worst, so that the balance of action shall be beneficent. And this is the practical truth contained in the teaching of Buckle, that as the multiplication of higher ideas and desires means widened knowledge, it is

the widening knowledge of mankind that determines their course—moral progress being impossible without intellectual ; or, as we may say, to go back to our homely figure, the clock cannot go on striking the hours when the hands are not moving.

Remember, all the effective emotion of the past related itself to ideas, and what you want is that new ideas shall be substituted for these, thus bringing about a new direction of that motor force which we call emotion. It was strictly an exaggeration to say that our savage, or even our dog, represented emotion pure and simple : there too the emotion, be it of love or hatred or desire, flows from a definite perception in sense or in memory. The nearest approach to a contagion of pure emotion is that of a dancing mania such as we read of in history and occasionally in the newspapers ; or an epidemic of hysteria ; and such phenomena are really forms of disease. Normal emotion belongs to an idea. Affect the perception, the idea, alter or modify or supersede that, and the emotion will take care of itself as surely as your shadow. The emotion of patriotism which hurled the people of Greece triumphantly against the invading hosts of Persia was a stress of feeling round a few vivid memories and forecasts ; and that emotion has affected all subsequent European civilisation mainly for the better. The excitement of medieval Christendom for the Crusades was just another

outburst of feeling upon one or two simple intellectual conceptions ; and these conceptions happening to be false and foolish, and the emotion for them happening to be so violent and so unhappily fostered, the net result was a mere tempest of destruction and misery, leaving no discernible balance of good, and involving lasting harm in the barbarising of European modes of thought, and the direct arrest of nobler tendencies.

Our formula, it may be said, does not go far, but at least it is of universal validity. And it clears the way for others. Applying it to the rise of Christianity, we say that the Christian movement began in the acceptance of a definite idea—the idea of an incarnation of deity ; and that if, in some countries, the new religion became more emotional than those before it, it was exactly in so far as the dazzling idea of a sacrifice by divinity on behalf of humanity—new to them though familiar to other races—generated a new outbreak of emotion. But this emotion, mark, could soon co-exist or alternate with the emotions of hate, whether religious or secular ; hate to the enemies of the new deity, or to heretic companions, coming in as soon as the first trance of the new idea was over. And we say that if that idea was intellectually unsound, it cannot conceivably be permanent ; that the emotion for it cannot save it from the advance of truer ideas ; and that to abandon it for the truer ideas is not at all to make an end of religious emotion as such but to give it

a new and better bias. Nay, so absolute is the union of emotion and intelligence that we tend to go astray even in speaking thus ; for the very desire to substitute the true for the false is in itself an emotion ; so that it is by an impulse of feeling as fundamental as our appetites that we turn from the incredible doctrine to the credible ; and the passion of the sceptic for truth is as essentially an emotion as the yearning of the believer for spiritual rest.

All this seems rather a truism than a truth when we think it over ; and yet how far are we from putting the truth in practice ! See what it involves. It implies that an emotion in itself is no criterion of its own rightness or value ; that the French Revolution might be in large measure a beneficent outbreak of emotion over true ideas, and a pernicious play of further emotion over delusions. It reminds us that the struggle for and against slavery really represented a conflict of emotions, and that the one was as genuine as the other. From all which it follows that we can never be too studious of the beliefs to which our emotions attach, whether by processes of comparison or of analysis, these being the only means open to us of checking our tendencies and of seeing whether we are making for good or for evil in the world. If we did but hold this idea firmly, how many of our antagonisms would slacken ; how many of our prepossessions would grow temperate ; how many of our fanaticisms would lose

their heat! Instead of there being a presumption against every bold new idea, there would be a certain leaning to a presumption in favor of it.

To-day, for instance, there is a very natural resentment among certain classes at proposals for what is known as a graduated income tax, and for imposing certain obligations on land-owners. I am not now inquiring whether these proposals are reasonable or not. But I do say that when we go back in imagination to the beginnings of the French Revolution; when we remember how the French noblesse actually paid no taxes at all, leaving the whole State burdens to fall on the artificers, and on the wretched tillers of the soil, and how they yet strenuously and warmly resisted the proposals to tax them*—when we recall these things, we are at least driven to question whether the case of the contemporary English upper class is fundamentally different from that of the old French upper class. What is certain is that the emotion of resentment in the one case was as genuine and as spontaneous as in the other.

And so with our enthusiasms. Remembering that the mere warmth of our feeling for our belief is not in itself a test of our rightness, should we not sometimes temper our estimate of those who differ from us? It is only too clear that even a humane emotion gives no security for its own pro-

* For making the proposal Turgot was dismissed from office. See Carlyle's 'History', B. ii, c. iv; and the Essay on Turgot in Mr. Morley's *Critical Miscellanies*.

per application ; and that a warm affection for animals, for instance, may entirely fail to make an anti-vivisector just and candid to those who oppose him. But there is a further and less obvious corollary. It has probably surprised many thoughtful people recently to find such a writer as Mr. Arnold suddenly taking up the cry of the war-party in regard to the episode of the battle of Majuba Hill in the Transvaal War, and deriding the Ministry† which had had the unusual courage—a courage, unfortunately, not exhibited since—to cut short an admittedly unjustifiable war when it was found to be unjustifiable, even though our arms had sustained a reverse in the earlier part of it. Mr. Arnold sneered at this policy. I do not say that Mr. Arnold's writings never before exhibited such a spirit ; but certainly many of us were surprised to see it in him ; and it seemed to need explanation. Now, what strikes one on reflection is that similar championship of what had otherwise appeared a barbarous policy has come at different times from such writers as Carlyle, Kingsley, and Mr. Ruskin—as, for instance, in the case of Governor Eyre's doings in Jamaica ; and that one thing these writers had in common even with Mr. Arnold was a strong tendency to stand up for certain ways of thinking, apparently not so much because they were true as because they were old. From which one is strongly led to

† See his article in the *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1885.

infer that a constant bias to the ideas of the past—ideas, that is, which the modern mind is discarding or has discarded—tends to involve a reproduction of the emotions of the past, and these precisely the most undesirable ones.

For the emotions react on each other, and prepare the way for each other, till, whether for good or bad, they go far to determine the acceptance of ideas. It has been the happy distinction of advanced religious thought in this country that it has usually been identified with the love of freedom and the love of peace ; and it is surely significant that an emotion of a more or less contrary tendency should be found associated with more or less reactionary tenets. For, indeed, this respect for the mere assertion of force is one of the most inveterate of the emotional aberrations of our race. It distorts many men's whole conception of the past, enabling them to see only a halo of glory round their country's history at a time when it was full of misery and largely governed by mean ideals ; and the whole cause of the transfiguration is the record of certain naval and military victories. It makes it possible for an admirable poet to sing of a " hope for the world in the coming wars ", and to create a contemporary cultus of sentimental bloodshed which has been fitly summed up in the injunction, " Go to the Crimea and thou shalt be saved ". It produces a popular attitude of oscillation between callous disregard for the status of our soldiers in time of peace

and barbaric jubilation over them when they have had some slaughter to perform. From all which harmful things it is the work of all good men to deliver us.

It will not be an easy task, or one soon performed. The poet who sang that the meanest flower could give him thoughts lying too deep for tears, was he who sang that Carnage was God's daughter; and even the young George Eliot, sensitively attuned to high and humane feelings, is for a time capable of the same strange creed; so subtle and so sinister are the kinships of those emotions which we are so often tempted to hail as something higher and nobler than patient thought. The final truth is that the general level of emotion follows the general movement of thought—this being the real explanation of the anti-slavery struggle, in which it was not one idea or one emotion that did the work, but the broad development of culture made a new form of emotion possible, which in turn fostered a new doctrine. The new generation differs subtly from the old in its whole mental texture, and thus can respond to appeals to which that was deaf.

We conclude, then, that the upward path for men lies by the way of knowledge and reason—a path from which emotion is in nowise shut out, but in which it is ever more finely touched to finer issues. The path will have its thorns. It may present to us great minds curiously lacking in some forms of sympathy—a Hawthorne strangely

unconcerned about slavery ; a Gibbon terrified into mere fury by a revolution which rights ancient wrongs ; a great evolutionist who may strenuously seek to promote the blind struggle for existence ; but in so far as such a thinker gives us truth he can work only our weal, and if he ever teach mistakenly he will be baffled by forces of beneficence which he himself has stirred. It is such a thinker who has admirably warned us against " the profoundest of all infidelity, the fear lest the truth be bad."* Free from that fear, we may dream of a future in which emotion shall have become so constantly bent to the betterment of things that men's lives will be a harmonious union, as of " perfect music unto noble words ". We to-day, alas, cannot even fully dream such a scene and such a life ; but in this indefinable hope, as in all good thoughts, our reason and our emotions blend.

* Spencer's *Essays*, vol. i, 'Progress, Its Laws and Cause,' p. 59.

THE ETHICS OF VIVISECTION.

(1885.)

AN interesting and even a helpful study in moral science would be a tracing out by the student of the history of his own notions as to right and wrong, from the earliest point to which his memory can go back, down to the moment of the investigation. Few people, perhaps, could give any very detailed account of the transformations their ethical beliefs have undergone since they began to think on moral questions. For the changes have in most cases been extremely numerous—how numerous only the habitually introspective can claim to say.

A tolerably early stage of moral development with most of us is that in which the child, apart from its own instincts of approbation and resentment, has no feeling save one of curiosity in regard to matters of moral judgment. At this stage the child is only attaining a knowledge of what other people regard as right and wrong; the promptings of desire are followed with no hesitations save those given rise to by outside precept; blame for selfish conduct is at first received with more or less open astonishment; and the tendency is to ask absolutely frank and extremely embarrassing questions of elders as to why a given act is wrong. It being the practice of the

elders to reply with decisive *à priori* solutions, the youthful mind has no resource but to assimilate as well as may be the *à priori* code presented to it ; and of this code the child's conduct becomes a more or less dubious application. Perplexities are likely to occur in the minds of the more inquisitive in regard to many forbidden acts in which they can see no harm ; and there is a distinct balance of probability that any child will on every opportunity commit acts obscurely " felt " to be wrong, because forbidden ; but with only a slight and soon forgotten sense of discomfort in the breach of law. Many grown-up people, now above the average in respect of scrupulosity, will confess to having lied and stolen in their well-trained childhood with only a moderate degree of perturbation as against the pleasure of escaping blame or securing a coveted object. The individual becomes a moral organism, so to speak, only by degrees ; his most rapid transition, after that from moral nescience to pupillage, being in all probability that which takes place sometime in his teens, when he makes some approach to intelligent thinking on religion. The youth whose good fortune it is to proceed slowly from doubt to doubt, till he attains complete rationalism, is likely to have a specially complex experience in respect of his moral creed. At first, when he is rejecting or has rejected the dogma of an inspired or heaven-sent code, he sees no serious difficulty in adjusting his moral judgments. Right and wrong are no harder

problems for him than they were before; and his acquired view as to given lines of secular conduct remains to him, though he may be secretly conscious of having contravened his code rather freely. He is now clear enough as to there being nothing wrong in staying away from church or amusing himself on Sunday: his reasonings have involved that: and other matters remain for him very much as they were. But this is only because of his comprehensive inexperience; and his mental history soon begins to be a record of steps towards a systematic moral philosophy. When he intelligently and vitally grasps the great principle of utility he has undergone the third decisive readjustment of his intellectual relations to life; and, filled with the light of the master idea, he is convinced, perhaps, that morals is henceforth for him all plain sailing. Then comes, however, the further experience of manhood, which gradually forces on him the conviction that there is no royal road to right conduct; that utility is a constantly fluctuating attribute in actions; and that the simple formula, logically all-embracing as it is, for that very reason fails to pack men's acts into hard-and-fast divisions of permanently good and bad.

This kind of individual experience does but imitate in miniature the history of the race, of which the progress has been from pre-moral simplicity to the stage of universal questioning; and it is difficult to understand how even minds which cleave to

the religious creeds of the past can fail, in the cases in which any reasonable penetration can be claimed for them, to recognise both in themselves and in humanity at large the evolutionary character of conscience. We may indeed be sure that they have undergone a substantially similar experience, and we may set down their assertion of an entirely intuitional theory of morals to the capacity for inconsistency which inheres in every Theist as such. That they can have constantly gone on from strength to strength of unwavering moral conviction is not to be believed. Yet two of the stock arguments against utilitarian morality are that it leaves room for dubiety, the implication being that the believer in inspiration is never in doubt as to his line of action ; and that it can lend itself to wrong conduct, as if religious belief never did. To describe such arguments is to destroy them ; and it almost savors of brutality to track the orthodox to the last rallying ground on which, driven to distraction by the scientific blockade on all hands, they feebly resume the internecine strife of their earlier prime. The spectacle becomes a trifle pitiful. Says one Christian Professor, laying down ' *First Principles of Moral Science* ': "A person follows his conscience when he does what he sincerely thinks to be his duty, though he may have mistaken his duty, and acted on a wrong judgment". Whereto another Christian Professor replies : " I greatly prefer to say, that the man sincerely thinks he is following his conscience,

when in reality he is not doing so, rather than lay to the charge of conscience the mass of our erroneous judgments".* That is to say, A.'s conscience, which has a distinct existence, gives him the admonition "don't", which A. in all good faith takes to be "do"; but B., who is similarly liable to mishear *his* conscience, can be quite sure that A.'s said the opposite of what A. thought, and *vice versa*. Such is moral science as endowed in our universities; reverend gentlemen setting forth in lectures and hand-books what they "prefer to say", good souls!

I have thus preliminarily alluded to these general matters in order, not to enlarge on them, but, on the contrary, to treat them briefly, and so keep within limits the following examination of the ethics of vivisection, it being the tendency of a thoroughgoing discussion of any question in ethics to bring under survey the whole range of the science—if science it be. The lines of the argument on either side can easily be carried back, on the foregoing basis, by the reader who thinks it worth while to do so. But the candid enquirer may perhaps find that he has had enough of transcendental morals for the present, when we have briefly examined its teachings on vivisection.

It is no part of our business here to inquire whether or not vivisection in the past has furthered medical science. All we have to do on that head

* 'Handbook of Moral Philosophy,' by the Rev. Professor Calderwood, of Edinburgh. Appendix A.

is to note that while the opponents of the practice dispute, not without ability, every claim made for it by its defenders, it is still resorted to under discouragement and inconvenience by some men who have no shadow of satisfaction in giving pain, and who sincerely count on obtaining useful results to add to those they believe to have been got by the same means. The motive for our inquiry is that the anti-vivisectionists, while thus disputing, as they are logically free to do, the practical efficacy of vivisection, strongly contend that it is morally indefensible even if serviceable. It is for the intuitionists here to note that the question of the moral rightness is just as strenuously disputed as that of the scientific fact.

The steps in the controversy are few and simple. The anti-vivisectionist, whom we shall call A, alleges that man has "no right" to give animals pain with a view of escaping it himself. The vivisectionist, whom we shall call V., alleging that the right does exist, puts it on all fours with the right to use animals for food or to make them work. A. replies that, granted the right to kill for food and to put to service, the right to give pain does not follow. And here sets in the deadlock. V. either points to the predacity of animals as indicating the deity's purpose to let one set of them profit by the sufferings of others; or argues that it is for man to decide how far he shall carry his virtually unchallenged right to affect the lot of the creatures inferior to him. On the theistic side A.

replies that to plead the example of the brutes is to degrade our moral standards ; and as against the non-theistic way of putting it he (or she—it is often she) reiterates the denial of the “ right ”.

What then is a “ right ” ; and how is it made out in the case before us? We have seen that A. does not deny the right of man to put animals to service ; and as a rule he concedes the right to kill for food, though some of the party are understood to deny that. Now, either of these cases will suffice to show that the “ right ” of man over animals is simply the assertion of his power. It is occasionally argued, indeed, that where man feeds and cares for an animal his right to its services is one of *quid pro quo* ; but it is only necessary to turn to the case of human slavery to find that “ right ” in this connection has no recognition in contemporary morals. No ethical authority now alleges that any one has the “ right ” to keep another in slavery on the score that he gives him food and shelter. What is really implied in the conception of “ right ”, as regards the relations between men, is simply the sympathetic putting of ourselves in the place of an abstract “ other ”, and vesting in that other our own instincts of self-preservation and self-assertion. We revolt at the idea of being sold and coerced ; and we revolt on behalf of others who so suffer. That is the basis of all our conceptions of “ rights ” as between man and man.

A contrary view, indeed, is widely held. “There

can, I think, be no doubt," says Stuart Mill, "that the *idée mère*, the primitive element in the formation of the notion of justice, was conformity to law."^{*} But that theory leaves us without any explanation of the origin of law. Are we to say that law was an inexplicable "variation" in social evolution—that laws were formed at random, in obedience to no instincts or convictions; and that whatever they enacted became the standard of conduct? What about the rejection and abolition of laws that were held bad? Mill admits that we stamp as unjust some actions which no law condemns; and he offers the explanation that "even here, the idea of the breach of what ought to be law, still lingers in a modified shape"; which is simply a surrender of the previous contention. The idea of "what ought to be law" is the notion of justice; and the truth is seen to be exactly the reverse of Mill's proposition: that is to say, the "notion of justice" is the *idée mère* of law, not law of justice.

It would be interesting, but difficult, to ascertain how far the vogue of Mill's doctrine is to be credited to the traditions of English jurisprudence. From the legal point of view, indeed, the affiliation of justice to law has a certain practical reasonableness, which is no doubt present to the minds of the publicists who declare that "there is no such thing as 'natural right'". What they

* 'Utilitarianism,' 7th ed., p. 70.

perceive is that the conceptions of "natural right" among different people are often conflicting ; and that law must be the decisive standard of appeal in society. But it is a perversion of this idea to teach, as Mr. Arnold does, that on self-examination we shall find we have no rights, only duties. That formula is suicidal, appealing as it does to a feeling which is capable of analysis just as far as, and no further than, the sentiment of "right". The consciousness of duty, obviously, exists only in correlation with the consciousness of right : our "duty" is simply the impulse to let others have their rights, which we cognise by sympathy.†

We attribute "natural rights", then, to those whom we conceive as having the same kind of affections and instincts as ourselves ; and wherever such rights are openly or tacitly denied it will be found that the denier virtually lacks this conception of similarity. The tyrannous Englishman among inferior races ; the Western American ill-using Chinese ; the Boer oppressing Zulus—all regard the races they oppress as feeling very differently from themselves. Here, as in every other direction, it is substantially knowledge that

† Mr. Spencer, who has lately revived the "dormant controversy" on this subject, points out that "a whole school of legists on the Continent maintains a belief diametrically opposed to that maintained by the English school. The idea of *Naturrecht* is the root-idea of German jurisprudence. Now, whatever may be the opinion held respecting German philosophy at large, it cannot be characterised as shallow." 'The Man *versus* the State,' p. 87.

ameliorates conduct, though the knowledge may come by way of a variation towards sensitiveness. But how, then, on this view, does it stand with the claim of "rights" for the lower animals? If we recognised rights inhering in them as in the inferior races, it is clear that we should not even feel ourselves entitled to keep them in forced service, much less to kill them; whereas in point of fact we do not even trouble ourselves to make sure that we have the "right" to tame and work horses. The one check we [that is, men of normal temperament] recognise in the matter is in regard to over-working or ill-using them: there we have scruples; but that only amounts to saying that at a certain point we so far conceive similarity between us and the horse as to shrink from causing him serious injury. We do not credit him with our own moral revolt against subjection: we credit him only with feeling pain.

On the other hand, we do not seriously scruple to put a horse to any stress of exertion, even to the point of killing him, when it is a question of our escaping, say, from hostile savages; because here we do not credit him with sense of martyrdom—only, as before, with feeling pain. The "right" to kill for food, again, can hardly be said to be seriously disputed; for even the extreme vegetarian would kill animals rather than let them overrun our fields; and it comes to be a question between breeding for slaughter on the one hand and extermination or partial prevention of breed-

ing on the other. Once killed, an animal may, ethically speaking, as well be eaten as not. All round, then, we make our own needs and interests our guides in dealing with animals, recognising no indefeasible right on their side because we do not hold that they feel as a breach of any "natural right" what would be a breach of that felt by a man. We forcibly tame and burden, we castrate (*i.e.* vivisect), we kill by forced over-exertion, we kill for food: on what grounds, then, shall we deny ourselves the "right" to give animals pain with the object of furthering our medical knowledge to our own advantage?

I am not aware of any argument on the anti-vivisectionists' side which can be pretended to meet that question; and their case therefore seems to me to break down, so far as the appeal to our sense of "right" goes. But as the old saying runs, we shall never fully refute an error until we have shown how it arose; and the origin of the anti-vivisectionist fallacy above analysed is a very interesting matter for further enquiry. That wrathful controversialist Miss Frances Power Cobbe, in her pamphlet on 'The Moral Aspects of Vivisection', thus expresses herself:

"But it is impossible to regard this subject as if it were a mere abstract ethical problem. The vivisection of dull reptiles, and wild rats and rabbits, wherewith the elder generation of students contented themselves, is not alone in question, nor even that of heavy beasts in our pas-

tures ; but by some strange and sinister fatality, the chosen victims at present are the most intelligent and friendly of our domestic favorites—the cats who purr in love and confidence as they sit beside us on the hearth, the dogs whose faithful hearts glow with an affection for us, truer and fonder than we may easily find in any human breast. To disregard all the beautiful and noble moral qualities which such animals exhibit, and coldly contemplate them as if their quivering frames were mere machines of bone and tissue which it might be interesting and profitable to explore with forceps and scalpel, is to display heinous indifference to Love and Fidelity themselves, and surely to renounce the claim to be the object of such sentiments to brute or man ” (pp. 18-19).

All this is transparent enough to those ruthless natures which are capable of exploring the quivering frame of the passage with the forceps and scalpel of dispassionate analysis. Miss Cobbe is an extreme anti-vivisectionist in that she does what we have said the majority do not do—carry her sympathy with animals to the extent of attributing to them, or some of them, a moral and emotional nature closely resembling our own. She lets it appear very plainly that she is moved by purely personal sentiment as distinguished from an impartial sense of justice. Her dog and cat are a great deal to her, and it is the idea of their suffering that excites her. The exigencies of pro-

paganda force her to be so far consistent as to protest against all vivisection, and to deprecate "sport"; but it is tolerably plain that if it were only "dull reptiles" and "wild rats and rabbits", and "the heavy beasts of our pastures" that were vivisected, she would not be greatly concerned. That is, she is not defending a "right" inherent in sentient things as such—though she refers to "Bishop Butler's grand axiom that every sentient creature has an indefeasible claim to be spared pain merely because it is sentient": she is doing special pleading for some of them for which she has a special liking. Her contention virtually is that cats and dogs have a better right to be spared than rats and rabbits, because they have the greater capacity for attachment to us—which is simply putting an "abstract ethical problem" where she disclaimed such a thing. Now we have seen that we admit the "rights" of men because we assume them to feel morally and physically as we should do in their place; but Miss Cobbe's argument, to be relevant from that point of view, would have to allege that we have cause to believe that dogs and cats under vivisection will feel both morally and physically as we do. We are entitled to believe, on the contrary, that their sensitiveness to pain is less, and that they have no moral feelings analogous to what a man's would be under the circumstances.

To some readers that may sound unfeeling; and I am the more ready to come to the next part

of the investigation, which consists in asking whether there are then no moral grounds for checking vivisection. We punish certain forms of cruelty to animals: is it not reasonable to do so? There need be no hesitation in answering in the affirmative; but there is need to ascertain carefully how we have come to act as we do in the matter. The most salient fact in the case is that when we see an animal wantonly ill-used we ourselves suffer a distinct nervous shock, in part closely resembling the shock we experience when we see a horse fall or a dog run over, partly further consisting of a revolt against the torturer. Now this passionate repulsion is an almost inevitable and a not unhealthy sentiment; but it is bad penology at once to punish a man and to vilipend him; and we shall be on safer ground when we say that the offender is an example of incomplete or arrested development in respect of his sympathies, and that our object should simply be to restrain his wrong action by working on his motives. If we can adequately influence him by blame or persuasion, so much the better; for judicial action is a clumsy instrument, and the exemplary effect of public punishment is largely mythical.

To make blame efficacious, however, is not easy; and in either case what we are doing is to take action on the promptings of our jarred sympathies, reinforced by the conviction that indulgence in wanton cruelty to animals tends to pro-

duce a degraded and anti-social type of man, and that letting it go without some kind of public reprobation fosters callousness, and consequently cruelty, in all directions. Here we deliberately interfere with the liberty of our fellows ; and that by way of asserting, not the rights of animals, but our own ; for we do not claim for the hurt beast our own right to freedom : we simply assert our determination to protect our own sensibilities in a case where we are quite convinced that the wounding of them implies an anti-social tendency in the aggressor.

The discerning reader perceives, no doubt, that this is the form of argument used to support the blasphemy and Sabbatarian laws, and religious persecution generally. But the knowledge that in these cases the conviction acted on has been mistaken, is a reason only for very narrowly testing our conviction in the present case. We must take this on its merits, as we do the question of laws against personal indecency. I grant some force in the contention that the true way to prevent cruelty to animals is to teach consideration to the young ; but I incline to think the prevention of cruelty by law is about as safe, and stands on the same moral footing, as the prohibition of indecency. As it has been put by one distinguished physician, " we owe it to ourselves " to prevent wanton cruelty ; and when Miss Cobbe exclaims that such an utterance betrays ignorance of the very alphabet of morality, she only

demonstrates her own omission to learn that alphabet.

We come now to the practical issue : Shall vivisection for purposes of medical research be suppressed on the score that the practice is demoralising, whether useful or not ; or shall we withdraw the restrictions at present laid on it? Those of us who have no fixed prejudice against legislation as such can see that there is a good deal to be said for the present arrangement of licenses, which puts some check on mere experiments in torture and leaves a possibility of conscientious research. For if some of the claims made for vivisectionists be true, the practice may lead to most important discoveries at the expense of no great infliction of suffering ; and in view of our relations to animals in general, it becomes a mere caprice to say that we have no " right " under any circumstances to profit by their pain. The question comes to be one of the spirit in which the vivisection is done, and the estimated tendency of the act in the given case. But when the opponents of vivisection are found protesting against licences on the ground that to give them is to legalise cruelty, one sees some cause to resist even the imposition of a check. For how does the case stand? At this moment a hundred forms of cruelty, in the shape of " sport " and the poisoning of vermin, are not even menaced by law ; and Miss Cobbe admits that " sportsmen " are to be found among those who demand the suppression of vivisection. What

we do is to put a rigorous check on the one form of systematic tampering with animal life—apart from butchering—which can be said to be pursued from respectable or disinterested motives ; and instead of impartially proposing to extend this check to the less defensible forms the anti-vivisectionists simply clamor against the modification of the check as being a sanction.

There could not be a more nefarious tactic, and it is impossible to escape the conclusion that here as in other conjunctures the effect of a predominantly emotional bias is to foster a disregard for one species of moral obligation in those who loudly proclaim another. A benevolent passion is in itself no safer a guide than passion of any other kind. At the best the emotionalist has to rely on stress of language rather than ratiocinative persuasion ; and at the worst the desired effect is compassed by fearless fabrication. Professor Huxley is said to have complained of the “ profligate lying of virtuous women ” in this connection ; and I can testify to having seen and heard some of the lying, from both sexes. I have heard one lady allege in a semi-public meeting that the Professor had declared animals to be automata who did not feel ; and on challenge she could give no reference save a general one which made it practically certain that she was simply misrepresenting his Belfast address, in which he maintained the thesis that men and animals alike are automata, thus leaving the question of their

comparative capacity for pain just as it stood before ; and in which, besides, he expressly said, benevolently rather than logically, that he was strengthened in his rejection of the extreme Cartesian view by the recognition that it might encourage cruel treatment of animals. Between such indulgences in reckless slander and the blunders into which they fall through extreme ignorance, some defenders of the "rights" of animals make a rather sorry moral exhibition. Miss Cobbe has been so egregiously absurd as to call a "reflex action" a "spasm of agony", not knowing that the *sine qua non* of the thing is the absence of sensation in the subject ; and the Scottish Anti-Vivisectionist Society a year or two ago made a vehement attack on a Professor for the cruelty of certain experiments in which he had pointed out that there was no pain at all. Anyone with the merest smattering of physiological knowledge would have known as much from the reports ; but the superfluously sympathetic zoophiles conceived a decapitated frog and an amputated frog's leg as writhing in agony under the hands of the demonstrator.

We see, then, that an excessive sympathy with animals is not at all necessarily an elevating influence, but may, like every other unregulated emotion, lead to some sorts of harmful conduct. What does the extreme attachment to animals, seen in so many anti-vivisectionists, really signify? Obviously, a faculty for taking an extremely

idealised (*i.e.*, false) view of an animal's nature ; for misconceiving, consequently, the relations of things in general ; and for keeping the reasoning faculties in disastrous subjection to the passions. People admit in theory that any personal quality may become a vice merely by running to excess ; but they singularly fail to apply the principle in detail. The zoophile flatters himself that his love of animals is a shining virtue, when in point of fact it is an extravagance which in a measure warps his moral nature, and makes him intellectually unscrupulous towards men in proportion as he is tender towards beasts. Take, further, the conception of the nature of cats and dogs exhibited in the above extract from Miss Cobbe's pamphlet. There is no word there of the other side of the animal nature ; and no recognition of the fact that the fidelity of cats and dogs is practically an unmoralised affection, being simply given to those near them without any save interested discrimination. That is the typical attitude of the adorers of pets, among whom women take the palm, the feminine nature being the more affectional and consequently the more disposed to regard affection as the essential matter in any personality—a tendency of very doubtful advantage. The pet-lover is not disturbed by his cat's cruelties to mice or his dog's ferocity towards other animals : these manifestations of character are serenely set down to irresponsible "instinct" ; while the show of affection, which is equally a

matter of instinct, is called a "noble moral quality". In short, the zoophile's zoophily is mainly egotistic; "my dog's devotion to me" being taken as the summing-up of the dog's relation to life; though sympathy so far operates as to attribute like excellence to other people's dogs. On the lines of Miss Cobbe's contention a dog which is not devoted and a cat which is not affectionate would be almost legitimate subjects for vivisection: which leaves the theory of animals' "rights" in a rather chaotic condition.

Let the phenomenon of zoophily be simply taken scientific note of like any other, and let its good and bad sides be impartially recognised. The good side is the cultivation of emotion and sympathy, which is a condition of all moral and intellectual progress; the bad side is precisely the undue exaltation of these at the cost of reason. And let it not be supposed that the harm of this ends with the slandering of opponents. I have only glanced hitherto at the relation of anti-vivisectionists to "sport", knowing that they suppose themselves to have amply disposed of the arguments on that head; but it is highly important to point out that it is their tendency to assert a most pernicious moral canon in this very connection. Miss Cobbe, while professing to disapprove of sport, thus defends the sportsman:

"The parallel between Vivisection and Field Sports is about as just and accurate as if a tyrant, accused of racking his prisoners in his secret dun-

geons, were to turn round and open a discussion on the Lawfulness of War. That creatures who chase and are chased all their days in fields and waters should have an arch enemy and pursuer in man may be differently estimated as ill or well. But it is almost ludicrous to compare a fox-hunt (for example), with its free chances of escape and its almost instantaneous termination in the annihilation of the poor fox when captured, with the slow, long-drawn agonies of an affectionate trustful dog, fastened down limb by limb, and mangled on its torture trough."

Here we have a sample of the vicious reasoning to which anti-vivisectionism may run, and at the same time an exhibition of positive defect of imagination arising out of the moral bias. Note the fatuity of the phrase about "free chances of escape", and the assumption that the fox suffers nothing save in the moment of death. But worst of all is the clear implication that to find enjoyment in the terror of a hunted animal is venial beside the simple act of inflicting pain for an ulterior scientific purpose. Miss Cobbe, after admitting that field sports do not "seem to harmonise with the highest type of cultivated and human feeling" goes on to say that "the men who follow them *may at least plead the excuses of custom and of partial ignorance*". This, when the very contention in dispute is that the reasoned and deliberate scientific action is right while the following of custom and primitive instinct is bar-

barous! Conceive of a hedonist sportsman pleading that he is cruel by force of custom and out of ignorance, and that he ought consequently to escape blame, while the vivisector who hopes to cure human ills deserves odium!

And that is not all. Another facile moralist, Dr. Anna Kingsford, asks, in reply to an alleged argument:

“Where is the analogy between the vivisector’s laboratory, with its gagged, bound, and trembling victims, carved to death in cold blood, and the field of battle, where every man in each contending army fights for home and country under the inspiration of enthusiasm, ambition, or the desire for renown?”*

We need not go into the question of the “analogy”; but it is worth while to note how here again we have the very bases of scientific morality overturned in the teaching that the lust of blood is unobjectionable when it pervades two excited armies, but that the readiness to hurt an animal in cold blood for a scientific purpose is hateful. It is another illustration of the tendencies of the emotional temperament. The same person who shrieks at the deliberate vivisection of a rabbit gets into a glow of enthusiasm over the dreary old claptrap about soldiers “fighting for home and country”, and the concept of “ambition” and “the desire for renown”. The sol-

* ‘Unscientific Science: a Lecture.’ Part II.

dier drunk with carnage, and transformed into a furious savage, mad to slay, is a poetic object in her eyes ; the man who causes carefully measured pain with an eye to benefiting his race is an accursed thing. And this lady, with her *penchant* for insane war, is voluble on the subject of the connection of vivisection with Materialism and Atheism, she being a believer in what she calls "the occult Book", and a fervent Theist. As a matter of fact her colleague Miss Cobbe cooperates with Atheist anti-vivisectionists in France, while she vilifies Atheists in the mass at home ; and everybody knows that there are Freethinking anti-vivisectionists and Christian vivisectionists in this country. The difference is, I presume, that the Freethinking opponent of vivisection is satisfied that it does more harm than good, and acts on his conviction as the rest of us would. But the final question for us at present is this: Ought we to help to maintain the close checks on vivisection while those who oppose the practice not only clamor for its entire suppression, but openly make light of barbarous practices as to the immorality and perniciousness of which there can be no dispute among fair moralists? There is the dilemma. An out-and-out anti-vivisectionist sees no serious harm in letting the housemaid kill the rats by slow poison ; but hotly denounces the doctor for vivisectioning a rabbit under anæsthetics. We who try to make our morality reasonable ask which practice is the less de-

moralising and does the most good with its harm : our emotionalist decides the matter by calling the doctor " cold-blooded ", and noting the housemaid's excitement over her operations. We say that thoughtlessness in sport, as in everything else, makes against civilisation ; and that the war spirit is a deplorable survival from times of savagery : our emotional friend thinks long custom partly condones evils, and considers war rather a fine thing, telling us that it promotes " courage ", while vivisection is " cowardice ". On the one hand we have the doubtful question whether the licensing system meets the ends we have in view ; on the other we have the spectacle of the anti-vivisection movement making for irrationality in ethics, empiricism in general thought, gross partiality in practice, falsehood in controversy, and the encouragement of the military spirit. Is it not expedient rather to expose these tendencies than to lend our voices to the condemnation of a practice already disproportionately condemned even in its worse aspects, and, as we have seen, illogically and inequitably attacked in principle?

Let the reader judge for himself. It has been sought in the foregoing pages to set forth the main ethical aspects of the case, without going into the technical question of the efficacy of vivisection. It has been assumed that we all detest those acts of atrocious and almost maniacal cruelty which are recorded of foreign vivisectors and mostly repudiated by those of this country.

But it has been assumed that there is a vivisection which, whether or not well-judged, is not wanton ; and it is the justifiability of that that has been considered. I have no hesitation in admitting that the question is a difficult one : I rather insist on the difficulty as against those who claim to settle all moral questions offhand by their instincts ; and I would fall back on my preliminary remarks on that head. Dr. Kingsford tells us that " The Materialist [by which she means the non-Theist] has no fundamental notion of Justice. For him everything is vague, relative, inexplicable." I leave it to the enquirer to judge whether the creed of the Theist, with its good Almighty who never gets his own way, but who yet fore-ordained all things, supplies a " fundamental notion of Justice " ; or whether one is to be found in " the occult Book ". I have heard one of Dr. Kingsford's supporters propose to make it a misdemeanor to kill dogs, but not to kill cats. There is nothing " vague " or relative there ; but between such precision and Dr. Anna's " occult " teaching that by vivisection we forfeit our " place in the divine Order ", one is fain to stick to " Materialism ".

POSTSCRIPT.

(1903.)

SINCE the foregoing essay was written, over seventeen years ago, the progress of the entire

humanitarian movement has been towards a higher level of consistency and of intellectual rectitude. As represented by the disinterested labors of its excellent journal, *The Humanitarian*, the Society of the same name draws no such suicidal distinction as so many anti-vivisectionists used to draw between vivisection and cruel "sport", but on the contrary makes a successful warfare on the latter. I am not sure whether the fallacious formula of "animals' rights" is still in vogue, as it still was ten years ago; but the stress of the argument is now rightly placed by the agitators on the inutility of most if not of all vivisection.

On this point it is now possible to come to a fairly judicial conclusion. The attacks of anti-vivisectionists have elicited an ostensibly systematic reply in the volume entitled 'Experiments on Animals', by Stephen Paget, certificated by an Introduction by Lord Lister*; and an attentive perusal of the case there set forth must impress any impartial reader with the smallness and vagueness of the residual claim for vivisection, even on the view that the whole argument is sound. Under 'Experiments on Animals' Mr. Paget includes some that are not of the nature of vivisection at all, such as feeding dogs painlessly in different ways and then killing and dissecting them.

* Fisher Unwin, 1900.

Nowhere does he seem to realise that there is any *total* scientific or moral problem: that it is necessary to make out some measurable *proportion* between the enormous number of cruel experiments on animals and the scientific results. On his own showing—if indeed he can be said to show anything but an occasional glimpse of the vast field of experimental torture—nine-tenths of the vivisection of the past has been a mere vain dabbling of the hands in blood, with an occasional inconclusive coincidence of experiment and discovery. Not once does he attempt to estimate the proportion of such discoveries to the whole, and so to settle the scientific problem of method.

In regard to some of the most important of the problems handled by Mr. Paget there is no specific evidence whatever as to how the vivisection practised afforded any assistance; and in more than one case the compiler unconsciously gives evidence which proves that the vivisection was quite gratuitous, the necessary clues to the therapeutic discovery being all independently in existence.

This matter calls for detailed discussion, and I will not attempt to deal with it at length in this Postscript beyond pointing out how in the case of myxœdema (in regard to which some of us had been led to believe that the discovery of the thyroid treatment was solely made possible by the experiments of Dr. Horsley on monkeys) Mr. Paget's own record shows that (1) the essential

facts were on record years before those experiments began, and (2) that the therapeutic inference could perfectly well have been made from those facts if the thinking processes of the faculty kept pace with their observations. And on this it must be said that the Preface of Lord Lister shows no more trace than does Mr. Paget's volume of the lesson which scientific men have to learn from such records. His lordship, I regret to say, has not even attempted to face the total scientific problem. He takes for granted that the professional case is inexpugnable, and that "the action of those well-meaning persons" who attack it "is based upon ignorance". He proceeds, in short, exactly as does a bishop who precludes to a polemic upon Christian Evidences, or a party leader who fathers a partisan pamphlet. Not thus is the dignity of science to be conserved. Her credentials are those of sheer truth, or nothing; and for her "truth" is something purer than the flag of a professional controversy.

Certainly the way of science is hard, and when Lord Lister is seen declining from it, the other side in the discussion had need walk warily. And I am compelled to except in turn, at the same special point, to the brilliant dialectic of the Hon. Mr. Stephen Coleridge. In his extremely clever Open Letter to the Registrar-General he satirically impeaches that official for publishing statistics which show that there are now more deaths than ever from those very maladies for which the doc-

tors claim to have found cures through vivisection; and among other figures he instances the mortality from myxœdema. Now, as the medical journalists have indignantly shown, this argument is only superficially valid. Twenty years ago the very diagnosis of myxœdema was so little known that its real prevalence is quite problematical; and on the other hand it is quite possible that the *disease* has become more prevalent, though it is now curable. The true issues are, whether the disease is or is not actually curable by the new treatment, and whether that treatment was discovered solely through vivisection. On neither of these issues does Mr. Coleridge offer a negative; and so far the case goes against him by default, though he might easily have won on the second.

It would indeed be unjust to condemn Mr. Coleridge for employing the special pleader's method when that method is constantly employed on the other side. The medical profession is so generally and so uncritically committed to vindicating vivisection through thick and thin that forensic measures on the critical side are almost inevitable. But it may be permitted to a dispassionate onlooker to suggest that the cause of truth will gain from a reform of temper and tactic on both sides; and that the credit will lie mainly with the side which begins.

There is no reason why that side should not be the anti-vivisectionist. The brilliant intellectu-

ality of Mr. Coleridge's polemic might easily be elevated to a quite judicial plane of inquiry ; and on that plane—unless he and I are alike mistaken—he might demonstrate (1) that at least a number of the claims made for vivisection are false, and (2) that the reliance upon it has lamed physiological science. The temper constantly shown by medical journalists on this subject is alone sufficient to rouse the latter suspicion ; so unscientific is it, so passionate, so far from the calm alertness of the true investigator. Even in the above-noted dispute as to myxoedema, it will be seen, the profession did not seem to know, until Mr. Coleridge brought out the fact, that the disease had been gaining ground on them despite the cure. That is to say, they have apparently neglected to study the primary causation of the malady even when they had come to understand its proximate causation. In the same way, what knowledge is now available of the history and nature of vaccinia is almost solely due to the researches and pressures of anti-vaccinationists ; and there has been absolutely no philosophic attempt on the part of orthodox practitioners to ascertain the *reactions* of vaccination apart from its relation to smallpox. It would not be hard for some anti-vivisectionists to be more scientific than many of their opponents.

But I venture to repeat here what I have elsewhere urged on my anti-vivisectionist friends, that they might greatly further their cause by endow-

ing a high-class laboratory for physiological research without vivisection. If they have faith in their own denial of the utility of the practice, they ought to do this if they can ; and they might surely count on the zealous co-operation of students whose sympathies are with them. Scientific gains thus attained would be more persuasive than much declamation.

Unfortunately there is in humanitarians as in other people a primary proclivity to mere coercion where coercion is not the method of true wisdom ; and there ensues the absurd spectacle of a dead set by some of them at the entire medical profession, which is only too generally ready to retaliate in the normal manner by making a dead set at all anti-vivisectionists and justifying all vivisection. Both attitudes are the negation alike of science and of sane morals. To love all dogs and hate all doctors, as some do, is to make zoophily ridiculous ; and to call all critics of vivisection evil names, as even Huxley did, is to show the healer in no better light than the typical priest. In the light of the whole history of science, it is probably quite safe to say that there is some truth on both sides. But it is perhaps still safer to say, in view of the temper shown all round, that on both sides there is much error. Truth is hardly to be reached while that temper prevails.

Si fueris sanctorum. Tu te tu
Nunc habemus in perditione.

No principio una fima. Sed, una
autodid. hunc fima ad fima.
O Tri. vna. I. fima, fima
una. vna. vna. vna. I. vna
vna. fima. fima. vna. vna
vna. fima. fima. vna. vna
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